! 


UtA 


SOCIALISM 


AND 


PHILOSOPHY 


BY 


ANTONIO  \LABRIOLA 


Translated  by 

ERNEST     UNTERMANN        . 

From  the  Third  Italian  Edition,  Revised  and 
Amplified  by  the  Author 


CHICAGO 

CHARLES  H.  KERR  &  COMPANY 
1912 


COPYRIGHT  1906 

BY 
CHARLES  H.  KERR  &  COMPANY 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 


Borne,  April  20,  1897. 
Dear  Mr.  Sorel! 

For  some  time  I  have  intended  to  carry  on  a  con- 
versation in  writing  with  you. 

This  will  be  the  best  and  most  appropriate  way  of 
expressing  my  gratitude  for  your  preface  to  my  essays. 
It  is  a  matter  of  course  that  I  could  not  silently  accept 
the  courteous  words  which  you  had  heaped  so  profusely 
upon  me.  I  could  not  but  reply  to  you  at  once  and 
acknowledge  my  obligation  to  you  by  a  private  letter. 
And  now  there  is  no  more  need  of  our  exchanging  com- 
pliments, especially  in  letters  which  either  you  or  I  may 
have  occasion  to  publish  at  some  future  time.  Besides, 
what  good  would  it  do  me  now  to  protest  modestly  and 
ward  off  your  praise  ?  It  is  entirely  due  to  you  that  my 
two  essays  on  historical  materialism,  which  are  but  rough 
sketches,  circulate  in  France  in  book-form.  You  placed 
them  before  the  public  in  this  shape.  It  has  never  been 
in  my  mind  to  write  a  standard  book,  in  the  sense  in 
which  you  French,  who  admire  and  cultivate  classic 
methods  in  literature,  use  this  term.  I  am  of  those  who 
regard  this  persistent  devotion  to  the  cult  of  classic  style 
as  rather  inconvenient  for  those  who  wish  to  express 

5 


6  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

the  results  of  strictly  scientific  thought  in  an  original, 
adequate,  and  easy  manner.  To  me  it  is  as  inconvenient 
as  a  badly  fitting  coat. 

Passing  over  all  compliments,  then,  I  shall  express 
myself  on  the  points  which  you  have  made  in  your 
preface.  I  shall  discuss  them  frankly  without  having  in 
view  the  writing  of  a  monograph.  I  choose  the  form  of 
letters  because  interruptions,  breaks  in  the  continuity  of 
thought,  and  occasional  jumps,  such  as  would  occur  in 
conversation,  do  not  seem  out  of  place  and  incongruous 
there.  I  really  should  not  write  so  many  dissertations, 
memorials,  or  articles,  were  it  not  for  the  fact  that  I 
want  to  reply  to  the  many  questions  which  you  ask  in 
the  few  pages  of  your  preface,  as  though  you  were  en- 
grossed in  doubting  thoughts.* 

But  while  I  shall  write  the  things  as  they  come  into 
my  mind,  I  do  not  intend  to  lessen  my  responsibility  for 
whatever  I  may  say  here,  and  shall  continue  to  say.  I 
merely  wish  to  throw  voff  the  burden  of  stiff  and  formal 
prose  which  is  customary  for  scientific  exposition.  Now- 
adays there  is  no  petty  postgraduate,  however  diminutive, 
who  does  not  imagine  that  he  is  erecting  a  monument  of 
himself  for  contemporary  and  future  generations  when- 
ever he  consecrates  a  ponderous  volume,  or  a  learned 
and  intricate  disquisition,  to  some  stray  thought  or 
chance  observation  caught  in  animated  conversation  or 
inspired  by  some  one  who  has  a  particular  talent  for 
teaching.  Such  impressions  always  have  a  greater  sug- 
gestive power  by  force  of  natural  expression  which  is  a 
gift  of  those  who  seek  the  truth  by  themselves  or  tell 
others  about  it  for  the  first  time. 

•For  the  better  understanding  of  my  letters  I  append  the 
preface  (III)  which  Sorel  has  written  for  the  French  edition 
of  my  two  essays  (Paris,  1897,  Giard  et  Briere). 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  I 

We  know  well  enough  that  this  closing  century,  which 
is  all  business,  all  money,  does  not  freely  circulate 
thought  unless  it  is  likewise  expressed  in  the  revered 
business  form  and  endorsed  by  it,  so  that  it  may  have 
for  fit  companions  the  bill  of  the  publisher  and  the 
literary  advertisements  from  frothy  puffs  to  sincerest 
praise.  In  the  society  of  the  future,  in  which  we  live 
with  our  hopes,  and  still  more  with  a  good  many  illusions 
that  are  not  always  the  fruit  of  a  well  balanced  imagi- 
nation, there  will  grow  out  of  all  proportion,  until  they 
are  legion,  the  number  of  men  who  will  be  able  to  dis- 
course with  that  divine  joy  in  research  and  that  heroic 
courage  of  truth  which  we  admire  in  a  Plato,  a  Bruno, 
a  Galilei.  There  may  also  multiply  infinitely  the  indi- 
viduals who,  like  Diderot,  shall  be  able  to  write  profound 
and  beguiling  things  such  as  Jacques  le  Fataliste,  which 
we  now  imagine  to  be  unsurpassed.  In  the  society  of 
the  future,  in  which  leisure,  rationally  increased  for  all, 
shall  give  to  all  the  requirements  of  liberty,  the  means 
of  culture,  and  the  right  to  be  lazy,  this  lucky  discovery 
of  our  Lafargue,  there  will  be  on  every  street  corner 
some  genius  wasting  his  time,  like  old  master  Socrates, 
by  working  busily  at  some  task  not  paid  for  in  money. 
But  now,  in  the  present  world,  in  which  only  the  insane 
have  visions  of  a  millennium,  many  idlers  exploit  the 
public  appreciation  by  their  worthless  literature  as 
though  they  had  earned  a  right  to  do  so  by  legitimate 
work.  So  it  is  that  even  Socialism  will  have  to  open  its 
bosom  for  a  discreet  multitude  of  idlers,  shirkers,  and 
incapables. 

In  this  trifling  manner  I  approach  my  real  argument. 
You  complain  that  the  theories  of  historical  materi- 
alism have  become  so  little  appreciated  in  France.    You 


8  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

complain  that  the  spread  of  these  theories  is  prevented 
by  prejudices  due  to  national  vanity,  to  the  literary 
pretensions  of  some,  to  the  philosophical  blindness  of 
others,  to  the  cursed  desire  to  pose  as  something  which 
one  is  not,  and  finally  to  insufficient  intellectual  develop- 
ment, not  to  mention  the  many  shortcomings  found  even 
among  socialists.  But  all  these  things  should  not  be 
considered  mere  accidents !  Vanity,  false  pride,  a  desire 
of  posing  without  really  being,  a  mania  for  self,  self- 
aggrandisement,  the  frenzied  will  to  shine,  all  these  and 
other  passions  and  virtues  of  civilized  man  are  by  no 
means  unessential  in  life,  but  may  rather  constitute  very 
often  its  substance  and  purpose.  We  know  that  the 
church  has  not  succeeded  in  the  majority  of  cases  in 
rendering  the  Christian  mind  humble,  but  has  on  the 
contrary  given  to  it  a  new  title  to  another  and  greater 
pretension.  Well  now . . .  this  historical  materialism 
demands  of  those  who  wish  to  profess  it  consciously  and 
frankly  a  certain  queer  humility,  that  is  to  say,  as  soon 
as  we  realize  that  we  are  bound  up  with  the  course  of 
human  events  and  study  its  complicated  lines  and  tortu- 
ous windings,  it  behooves  us  not  to  be  merely  resigned 
and  acquiescent,  but  to  engage  in  some  conscious  and 
rational  work.  But  there  is  the  difficulty.  We  are  to 
come  to  the  point  of  confessing  to  ourselves  that  our  own 
individuality,  to  which  we  are  so  closely  attached 
through  an  obvious  and  genetic  habit,  is  a  pretty  small 
thing  in  the  complicated  network  of  the  social  mechan- 
ism, however  great  it  may  be,  or  appear,  to  us,  even  if 
it  is  not  such  a  mere  evanescent  nonentity  as  some  hare- 
brained theosophists  claim.  We  are  to  adapt  ourselves 
to  the  conviction  that  the  subjective  intentions  and  aims 
of  every  one  of  us  are  always  struggling  against  the 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  9 

resistance  of  the  intricate  processes  of  life,  so  that  our 
designs  leave  no  trace  of  themselves,  or  leave  a  trace 
which  is  quite  different  from  the  original  intent,  because 
it  is  altered  and  transformed  by  the  accompanying  con- 
ditions. We  are  to  admit,  after  this  statement,  that 
history  lives  our  lives,  so  to  say,  and  that  our  own  con- 
tribution toward  it,  while  indispensable,  is  nevertheless 
but  a  very  minute  factor  in  the  crossing  of  forces  which 
combine,  complete  and  alternately  eliminate  one  another. 
But  all  these  conceptions  are  veritable  bores  for  all  those 
who  feel  the  need  of  confining  the  universe  within  the 
scope  of  their  individual  vision.  Therefore  the  privilege 
of  heroes  must  be  preserved  in  history,  so  that  the 
dwarfs  may  not  be  deprived  of  the  faith  that  they  are 
able  to  ride  on  their  own  shoulders  and  make  themselves 
conspicuous.  And  this  must  be  granted  to  them,  even 
if  they  are  not  worthy,  in  the  words  of  Jean  Paul,  of 
reaching  to  their  own  knees. 

In  fact,  have  not  people  been  going  to  school  for 
centuries,  only  to  be  told  that  Julius  Caesar  founded 
the  empire  and  Charlemagne  reconstructed  it?  That 
Socrates  as  much  as  invented  logic,  and  Dante  created 
Italian  literature  by  a  stroke  of  his  pen?  It  is  but  a 
very  short  time  that  the  mythological  conception  of  such 
people  as  the  creators  of  history  has  been  gradually  dis- 
placed, and  not  always  in  precise  terms,  by  the  prosaic 
notion  of  a  historical  process  of  society.  Was  not  the 
French  revolution  willed  and  made,  according  to  vari- 
ous versions  of  literary  invention,  by  the  different  saints 
of  the  liberalist  legends,  the  saints  of  the  right,  the  saints 
of  the  left,  the  Girondist  saints,  the  Jacobine  saints? 
Thus  it  comes  that  Taine  has  devoted  quite  a  consider- 
able portion  of  his  ponderous  intellect  to  the  proof,  as 


10  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

though  he  were  a  proofreader  of  history,  that  all  those 
disturbances  might  eventually  not  have  occurred  at  all. 
By  the  way,  I  have  never  been  able  to  understand  why 
a  man  with  so  little  appreciation  for  the  crude  necessity 
of  facts  should  have  called  himself  a  positivist.  It  was 
the  good  fortune  of  most  of  your  saints  in  France  which 
enabled  them  alternately  to  honor  one  another  and  to 
crown  one  another  in  due  time  with  their  deserved 
diadem  of  thorns.  For  this  reason  the  rules  of  classic 
tragedy  remained  gloriously  in  force  for  them.  If  it 
were  not  so,  who  knows  how  many  imitators  of  Saint 
Juste  (a  truly  great  man)  would  have  ended  through 
the  hands  of  the  henchmen  of  the  scoundrel  Fouche,  and 
how  many  accomplices  of  Danton  (a  great  man  who 
missed  his  place)  would  have  donned  the  felon's  garb 
at  Cambaceres,  while  others  might  have  been  content  to 
pit  themselves  against  the  adventurous  Drouet,  or  that 
pitiful  actor  Tallien,  for  the  modest  stripes  of  a  petty 
prefect. 

In  short,  to  strive  for  first  place  is  a  matter  of  faith 
and  devotion  for  all  who  have  learned  the  history  of  the 
ancient  style  and  agree  with  the  orator  Cicero  in  calling 
her  the  Mistress  of  Life.  And  therefore  they  feel  the 
need  of  "making  Socialism  moral."  Has  not  morality 
taught  us  for  centuries  that  we  must  give  to  each  one 
his  dues?  Aren't  you  going  to  preserve  just  a  little 
corner  of  paradise  for  us?  This  is  what  they  seem  to 
ask  me.  And  if  we  must  give  up  the  paradise  of  the 
faithful  and  theologians,  can 't  we  preserve  a  little  pagan 
apotheosis  in  this  world?  Don't  throw  away  the  entire 
moral  of  honest  reward.  Keep  at  least  a  good  couch,  or 
a  seat  in  the  front  ranks  of  the  theatre  of  vanity ! 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  11 

And  this  is  the  reason  why  revolutions,  aside  from 
other  necessary  and  inevitable  causes,  are  useful  and 
desirable  from  this  point  of  view.  With  the  sweep  of  a 
heavy  broom  they  clear  the  ground  of  those  who  occupied 
it  so  long,  or  at  least  they  make  the  air  more  fit  to  be 
breathed  by  giving  it  more  ozone  after  the  manner  of 
storms. 

Don 't  you  claim,  and  justly  so,  that  the  whole  practical 
question  of  Socialism  (and  by  practical  you  mean  no 
doubt  a  method  which  is  guided  by  the  intellectual  facts 
of  an  enlightened  consciousness  based  on  theoretical 
knowledge)  may  be  reduced  to,  and  summed  up  in,  the 
following  three  points:  1)  Has  the  proletariat  arrived 
at  a  clear  conception  of  its  existence  as  a  class  by  itself  ? 
2)  Has  it  strength  enough  to  engage  in  a  struggle 
against  the  other  classes?  3)  Is  it  about  to  overthrow, 
together  with  the  organization  of  capitalism,  the  entire 
system  of  traditional  thought? 

Very  well ! 

Now  let  the  proletariat  come  to  a  clear  understanding 
of  what  it  can  accomplish,  or  let  it  learn  to  want  what 
it  can  accomplish.  Let  this  proletariat  make  it  its  busi- 
ness, in  the  inept  language  of  the  professional  writers,, 
to  solve  the  so-called  social  question.  Let  this  proletariat 
set  before  itself  the  task  of  doing  away,  among  other 
forms  of  exploiting  your  fellow-beings,  with  false  glory, 
with  presumption,  and  with  that  singular  competition 
among  themselves  which  prompts  some  of  them  to  write 
their  own  names  into  the  golden  book  of  merit  in  the 
service  of  humanity.  Let  it  make  a  bonfire  also  of  this 
book,  together  with  so  many  others  which  bear  the  title 
of  Public  Debt. 


12  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

For  the  present  it  would  be  a  vain  undertaking  to  try 
to  make  all  these  people  understand  this  frank  principle 
of  communist  ethjcs,  a  principle  which  declares  that 
gratitude  and  admiration  should  come  as  a  spontaneous 
gift  from  our  fellow-beings.  Many  of  them  would  not 
care  to  reach  out  for  progress,  were  they  sure  of  being 
told,  in  the  words  of  Baruch  Spinoza,  that  virtue  is  its 
own  reward.  In  the  meantime,  until  only  the  most 
worthy  things  shall  remain  as  objects  of  admiration  in  a 
better  society  than  ours,  objects  such  as  the  outlines  of 
the  Parthenon,  the  paintings  of  Raphael,  the  verses  of 
Dante  and  Goethe,  and  so  many  useful,  secure,  and 
definitely  acquired  gifts  of  science,  until  then,  I  say,  it 
is  not  for  us  to  stand  in  the  way  of  those  who  have  any 
breath  to  spend,  or  printed  cards  to  circulate,  and  who 
wish  to  parade  themselves  in  the  name  of  so  many  fine 
things,  such  as  humanity,  social  justice,  and  so  forth, 
and  even  of  Socialism,  as  happens  frequently  to  those 
who  compete  for  the  medal  pour  le  merite  and  a  place 
in  the  legion  of  honor  of  the  future  proletarian  revolu- 
tion, though  it  may  still  be  far  off.  Should  not  such 
men  have  a  presentiment  that  historical  materialism  is 
a  satire  upon  all  their  cherished  assumptions  and  futile 
ambitions?  Should  not  they  detest  this  new  species  of 
pantheism,  from  which  has  disappeared,  if  you  will 
permit  me  to  say  so,— it  is  so  utterly  prosaic— even  the 
revered  name  of  God? 

Here  we  must  mention  one  important  circumstance. 
In  all  parts  of  civilized  Europe  men's  minds,  whether 
true  or  false,  have  many  opportunties  to  work  in  the 
service  of  the  state  and  in  all  lines  of  profit  and  honor 
which  the  capitalist  class  has  to  offer.  And  this  class  is 
not  near  so  close  to  its  end  as  some  merry  prophets  would 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  13 

have  us  believe.  We  need  not  wonder,  then,  that  Engels 
wrote  in  his  preface  to  the  third  volume  of  Marx's 
Capital,  on  October  4,  1894:  "In  our  stirring  times,  as 
in  the  16th  century,  mere  theorizers  on  public  affairs 
are  found  only  on  the  side  of  the  reactionaries."  These 
words,  which  are  as  clear  as  they  are  grave,  should  be 
sufficient  to  close  the  mouths  of  those  who  boast  that  all 
intelligence  has  passed  over  on  our  side,  and  that  the 
capitalist  class  will  soon  lay  down  arms.  Just  the  reverse 
is  true.  There  is  a  scarcity  of  intellectual  forces  in  our 
ranks,  the  more  so  as  the  genuine  laborers,  for  obvious 
reasons,  often  protest  against  the  speakers  and  writers 
of  the  party.  There  is,  then,  no  cause  for  surprise  that 
historical  materialism  should  have  made  so  little  head- 
way from  its  first  general  enunciation.  And  even  if 
we  pass  on  to  those  who  have  done  more  than  merely 
repeat  or  ape  the  fundamental  statements  in  a  way  that 
sometimes  approaches  the  burlesque,  we  must  confess 
that  all  the  serious,  relevant,  and  correct  things  which 
have  been  written  do  not  yet  make  a  complete  theory 
which  has  risen  above  the  stage  of  first  formation.  None 
of  us  would  dare  to  invite  comparison  with  Darwinism, 
which  in  less  than  40  years  has  gone  through  so  much 
of  intensive  and  extensive  development,  that  its  theory 
has  already  an  enormous  history,  a  superabundance  of 
material,  a  multitude  of  points  of  contact  with  other 
sciences,  a  great  store  of  methodical  corrections,  and  a 
great  array  of  criticisms  on  the  part  of  friend  and  foe. 
All  those  who  are  standing  outside  of  the  socialist 
movement  had  and  have  an  interest  in  combatting,  mis- 
representing, or  ignoring  this  new  theory.  The  socialists, 
on  the  other  hand,  have  not  had  the  time  to  devote  them- 
selves to  the  care  and  study  which  are  necessary  in  order 


14  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

that  any  mental  departure  might  gain  in  breadth  of 
development  and  scholarly  maturity,  such  as  mark  those 
sciences  which  are  protected,  or  at  least  not  combatted, 
by  the  official  world,  and  which  grow  and  prosper 
through  the  co-operation  of  many  devoted  collaborators. 

Is  not  the  diagnosis  of  a  disease  half  a  consolation? 
Do  not  physicians  act  that  way  nowadays  with  sick 
people,  since  they  have  become  more  inspired  in  their 
medical  practice  by  that  scientific  sentiment  which  shall 
solve  the  problems  of  life? 

After  all,  only  a  few  of  the  various  results  of  historical 
materialism  are  of  a  nature  to  acquire  any  marked  popu- 
larity. It  is  certain  that  this  new  method  of  investiga- 
tion will  enable  some  of  us  to  write  more  conclusive 
works  of  history  than  those  generally  written  by  literary 
men  who  ply  their  art  only  with  the  help  of  philology 
and  classic  learning.  And  aside  from  the  knowledge 
which  active  socialists  may  derive  from  the  accurate 
analysis  of  the  field  on  which  they  move,  there  is  no 
doubt  that  historical  materialism  has  directly  or  in- 
directly exerted  a  great  influence  on  many  thinkers  of 
our  day,  and  will  exert  a  still  greater  influence  to  the 
extent  that  the  study  of  economic  history  is  developed 
and  practically  interpreted  by  laying  bare  the  funda- 
mental causes  and  intimate  reasons  for  certain  political 
events.  But  it  seems  to  me  that  the  whole  theory  in  its 
most  intimate  bearings,  or  the  whole  theory  in  its  en- 
tirety, that  it  to  say,  as  a  philosophy,  can  never  become 
one  of  the  articles  of  universal  popular  culture.  And 
when  I  say  philosophy,  I  know  well  that  I  may  be  mis- 
understood. And  if  I  were  to  write  in  German,  I  should 
say  Lebens-und-Welt-Anschauung,  a  conception  of  life 
and  the  universe.  For  in  order  to  become  familiar 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  15 

with  this  philosophy,  one  must  have  a  deep  mental  power 
which  must  be  accustomed  to  the  difficulties  of  mental 
combination.  The  attempt  to  handle  it  might  expose 
shallow  minds,  who  are  prone  to  make  easy  conclusions, 
to  the  danger  of  saying  silly  things  of  sacred  reason. 
And  we  don 't  want  to  become  responsible  for  the  promo- 
tion of  such  literary  charlatanry. 


Rome,  April  24,  1897. 

Now  permit  me  to  pass  on  to  the  consideration  of 
certain  prosaically  small  things,  which,  however,  as  small 
things  often  do  in  the  great  affairs  of  the  world,  carry 
considerable  weight  in  our  discussion. 

To  speak  of  the  writings  of  Marx  and  Engels,  since 
they  are  particularly  under  discussion,  have  they  never 
been  read  in  their  entirety  by  any  one  outside  of  the 
circle  of  the  nearest  friends  and  disciples,  and  outside  of 
the  circle  of  the  followers  and  direct  interpreters,  01 
these  authors?  Have  these  writings,  as  a  whole,  never 
been  the  objects  of  comment  and  illustration  on  the  part 
of  people  outside  of  the  camp  formed  around  the  tradi- 
tions of  the  German  Social-Democracy?  I  refer  especially 
to  those  who  have  done  the  work  of  applying  and  ex- 
plaining those  writings,  and  particularly  to  the  Neue 
Zeit,  the  magazine  which  has  held  the  front  rank  among 
the  publications  of  the  party.  In  short,  the  question  is 
whether  these  writings  have  gathered  around  themselves 
what  modern  thinkers  call  a,  literary  environment  in  any 
other  country  but  Germany,  and  whether  even  in  this 
country  such  a  development  has  not  been  but  partial, 
and  accomplished  by  means  which  were  not  always 
above  criticism. 

And  how  rare  are  many  of  these  writings,  and  how 
hard  are  some  of  them  to  find!  Are  there  many  who, 
like  myself,  have  had  the  patience  to  hunt  for  years  for 

16 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  17 

a  copy  of  the  Poverty  of  Philosophy,  which  was  but  very 
recently  republished  in  Paris,  or  of  that  queer  work, 
The  Holy  Family;  or  who  would  be  willing  to  endure 
more  hardships  to  secure  a  copy  of  the  Neue  Rheinische 
Zeitung  than  a  student  of  philology  or  history  would 
under  ordinary  conditions  in  reading  and  studying  all 
the  documents  of  ancient  Egypt  ?  I  have  the  reputation 
of  being  a  praticed  hand  at  seeking  and  locating  books, 
but  I  have  never  experienced  more  trouble  than  I  did 
in  the  quest  for  that  paper.  The  reading  of  all  the 
writings  of  the  founders  of  scientific  socialism  has  so  far 
been  largely  a  privilege  of  the  initiated  !* 

Is  it  a  wonder,  then,  that  outside  of  Germany,  for 
instance  in  France,  and  particularly  there,  many  writers, 
especially  among  publicists,  should  have  felt  a  tempta- 
tion to  draw  the  elements  for  the  formation  of  a  Marxism 
of  their  own  making  from  criticisms  of  our  adversaries, 
from  incidental  quotations,  from  hasty  snatches  taken 
out  of  special  articles,  or  from  vague  recollections  ?  This 
took  place  all  the  more  easily,  since  the  rise  of  socialist 
parties  in  France  and  Italy  gave  voice  more  or  less  to 
representatives  of  alleged  Marxism,  although  in  my 
opinion  it  would  be  inexact  to  call  them  so.  But  this 
gave  to  literary  men  of  all  sorts  the  easy  excuse  of 
believing,  or  making  others  believe,  that  every  speech 
of  an  agitator  or  politician,  every  declaration  of  prin- 
ciples, every  newspaper  article,  and  every  official  party 
action,  was  an  authentic  and  orthodox  revelation  of  the 
new  doctrine  in  a  new  church.  Was  not  the  French 

*Quite  recently  Franz  Mehring  has  undertaken  to  publish  a 
collection  of  all  the  less  known  writings  of  Marx  and  Engels 
from  1840  to  1850,  and  among  them  appeared  also  "The  Holy 
Family."  "The  Poverty  of  Philosophy"  is  now  published  in 
English  by  the  Twentieth  Century  Press  of  London. 


18  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

Chamber  of  Deputies,  about  two  years  ago,  on  the  point 
of  discussing  Marx's  theory  of  value?  And  what  are 
we  to  say  of  so  many  Italian  professors  who  quoted  and 
discussed  for  years  books  and  works  which  notoriously 
had  never  reached  our  latitude  ?  Soon  after  that  George 
Adler  wrote  those  two  shallow  and  inconclusive  books  of 
his,*  in  which  he  offered  easy  treasures  of  bibliography 
and  copious  quotations  to  all  who  were  looking  for  com- 
fortable instruction  and  a  chance  to  plagiarise.  One 
might  truly  say  that  Adler  had  read  much  and  sinned 
much. 

Historical  materialism  is  in  a  certain  sense  all  there 
is  to  Marxism.  Before  it  surrounded  itself  with  a 
literature  written  by  competent  thinkers,  who  could 
develop  and  continue  it,  Marxism  passed  among  the 
peoples  of  neo-Latin  speech  through  innumerable  mis- 
takes, misinterpretations,  grotesque  alterations,  queer 
travesties,  and  gratuitous  inventions.  No  one  has  a  right 
to  place  these  things  on  the  ledger  of  a  history  of 
Socialism.  But  they  could  not  but  cause  much  em- 
barrassment to  those  who  were  eager  to  create  a  socialist 
culture,  especially  if  they  belonged  to  the  ranks  of  pro- 
fessional students. 

You  are  familiar  with  the  fantastic  story  told  by  Croce 
in  Le  Devenir  Social  of  that  blond  Marx  who  is  supposed 
to  have  founded  the  International  at  Naples,  in  1867. 
I  could  tell  other  similar  stories.  I  could  tell  you  of  a 
student  who  came  to  my  house,  some  years  ago,  to  have 
at  least  one  personal  look  at  the  famous  Poverty  of 
Philosophy.  He  was  quite  disappointed.  "It  is  a  serious 

*I  refer  to  the  "Geschichte  der  ersten  sozialpolltischen  Ar- 
belterbewegung  in  Deutschland,"  and  "Die  Grundlagen  der 
Karl  Marx'  schen  Kritik,"  which  were  pillaged  also  in  Italy  by 
cheap  critics. 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  19 

book  on  political  economy?,"  he  said.  "Not  only  seri- 
ous," said  I,  "but  also  hard  to  read  and  in  many  points 
obscure."  He  could  not  understand  it  at  all.  "Did 
you  expect, ' '  I  continued,  ' '  a  poem  on  the  heroes  of  the 
attic,  or  a  romance  like  that  of  the  poor  young  man?" 

The  farfetched  title  of  The  Holy  Family  has  given  to 
some  an  excuse  for  some  queer  tales.  It  is  the  singular 
fate  of  that  circle  of  Young-Hegelians,  among  whom  was 
at  least  one  man  of  mark,  Bruno  Bauer,  that  they  should 
be  known  to  posterity  through  the  ridicule  which  two 
young  writers  heaped  upon  them.  And  to  think  that 
this  book,  which  would  appear  dry,  hard  to  understand, 
and  harsh  to  most  French  readers,  is  really  not  very 
notable,  except  for  the  fact  that  it  shows  the  way  in 
which  Marx  and  Engels,  after  they  had  thrown  off  the 
burden  of  Hegelian  scholasticism,  began  to  extricate 
themselves  from  the  humanitarianism  of  Feuerbach! 
And  while  they  were  developing  into  what  later  became 
their  own  theory,  they  were  still  to  a  certain  extent  im- 
bued with  that  true  socialism  which  later  on  they  them- 
selves ridiculed  in  the  Manifesto. 

But  apart  from  the  ridiculous  stories  which  have  been 
circulated  about  these  two,  there  is  one  which  has 
developed  in  Italy,  and  there  is  nothing  to  laugh  about. 
This  is  the  case  of  Loria.  It  is  so  much  the  more  sad, 
since  just  in  these  last  years,  in  spite  of  the  great  difficul- 
ties surrounding  it,  a  socialist  party  has  been  in  process 
of  formation  in  Italy,  which  in  program  and  intent 
represents  the  tendencies  of  international  socialism,  so 
far  as  the  conditions  of  our  country  will  permit,  and 
tries  to  accomplish  its  work.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that 
just  at  this  period  some  people,  either  students  or  ex- 
students,  should  have  taken  it  into  their  heads  to  pro- 


20  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

claim  Loria,  now  as  the  authentic  author  of  the  theories 
of  scientific  socialism,  now  as  the  discoverer  of  the 
economic  interpretation  of  history,  now  as  this,  then  as 
that,  however  contradictory  it  might  be.  Loria  has  thus 
been  acclaimed,  all  in  the  same  breath,  but  without  his 
knowledge  and  consent,  as  a  champion  of  Marx,  as  an 
enemy  of  Marx,  as  a  substitute,  a  superior,  and  inferior 
of  Marx.  Well,  this  misunderstanding  is  now  a  thing 
of  the  past.  And  peace  be  to  its  memory.  Since  the 
Social  Problems  of  Loria  have  been  translated  into 
French,  many  of  your  countrymen  will  wonder  how  it 
was  possible  that  he  could  be  mistaken,  not  so  much  for 
a  socialist  of  some  sort— for  this  might  have  been  con- 
sidered a  sign  or  design  of  ingeniousness— but  as  a  man 
who  continued  the  work  of  Marx  and  improved  on  it. 
The  very  idea  makes  one's  hair  stand  on  end. 

However,  so  far  as  France  is  concerned,  you  may  rest 
easy  about  these  anecdotes  of  model  intuition.  For  it  is 
not  only  true  that  sins  are  committed  outside  and  inside 
of  the  walls  of  Troy,  but  it  is  also  an  axiom  which  every 
one  will  accept  who  does  not  belong  to  the  insane  cate- 
gory of  misunderstood  geniuses,  that  no  one  comes  too 
late  into  the  world  to  do  his  duty.  And  in  the  present 
case  it  is  so  much  less  too  late,  as  we  may  truthfully  say 
in  the  words  of  Engels,  written  to  me  a  short  time  before 
his  death:  "We  are  as  yet  at  the  very  beginning  of 
things." 

And  because  we  are  still  in  the  first  beginnings,  it 
seems  to  me  that  the  German  socialist  party  should  con- 
sider it  its  duty  to  get  out  a  complete  critical  edition  of 
the  works  of  Marx  and  Engels,  in  order  that  students 
may  be  able  to  occupy  themselves  with  these  theories 
with  a  full  understanding  of  their  causes  and  get  their 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  21 

knowledge  of  them  with  as  little  inconvenience  as  possible 
from  the  first  sources.  This  edition  should  be  supplied 
from  case  to  case  with  prefaces  containing  statements 
of  fact,  with  foot  notes,  references,  and  explanations. 
It  would  alone  be  a  meritorious  work  to  deprive  second- 
hand book  dealers  of  the  privilege  to  make  objects  of 
indecent  speculation  of  the  rarest  copies  of  old  writings. 
I  can  tell  a  story  or  two  about  that.  Works  which  have 
already  appeared  in  the  form  of  books  or  pamphlets 
should  be  supplemented  by  newspaper  articles,  mani- 
festoes, circulars,  programs,  and  all  those  letters  which, 
although  written  to  private  people,  have  a  political  and 
scientific  value  because  dealing  with  matters  of  public 
and  general  interest. 

Such  an  enterprise  can  be  undertaken  only  by  the 
German  speaking  socialists.  Not  that  Marx  and  Engels 
belong  only  to  Germany,  in  the  patriotic  and  chauvinist 
sense  of  the  term,  such  as  many  mistake  for  nationality. 
The  form  of  their  brains,  the  course  of  their  productions, 
the  logical  order  of  their  mode  of  seeing  things,  their 
scientific  spirit,  and  their  philosophy,  were  the  fruit  and 
outcome  of  German  culture.  But  the  substance  of  their 
thought  and  teaching  deals  with  social  conditions,  which 
up  to  the  time  of  their  mature  years  developed  for  the 
greater  part  outside  of  Germany.  It  is  rooted  especially 
in  the  conditions  created  by  that  great  economic  and 
political  revolution  which  from  the  second  half  of  the 
eighteenth  century  had  its  basis  and  development  over- 
whelmingly in  England  and  France.  Both  of  them  were 
in  every  respect  international  spirits.  But  nevertheless 
only  the  German  socialists,  from  the  Communist  Club 
to  the  Erfurt  program,  and  to  the  last  articles  of  the 
prudent  and  experienced  Kautsky,  have  that  continuity 


22  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

and  persistency  of  tradition,  and  that  assistance  of  con- 
stant experience,  which  are  necessary  in  order  that  a 
critical  edition  of  these  works  may  find  in  the  things 
themselves  and  in  the  memories  of  men  the  data  required 
for  making  it  complete  and  true  to  life.  And  it  is  not 
a  question  of  selection;  The  entire  scientific  and  political 
activity,  all  the  literary  productions,  of  the  two  founders 
of  critical  socialism,  even  if  they  were  written  for  the 
occasion  of  the  hour,  should  be  made  accessible  to  the 
reader.  It  is  not  a  matter  of  compiling  a  Corpus  juris 
or  a  Testamentum  juxta  canonem  receptum  (a  code  of 
laws  or  a  testament  according  to  received  canons) .  It  is 
a  matter  of  collecting  an  elaborate  series  of  writings,  in 
order  that  they  may  speak  directly  to  all  who  may  wish 
to  read  them.  Only  in  this  way  can  the  students  of  other 
countries  have  all  the  sources  at  their  disposal.  Those 
who  got  their  learning  in  some  other  way,  through  un- 
reliable reproductions  or  vague  recollections,  gave  rise 
to  the  strange  phenomenon  that  until  very  recent  times 
there  was  not  a  single  work  on  Marxism  outside  of  the 
German  language  written  on  the  strength  of  documen- 
tary criticism.  And  often  such  works  came  from  the 
pens  of  writers  of  other  revolutionary  parties,  or  other 
schools  of  socialism.  A  typical  case  of  this  kind  is  that 
of  the  anarchist  writers,  for  whom,  especially  in  France 
and  Italy,  the  founder  of  Marxism  seems  generally  not 
to  have  existed  at  all,  unless  it  be  as  the  man  who 
whipped  Proudhon  and  who  opposed  Bakunin,  or  as  the 
head  of  that  which  is  the  greatest  crime  in  their  eyes, 
namely  the  typical  representative  of  political  socialism 
and  therefore— what  infamy!— of  parliamentarian  so- 
cialism. 
All  these  writings  have  one  common  foundation.  And 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  23 

this  is  historical  materialism,  taken  as  a  threefold  theory, 
namely  as  a  philosophical  method  for  the  general  under- 
standing of  life  and  the  universe,  as  a  critique  of  polit- 
ical economy  reducible  to  certain  laws  only  because  it 
represents  a  certain  historical  phase,  and  as  an  inter- 
pretation of  politics,  above  all  of  those  political  move- 
ments which  are  necessary  and  serviceable  for  the  march 
of  the  working  class  toward  socialism.  These  three 
aspects,  which  I  enumerate  abstractly,  as  is  always  the 
custom  for  purposes  of  analysis,  form  one  single  unity 
in  the  minds  of  the  two  authors.  For  this  reason,  their 
writings,  with  the  exception  of  Engels'  Anti-Diihring 
and  the  first  volume  of  Capital,  never  appear  to  literary 
men  of  classic  traditions  to  have  been  written  according 
to  the  canons  of  the  art  of  book  writing.  These  writings 
are  in  reality  monographs,  and  in  most  cases  they  are  the 
outgrowth  of  special  occasions.  They  are  fragments  of 
a  science  and  politics  in  a  process  of  continuous  growth. 
Others,  of  course  not  mere  chance  comers,  must  and  can 
continue  this  work.  In  order  to  understand  them  fully, 
these  writings  should  be  arranged  biographically.  And 
in  such  a  biography  we  shall  find,  so  to  say,  the  traces 
and  imprints,  the  marks  and  reflections,  of  the  genesis 
of  modern  socialism.  Those  who  are  not  able  to  follow 
up  this  genesis,  will  look  in  those  fragments  for  some- 
thing which  is  not  in  them,  and  ought  not  to  be  in  them, 
for  instance,  answers  to  all  the  questions  which  historical 
and  social  science  may  ever  present  in  their  vast  and 
variegated  experience,  or  a  summary  solution  of  the 
practical  problems  of  all  time  and  place.  To  illustrate, 
in  the  discussion  of  the  Eastern  question,  in  which  some 
socialists  present  the  singular  spectacle  of  a  struggle 
between  idiocy  and  heedlessness,  we  hear  on  all  sides 


24  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

references  to  Marxism  !*  The  doctrinaires  and  theorisers 
of  all  sorts,  who  need  intellectual  idols,  the  makers  of 
classic  systems  good  for  all  eternity,  the  compilers  of 
manuals  and  encyclopedias,  will  in  vain  look  in  Marxism 
for  that  which  it  has  never  offered  to  anybody.  These 
people  conceive  of  thought  and  knowlege  as  things  which 
have  a  material  existence,  but  they  do  not  understand 
that  thought  and  knowledge  are  activities  in  process  of 
formation.  They  are  metaphysicians  in  the  sense  in 
which  Engels  used  this  term,  which,  of  course,  is  not 
the  only  possible  meaning.  In  the  present  case  I  mean 
to  say  that  these  men  are  metaphysicians  in  the  sense  in 
which  Engels  applied  this  term  to  them  by  enlarging 
upon  that  characteristic  which  Hegel  bestowed  upon 
ontologists  like  Wolf  and  others  like  him. 

But  did  Marx,  although  he  is  unexcelled  as  a  publicist, 
ever  pretend  to  pose  as  an  accomplished  writer  of  history, 
while  he  penned  from  1848  to  1860  his  essays  on  con- 
temporaneous history  and  his  memorable  newspaper 
articles?  And  did  he,  perhaps,  fail  in  this,  because  it 
was  not  his  vocation,  and  because  he  had  no  aptitude  for 
it?  Or  did  Engels,  when  he  wrote  his  Anti-Diihring, 
which  is  to  this  day  the  most  accomplished  work  of 
critical  socialism  and  contains  in  a  nutshell  the  whole 
philosophy  required  for  the  thinkers  of  socialism,  ever 

*While  I  am  arrangfng  these  letters  for  publication,  at  the 
end  of  September,  1901,  there  comes  to  my  desk  "The  Eastern 
Question,"  by  Karl  Marx,  London,  Sonnenschein  edition,  pages 
XVI  and  656,  in  great  octavo,  with  copious  index  and  two 
geographical  maps.  It  Is  a  carefully  edited  reproduction,  by 
Eleanor  Marx  and  Edward  Aveling,  of  the  articles  which  Karl 
Marx  wrote  from  1853  to  1856  on  the  Eastern  question,  mainly 
in  the  "New  York  Tribune."  It  is  a  miracle  of  literary  work- 
manship. I  note  in  passing  that  when  Marx  wrote  political 
articles  he  did  not  lose  himself  in  a  cloud  of  doctrinairlsm 
and  exposition  of  principles,  but  aimed  to  make  himself  clear 
and  understood. 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  25 

dream  of  exhausting  the  possibilities  of  the  knowable 
universe  in  his  short  and  exquisite  work,  or  of  laying 
down  forever  the  outlines  of  metaphysics,  psychology, 
ethics,  logic,  and  whatever  may  be  the  names  of  the  other 
sections  of  the  encyclopedia,  which  were  chosen  either 
for  intrinsic  reasons  of  objective  division,  or  for  reasons 
of  expediency,  comfort,  vanity,  by  those  who  profess  to 
be  teachers  ?  Or  is  Marx 's  Capital  perhaps  another  one 
of  those  encyclopedias  of  all  economic  learning,  with 
which  especially  the  professors,  above  all  in  Germany, 
overstock  the  market? 

This  work,  of  three  large  volumes  in  four  not  very 
small  books,  may  be  likened  to  a  colossal  monograph  as 
distinguished  from  so  many  encyclopedic  compilations. 
Its  main  object  is  to  demonstrate  the  origin  and  produc- 
tion of  surplus-value  (under  the  capitalist  system)  and 
then  to  show  the  manner  in  which  the  surplus-value  is 
divided  by  the  combination  of  production  with  the  circu- 
lation of  capital.  The  basis  of  the  analyses  is  the  theory 
of  value,  which  is  a  perfection  of  an  elaboration  made 
by  economic  science  for  a  century  and  a  half.  This 
theory  does  not  represent  an  empirical  fact  drawn  from 
vulgar  induction,  nor  a  simple  category  of  logic,  as  some 
have  chronicled  it.  It  is  rather  the  typical  premise 
without  which  all  the  rest  of  the  work  is  unthinkable. 
The  matter  of  fact  premises,  namely  precapitalist  society 
and  the  social  genesis  of  wage-labor,  are  the  starting 
points  of  the  historical  explanation  of  the  origin  of 
present  capitalism.  The  mechanism  of  circulation,  with 
its  secondary  and  minor  side-laws,  and  finally  the  pheno- 
mena of  distribution,  viewed  in  their  antithetical  and 
relatively  independent  aspects,  form  the  means  by  which 
we  arrive  at  the  concrete  facts  as  they  are  given  by  the 


26  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

obvious  movements  of  everyday  life.  The  facts  and 
processes  are  generally  presented  in  their  typical  forms, 
the  supposition  being  that  all  the  regular  conditions  of 
capitalist  production  are  in  full  force.  Other  modes 
of  production  are  discussed  only  so  far  as  they  have 
already  been  outgrown  and  to  show  the  way  in  which 
they  were  outgrown,  or  if  they  still  survive,  the  extent 
to  which  they  become  obstacles  of  capitalist  production 
is  taken  into  consideration.  Marx  therefore  quotes  fre- 
quently illustrations  from  descriptive  history,  and  then, 
after  stating  his  actual  premises,  he  gives  a  genetic  ex- 
planation af  the  way  in  which  these  premises  go  through 
their  typical  development,  once  that  the  conditions  of 
their  interrelation  are  given.  Thus  the  morphological 
structure  of  capitalist  society  is  laid  bare.  Marx's  work 
is  therefore  not  dogmatic,  but  critical.  And  it  is  critical, 
not  in  the  subjective  meaning  of  the  term,  but  because 
it  draws  its  criticism  from  the  antithetical  and  contra- 
dictory nature  of  the  things  themselves.  Even  when 
Marx  comes  to  the  descriptive  portions  of  historical  refe- 
ences,  he  never  loses  himself  in  vulgar  conceptions,  whose 
secret  consists  in  avoiding  an  inquiry  into  the  laws  of 
development  and  in  simply  pasting  upon  a  mere  enume- 
ration and  description  of  events  such  labels  as  "histori- 
cal process,  development,  or  evolution".  The  guiding 
thread  of  the  inquiry  is  the  dialectic  method.  And  this 
is  the  ticklish  point  which  throws  into  the  saddest  of  con- 
fusions all  those  readers  of  Capital  who  carry  into  its 
perusal  the  intellectual  habits  of  the  empiricists,  meta- 
physicians, and  authors  of  definitions  of  entities  con- 
ceived for  all  eternity.  The  fastidious  questions  raised 
by  many  concerning  the  alleged  contradictions  between 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  27 

the  first  and  the  third  volume*  of  this  work  reveal  them- 
selves on  closer  scrutiny  as  results  of  a  misapprehension 
of  the  dialectic  method  on  the  part  of  these  critics.  I 
refer  here  merely  to  the  spirit  in  which  the  dispute  has 
been  waged,  not  to  the  particular  points  which  have 
been  raised.  For  it  is  a  fact  that  the  third  volume  is  by 
no  means  a  finished  work  and  may  be  open  to  criticism 
even  on  the  part  of  those  who  agree  with  its  general 
principles.  The  contradictions  noted  by  the  critics  are 
not  contradictions  between  one  book  and  another,  are 
not  due  to  a  failure  of  the  author  to  stick  to  his  pre- 
mises and  promises,  but  are  actual  contradictions  found 
in  capitalist  production  itself.  When  expressed  in  the 
shape  of  formulae,  these  phenomena  appear  to  the  think- 
ing mind  as  contradictions.  An  average  rate  of  profit 
based  on  the  total  capital  invested,  regardless  of  its 
organic  composition,  that  is  to  say,  regardless  of  the  pro- 
portion between  its  constant  and  variable  part;  prices 
formed  on  the  market  by  means  of  averages  which  fluct- 
uate widely  around  the  value  of  commodities;  simple 
interest  on  money  owned  as  such  and  loaned  to  others  for 
investment  in  business;  ground-rent,  that  is  to  say,  rent 
on  something  which  was  not  produced  by  anybody's 
labor :  these  and  other  refutations  of  the  socalled  law  of 
value  are  actual  contradictions  inherent  in  capitalist  pro- 
duction. By  the  way,  that  term  law  confuses  a  good 
many.  These  antitheses,  however  irrational  they  may 
appear,  actually  exist,  beginning  with  the  fundamental 
irrationality  that  the  labor  of  the  wage  worker  should 
create  a  product  greater  than  its  cost  (wages)  for  him 

•I  have  in  mind  especially  the  polemic  writings  of  B8hm- 
Bawerk  and  Komorzynski.  To  my  surprise,  the  work  of  the 
first-named,  entitled,  "Karl  Marx  and  the  Close  of  his  System," 
has  been  treated  very  indulgently  by  Conrad  Schmidt  in  the 
supplement  of  "Vorwarts,"  April  16,  1897,  No.  85. 


28  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

who  hires  it.  This  vast  system  of  economic  contradic- 
tions (thanks  be  to  Proudhon  for  this  term)  appears  in 
its  entirety  as  a  sum  of  social  injustices  to  all  sentimental 
socialists,  rational  socialists,  and  all  shades  of  declaiming 
radicals.  The  honest  people  among  the  reformers  desire 
to  eliminate  these  injustices  by  means  of  honest  legal 
efforts.  When  we  now  compare,  after  a  lapse  of  fifty 
years,  the  presentation  of  these  antinomies,  in  their  con- 
crete details  as  shown  in  the  third  volume  of  Capital, 
with  the  general  outlines  given  in  The  Poverty  of  Philo- 
sophy, we  readily  recognise  the  nature  of  the  dialectic 
thread  which  holds  these  analyses  together.  The  anti- 
nomies, which  Proudhon  wanted  to  solve  abstractedly  on 
the  ground  that  the  reasoning  mind  condemned  them  in 
the  name  of  justice  (and  this  mistake  assigns  him  a 
certain  place  in  history),  are  now  seen  to  be  contradic- 
tions in  the  social  structure  itself,  so  that  the  very  nature 
of  the  process  engenders  contradictions.  When  we  realise 
that  irrationalities  are  born  of  the  historical  process  it- 
self, we  are  emancipated  from  the  simplemindedness  of 
abstract  reason  and  understand  that  the  negative  power 
of  revolution  is  relatively  necessary  in  the  cycle  of  the 
historical  development. 

Whatever  may  be  said  about  this  grave  and  very  in- 
tricate question  of  historical  interpretation,  which  I 
shall  not  venture  to  treat  exhaustively  as  an  incident  to 
a  letter,  the  fact  remains  that  no  one  will  succeed  in 
separating  the  premises,  the  methodical  process,  the  in- 
ferences and  conclusions  of  this  work,  from  the  actual 
world  in  which  they  are  developed  and  the  living  facts 
to  which  they  refer.  No  one  can  ever  reduce  its  teaching 
to  a  mere  Bible,  or  to  a  recipe  for  the  interpretation 
of  the  history  of  any  time  and  place.  There  is  no  more 
insipid  and  ridiculous  phraee  than  that  whwh  otlls 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  29 

Marx's  Capital  the  Bible  of  Socialism.  The  Bible,  which 
is  a  collection  of  religious  works  and  theological  essays, 
was  made  in  the  course  of  centuries.  And  even  if 
Capital  were  our  Bible,  the  knowledge  of  Socialism  alone 
would  not  make  the  socialists  omniscient. 

Marxism  is  not,  and  will  not  be,  confined  to  the  writ- 
ings of  Marx  and  Engels.    The  name  stands  even  now  as 
a  symbol  and  compendium  of  a  manysided  tendency  and 
a  complex  theory.     A  great  deal  is  still  lacking  before 
Marxism  can  become  a  full  and  complete  theory  of  all 
phases  of  history  which  have  so  far  been  traced  to  their 
respective  forms  of  economic  production,  a  theory  which 
shall  regulate  the  pace  of  political  development.     In 
order  to  accomplish  that,  those  who  wish  to  devote  them- 
selves to  a  study  of  the  past  from  the  point  of  view  of 
this   new  method  of  historical   research   must   submit 
the  original  sources  to  a  new  and  accurate  test,  and 
those  who  wish  to  apply  it  to  the  practical  questions  of 
present-day  politics  must  find  special  modes  of  orientation. 
Since  this  theory  is  in  its  very  essence  critical,  it  cannot 
be  continued,  applied,  and  improved,  unless  it  criticises 
itself.     Seeing  that  it  is  a  question  of  clarifying  and 
deepening  definite  processes,  no  catechism  will  hold  good, 
no  diagrammatic  generalisation  will  serve.    I  received  a 
proof  of  this  in  the  course  of  this  year.    I  proposed  to 
lecture  at  the  university  on  the  economic  conditions  of 
Upper  and  Middle  Italy  at  the  end  of  the  13th,  and  the 
beginning  of  the  14th   century,  with  the  principal  object 
of  explaining  the  origin  of  the  agricultural  and  city  pro- 
letariat and  thereby  finding  a  practicable  way  of  tracing 
the  rise  of  certain  communistic  movements  and  revealing 
as  a  final  conclusion  the  somewhat  obscure  vicissitudes 
of  the  heroic  life  of  Fra  Dolcino.    It  certainly  was  my 
intention  to  be  and  remain  a  Marxian.     But  I  cannot 


30  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

avoid  assuming  the  responsibility  for  the  things  which  I 
said  at  my  own  risk,  because  the  sources  on  which  I  - 
based  my  studies  were  those  which  are  handled  by  all 
other  historians,  of  all  the  other  schools  and  tendencies, 
and  I  could  not  ask  Marx  for  advice,  because  he  had 
nothing  to  offer  concerning  these  particular  facts. 

It  seems  to  me  that  I  have  given  a  satisfactory  reply 
to  the  principal  question  which  recurs  not  only  in  your 
preface,  to  which  I  have  particular  reference,  but  also 
in  various  articles  written  by  you  for  Le  Devenir  Social. 
Of  course,  I  shall  have  to  take  up  still  other  questions. 
But  your  principal  question  turned  on  this  point :  What 
reasons  are  to  blame  for  the  fact  that  historical  mate- 
rialism has  so  far  been  spread  so  little  and  developed  so 
poorly  ? 

Without  prejudice  to  the  things  which  I  shall  say  in 
my  following  letters— you  see  that  I  hold  out  a  nice 
threat  of  still  more  wearying  talk— you  should  experi- 
ence no  great  trouble  in  making  your  own  reply  to 
another  question  which  you  asked  especially  in  certain 
book  reviews,  and  which  runs  about  as  follows  (at  least 
this  is  the  way  in  which  I  interpret  it)  :  How  is  it  that 
so  many  have  tried  to  complete  this  imperfect  under- 
standing and  elaboration  of  Marxism,  now  by  the  help 
of  Spencer,  now  with  positivism  in  general;  now  with 
Darwin,  now  with  any  other  gift  of  the  gods,  showing 
an  evident  inclination— what  shall  I  say— to  Italianize, 
Frenchify,  Russianize  this  historical  materialism?  Why 
did  they  forget  two  things,  namely  that  this  theory 
carries  with  it  the  conditions  and  expressions  of  its  own 
philosophy,  and  that  it  is  essentially  international  in 
origin  and  substance  ? 

However,  I  shall  have  to  continue  my  letters  also  for 
this  reason. 


III. 


Rome,  May  10,  1897. 

To  speak  once  more  of  the  two  founders  of  scientific 
socialism,  I  must  confess  that  I  use  this  term  not  without 
apprehension,  lest  the  false  use  made  of  it  in  certain 
quarters  might  have  rendered  it  almost  ridiculous,  par- 
ticularly when  it  is  supposed  to  stand  for  a  sort  of 
universal  science.  If  these  two  men  had  only  been,  if  not 
saints  of  the  legendary  kind,  at  least  makers  of  schemes 
and  systems,  whose  classic  form  and  sharp  outlines  would 
have  lent  themselves  easily  to  admiration !  But  no,  sir ! 
They  were  critical  and  aggressive  thinkers,  not  only  in 
their  writings,  but  also  in  their  method  of  doing  things. 
And  they  never  exhibited  either  their  own  personalities 
or  their  own  ideas  as  examples  and  models.  They  pro- 
claimed indeed  the  revolutionary  nature  of  the  things 
in  the  social  processes  of  history,  but  not  in  the  spirit  of 
men  who  measure  great  historical  events  by  the  yardstick 
of  their  fantastic  and  impulsive  personality.  Hence  the 
scorn  of  the  many!  Had  they  been  at  least  like  those 
loving  professors,  who  descend  occasionally  from  their 
pedestals  in  order  to  honor  poor  and  sinful  humanity 
with  their  advice  and  strut  around  among  them  in  the 
garb  of  a  protector  and  guardian  of  the  social  question! 
But  they  did  just  the  reverse.  They  identified  them- 
selves with  the  cause  of  the  proletariat,  and  they  became 
inseparable  from  the  conscience  and  science  of  the  prole- 
tarian revolution.  While  they  were  in  every  respect 

31 


32  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

thorough  revolutionaries  (although  not  impassioned  or 
emotional) ,  they  never  suggested  any  conspiratory  plans, 
or  political  schemes,  but  explained  the  theory  of  their 
new  politics  and  aided  in  its  practical  application,  in  the 
way  which  the  modern  working  class  movement  indicates 
and  requires  as  an  actual  necessity  of  history.  In  other 
words,  incredible  as  it  may  seem,  they  were  something 
more  than  simple  socialists.  And  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
many  who  were  not  more  than  just  simple  socialists,  or 
even  still  simpler  makers  of  revolutions,  often  looked 
upon  them,  if  not  with  suspicion,  at  least  with  contempt 
and  aversion. 

I  should  never  get  done  if  I  tried  to  enumerate  all  the 
reasons  which  for  many  long  years  retarded  an  objective 
discussion  of  Marxism.  You  are  well  aware  that  certain 
writers  of  the  left  wing  of  the  revolutionary  parties  in 
France  treat  historical  materialism,  not  in  the  way  that 
is  customary  in  dealing  with  gifts  of  the  scientific  spirit, 
which  are  certainly  subject  to  criticism  like  all  of  science, 
but  as  a  personal  thesis  of  these  two  authors,  who,  how- 
ever notable  and  great  they  may  be,  remain  for  those 
people  always  but  two  among  the  other  leaders  of  so- 
cialism, that  is  to  say,  two  among  so  many  other  X's  in 
the  universe!*  To  be  plain,  I  will  say  that  only  such 
good  or  bad  arguments  have  been  advanced  against  this 
theory  as  are  always  obstacles  and  stumbling  blocks  in 
the  way  of  new  ideas,  especially  among  professional  wise 
men.  Frequently  objections  arose  also  from  a  very  special 
motive.  The  theories  of  Marx  and  Engels,  namely,  were 
regarded  as  opinions  of  comrades  and  measured  accord- 
ing to  standards  of  sympathy  or  antipathy  aroused  by 
these  comrades.  Such  are  the  bizarre  results  of  prema- 

»I  Invite  those  X's  to  a  joint  concourse. 


SOCIALISM    AND   PHILOSOPHY  33 

ture  democracy  that  we  are  not  permitted  to  exempt 
anything  from  the  control  of  incompetents,  not  even 
logic ! 

But  there  are  other  reasons.  When  the  first  volume  of 
Marx's  Capital  appeared  in  1867,  it  came  to  the  profes- 
sors and  academic  writers,  especially  of  Germany,  like  a 
blow  on  their  heads.  It  was  then  a  period  of  great  in- 
activity in  economic  science.  The  historical  school  had 
not  yet  produced  those  ponderous,  and  often  useful, 
volumes  which  later  appeared  in  Germany.  In  France, 
Italy,  and  even  Germany,  the  very  commonplace  pro- 
ductions of  that  vulgar  economy,  which  had  obliterated 
the  critical  spirit  of  the  great  classic  economists  between 
1840  and  1860,  were  leading  a  precarious  existence. 
England  had  taken  to  John  Stuart  Mill,  who,  although 
a  professional  logician,  was  always  suspended  between 
the  yes  and  the  no  in  matters  of  importance,  like  one  of 
the  well-known  characters  on  our  comic  stage.  No  one 
had  then  given  a  thought  to  that  new  economics  which 
the  Hedonists  have  lately  produced.  In  Germany,  where 
Marx  shoud  have  been  read  first,  for  evident  reasons, 
and  where  Rodbertus  remained  almost  unknown,  the 
mediocre  spirits  ruled  the  situation,  prominent  among 
them  that  famous  writer  of  erudite  and  minute  notes, 
Roscher,  who  loved  to  encumber  quite  clear  passages  with 
nominal  and  often  senseless  definitions.  The  first  volume 
of  Capital  appeared  just  in  time  to  disillusion  the  minds 
of  the  professors  and  academicians.  They,  the  learned 
bearers  of  titles,  especially  privileged  in  the  so-callad 
land  of  thinkers,  were  expected  to  go  to  school!  They 
had  either  been  lost  in  the  minute  particulars  of  erudi- 
tion, or  had  tried  to  make  a  school  of  apologetics  of  poli- 
tical economy,  or  had  bothered  their  heads  to  find  a 


34  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

plausible  way  of  applying  to  their  own  country  the  con- 
clusions of  a  science  grown  in  the  entirely  different  con- 
ditions of  another  country.  And  thus  all  those  pro- 
fessors of  the  land  of  the  learned  par  excellence  had 
forgotten  the  art  of  analysis  and  critique.  Capital  com- 
pelled them  to  begin  their  studies  from  the  bottom.  They 
had  to  get  an  entirely  new  foundation.  For  this  work, 
while  coming  from  the  pen  of  an  extreme  and  determined 
communist,  did  not  show  a  trace  of  subjective  protest  or 
scheming,  but  was  a  strictly  and  rigorously  objective 
analysis  of  the  process  of  capitalist  production.  There 
was  evidently  something  more  terrible  in  this  revolution- 
ary journalist  of  1848  and  exile  of  1849  than  a  mere 
continuation  or  complement  of  that  socialism  which  the 
bourgeois  literature  of  all  countries  dreamed  of  having 
definitely  overcome  as  a  political  expression  since  the 
fall  of  Chartism  and  the  triumph  of  the  sinister  head  of 
the  coup  d'etat  in  France.  It  became  necessary  to  study 
economics  anew.  In  other  words,  this  science  opened 
once  more  a  critical  period.  To  give  the  devil  his  due, 
it  must  be  admitted  that  the  German  professors  after 
that  date,  that  is  to  say,  beginning  with  1870,  and  still 
more  since  1880,  undertook  the  critical  revision  of 
economics  with  that  diligence,  persistence,  good  will,  and 
laboriousness,  which  the  learned  of  that  country  have 
always  exhibited  in  all  lines  of  research.  Although  any- 
thing written  by  them  can  hardly  ever  be  fully  accepted 
by  us,  it  is  nevertheless  true  that  the  field  of  economics 
was  newly  plowed  by  their  labors  in  the  manner  custom- 
ary among  professors  and  academicians,  and  that  now 
this  science  can  no  longer  be  committed  to  mind  as 
easily  as  any  lazy  man's  lesson.  Of  late  the  name  of  Marx 
has  become  so  fashionable  that  it  is  heard  in  the  lecture 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  35 

rooms  of  universities  ar?  one  of  the  preferred  subjects  of 
critique,  polemics,  and  reference,  and  no  longer  merely 
in  terms  of  regret  and  vulgar  invective.  The  social 
literature  of  Germany  is  now  fully  impregnated  with 
memories  of  Marx. 

But  this  could  not  take  place  in  1867.    Capital  made 
its  appearance  just  when  the  International  began  to  be 
talked  about  and  make  itself  feared  for  a  short  while, 
not  only  on  account  of  the  thing  that  it  stood  for  in- 
trinsically, and  what  it  might  have  become  had  not  the 
Franco-German   war   and    the    tragic    incident   of  the 
Commune  dealt  it  heavy  blows,  but  also  on  account  of 
the  blood-curdling  mouthings  of  some  of  its  members  and 
the  stupid  revolutionary  maneuvers  of  some  intruders. 
Was  it  not  notorious  that  the  Inaugural  Address  of  the 
International   Workingmen's  Association    (from   which 
address  every  socialist  may  still  learn  much)  came  from 
the  pen  of  Marx  ?    And  was  there  not  good  reason  to  at- 
tribute the  more  determined  actions  and  resolutions  of 
the  International  to  him?    Well  then,  if  a  revolutionist 
of  such  undoubted  loyalty  and  acumen  as  Mazzini  could 
not  distinguish  between  the  International  to  which  Marx 
devoted  his  work  and  the  Bakounist  Alliance,  is  it  a 
wonder  that  the  German  professors  were  disinclined  to 
enter  into  a  critical  discussion    with    the    author    of 
Capital  ?    How  was  it  possible  to  get  on  terms  of  friendly 
discussion  with  a  man  who  was,  so  to  say,  hung  in  effigy 
in  all  laws  of  exception  made  for  the  use  of  Favre  and 
consorts,  and  was  held  morally  responsible  for  all  the 
deeds  of  the  revolutionaries,  even  their  errors  and  extra- 
vagancies, although  he  had  at  the  same  time  written  a 
masterly  work,   like  a  new  Ricardo,  who  studied  im- 
passibly  the  economic  processes  after  the  manner  of 


36  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

geometricians?  This  fact  is  to  blame  for  that  queer 
method  of  polemics  which  made  the  intentions  of  the 
author  responsible  for  his  conclusions.  It  was  alleged 
that  Marx  had  thought  out  his  scientific  analysis  for  the 
purpose  of  giving  strength  to  certain  tendencies.  This 
led  for  many  years  to  the  writing  of  sensational  attacks 
in  place  of  objective  analyses.* 

But  the  worst  of  it  was  that  the  effects  of  this  grossly 
false  critique  made  themselves  felt  even  in  the  minds  of 
socialists,  particularly  in  those  of  the  young  intellectuals 
who  took  up  the  cause  of  the  proletariat  between  1870 
and  1880.  Many  of  the  fiery  remodelers  of  the  world 
undertook  to  proclaim  themselves  champions  of  Marxian 
theories,  choosing  as  legal  tender  precisely  the  more  or 
less  spurious  Marxism  of  our  adversaries.  The  case  is 
clearest  in  Germany  where  it  left  its  traces  in  the  party 
discussions  and  in  its  small  literature.  The  most  para- 
doxical point  of  the  whole  mistake  is  this:  Those  who 
incline  toward  easy  inferences,  as  most  newcomers  do, 
thought  that  the  theories  of  value  and  surplus-value,  as 
ordinarily  presented  in  popular  expositions,  contained 
here  and  now  the  canons  of  practical  activity,  the  motive 
power,  the  ethics  and  legal  basis,  for  all  proletarian 

*"Marx   starts   out   from   the   principle that   the   value   of 

commodities  is  exclusively  determined  by  the  quantity  of 
labor  contained  in  them.  Now,  if  there  is  nothing  to  the  value 
of  commodities  but  labor,  if  a  commodity  is  nothing  else  but 
crystalized  labor,  then  it  is  evident  that  it  should  wholly  belong 
to  the  laborer  and  that  no  part  of  it  should  be  appropriated  by 
the  capitalist.  Hence,  if  the  laborer  gets  only  a  part  of  the 
value  of  his  product,  this  can  be  only  the  result  of  usurpation." 
Thus  wrote  Loria  on  page  462  of  the  "Nuova  Antologia," 
February,  1895,  in  the  noted  article,  "The  Posthumous  Work  of 
Karl  Marx."  I  quote  these  words,  which  are  not  the  only  ones 
of  this  sort  written  by  Loria,  merely  as  an  illustration  of  the 
way  in  which  free  versions  of  Marx  may  be  given  in  the  style 
of  Proudhon.  And  on  such  free  versions  were  based  those 
mental  vagaries  from  1870  to  1880  which  I  mention  later  on. 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  37 

efforts.  Isn't  it  a  great  injustice  that  millions  and 
millions  of  human  beings  should  be  robbed  of  the  fruits 
of  their  labor  ?  This  statement  is  so  simple  and  so  poig- 
nant that  all  the  modern  Bastiles  ought  to  fall  at  the 
first  scientific  blast  of  the  new  trumpets  of  Jericho !  This 
easy  simplicity  was  strengthened  by  many  of  the  theore- 
tical errors  of  Lassalle,  such  as  those  which  were  due  to 
his  relative  lack  of  knowledge,  for  instance  the  iron  laiv 
of  wages,  a  half-truth  which  becomes  a  total  error  when 
not  fully  explained,  or  those  which  in  his  case  may  be 
regarded  as  expedients  of  agitation,  for  instance  his 
famous  co-operatives  with  state  help.  Whoever  is  in- 
clined to  confine  his  whole  socialist  confession  of  faith  to 
the  simplest  inference  from  the  recognized  exploitation 
to  the  demand  for  the  emancipation  of  the  exploited, 
which  is  invitable  only  because  it  is  just,  has  but  to  make 
another  step  on  the  slippery  path  of  logic  in  order  to 
reduce  the  whole  story  of  the  human  race  to  a  case  of 
moral  conscience  and  consider  its  successive  development 
in  social  life  as  so  many  variations  of  a  continued  error 
of  calculation. 

Between  1870  and  1880,  and  a  little  after,  a  sort  of 
new  utopianism  formed  around  this  vague  conception  of 
a  certain  something  entitled  scientific  socialism,  which, 
like  fruits  out  of  season,  was  very  insipid.  And  what 
else  is  utopianism  without  the  genius  of  a  Fourier  and 
the  eloquence  of  a  Considerant  but  a  matter  for  ridicule  ? 
This  new  utopianism,  which  still  flourishes  here  and  there, 
has  played  quite  a  role  in  France.  It  has  left  its  imprint 
in  the  struggles  with  other  sects  and  schools  fought  by 
our  brave  friends  in  the  Revolutionary  Labor  Party,  who 
from  the  first  endeavored  to  develop  socialism  along  the 
lines  of  class-consciousness  and  the  progressive  conquest 


38  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  political  power  by  the  proletariat.  Only  through 
the  experience  of  this  practical  test,  only  by  the  daily 
study  of  the  class-struggle,  only  through  testing  and  re- 
testing  the  forces  of  the  proletariat  so1  far  as  they  are 
already  organized  and  concentrated,  are  we  enabled  to 
estimate  the  chances  of  socialism.  Those  who  proceed 
differently,  are  and  remain  Utopians,  even  in  the  revered 
name  of  Marx. 

Against  these  new  Utopians,  against  the  outgrown  re- 
presentatives of  the  old  schools,  and  against  the  various 
side-lines  of  contemporaneous  socialism,  our  two  authors 
continuously  applied  the  rays  of  their  critique.  In  their 
long  career  they  took  their  science  as  a  guide  for  their 
practical  work,  and  out  of  their  practical  experience  they 
culled  the  material  and  received  directions  for  deepening 
their  science.  They  never  treated  history  as  though  she 
were  a  mare  which  they  could  straddle  and  trot  around, 
nor  did  they  look  for  formulae  by  which  to  keep  alive 
momentary  illusions.  They  were  thus  compelled,  by  the 
necessity  of  circumstances,  to  measure  swords  in  bitter, 
sharp,  and  relentless  controversies  with  all  those  whom 
they  considered  as  dangers  to  the  proletarian  movement. 
Who  does  not  remember,  for  instance,  the  Proudhonists, 
who  pretended  to  destroy  the  state  by  reducing  it  by 
stealth,  as  though  it  were  closing  its  eyes  and  pretending 
not  to  see  ?  Or  the  one-time  Blanquists,  who  wanted  to 
seize  the  powers  of  state  by  force  and  then  start  a  revolu- 
tion? Or  Bakounin  who  sneaked  surreptitiously  into  the 
International  and  compelled  the  others  to  throw  him 
out  ?  Or  here  and  there  the  pretenses  of  so  many  differ- 
ent schools  of  socialism,  and  the  competition  of  so  many 
leaders  ? 

From  the  time  that  Marx  routed  the  ingenuous  Weit- 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  39 

ling  in  a  personal  debate*  to  his  trenchant  critique  of  the 
Gotha  program  (1875),  which  was  not  published  until 
1890,  his  life  was  one  continual  battle,  not  only  with  the 
bourgeoisie  and  the  politics  represented  by  it,  but  also 
with  the  various  revolutionary  and  reactionary  currents 
which  wrongfully  or  spitefully  assumed  the  name  of 
socialism.  All  those  struggles  were  fought  out  in  the 
International,  and  I  speak  of  the  International  of 
glorious  records,  which  left  its  imprint  to  this  day  on  all 
the  present-day  activity  of  the  proletariat,  not  of  its  sub- 
sequent caricature.**  The  greater  bulk  of  the  contro- 
versies with  Marxism,  a  Marxism  which  the  imagination 
of  certain  critics  has  reduced  to  a  mere  variety  of  political 
schooling,  is  due  to  the  traditions  of  those  revolutionaries 
who,  especially  in  the  Latin  countries,  recognised  in  Ba- 
kounin  their  leader  and  master.  What  is  it  that  the 
anarchists  of  our  day  are  repeating  but  the  lamentations 
and  mistakes  of  those  past  days  ? 

Twenty  years  ago,  the  majority  of  the  Italian  public, 
with  the  exception  of  those  scientists  who  masticated  over 
and  over,  in  their  homes,  the  things  which  they  had  read 
in  books,  knew  nothing  of  the  two  founders  of  scientific- 
socialism  but  what  had  been  preserved  through  recollec- 
tions of  the  invectives  of  Mazzini  and  the  malice  of 
Bakounin. 

And  so  critical  communism,  which  has  been  admitted  so 
tardily  to  the  honor  of  discussion  in  the  circles  of  officin^ 
science,  met  in  its  own  camp  with  the  very  worst  of 
adversities,  the  enmity  of  its  own  friends. 

*The  Russion  Annencoff  was  a  personal  witness  of  this  debate 
and  referred  to  it  later,  among  many  other  reminiscences  of 
Marx,  in  the  "Vyestnik  Tevropy,"  1880.  (Reproduced  in  the 
"Neue  Zeit,"  May,  1883. 

**This  was  written  before  the  founding  of  the  present  Inter- 
national Social  Bureau  and  does  not  refer  to  it — Publisher. 


40  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

All  those  difficulties  have  now  either  been  overcome,  or 
are  at  least  for  the  greater  part  about  to  disappear. 

Not  the  intrinsic  virtue  of  ideas,  which  have  never  had 
any  feet  for  walking,  nor  hands  for  grasping,  but  the 
sole  fact  that  the  programs  of  socialist  parties,  wherever 
such  parties  arose,  assumed  the  same  tendencies,  induced 
the  socialists  of  all  countries,  through  the  imperious  sug- 
gestion of  conditions,  to  place  themselves  at  the  visual 
angle  of  the  Communist  Manifesto.  Don 't  you  think  that 
I  wrote  my  essay  in  memory  of  this  manifesto  at  an 
opportune  time?  The  exploiting  classes  create  for  the 
exploited  classes  almost  everywhere  the  same  conditions. 
For  this  reason,  the  active  representatives  of  these  ex- 
ploited travel  everywhere  the  same  road  of  agitation  and 
follow  the  same  points  of  view  in  ther  propaganda  and 
organization.  Many  call  this  practical  Marxism.  Be  it 
so!  What  good  is  there  in  quarreling  about  words? 
Even  though  Marxism  reduces  itself  for  many  to  mere 
words,  or  to  the  worship  of  Marx's  picture,  his  plaster  of 
Paris  bust,  or  his  features  on  a  button  (the  Italian  police 
frequently  exhibit  their  deep  feeling  for  such  innocent 
symbols),  the  fact  uemains  that  this  symbolical  un- 
animity is  a  proof  of  the  incipient  unification  in  reality, 
and  of  the  growing  unity  of  thought  and  action  in  all 
proletarian  movements  of  the  world.  In  other  words,  the 
international  solidarity  is  shaping  itself  at  long  range 
through  material  conditions.  Those  who  use  the  lan- 
guage of  the  decadent  writers  of  the  bourgeoisie,  mistak- 
ing the  symbol  for  the  thing,  are  now  saying  that  this 
is  a  personal  triumph  of  Marx.  It  is  as  though  one  had 
said  that  Christianity  was  a  personal  triumph  of  Jesus  of 
Nazareth  (or  why  not  say  outright  his  success  ?) ,  of  Jesus 
who  divested  himself  of  his  quality  of  the  son  of  a  god 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  41 

that  assumed  human  shape,  and  who,  in  the  soft  and 
weak  language  of  your  Renan,  became  a  man  of  such 
childlike  divinity  as  to  seem  a  god. 

In  view  of  this  intuitive  shaping  of  socialist  politics, 
which  is  tantamount  to  proletarian  politics,  the  divergen- 
ces of  the  old  schools  have  fallen  to  the  ground.  Some  of 
these  were  in  fact  nothing  but  distinctions  of  the  letter 
and  vain  hairsplitting,  which  had  to  give  way  to  such 
useful  distinctions  as  arise  spontaneously  through  the 
different  ways  of  handling  practical  problems.  In  the 
concrete  reality,  in  the  positive  and  prosaic  development 
of  socialism,  it  matters  little  whether  all  its  heads, 
leaders,  orators,  and  representatives  conform  to  one 
theory,  or  do  not  conform  to  it,  whether  or  not  they  pro- 
fess it  publicly.  Socialism  is  not  a  church,  not  a  sect, 
that  must  have  its  fixed  dogma  or  formula.  If  so  many 
speak  nowadays  of  the  triumph  of  Marxism,  such  an 
emphatic  expression,  when  stated  in  a  crudely  prosaic 
form,  simply  means  that  henceforth  no  one  can  be  a 
socialist,  unless  he  asks  himself  every  minute :  What  is 
the  proper  thing  to  think,  to  say,  to  do,  under  the  present 
circumstances,  for  the  best  interests  of  the  proletariat? 
The  day  has  gone  by  for  such  dialecticians,  or  rather 
sophists,  as  Proudhon,  for  the  inventors  of  personal 
social  systems,  the  makers  of  private  revolutions.*  The 
practical  indication  of  that  which  is  practicable  is  given 
by  the  condition  of  the  proletariat,  and  this  is  appreci- 
able and  measurable  precisely  because  Marxism  (I  mean 
the  thing,  not  the  symbol)  supplies  us  with  a  progressive 
standard  by  its  theory.  The  two  things,  the  measurable 

*What  I  wrote  in  May,  1897,  was  certainly  not  disproved  by 
the  events  in  Italy,  in  May,  1898.  Those  events  were  not  the 
work  of  any  one  party,  but  a  veritable  case  of  spontaneous 
anarchy. 


42  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

and  the  measure,  are  one  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
historical  process,  especially  when  they  are  seen  at  a 
convenient  distance. 

And  you  can  actually  see  that  to  the  extent  that  the 
outlines  of  the  practical  policy  of  socialism  become 
distinct,  all  the  old  poetical  and  fantastic  ideas  are  dis- 
persed and  leave  but  traces  in  phraseology  behind  them. 
At  the  same  time  the  critical  study  of  the  science  of 
economics  has  been  growing  in  every  respect  in  the  field 
of  academic  research.  The  exile  Marx  has  made  himself 
at  home,  after  his  death,  in  the  circles  of  official  science, 
at  least  as  an  adversary  who  will  stand  no  fooling.  And 
just  as  the  socialists  have  come  by  so  many  different 
roads  to  the  understanding  that  a  revolution  cannot  be 
made,  but  makes  itself  through  a  process  of  growth,  so 
that  public  has  been  gradually  developing  for  whom 
historical  materialism  is  a  true  and  distinct  intellectual 
necessity.  You  have  seen  that  many  have  stuck  their 
noses  into  this  theory  during  recent  years,  even  though 
it  was  done  badly  or  with  evil  intent.  Now,  if  you  take 
a  good  look,  you  will  note  that  we  have  not  gone  back- 
ward. Since  my  young  days  I  have  often  heard  it  re- 
lated how  Hegel  had  said  that  only  one  of  his  pupils 
understood  him.  This  anecdote  cannot  be  verified,  be- 
cause this  one  disciple  has  never  been  identified.  But 
the  same  thing  may  repeat  itself  infinitely,  from  system 
to  system,  from  school  to  school.  For,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  intellectual  activity  is  not  due  purely  to  personal 
suggestion,  and  thought  is  not  communicated  mechanic- 
ally from  brain  to  brain  as  such.  Nor  are  great  systems 
diffused  unless  similar  social  conditions  dispose  and 
incline  many  minds  towards  them  at  the  same  time. 
Historical  materialism  will  be  enlarged,  diffused,  special- 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  43 

ized,  and  will  have  its  own  history.  It  may  vary  in 
coloring  and  outline  from  country  to  country.  But  this 
will  do  no  great  harm,  so  long  as  it  preserves  that  kernel 
which  is,  so  to  say,  its  whole  philosophy.  One  of  its 
fundamental  theses  is  this:  The  nature  of  man,  his 
historical  making,  is  a  practical  process.  And  when  I 
say  practical,  it  implies  the  elimination  of  the  vulgar 
distinction  between  theory  and  practice.  For,  in  so 
many  words,  the  history  of  man  is  the  history  of  labor. 
And  labor  implies  and  includes  on  the  one  hand  the 
relative,  proportional,  and  proportioned  development  of 
both  mental  and  manual  activities,  and  on  the  other  the 
concept  of  a  history  of  labor  implies  ever  the  social  form 
of  labor  and  its  variations.  Historical  man  is  always 
human  society,  and  the  presumption  of  a  presocial,  or 
supersocial,  man  is  a  creature  of  imagination.  And  there 
we  are. 

Here  I  pause,  mainly  to  avoid  repeating  myself,  and  to 
save  you  from  a  repetition  of  the  things  which  I  have 
written  in  my  two  essays.  You  certainly  do  not  feel  the 
need  of  such  a  repetition,  and  most  assuredly  I  do  not. 


IV. 


Rome,  May  14,  1897. 

To  return  to  my  first  argument,  it  seems  to  me  that 
the  following  question  is  uppermost  in  your  mind :  By 
what  means,  and  in  what  manner,  would  it  be  possible  to 
inaugurate  a  school  of  historical  materialism  in  France  ? 
I  don't  know  whether  I  am  at  liberty  to  answer  this 
question,  without  running  the  risk  of  being  numbered 
among  those  journalists  of  the  old  school  who,  with 
imperturbable  assurance,  gave  good  advice  to  Europe 
at  the  imminent  peril  of  being  almost  never  heeded. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  they  never  were.  I  shall  try  to  be 
modest. 

In  the  first  place,  it  ought  not  to  be  so  very  difficult  to 
find  editors  and  publishers  in  France  who  should  be 
willing  to  publish  and  spread  accurate  translations  of 
the  works  of  Marx,  Engels,  and  others  that  may  be 
desired.  That  would  be  the  best  way  to  make  a  start.  I 
am  aware  of  the  fact  that  in  the  art  of  translating  one 
comes  across  some  queer  difficulties.  I  have  been  reading 
German  for  more  than  thirty-seven  years,  and  I  have 
always  noted  that  we  people  of  the  Latin  tongue  get  into 
strange  linguistic  and  literary  byways,  whenever  we 
attempt  to  translate  from  the  German.  That  which 
seems  alive,  clear,  direct,  in  German,  becomes  often 
enough,  when  translated  into  Italian,  cold,  pointless,  and 
even  outright  jargon.  In  such  translations  as  are  com- 
monly current  the  convincing  effect  is  lost  with  that  of 

44 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  45 

the  meaning.  In  such  a  vast  work  of  popularisation  as 
that  which  I  have  in  mind,  it  would  be  desirable,  aside 
from  the  faithful  interpretation  of  the  original  text,  to 
supply  in  the  prefaces,  foot-notes,  and  comments  of  the 
translated  writings  the  materials  for  that  easy  assimila- 
tion which  is  already  in  process  or  prepared  in  the  writ- 
ings grown  on  native  soil. 

Languages  are  not  accidental  variations  of  universal 
speech.  They  are  even  more  than  simple  external  means 
of  communication  expressing  thought  and  mind.  They 
are  the  conditions  and  limits  of  our  internal  activity, 
which  for  this  reason,  among  many  others,  is  not  in- 
debted to  accident  for  the  various  national  modes  and 
forms.  If  there  are  any  internationalists  who  ignore 
this,  they  should  rather  be  called  confusionists  and 
ignorers  of  form.  Of  such  are  those  who  get  their  in- 
formation, not  from  the  ancient  apocalyptics,  but  from 
that  specious  Bakounin  who  proclaimed  even  the  equali- 
sation of  the  sexes.  The  assimilation  of  ideas,  of  lines 
of  thought,  of  definite  tendencies,  of  plans,  which  have 
found  mature  expression  in  the  literature  of  a  foreign 
language,  is  a  rather  difficult  case  of  social  pedagogy. 

Since  this  last  expression  has  slipped  from  my  pen, 
permit  me  also  to  confess  that  it  is  not  the  continuous 
growth  of  success  at  elections  which  fills  me  more  than 
anything  else  with  admiration  and  vivid  hope,  when  I 
closely  examine  the  previous  history  and  present  con- 
dition of  the  German  Social-Democracy.  Instead  of 
speculating  over  the  vote  as  a  measure  of  the  future, 
according  to  the  often  erroneous  calculations  of  inference 
and  statistical  combination,  I  feel  a  special  admiration 
for  this  truly  new  and  imposing  case  of  social  education. 
This  is  the  great  point  that  in  such  a  vast  number  of 


46  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

men,  especially  of  laborers  and  little  bourgeois,  a  new 
consciousness  is  in  process  of  formation,  to  which  the 
direct  influence  of  economic  conditions,  which  cause 
them  to  struggle,  and  the  propaganda  of  socialism  as  a 
means  and  aim  of  development,  equally  contribute.  This 
digression  calls  to  my  mind  a  recollection.  I  was  either 
the  first,  or  certainly  one  of  the  first,  in  Italy  to  call  the 
attention  of  those  of  our  laborers,  who  were  and  are  able 
to  move  along  the  line  of  the  modern  proletarian  class- 
struggle,  to  the  example  of  Germany.  But  it  never 
entered  my  mind  to  assume  that  the  imitation  of  Ger- 
many should  relieve  us  in  any  way  from  spontaneous 
action.  It  never  occurred  to  me  to  follow  the  example 
of  those  monks  and  priests,  who  were  for  centuries 
almost  the  exclusive  educators  of  an  already  disintegrat- 
ing Italy,  and  who  blithely  taught  the  art  of -poetry  by 
ordering  their  pupils  to  learn  Horace's  Art  of  Poetry  by 
heart.  It  would  be  queer,  if  you,  Bebel,  with  your 
merits,  activity,  and  wisdom,  were  introduced  among  us 
in  the  garb  of  another  Horace !  It  would  surprise  even 
my  friend  Lombroso,  who  hates  Latin  worse  than  the 
starvation  fever. 

In  short,  there  are  still  other  difficulties,  of  a  greater 
scope  and  weight.  Even  if  able  and  experienced  writers 
and  editors,  not  only  in  France,  but  also  in  the  other 
civilized  countries,  undertook  to  spread  translations  of 
all  the  works  on  historical  materialism,  it  would  only 
stimulate,  but  not  form  and  keep  alive  in  the  various 
nations  those  creative  energies  which  produce  and 
nourish  vigorously  a  certain  intellectual  movement.  To 
think  is  to  produce.  To  learn  means  to  produce  by 
reproduction.  We  do  not  really  and  truly  know  a  thing, 
until  we  are  capable  of  producing  it  ourselves  by  thought, 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  47 

work,  proof,  and  renewed  proof.  We  do  this  only  by 
virtue  of  our  own  powers,  in  our  social  group  and  from 
the  point  of  view  which  we  occupy  in  it. 

And  now  think  of  France,  with  its  great  history,  with 
its  literature,  which  was  so  dominant  for  centuries,  with 
its  patriotic  ambitions,  and  with  its  very  peculiar  ethno- 
logical and  psychological  differentiation,  which  shows 
itself  even  in  the  most  abstract  products  of  the  mind! 
It  would  not  become  me,  an  Italian,  very  well  to  pose  as 
the  defender  of  your  chauvinists,  upon  whom  you  heap 
so  much  well-deserved  opprobrium.  But  let  us  remember 
what  happened  in  the  eighteenth  century.  The  revolu- 
tionary thought  came  from  more  than  one  part  of  the 
civilised  world,  from  Italy,  England,  Germany,  but  it 
was  not  European  unless  it  assumed  the  guise  of  French 
spirit.  And  the  European  revolution  was  at  bottom  the 
French  revolution.  This  imperishable  glory  of  your 
nation  weighs,  like  all  glories,  upon  the  people.  It 
burdens  you  with  a  deep-rooted  prejudice.  But  are  not 
prejudices  likewise  forces,  at  least  impediments  of  pro- 
gress, if  nothing  else  ?  Paris  will  no  longer  be  the  brain 
of  the  world,  if  for  no  other  reason  but  that  the  world 
has  no  brain,  except  in  the  imagination  of  some  shallow 
sociologists.*  Neither  is  Paris  to-day,  nor  will  it  ever  be 
in  the  future, that  sacred  Jerusalem  of  revolutionists  from 
all  parts  of  the  world  which  it  seemed  to  be  once  upon  a 
time.  At  all  events  the  future  proletarian  revolution 
will  have  nothing  in  common  with  an  apocalyptic  millen- 
ium.  And  in  our  day,  special  privileges  are  doomed 
for  nations  as  well  as  for  single  individuals.  So  Engels 

•Long  before  symbolism  and  analogies  with  organisms  be- 
came the  fashion  in  sociology,  I  had  occasion  to  criticise  this 
curious  tendency  in  an  article  reviewing  the  "Social  Psycho- 
logy" of  Lindner  (in  "Nuova  Antologia,"  December,  1872, 
pages  971-989). 


48  CGCIALlfaJM    AJN'D    PHILOSOPHY 

observed,  justly.  By  the  way,  it  would  be  worth  the 
while  of  you  French  to  read  what  he  wrote  in  1874 
concerning  the  Blanquists,  who  were  trying  to  foment 
a  violent  revolution,  so  shortly  after  the  catastrophe  of 
the  Commune.*  But  when  all  is  said,  when  the  peculiar 
conditions  of  French  agriculture  and  industry  are  taken 
into  account,  which  retarded  so  long  the  concentration 
of  the  labor  movement,  and  when  the  proper  blame  is 
recorded  against  the  various  petty  leaders  and  heads, 
who  kept  French  Socialism  so  long  split  and  divided, 
then  the  fact  always  remains  that  historical  materialism 
will  not  make  any  headway  among  you,  so  long  as  it 
gives  the  impression  of  being  simply  a  mental  elabora- 
tion of  two  Germans  of  great  genius.  By  this  expression 
Mazzini  intensified  the  national  resentment  against  these 
two  authors,  who,  being  communists  and  materialists, 
seemed  made  to  order  for  the  purpose  of  routing  the 
idealistic  formula  of  Patriotism  and  God. 

In  this  respect,  the  fate  of  the  two  founders  of  scienti- 
fic socialism  was  almost  tragical.  They  were  often 
regarded  as  the  two  Germans  by  so  many  who  were 
jingoes  even  though  revolutionaries.  And  Bakounin, 
whose  mind  inclined  so  strongly  toward  invention,  to  put 
it  mildly,  accused  them  of  being  champions  of  Pan- 
Germanism,  although  these  two  Germans,  who  left  their 
country  as  exiles  from  the  days  of  their  young  manhood, 
were  received  with  studied  silence  by  those  professors 
for  whom  servility  is  an  act  of  patriotism.  As  a  matter 
of  fact  these  professors  avenged  themselves.  For  Capital, 
whose  entire  presentation  is  rooted  in  the  traditions  of 

*In  an  article  entitled,  "Program  der  blanquistischen  Kom- 
mune  Fluchtling-e,"  published  in  the  "Volksstaat,"  No.  73,  and 
later  reproduced  on  pages  40-46  of  the  pamphlet,  "Inter- 
nationales aus  dem  Volksstaat,"  Berlin,  1894. 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  49 

classic  economy,  'not  excluding  the  ingenious  and  often 
talented  writers  of  Italy  in  the  18th  century,  speaks  only 
with  sovereign  contempt  of  such  men  as  Roscher  and 
others  like  him.  Engels,  who  devoted  himself  with  so 
much  ability  to  the  amplification  and  popularisation  of 
the  results  of  researches  made  by  the  American  Morgan, 
had  the  settled  conviction  that  the  thing  which  he  justly 
called  classic  philosophy  had  reached  its  dissolution  with 
Feuerbach.  And  when  he  wrote  his  Anti-Duliring,  he 
showed  a  frank  unconcern  for  the  philosophers  of  his 
time,  the  neocriticism  of  his  countrymen,  an  unconcern 
which  is  explicable,  even  if  not  excusable,  in  his  case,  but 
which  is  ridiculous  in  other  socialists  who  affect  to  imi- 
tate him.  Their  tragic  fate  was,  so  to  say,  inherent 
in  their  mission.  They  had  given  themselves  heart  and 
soul  to  the  cause  af  the  proletariat  of  all  nations.  And 
for  this  reason  their  scientific  work  finds  in  every  nation 
only  that  reading  public  which  is  capable  of  a  similar 
intellectual  revolution.  In  Germany,  where  Social- 
Democracy  stands  firmly  in  serried  ranks,  owing  to  histo- 
rical conditions,  among  them  above  all  the  fact  that  the 
capitalist  class  has  never  been  able  to  break  its  ties  with 
the  old  regime  (look  at  that  emperor  who  speaks  with 
impunity  in  the  language  of  a  vice-god  and  who  is 
nothing  but  a  Frederick  Barbarossa  acting  as  a  commer- 
cial traveler  for  goods  made  in  Germany),  it  was  quite 
natural  that  the  ideas  of  scientific  socialism  should  find 
a  favorable  soil  for  their  normal  and  progressive  diffu- 
sion. But  none  of  the  German  socialists— at  least  I  hope 
not— will  ever  think  of  looking  upon  the  ideas  of  Marx 
and  Engels  from  the  simple  point  of  view  of  the  rights 
and  duties,  merits  and  demerits,  of  comrades  of  the 
party.  Here  is  what  Engels  wrote  not  so  very  long 


50  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

ago*:  "It  will  be  noticed  that  I  do  not  call  myself  a 
social-democrat  in  these  articles,  but  a  communist.  I  do 
this  for  the  reason  that  the  name  of  social-democrats  was 
given  in  those  days  to  many  who  had  not  written  upon 
their  banners  the  demand  for  the  socialization  of  all  the 
means  of  production.  By  a  social-democrat  people  un- 
derstood in  France  a  republican  democrat,  who  had 
genuine,  but  indefinite,  sympathies  for  the  working  class, 
men  like  Ledru-Rollin  in  1848,  and  like  the  socialist 
radicals  in  1874,  who  were  tainted  with  Proudhonism. 
In  Germany,  the  Lasallians  called  themselves  social- 
democrats.  Although  the  great  majority  of  these  grad- 
ually recognised  the  necessity  of  the  socialization  of  the 
means  of  production,  nevertheless  one  of  the  essential 
points  of  their  public  program  remained  productive 
associations  with  state  help.  It  was,  therefore,  quite 
impossible  for  Marx  and  myself  to  choose  such  an  elastic 
term  for  the  designation  of  our  specific  point  of  view. 
To-day  it  is  different  and  this  term  may  pass  muster. 
Nevertheless  it  will  always  be  illfitting  for  a  party  whose 
program  is  not  generically  socialistic,  but  directly  com- 
munistic, and  whose  ultimate  political  aim  is  to  do  away 
with  all  forms  of  state,  and  therefore  also  with  "demo- 
cracy." 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  patriots — I  do  not  use  this 
term  derisively— have  good  ground  for  consolation  and 
comfort.  For  there  is  no  foundation  for  the  conclusion 
that  historical  materialism  is  the  intellectual  patrimony 
of  one  sole  nation,  or  that  it  was  to  become  the  privilege 
of  any  clique,  circle,  or  sect.  Its  objective  origins  belong 

*On  page  6  of  the  preface  of  the  pamphlet,  "Internationales 
aus  dem  Volksstaat,"  which  contains  articles  written  by  Engels 
between  1871-75.  This  preface,  mark  well,  bears  the  date  of 
January  3,  1894. 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  51 

equally  to  France,  England,  and  Gernmny.  I  shall  not 
repeat  at  this  place  what  I  said  in  another  letter  con- 
cerning the  form  of  the  thought  which  developed  in  the 
minds  of  our  two  authors  under  the  conditions  created 
by  the  intellectual  culture  of  Germany  in  their  youth, 
especially  by  philosophy,  while  Hegelianism  either  lost 
itself  in  the  walks  of  a  new  scholasticism,  or  gave  way  to 
a  new  and  more  ponderous  criticism.  But  at  the  same 
time  there  existed  the  great  industries  of  England  with 
all  their  accompanying  miseries,  with  the  ideological 
counterbalance  of  Owen  and  the  practical  counteraction 
of  the  chartist  agitation.  There  were  furthermore  the 
schools  of  French  socialism,  and  the  revolutionary  tradi- 
tions of  the  "West,  out  of  which  were  just  developing  the 
forms  of  a  truly  proletarian  communism.  What  else  is 
Capital  but  the  critique  of  that  political  economy  which, 
as  a  practical  revolution  and  its  theoretical  expression, 
had  reached  full  maturity  only  in  England,  about  the 
sixties,  and  which  had  barely  begun  in  Germany  ?  What 
else  is  the  Communist  Manifesto  but  the  conclusion  and 
explanation  of  that  socialism  which  was  either  latent 
or  manifest  in  the  labor  movements  of  France  and  Eng- 
land? All  these  things  were  continued  and  brought  to 
the  point  of  critique,  not  excluding  the  philosophy  of 
Hegel,  by  the  immanent  critical  character  of  dialectic 
advance  and  its  transformations.  That  is  the  process  of 
that  negation  which  does  not  consist  in  the  contentious 
and  oppositional  discussion  of  one  concept  with  another, 
of  one  opinion  with  another,  but  which  rather  verifies 
the  things  which  it  denies,  because  that  which  is  made 
negative  by  it  either  contains  the  material  conditions  or 


52  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

the   intellectual   premise   for   the   continuation   of   the 
process.* 

France  and  England  may  resume  their  parts  in  the 
elaboration  of  historical  materialism  without  seeming  to 
commit  an  act  of  mere  imitation.  Should  the  French 
never  write  truly  critical  books  on  Fourier  and  Saint 
Simon,  showing  that  they  were,  and  to  what  extent  they 
were,  true  precursors  of  contemporaneous  socialism? 
Isn't  there  enough  occasion  to  devote  literary  work  to 
the  events  of  1830  to  1848,  so  that  one  may  see  that  the 
theory  of  the  Communist  Manifesto  was  not  their  nega- 
tion, but  rather  was  their  outcome  and  solution?  Isn't 
there  a  demand  for  an  exhaustive  work  on  the  coup 
d'etat  of  Louis  Napoleon,  as  a  counterpart  for  the 
Eighteenth  Brumaire  of  Marx,  which,  though  a  work  of 
great  genius  and  insuperable  in  its  aim,  is  nevertheless 
largely  a  work  of  the  hour  and  colored  by  publicist 
methods?  Does  not  the  Commune  still  await  its  final 
critical  treatment  ?  Has  the  great  revolution  of  the  18th 
century,  whose  literature  is  colossal  so  far  as  its  general 
history  goes,  but  very  small  when  it  comes  to  details,  ever 
been  thoroughly  treated  with  an  insight  into  the  class 
movements  of  which  it  consisted,  and  as  a  typical 
illustration  of  industrial  history  ?  To  be  brief,  does  not 
the  whole  modern  history  of  France  and  England  offer 
to  the  students  of  those  countries  a  far  greater  scope  for 
the  illustration  of  historical  materialism  than  that 
afforded  until  recently  by  the  conditions  of  Germany? 
The  conditions  of  Germany  were,  since  the  Thirty  Years ' 
War,  greatly  complicated  through  obstacles  to  progress 
and  remained  almost  always  enveloped  in  the  mists  of 

•For  this  reason  Hegel  and  the  Hegelians,  who  so  frequently 
made  use  of  word  symbols,  employed  the  term  "aufheben," 
which  may  signify  both  to  remove  and  elevate. 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  53 

various  speculations  in  the  heads  of  those  who  lived 
under  them  and  observed  them.  The  Florentine  chronic- 
lers of  the  14th  century  would  be  moved  to  merriment  by 
those  misty  ideas. 

I  have  dwelt  upon  these  particulars,  not  in  order  to 
assume  the  airs  of  a  counsellor  of  France,  but  in  order 
to  wind  up  with  the  statement  that,  with  the  present  bent 
of  Latin  minds,  it  is  not  an  easy  thing  to  get  them 
imbued  with  new  ideas,  if  one  undertakes  to  approach 
them  merely  with  abstract  forms  of  thought.  But  they 
will  assimilate  new  ideas  quickly  and  effectively,  when 
offered  in  the  shape  of  stories  or  essays  which  have  some 
of  the  elements  of  art  about  them. 

I  return  for  a  moment  to  the  question  of  translating. 
Engels'  Anti-Diihring  is  that  work  which  ought  to  get 
an  international  circulation  before  any  other.  I  know 
few  books  which  are  equal  to  it  in  compactness  of 
thought,  multiplicity  of  view-points,  and  effectiveness  in 
bringing  home  its  points.  It  may  become  mental  medi- 
cine for  young  thinkers,  who  generally  turn  with  vague 
and  uncertain  touch  to  books  which  are  said  to  deal  with 
socialism  of  some  kind.  This  was  what  happened  when 
this  book  appeared,  as  Bernstein  wrote  about  three  years 
ago  in  the  Neue  Zeit,  in  an  article  commemorating  the 
event.  This  work  of  Engels  remains  the  unexcelled  book 
in  the  literature  of  socialism. 

Now,  this  book  was  not  written  for  a  thesis,  but  rather 
for  an  anti-thesis.  With  the  exception  of  some  detach- 
able portions  which  were  made  into  a  book  by  themselves 
and  in  .this  shape  made  a  tour  of  the  world  (Socialism, 
Utopian  and  Scientific},  this  book  has  for  its  guiding 
thread  the  criticism  of  Eugene  Diihring,  who  had  in- 
a  philosophy  and  a  socialism  of  his  own,  But 


54  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

what  person  not  living  in  the  circles  of  professed  scien- 
tists, and  how  many  readers  of  other  than  German 
nationality,  should  take  an  interest  in  Mr.  Diihring? 
Well,  unfortunately  every  nation  has  too  many  Diih- 
rings.  Who  knows  what  book  against  some  other  know- 
it-all  an  Engels  of  some  other  nationality  might  have 
written,  or  might  still  write  ?  The  effect  of  this  work  on 
the  socialists  of  other  countries  should  be,  in  my  opinion, 
to  supply  them  with  those  critical  aptitudes  which  are 
required  for  writing  all  other  Anti-Somethings  needed 
for  the  rebuttal  of  those  who  try  to  thwart  or  infest  the 
socialist  movement  in  the  name  of  so  many  confused 
notions  in  sociology.  The  weapons  and  methods  of  cri- 
tique will,  of  course,  vary  from  country  to  country 
according  to  the  requirements  of  local  adaptation.  The 
point  is  to  cure  the  patient,  not  the  disease.  That  is  the 
method  of  modern  medicine. 

To  try  to  act  differently  would  be  to  invite  the  fate  of 
those  Hegelians  who  came  to  the  fore  in  Italy  from  1840 
to  1880,  especially  in  the  South,  for  instance  in  Naples. 
Most  of  them  were  mere  followers,  but  a  few  were  strong 
thinkers.  On  the  whole  they  represented  a  revolutionary 
current  of  great  importance,  owing  to  their  traditional 
scholasticism,  their  French  esprit,  and  their  philosophy 
of  the  so-called  common  sense.  This  movement  became 
somewhat  known  in  France.  For  it  was  one  of  these 
Hegelians,  Vera  by  name,  and  not  the  profoundest  and 
strongest  of  them,  who  supplied  France  with  the  most 
readable  translations  of  some  of  the  fundamental  works 
of  Hegel  and  accompanied  them  with  copious  com- 
ments.* Now  every  trace,  and  even  the  memory,  of  this 

•Vera  wrote  as  late  as  1870  a  "Philosophy  of  History"  In  the 
style  of  the  strictest  Hegelian,  for  which  I  roasted  him  in  a 
review  written  for  the  "Zeitschrift  fur  exacte  Philosophic,"  vol. 
X,  pages  79,  ff.,  1872, 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  55 

movement  lias  passed  away  among  us  after  the  lapse  of 
but  a  few  years.  The  writings  of  these  thinkers  are  not 
found  anywhere  but  in  the  shops  of  antiquarians  and 
second  rate  book  dealers.  This  dissolution  into  nothing 
of  an  entire  scientific  school  of  no  mean  account  is  not 
due  solely  to  the  often  unkind  and  little  praiseworthy 
vicissitudes  of  university  life,  nor  to  the  epidemic  spread 
of  positivism  which  gathers  here  and  there  fruits  of  a 
rather  demi-monde  science,  but  to  deeper  causes.  Those 
Hegelians  wrote,  and  taught,  and  held  disputations 
among  themselves,  as  though  they  were  living  in  Berlin, 
or  in  Utopia,  instead  of  Naples.  They  held  mental  con- 
verse with  their  German  comrades*  They  replied  from 
their  pulpits,  or  in  their  writings,  only  to  such  criticisms 
as  were  made  by  themselves,  so  that  they  carried  on  a 
dialog  which  appeared  as  a  monolog  to  their  audience 
and  readers.  They  did  not  succeed  in  molding  their 
treatises  and  dialectics  into  books  which  looked  like  new 
intellectual  conquests  of  the  nation.  This  unpleasant 
and  unattractive  recollection  came  to  my  mind  when  I 
began  writing  the  first  of  my  two  essays  on  historical 
materialism,  and  there  is  now  no  reason  why  I  should 

•In  fact  Rosenkranz,  one  of  the  leading  lights  among  the  late 
followers  of  Hegel,  wrote  a  special  work  on  "Hegel's  Natur- 
philosophie  und  die  Bearbeitung  derselben  durch  den  italien- 
ischen  Philosophen  A.  Vera,"  Berlin,  1868.  I  quote  a  few 
passages  from  this  work  which  illustrate  my  point:  "It  is  in- 
teresting to  observe  the  way  in  which  the  German  of  Hegel 
comes  to  life  again  in  the  Italian  language.  Messieurs. . . .  (here 
follows  a  list  of  names) ...  .and  others  rendered  the  thoughts 
of  Hegel  with  a  precision  and  facility  which  would  have 
appeared  impossible  in  Germany  ten  years  ago."  (Page  3.) 
"Vera  is  the  strictest  systematiser  whom  Hegel  has  ever  found, 
and  who  follows  his  master  step  by  step  with  the  greatest 
devotion."  (Page  5.)  "If  after  this  any  one  excuses  himself 
with  the  difficulty  of  understanding  Hegel  in  German,  he  should 
be  advised  to  read  him  in  the  Italian  translation  of  Vera.  He 
will  understand  that,  always  assuming  that  he  has  intelligence 
enough  to  understand  any  philosophy."  (Page  9.) 


56  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

not  follow  them  up  with  others.  But  then  I  asked 
myself  quite  often :  How  shall  I  go  about  it  to  say  things 
which  will  not  appear  hard,  foreign,  and  strange  to 
Italian  readers?  You  tell  me  that  I  succeeded,  and 
perhaps  it  is  so.  Would  it  not  be  a  singular  case  of 
discourtesy,  if  I  should  be  my  own  judge  and  discuss 
the  praise  which  you  bestow  upon  me  ? 

About  five  years  ago  I  wrote  to  Engels:  "In  reading 
the  Holy  Family  I  remembered  the  Hegelians  of  Naples, 
among  whom  I  lived  in  my  earliest  youth,  and  it  seems 
to  me  that  I  understood  and  appreciated  that  book  more 
than  others  could  who  are  not  familiar  with  the  peculiar 
inside  facts  of  that  queer  satire.  It  seemed  to  me  that 
I  had  personally  seen  that  quaint  circle  in  Charlotten- 
burg  at  close  range,  whom  you  and  Marx  satirised  so 
funnily.  I  saw  before  my  mind 's  eye,  more  than  any  one 
else,  a  certain  professor  of  esthetics,  a  very  original  and 
talented  man,  who  explained  the  romances  of  Balzac  by 
deduction,  made  a  construction  of  the  cupola  of  the 
Church  of  Saint  Peter,  and  arranged  the  musical  instru- 
ments in  a  genetic  series ;  and  who  by  degrees,  from  nega- 
tion to  negation,  by  way  of  the  negation  of  the  negation, 
arrived  ultimately  at  the  metaphysics  of  the  unknowable, 
which  he,  although  unfamiliar  with  Spencer,  but  in  a 
way  himself  an  unglorified  Spencer,  called  the  unname- 
able.  I,  also,  lived  in  my  young  days,  as  it  were,  in  such 
a  training  hall,  and  I  am  not  sorry  for  it.  For  years  my 
mind  was  divided  between  Hegel  and  Spinoza.  With 
youthful  ingenuity  I  defended  the  dialectics  of  the  for- 
mer against  Zeller,  the  founder  of  Neokantianism.  The 
writings  of  Spinoza  I  knew  by  heart,  and  with  loving 
understanding  I  gave  expositions  of  his  theory  of  affec- 
tions and  passions.  But  now  $11  these  things  seem  as  far 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  57 

away  in  my  recollection  as  primeval  history.  Shall  I,  too 
have  presently  my  negation  of  the  negation?  You  en- 
courage me  to  write  on  communism.  But  I  have  always 
misgivings  when  it  comes  to  doing  things  which  are 
beyond  my  strength  and  which  have  little  effect  in 
Italy." 

Whereupon  he  replied ....  But  I  shall  make  a  period 
here.  It  seems  almost  impolite  to  reproduce  the  private 
letters  of  a  man,  especially  so  soon  after  his  death,  unless 
the  public  interest  urgently  demands  it.  At  all  events, 
compared  with  writings  which  are  purposely  written  for 
publication,  quotations  from  private  letters  carry  little 
conviction  and  little  weight,  even  if  they  refer  to  current 
topics  and  are  limited  to  questions  of  theory  and  science. 
With  the  growth  of  the  interest  in  historical  materialism, 
and  in  the  absence  of  a  literature  which  would  illustrate 
it  generally  and  specifically,  it  came  about  that  Engels, 
during  the  last  years  of  his  life,  was  asked,  and  even  tor- 
mented with  endless  questions,  by  many  who  enrolled 
themselves  as  voluntary  and  free  students  in  the  advent- 
urous and  outlawed  university  of  socialism,  of  which 
Engels  was  a  professor  without  a  chair.  This  accounts 
for  his  published  letters,  and  for  many  of  them  which 
have  not  been  published.  From  those  three  letters, 
which  were  recently  reproduced  by  Le  Devenir  Social 
from  a  Berlin  review  and  a  Leipsic  paper,  it  appears 
that  he  was  somewhat  afraid  lest  Marxism  might  present- 
ly develop  into  a  sort  of  cheap  doctrinairism. 

To  many  of  those  who  profess  to  be  scientists,  not  in 
the  adventurous  university  of  the  coming  people,  but  in 
that  of  present  official  society,  it  happens  that  they  are 
caught  on  the  wing  by  students  and  seekers  of  informa- 
tion and  that,  with  one  foot  lifted,  they  answer  every 


58  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

question  as  though  they  had  the  explanation  for  every- 
thing stamped  upon  their  brains.  The  most  conceited  of 
the  professors,  not  wishing  to  deprive  science  of  its 
priestly  saintliness  and  pretending  that  it  consists  wholly 
of  materialised  knowledge  instead  of  being  mainly  a  skill 
in  directing  the  formation  of  knowledge,  give  offhand 
answers  and  thereby  frequently  succeed  in  satirising 
themselves,  after  the  manner  of  that  delightful  Mephisto- 
pheles  in  the  guise  of  a  master  of  all  four  faculties.  Few 
have  the  Socratic  resignation  to  reply :  I  don 't  know,  but 
I  know  that  I  don't  know,  and  I  know  what  might  be 
known,  and  what  I  might  know,  if  I  had  made  those 
efforts,  or  accomplished  those  labors,  which  are  necessary 
in  order  to  know;  and  if  you  will  give  me  an  infinite 
number  of  years,  and  an  infinite  capacity  for  methodical 
work,  I  might  extend  my  knowledge  almost  indefinitely. 

This  is  the  substance  of  the  practical  mental  revolution 
of  the  theory  of  understanding  implied  by  historical  ma- 
terialism. 

Every  act  of  thinking  is  an  effort,  that  is  to  say,  new 
labor.  In  order  to  perform  it,  we  need  above  all  the 
material  of  mature  experience  and  the  methodical  instru- 
ments, made  familiar  and  effective  by  long  handling. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  an  accomplished  task,  or  a  finished 
thought,  facilitates  the  production  of  new  thought  by 
new  forces.  This  is  so,  first,  because  the  products  of 
yesterday  remain  incorporated  in  the  writings  and  other 
representative  arts  of  to-day,  and  in  the  second  place, 
because  energies  accumulated  by  us  internally  penetrate 
and  endow  labor,  thereby  keeping  up  a  rhythmic  move- 
ment. And  it  is  precisely  this  rhythmic  process  which 
constitutes  the  method  of  memory,  of  reasoning,  of  ex- 
pression, of  communication,  and  so  forth.  But  neverthe- 


SOCIALISM    .\ND    PHILOSOPHY  59 

less  this  is  not  saying  that  we  ever  become  thinking  ma- 
chines. Every  time  that  we  set  about  producing  a  new 
thought,  we  need  not  only  the  external  materials  and  im- 
pulses of  actual  experience,  but  also  an  adequate  effort 
in  order  to  pass  from  the  most  primitive  stages  of  mental 
life  to  that  superior,  derived  and  complex  stage  called 
thought,  in  which  we  cannot  maintain  ourselves,  unless 
we  exert  our  will-power,  which  has  a  certain  determined 
intensity  and  duration  beyond  which  it  cannot  be 
exerted. 

This  brain  work,  which  makes  itself  known  in  our  own 
consciousness  as  a  fact  concerning  only  our  own  indivi- 
dual personality,  is  going  on  in  each  one  of  us  only  in  so 
far  as  we  are  beings  living  together  in  a  certain  environ- 
ment which  is  socially,  and  therefore  historically,  devel- 
oped. The  means  of  social  activity,  made  up  on  one  side 
of  the  conditions  and  instruments,  on  the  other  of  the 
products  of  co-operative  labor  and  specialization,  consti- 
tute together  with  the  free  gifts  of  nature  the  materials 
and  incentives  for  our  internal  activity.  These  are  the 
sources  of  those  secondary,  derived  and  complex  habits 
by  which  we  become  aware  that  we  are  parts  of  a  whole 
outside  of  the  boundaries  of  our  bodily  personality,  that 
we  ?re  parts  of  a  certain  mode  of  life,  custom,  institution, 
church,  country,  historical  tradition,  and  so  forth.  These 
practical  interrelations  of  social  life,  connecting  indi- 
vidual with  individual,  are  the  ground  in  which  are 
rooted  and  materialised  those  intellectual  expressions  of 
public  thought,  social  soul  life,  national  spirit,  etc., 
which  are  objects  of  speculation  for  those  sociologists 
and  psychologists  who  belong  to  the  bad  school  of 
metaphysics,  and  whom  I  would  call  symbolists  and 
symbol  readers.  These*  practical  interrelations  breed 


60  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

those  common  currents  which  give  to  individual  thought, 
and  to  the  science  following  from  it,  the  character  of  a 
true  social  function. 

So  here  we  have  arrived  once  more  at  the  philosophy 
of  practice,  which  is  the  pith  of  historical  materialism.  It 
is  the  immanent  philosophy  of  things  about  which  people 
philosophize.  The  realistic  process  leads  first  from  life 
to  thought,  not  from  thought  to  life.  It  leads  from 
work,  from  the  labor  of  cognition,  to  understanding  as 
an  abstract  theory,  not  from  theory  to  cognition.  It 
leads  from  wants,  and  therefore  from  various  feelings  of 
well-being  or  illness  resulting  from  the  satisfaction  or 
neglect  of  these  wants,  to  the  creation  of  the  poetical 
myth  of  supernatural  forces,  not  vice-versa.  In  these 
statements  lies  the  secret  of  a  phrase  used  by  Marx, 
which  has  been  the  cause  of  much  racking  for  some 
brains.  He  said  that  he  had  turned  the  dialectics  of 
Hegel  right  side  up.  This  means  in  plain  words  that  the 
rhythmic  movement  of  The  Idea  Itself  (the  spontaneous 
generation  of  thought ! )  was  set  aside  and  the  rhythmic 
movements  of  real  things  adopted,  a  movement  which 
ultimately  produces  thought. 

Historical  materialism,  then,  or  the  philosophy  of 
practice,  takes  account  of  man  as  a  social  and  historical 
being.  It  gives  the  last  blow  to  all  forms  of  idealism 
which  regard  actually  existing  things  as  mere  reflexes, 
reproductions,  imitations,  illustrations,  results,  of  so- 
called  a  priori  thought,  thought  before  the  fact.  It 
marks  also  the  end  of  naturalistic  materialism,  using  this 
term  in  the  sense  which  it  had  up  to  a  few  years  ago. 
The  intellectual  revolution,  which  has  come  to  regard 
the  processes  of  human  history  as  absolutely  objective 
pnes,  is  simultaneously  accompanied  by  that  intellectual 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  61 

revolution  which  regards  the  philosophical  mind  itself  as 
a  product  of  history.  This  mind  is  no  longer  for  any 
thinking  man  a  fact  which  was  never  in  the  making,  an 
event  which  had  no  causes,  an  eternal  entity  which  does 
not  change,  and  still  less  the  creature  of  one  sole  act.  It 
is  rather  a  process  of  creation  in  perpetuity. 


V. 

Rome,  May  24,  1897. 

Picking  up  my  thread  at  the  point  where  I  dropped 
it  the  other  day,  I  want  to  say  that  I  think  you  are 
perfectly  right  in  placing  the  problem  of  general  philo- 
sophy on  the  order  of  business.  I  refer  in  this  respect 
not  only  to  your  preface,  the  effect  of  which  I  am  try- 
ing to  heighten  by  my  prolonged  conversation  in  writing, 
but  also  to  some  of  your  articles  in  Le  Devenir  Social 
and  to  some  of  the  private  letters  which  you  were  kind 
enough  to  address  to  me.  You  have  an  idea  that  histo- 
rical materialism  may  seem  to  be  suspended  in  the  air 
so  long  as  it  has  for  opponents  other  philosophies  which 
do  not  harmonize  with  it,  and  so  long  as  it  does  not  find 
the  means  to  develop  its  own  philosophy,  such  as  is 
inherent  and  immanent  in  its  fundamental  facts  and 
premises. 

Have  I  grasped  your  meaning  correctly? 

You  refer  explicitly  to  psychology,  ethics,  and  meta- 
physics. By  this  last  term  you  intend  to  convey  what 
I,  owing  to  other  mental  habits  and  other  methods  of 
teaching,  would  call  either  the  general  theory  of  cogni- 
tion, or  the  general  theory  of  the  fundamental  forms  of 
thought.  I  prefer  these,  or  similar,  terms  partly  out  of 
very  great  caution,  partly  for  fear  of  being  misunder- 
stood, and  also  in  order  not  to  run  foul  of  certain  pre- 
judices. However,  I  pass  over  such  auxiliary  terms  as 
these.  For  on  the  field  of  science  we  are  not  bound  to 
stick  slavishly  to  the  significance  which  terms  have  in 

62 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  63 

the  ordinary  experience  and  the  ordinary  minds,  unless 
they  are  terms  of  every  day  life  which  science  uses  the 
same  as  everybody  else,  when  it  calls  bread — bread.  But 
those  other  terms  were  selected  by  ourselves,  when  we 
fixed  and  developed  certain  concepts  which  we  desired  to 
formulate  comprehensively  by  means  of  convenient 
words.  It  would  be  absurd  for  us  to  try  to  deduct  the 
meaning  and  essence  of  a  science,  for  instance  of  chem- 
istry, from  the  etymology  of  this  word.  For  we  should 
be  face  to  face  with  the  most  ancient  Egypt,  instead  of 
the  name  which  signifies  the  yellow  land  on  both  sides 
of  the  Nile  from  its  mouth  to  the  mountains! 

I  shall  let  you  enjoy  the  company  of  the  metaphysical 
word  in  peace,  if  it  suits  you  to  rest  content  with  that. 
Away  with  such  frivolities !  If  anybody  who  wanted  to 
extend  his  catalogue  were  to  catch  the  First  Principles 
of  the  now  indispensable  Spencer  under  the  heading  of 
metaphysics,  he  would  do  no  more  and  no  less  than  the 
librarian  of  Troy  did,  namely  to  paste  so  many  labels 
on  the  various  essays  dealing  with  the  first  principles  of 
philosophy  (Aristotle  used  the  same  terms  to  denote 
them),  and  no  amount  of  commentary  by  ancient 
writers,  nor  criticism  by  modern  ones,  has  ever  suc- 
ceeded in  bringing  them  up  to  the  clearness  and  con- 
sistency of  a  perfect  book.  Who  knows  but  many  would 
now  be  glad  to  find  out  that,  after  all,  the  ancient  Sta- 
girite,  who  impressed  his  ideas  upon  the  minds  of  man- 
kind for  so  many  centuries,  and  whose  name  was  carried 
as  a  banner  in  so  many  battles  of  the  mind,  was  but 
another  Spencer  of  other  times,  who,  solely  through  the 
fault  of  time,  wrote  in  Greek  instead  of  English,  and  not 
very  good  Greek  either. 

Tradition  must  not  weigh  npon  us  like  a  nightmare,  it 


64  SOCIALISM    AND   PHILOSOPHY 

must  not  be  an  impediment,  an  obstacle,  an  object  of  a 
cult  or  of  stupid  reverence.  We  agree  pretty  well  on 
that.  But  on  the  other  hand,  tradition  is  that  which 
holds  us  fast  to  history,  I  mean  to  say,  it  is  that  which 
unites  us  with  painfully  acquired  stages,  which  facilitate 
labor  and  make  for  further  progress.  This  distinguishes 
us  from  brutes.  It  is  only  the  long  centuries  of  travail 
which  differentiate  our  history  from  that  of  animals. 
Really,  no  one  who  devotes  himself  to  some  study,  be  it 
ever  so  concrete,  empirical,  particular,  minute,  and  de- 
tailed, anywhere  in  actual  life,  can  fail  to  admit  that 
there  is  a  certain  point  where  he  feels  the  pressing  want 
of  reconsidering  all  general  concepts  (categories)  recurr- 
ing in  particular  acts  of  thought,  such  as  unity,  multi- 
plicity, totality,  condition,  end,  the  reason  of  everything, 
cause,  effect,  progression,  finite,  infinite,  and  so  forth. 
Now,  even  if  we  do  not  stop  very  long  to  consider  these 
new  and  curious  aspects,  we  are  impressed  with  the 
universal  problems  of  cognition.  These  problems  appear 
•to  us  as  neccessarily  existing.  It  is  this  suggestion  of 
inevitability  which  is  the  source  and  seat  of  that  which 
you  call  metaphysics,  and  which  may  also  be  called 
differently. 

The  whole  question  is  to  know  how  these  necessary 
data  are  handled  by  us.  The  characteristic  mark  of  the 
classic  thought,  generally  speaking,  for  instance  of  the 
Grecian,  is  a  certain  ingenuousness  in  the  use  and  hand- 
ling of  such  concepts.  On  the  other  hand,  the  character- 
istic mark  of  modern  philosophy,  again  generally  speak- 
ing, is  a  methodical  doubt,  a  critical  attitude  which 
accompanies  the  use  of  these  concepts  like  a  suspicious 
and  cautious  guard  and  searches  them  internally  as  well 
as  externally,  in  their  wider  bearings.  The  deciding 


SOCIALISM    AND   PHILOSOPHY  65 

factor  in  the  transition  from  ingenuousness  to  critical 
analysis  is  methodical  observation  (which  was  limited  in 
scope  and  means  among  the  ancients),  and  even  more 
than  observation  it  is  the  careful  and  technically 
accurate  experiment  (which  was  almost  entirely  un- 
known among  the  ancients).  By  experiment  we  become 
co-workers  of  nature.  We  produce  artificially  things 
which  nature  produces  out  of  itself.  Through  the  art  of 
experiment  things  cease  to  be  mere  rigid  objects  of 
vision,  because  they  are  generated  under  our  guidance. 
And  thought  ceases  to  be  a  hypothesis,  or  a  puzzling 
forerunner  of  things,  and  becomes  a  concrete  thing, 
because  it  grows  with  the  things,  and  keeps  on  growing 
with  them  to  the  extent  that  we  learn  to  understand 
them. 

The  art  of  methodical  experiment  ultimately  leads  us 
to  the  acceptance  of  the  following  simple  truth:  Even 
before  the  rise  of  science,  and  in  all  human  beings  who 
never  embrace  science,  the  internal  activities,,  including 
natural  reflection,  constitute  a  process  of  growth,  which 
takes  place  in  us  while  we  follow  the  satisfaction  of  our 
needs,  and  which  implies  the  successive  creation  of  new 
conditions.*  From  this  point  of  view,  likewise,  histo- 
rical materialism  is  the  outcome  of  a  long  development. 
It  explains  the  historical  rise  of  scientific  knowledge,  by 

*"The  plays  of  childhood — I  am  In  earnest — are  the  first  be- 
ginning and  first  fundament  of  all  serious  things  in  life.  They 
permit  the  immediate  discharge  and  expression  of  the  internal 
activities,  stimulate  successive  acts  of  observation,  and  promote 
a  gradual  transition  from  one  form  of  knowledge  to  another. 
At  the  summit  of  this  process  arises  the  Illusion  that  the 
acquired  control  (of  ourselves  over  ourselves)  is  an  independent 
power  and  the  constant  cause  of  those  visible  effects,  which  we 
and  others  perceive  objectively  in  our  actions." — This  you  will 
find,  on  pages  13-14  of  my  work,  THE  CONCEPT  OP  LIBERTY. 
A  Psychological  Study.  Rome,  1878.  It  was  written  during 
the  acute  stage  of  the  crisis  in  psychology. 


66  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

showing  that  this  knowledge  corresponds  in  quality,  and 
is  proportional  in  quantity,  to  the  productivity  of  labor. 
In  other  words,  science  depends  on  our  needs. 

Now  I  turn  to  you,  and  approve  of  the  kick  which  you 
administer  to  agnosticism.  For  it  is  but  the  English 
counterpart  of  German  Neokantianism.  There  is  but 
one  appreciable  difference.  Neokantianism  represents  in 
the  last  analysis  nothing  but  a  certain  academic  line  of 
thought,  which  has  supplied  us  with  a  better  knowledge 
of  Kant  and  a  useful  literature  of  educated  people. 
Agnosticism,  on  the  other  hand,  on  account  of  its  diffu- 
sion among  the  people,  is  an  actual  symptom  of  the 
present  condition  of  certain  social  classes.  The  socialists 
would  have  good  grounds  for  believing  that  this  symp- 
tom is  one  of  the  evidences  of  the  decadence  of  the 
bourgeoisie.  It  certainly  stands  in  marked  contrast  to 
the  heroic  devotion  to  truth  shown  by  the  thought  of  the 
precursors  of  modern  history,  such  as  Bruno  and  Spi- 
noza, or  to  that  conventional  assertiveness,  which  was 
typical  of  the  thinkers  of  the  18th  century,  until  the 
classic  German  philosophy  gradually  came  upon  the 
scene.  It  is  still  more  at  variance  with  the  precision  of 
the  modern  means  of  research,  which  in  our  times  have 
increased  to  such  an  extent  the  dominion  of  human 
thought  over  nature.  It  lacks  that  characteristic  which, 
according  to  Hegel,  is  essential  for  every  philosophy, 
namely  the  courage  of  truth.  It  gives  the  impression  of 
a  cowardly  resignation.  Some  of  those  Marxists,  who 
go  by  a  short  cut  from  economic  conditions  to  mental 
reflections,  as  though  it  were  simply  a  matter  of  inter- 
preting stenographic  signs,  might  say  that  this  unknow- 
able, which  is  held  so  sacred  by  a  vast  number  of 
quietists  on  the  field  of  reason,  is  an  evidence  that  the 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  67 

spirit  of  the  bourgeois  epoch  is  no  longer  able  to  see 
clearly  through  the  world's  arrangement,  because  capi- 
talism, from  which  it  receives  its  directions,  is  already 
in  a  state  of  disintegration.  In  other  words,  the  bour- 
geoisie has  an  instinctive  presentiment  of  its  impending 
ruin  and  therefore  delivers  itself  over  to  a  sort  of 
religion  of  imbecility.  Such  an  assertion  might  even 
seem  to  be  ingenious  and  fine,  although  it  cannot  be 
demonstrated.  Still,  it  somewhat  resembles  that  great 
number  of  absurdities  which  have  been  said  by  many  in 
the  name  of  the  economic  interpretation  of  history.* 

On  the  other  hand,  I  say  that  this  agnosticism  renders 
us  a  great  service.  By  stating  over  and  over  again  that 
it  is  not  given  to  us  to  know  the  thing  itself,  the  inmost 
nature  of  things,  the  final  cause  and  fundamental  reason 
of  phenomena,  the  agnostics  arrive  in  their  own  way,  by 
a  different  road,  namely  by  regretting  the  impossibility 
of  knowing  this  alleged  mystery,  at  the  same  result  that 
we  do,  only  we  do  not  regret,  but  rather  seek  knowledge 
without  the  assistance  of  the  imagination.  This  result 
is  that  we  cannot  think  anything  except  things  which 
we  ourselves  experience,  taking  this  word  in  its  widest 
meaning. 

Just  see  what  happened  on  the  field  of  psychology.  On 
one  side,  the  illusion  was  dispersed  that  psychic  facts 
may  be  explained  by  the  assumption  of  a  supernatural 
entity.  On  the  other  side,  the  vulgar  and  more  material 
than  materialistic  idea  was  abandoned  that  thought  is  a 
secretion  of  the  brain.  It  was  shown  that  psychic  facts 
are  coupled  to  a  specific  organism,  that  this  organism 

•Some  of  these  absurdities  were  cleverly  illustrated  by  B. 
Croce.  See  THE  HISTORICAL  THEORIES  OP  PROP.  LORIA, 
Naples,  1897;  and  CONCERNING  THE  COMMUNISM  OF  TOM- 
MASO  CAMPANELLA,  Naples,  1895. 


68  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

itself  was  in  a  constant  process  of  formation,  that  psy- 
chic facts  are  accompanied  by  internal  nerve  processes, 
so  far  as  these  processes  are  parts  of  consciousness.  The 
gross  hypothesis  of  mechanical  materialism  was  rejected, 
according  to  which  it  was  possible  to  observe  the  internal 
activity,  its  maintenance  and  complications  as  a  function 
of  consciousness,  by  external  means,  simply  because  we 
may  discover  from  day  to  day  the  corresponding  con- 
ditions in  the  nerve  centers.  And  so  we  have  arrived 
at  psychic  science.  It  is  incorrect,  not  to  say  erroneous, 
to  call  this  science  a  psychology  without  the  soul.  It 
should  rather  be  called  the  science  of  psychic  products 
without  the  myth  of  spiritual  substance. 

"When  Engels,  in  his  Anti-Duhring,  used  the  term 
metaphysics  in  a  deprecating  manner,  he  intended  pre- 
cisely to  referxto  that  way  of  thinking,  conceiving,  in- 
ferring, expounding  which  is  the  opposite  of  a  genetic, 
and  therefore  dialectical,  consideration  of  things.  The 
metaphysical  way  of  thinking  has  the  following  charac- 
teristics :  In  the  first  place,  it  regards  as  selfdependent 
things,  as  things  independent  of  one  another,  those 
modes  of  thought,  which  are  in  reality  modes  only  to  the 
extent  that  they  represent  points  of  correlation  and  tran- 
sition in  a  process;  in  the  second  place,  it  regards  these 
modes  of  thought  as  existing  before  the  fact,  as  pre- 
existing, as  types,  or  prototypes,  of  the  weak  and  sha- 
dowy reality  of  sense-perceptions.  From  the  first  point 
of  view,  for  instance,  such  thoughts  as  cause  and  effect, 
means  and  end,  origin  and  reality,  and  so  forth,  appear 
merely  as  distinct  terminals  of  different,  and  sometimes 
opposite,  kinds.  Some  of  them  seem  to  be  only  causes, 
others  only  effects,  and  so  forth.  In  the  second  case, 
the  world  of  experience  seems  to  be  disintegrating  and 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  69 

falling  to  pieces  before  our  eyes,  separating  into  sub- 
stance and  attribute,  thing  in  itself  and  phenomenon, 
possibility  and  obvious  reality.  The  critique  of  Engels 
demands  substantially  and  realistically  that  terminal 
thought  should  not  be  considered  as  a  fixed  entity,  but 
as  a  function.  For  such  terminal  concepts  are  valuable 
only  in  so  far  as  they  help  us  to  think  now,  while  we  are 
actively  engaged  in  proceeding  with  new  thought. 

This  critique  of  Engels,  which  may  be  improved  in 
many  respects  by  more  specific  and  precise  statements, 
particularly  as  regards  the  origin  of  the  metaphysical 
way  of  thinking,  repeats  in  its  own  way  the  Hegelian 
distinction  between  understanding,  which  defines  oppo- 
sites  as  such,  and  reason,  which  arranges  these  opposites 
in  an  ascending  series  (Bruno  would  say:  The  divine  art 
of  reconciling  opposites,  and  Spinoza  said:  Every  deter- 
mination is  a  negation} . 

The  metaphysical  way  of  thinking,  when  seen  at  a 
distance,  has  some  things  in  common  with  the  origin  of 
myths.  It  is  rooted  in  theology,  which  tries  to  make 
articles  of  faith  (which  auto-illusion  presents  as  objec- 
tive facts,  while  they  are  subjective  assumptions)  plau- 
sible to  logical  reason.  How  many  miracles  has  that 
myth  of  The  Word  performed!  Such  metaphysical 
thoughts,  using  this  term  in  a  deprecating  sense,  as 
indicating  a  certain  stage  of  thought  which  interferes 
with  the  formation  of  a  new  thought,  are  found  in  every 
branch  of  human  knowledge.  What  an  enormous  amount 
of  strength  had  to  be  spent  by  doctrinaire  reflection  on 
the  field  of  language  study,  before  the  diagrammatic  illu- 
sion of  grammatical  forms  was  replaced  by  their  genesis ! 
This  genesis  is  now  sought  and  located  in  the  various 
stages  of  language  composition,  which  is  a  process  of 


70  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

work  and  production,  not  a  mere  fact.  Metaphysics  in 
this  ironical  sense  exists,  and  will,  perhaps,  always  exist, 
in  the  words  and  phraseology  derived  from  the  expres- 
sion of  thought.  For  language,  without  which  we  could 
neither  grasp  thought  precisely  nor  formulate  its  expres- 
sion, changes  the  thing  it  expresses  at  the  same  time 
that  it  pronounces  it.  For  this  reason  language  has, 
perhaps,  always  a  mythical  germ.  No  matter  how  much 
we  may  perfect  the  general  theory  of  vibrations,  we  shall 
always  say :  The  light  produces  such  and  such  an  effect ; 
the  heat  operates  so  and  so.  There  is  always  the  tempta- 
tion, (or  at  least  the  danger),  to  personify  a  process,  or 
its  terminal  points.  By  means  of  an  illusory  projection, 
relations  become  things,  and  by  cogitating  farther  upon 
them  these  things  become  operative  subjects.  If  we  pay 
attention  to  this  frequent  lapse  of  our  mind  into  the 
pre-scientific  mode  of  using  words,  we  shall  discover  in 
ourselves  the  psychological  data  for  the  explanation  of 
the  way,  in  which  forms  of  thought  were  transformed 
into  objective  entities,  under  different  circumstances  and 
in  other  times.  The  Platonic  ideas  are  typical  of  this 
case.  I  call  it  typical,  because  it  is  the  most  plastic. 
All  history  is  full  of  such  metaphysics,  which  is  an  evi- 
dence of  an  immature  mind  not  yet  sharpened  by  self- 
critique  and  re-enforced  by  experiment.  The  same  rea- 
sons, among  many  others,  place  in  the  same  class  such 
things  as  superstition,  mythology,  religion,  poetry,  a 
fanatic  worship  of  words,  a  cult  of  empty  forms.  This 
metaphysics  leaves  its  traces  also  in  that  field  of  thought 
which  we  call  nowadays,  conceitedly,  science. 

Does  not  such  a  metaphysical  mode  of  thought  obscure 
the  field  of  political  economy?  Does  not  money,  which 
is  originally  but  a  medium  of  exchange  and  transforms 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  71 

itself  into  capital  only  because  it  is  combined  with  a 
process  of  productive  labor,  become  in  the  imagination 
of  some  economists  a  self-originated  capital,  which  se- 
cretes interest  by  some  inherent  power  ?  For  this  reason, 
that  chapter  in  Marx's  Capital,  which  speaks  of  the 
fetishism  of  capital,  is  very  important.*  The  science 
of  economics  is  full  of  such  fetishes.  The  character  of 
a  commodity,  which  the  product  of  human  labor  assumes 
only  under  certain  historical  conditions,  under  which 
human  beings  live  when  a  definite  system  of  social  inter- 
relations exists,  is  regarded  by  some  as  an  intrinsic 
quality  of  the  product  from  all  eternity.  Wages,  which 
cannot  be  conceived  unless  some  people  are  under  the 
necessity  of  offering  themselves  for  hire  to  other  human 
beings,  are  regarded  as  an  absolute  category,  that  is  to 
say,  as  an  element  of  all  gain,  so  that  ultimately  the 
capitalist  schemer  adorns  himself  with  the  title  of  a  man 
who  earns  by  his  own  merit  the  highest  wages.  And 
what  about  the  rent  of  the  land— of  the  land,  mind  you. 
I  should  never  get  done,  if  I  wanted  to  enumerate  all 
those  metaphorical  transformations  of  relative  condi- 
tions into  eternal  attributes  of  men  and  things. 

What  have  the  crude  expounders  of  Darwinism  made 
of  the  struggle  for  existence?  An  imperative,  a  com- 
mand, a  fate,  a  tyrant.  They  have  forgotten  about  the 
material  circumstances  surrounding  the  mouse  and  the 
cat,  the  bat  and  the  insect,  the  bumble  bee  and  the  clover. 

*At  present  the  hedonists,  operating  with  the  reason  of  their 
time,  explain  interest  as  such  (money  which  produces  money) 
by  means  of  the  differential  value  between  the  good  of  the 
present  and  the  good  of  the  future.  They  make  a  psychological 
concept  of  the  assumption  of  risk,  and  other  considerations  of 
matter  of  fact  commercial  practice.  And  then  they  operate 
upon  such  matters  by  the  help  of  mathematical  processes  which 
are  often  factitious  and  fictitious. 


72  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

The  process  of  evolution,  which  is  a  mutually  balancing 
expression  of  infinite  movements  giving  rise  to  many 
complicated  problems,  not  to  one  single  theorem,  is 
suddenly  transformed  into  one  fantastic  Evolution. 
Consequently  the  vulgarisers  of  Marxian  sociology  ren- 
der conditions,  relations,  interconnections  of  common 
economic  life,  into  a  certain  fantastic  something  which 
dominates  us,  frequently  because  these  expounders  of 
Marxism  lack  literary  ability.  The  whole  thing  is  made 
to  look  as  though  there  were  still  other  matters  to  con- 
sider but  merely  the  natural  elements  of  the  problem, 
such  as  persons  and  persons,  renters  and  house  owners, 
land  owners  and  farm  hands,  capitalists  and  wage 
earners,  gentlemen  and  servants,  exploited  and  exploit- 
ers, in  one  word,  human  beings  living  in  definite  condi- 
tions of  time  and  place,  in  various  degrees  of  mutual 
dependence  on  account  of  the  peculiar  manner  of  own- 
ing and  using  the  social  means  of  production. 

The  undoubted  recurrence  of  the  metaphysical  vice, 
which  sometimes  directly  coincides  with  mythology, 
should  make  us  indulgent  toward  the  causes  and  condi- 
tions, whether  directly  psychic,  or  more  generally  social, 
which  have  in  past  times  retarded  the  advent  of  critical 
thought,  which  is  consciously  experimental  and  stands 
cautiously  on  guard  against  verbalism.  There  is  no  use 
in  going  back  to  Comte's  three  epochs.  Of  course,  the 
question  of  the  quantitative  predominance  of  theological 
and  metaphysical  forms  in  the  various  epochs  of  human 
history  must  be  discussed.  But  it  must  not  be  con- 
sidered in  the  light  of  an  exclusively  qualitative  differ- 
ence from  the  socalled  scientific  epoch.  Human  beings 
have  never  been  exclusively  theological  or  metaphysical, 
nor  will  they  ever  be  exclusively  scientific.  The  merest 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  73 

savage,  who  is  afraid  of  his  fetish,  knows  that  it  costs 
less  trouble  to  descend  with  the  river  than  to  swim 
against  its  current,  and  the  performance  of  his  most 
elementary  labors  implies  a  certain  amount  of  experi- 
ence and  science.  On  the  other  hand,  we  have  in  our 
day  scientists,  whose  minds  are  clouded  by  mythologies. 
Metaphysics,  as  the  opposite  of  scientific  accuracy,  has 
not  yet  become  so  prehistoric  a  fact  as  to  be  on  the  same 
level  with  tattooing  and  cannibalism. 

There  is  no  one,  I  hope,  who  would  place  the  definite 
victory  over  metaphysics  entirely  to  the  credit  of  histo- 
rical materialism,  at  least  over  metaphysics  as  under- 
stood heretofore,  according  to  Engels.  This  victory  is 
rather  a  particular  case  in  the  development  of  anti- 
metaphysical  thought.  It  would  not  have  happened,  had 
not  critical  thought  developed  long  ago.  We  have  to 
square  accounts  in  this  matter  with  the  entire  history  of 
modern  science.  When  Don  Ferrante  of  the  Promessi 
Sposi*  (in  the  17th  century,  mind  you)  died  of  the 
pest  while  denying  its  existence,  because  it  was  not  men- 
tioned in  the  ten  categories  of  Aristotle,  scholasticism 
had  already  received  the  first  hard  and  decisive  blows. 
He  was  the  last  convinced  scholastic,  and  I  hope  Leo 
XIII  will  not  object  to  this  statement  because  it  inter- 
feres with  his  business.  And  from  then  until  now  we 
have  a  long  history  of  positive  conquests  of  thought,  by 
which  the  essence  of  independent  philosophy,  which  dist- 
inguished it  from  science,  namely  the  theory  of  cogni- 
tion, was  either  absorbed,  or  eliminated,  or  otherwise 
reduced  and  assimilated.  On  this  road  of  scientific 
thought  we  meet  with  such  things  as  empirical  psycho- 

*"The  Engaged  Lovers,"  a  novel  by  Alessandro  Manzoni. — 
Translator. 


74  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

logy,  language  study,  Darwinism,  the  history  of  institu- 
tions, and  criticism,  strictly  socalled.    I  should  also  add 
positivism,  were  I  not  afraid  of  being  misunderstood. 
As  a  matter,  of  fact,  taking  positivism  as  a  whole  and 
summarily,  it  has  been  one  of  the  many  forms  through 
which  the  thought  of  mankind  has  approached  a  con- 
ception of  philosophy,  which  does  not  reason  before  the 
fact,  but  is  the  outcome  of  the  immanent  nature  of 
things.     "We  need  not  be  surprised,  on  this  account,  if 
the  generic  similarity  of  historical  materialism  to  so 
many  other  products  of  the  contemporaneous  thought 
and  knowledge  has  led  many,  who  deal  with  science  in 
the   style   of  literary  men   or  magazine   readers,   into 
making  the  misake  of  acting  under  superficial  impres- 
sions, following  the  impulses  of  erudite  curiosity,  and 
flattering  themselves  that  they  could  make  the  Marxian 
theory  more  complete  by  this  or  that  addition.    We  shall 
have  to  put  up  with  such  tinkering  for  a  while.    Many 
are  led  into  this  error  through  the  habit,  which  is  at 
present  common  in  all  the  branches  of  modern  science, 
of  considering  everything  from  the  point  of  view  of 
evolution  and  growth.    Since  everybody  is  talking  about 
evolution,  the  inexperienced  and  superficial  think  that 
everybody  means  the  same  thing.    You  have  very  pro- 
perly directed  your  attention  to  the  various  points  of 
differentiation  in  historical  materialism,  which,  let  me 
add,  are  characteristic  of  a  science  which  is  based  on 
dialectic  and  revolutionary  communism.     You  did  not 
propose  to  settle  the  question,  whether  Mr.  Marx  could 
go  arm  in  arm  with  this  or  that  other  philosopher,  but 
you  rather  strive  to  ascertain,  what  kind  of  philosophy 
is  the  logical  and  necessary  outcome  of  the  Marxian 
theory. 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  75 

It  is  for  these  reasons  that  I  have  not  objected,  and  do 
not  object  now,  to  the  use  of  metaphysical  language  on 
your  part,  taking  this  term  in  a  sense  which  is  not 
disparaging.  Marxism  deals  fundamentally  with  gene- 
ral problems.  And  these  refer,  on  the  one  hand,  to  the 
limits  and  forms  of  cognition,  and  on  the  other  to  the 
relations  of  mankind  to  the  rest  of  the  knowable  and 
known  universe.  Isn't  this  what  you  intend  to  convey? 
For  this  very  reason  did  I  devote  my  attention  to  the 
most  general  questions  in  the  second  of  my  essays.  But 
I  treated  the  subject  in  such  a  way  that  my  intention 
remained  hidden. 

Whoever  considers  historical  materialism  in  its  full 
significance,  will  find  that  it  presents  three  lines  of 
study.  The  first  corresponds  to  the  practical  require- 
ments of  the  socialist  parties,  demands  the  acquisition 
of  an  adequate  knowledge  of  the  specific  conditions  of 
the  proletariat  in  each  country,  and  adapts  socialist  acti- 
vity to  the  causes,  prospects,  and  dangers  of  complex 
politics.  The  second  may  lead,  and  will  certainly  do  so, 
to  a  revision  of  the  methods  of  writing  history,  for  it 
tends  to  establish  this  art  on  the  field  of  class  struggles 
and  social  relations  following  from  them,  on  the  basis  of 
the  corresponding  economic  structure,  which  every  histo- 
rian must  henceforth  know  and  understand.  The  third 
consists  in  the  treatment  of  the  directing  principles.  In 
order  to  understand  and  follow  these,  we  must  of  necess- 
ity be  guided  by  the  general  points  of  view  which  you 
indicate. 

Now,  it  seems  to  me— and  I  have  furnished  the  proof 
in  writing— that  the  adherence  to  general  principles  as 
such  does  not  necessarily  imply  a  return  to  a  formal 
scholasticism,  or  to  a  disregard  for  the  things  from 


76  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

which  these  general  principles  are  deduced,  so  long  as 
we  do  not  relapse  into  the  ancient  error  of  believing 
that  ideas  are  a  sort  of  supernatural  agency  standing 
above  things,  but  still  admit  the  inevitable  division  of 
labor.  It  is  certain  that  these  three  lines  of  study  were 
combined  into  one  in  the  mind  of  Marx,  and  not  only  in 
his  mind,  but  also  in  his  works.  His  politics  were,  in 
a  way,  the  practical  application  of  his  historical  mate- 
rialism, and  his  philosophy  was  incorporated  in  his  cri- 
tique of  political  economy,  for  this  was  his  method  of 
dealing  with  history.  But  taking  it  for  granted  that 
such  a  universal  comprehension  is  the  characteristic 
mark  of  a  genius  who  inaugurates  a  new  line  of  thought, 
the  fact  is  that  Marx  himself  carried  his  theory  to  its 
full  conclusion  only  in  one  case,  and  that  is  in  Capital. 
The  perfect  identification  of  philosophy,  or  of  critic- 
ally self-conscious  thought,  with  the  material  of  know- 
ledge, in  other  words,  the  complete  elimination  of  the 
traditional  distinction  between  philosophy  and  science, 
is  a  tendency  of  our  times.  However,  it  is  a  tendency 
which  remains  mostly  in  the  stage  of  mere  desire.  It  is 
precisely  this  tendency  to  which  some  refer  when  claim- 
ing that  metaphysics  has  been  completely  overcome. 
Others,  again,  who  are  more  exact,  suppose  that  a  science 
in  its  perfect  state  will  have  absorbed  philosophy.  The 
same  tendency  justifies  the  use  of  the  term  scientific 
philosophy,  which  would  otherwise  be  ridiculously 
absurd.  If  this  expression  can  ever  have  its  practical 
verification  through  the  evidence  of  proof,  it  will  be 
done  precisely  by  means  of  historical  materialism,  as  it 
was  in  the  mind  and  in  the  writings  of  Marx.  There 
philosophy  is  so  much  in  the  things  themselves,  and  so 
permeated  with  them,  that  the  reader  of  that  work  feels 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  77 

the  effect,  as  though  philosophizing  were  a  natural  func- 
tion of  the  scientific  method. 

Should  I  stop  here  and  make  a  confession?  Or  have 
I  only  to  limit  myself  to  an  objective  discussion  with  you 
of  those  points  on  which  we  can  approach  one  another 
in  our  aims  ?  If  I  had  to  be  satisfied  with  the  aphoristic 
expressions  which  are  typical  of  a  confession,  I  should 
say:  a)  The  ideal  of  knowledge  should  be  one  in  which 
the  antagonism  between  science  and  philosophy  is  at  an 
end;  b)  However,  (empirical)  science  is  in  a  process  of 
continual  growth,  multiplies  in  material  and  depart- 
ments, and  differentiates  at  the  same  time  the  instru- 
ments used  in  the  various  lines,  while  on  the  other  hand 
the  mass  of  methodical  and  formal  knowledge  contin- 
ually accumulates  under  the  name  of  philosophy;  c) 
For  this  reason  the  distinction  between  science  and  phi- 
losophy will  always  be  maintained  as  a  provisional  ele- 
ment, in  order  to  indicate  that  science  is  always  in  pro- 
cess of  growth  and  that  this  growth  is  largely  accompa- 
nied by  self -critique. 

It  is  sufficient  to  look  at  Darwin,  in  order  to  under- 
stand how  cautious  we  should  be  in  affirming  that  hence- 
forth science  implies  of  itself  the  end  of  philosophy. 
Darwin  has  certainly  revolutionized  the  field  of  the 
science  of  organisms,  and  with  it  the  entire  conception 
of  nature.  But  Darwin  himself  did  not  have  the  full 
understanding  of  the  import  of  his  discoveries.  He  was 
not  the  philosopher  of  his  science.  Darwinism  as  a  new 
view  of  life,  and  of  nature,  is  beyond  the  personality 
and  intentions  of  Darwin  himself.  On  the  other  hand, 
some  vulgar  expounders  of  Marxism  have  robbed  this 
theory  of  its  immanent  philosophy  and  reduced  it  to  a 
simple  way  of  deducing  changes  in  the  historical  condi- 


78  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

tions  from  changes  in  the  economic  conditions.  Such 
simple  observations  suffice  to  convince  us  that  while  we 
may  affirm  that  a  perfect  science  is  a  perfect  philosophy, 
or  that  such  a  philosophy  signifies  but  the  highest  degree 
of  elaboration  of  concepts  (Herbart),  we  must  not 
authorize  any  one,  in  making  such  a  statement,  to  speak 
disparagingly  of  the  thing  we  may  call  philosophy  as  a 
matter  of  differentiation.  Nor  should  we  believe  every 
scientist  who  claims  regardless  of  the  mental  develop- 
ment at  which  he  may  stop  that  he  has  triumphed  over 
that  bagatelle  called  philosophy  or  become  its  heir.  And 
therefore  you  did  not  ask  an  idle  question,  when  you 
inquired  in  substance :  What  will  be  the  spirit  in  which 
the  advocates  of  historical  materialism  will  look  upon 
the  remaining  philosophies  ? 


VI. 

Rome,  May  28,  1897. 

In  the  scientific  biography  of  our  two  great  authors 
there  is  a  blank.  A  certain  work  of  theirs  wandered  to 
the  printer  in  1847.  But  for  accidental  reasons  it  re- 
mained unpublished.*  In  that  work,  which  remained 
in  the  form  of  a  manuscript,  and  which,  so  far  as  I 
know,  was  never  seen  by  any  other  outside  author 
since,**  they  squared  accounts  with  their  own  conscien- 
ces by  coming  to  an  understanding  about  their  position 
toward  the  other  currents  of  contemporaneous  philo- 
sophy. There  is  no  doubt  that  this  account  was  closed 
principally  with  the  Hegelian  conclusions  and  their  ma- 
terialistic counterpart  in  the  theories  of  Feuerbach. 
Aside  from  general  reasons  connected  with  the  philoso- 
phical movement  of  that  time,  this  opinion  is  further 
strengthened  by  various  passages  from  magazine  and 
newspaper  articles,  which  were  recently  published  by 
Struve  in  the  Neue  Zeit,  as  souvenirs  of  former  contro- 
versies of  Marx.  But  what  was  the  full  mental  position 
of  these  two  writers?  How  far  did  their  bibliographical 
horizon  reach?  What  attitude  did  they  assume  toward 
the  other  scientific  struggles,  which  later  on  blossomed 
out  into  so  many  revolutions,  in  the  field  of  natural 
philosophy  as  well  as  in  that  of  historical  philosophy, 

*See  Marx,  "Critique  of  Political  Economy,"  author's  preface, 
page  13. — Also  Engels,  "Feuerbach,"  author's  preface,  page  33. 

**I  once  asked  Engels  to  show  this  manuscript,  not  to  me, 
but  to  the  anarchist  Mackay,  who  was  very  much  interested  in 
Stirner.  But  Engels  replied  to  me  that  the  manuscript  had 
been  too  much  gnawed  by  mice. 

79 


80  SOCIALISM'  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

and  how  much  did  they  know  about  those  things?  "We 
have  no  satisfactory  replies  to  these  questions.  Of 
course,  we  understand  that  one  might  be  sorry  to  have 
published  in  his  young  years  some  writings  which  one 
would  write  quite  differently  in  his  advanced  years. 
But  still  it  is  so  much  harder  for  us  to  get  access  to 
them,  when  we  wish  to  study  these  authors.  Engels  him- 
self was  of  the  opinion  that  this  work  had  produced  the 
desired  effect,  inasmuch  as  it  had  cleared  up  the  question 
for  those  who  had  written  it. 

Subsequently,  after  the  authors  had  taken  their  own 
road,  they  did  not  write  any  more  on  questions  of  philo- 
sophy in  the  strict  meaning  of  the  term.*  Not  only 
their  occupation  as  practical  agitators,  as  publicist  wri- 
ters, as  devotees  of  the  proletarian  movement,  influenced 
them  in  this  respect,  but  also  their  own  mental  inclina- 
tions tended  to  take  them  away  from  the  occupation  of 
professional  philosophers.  It  would,  therefore,  be  a  vain 
undertaking  to  search  step  by  step  for  the  personal 
opinions  which  they  entertained  in  their  studies  and 
reading  of  new  conclusions  of  science,  whether  these 
were  in  line  with  their  new  method  of  historical  research 
or  opposed  to  it.  It  is  certain  that  we  must  recognize  as 
auxiliaries,  and  as  cases  analogous  to  the  rise  of  histori- 
cal materialism,  the  recently  developed  psychology,  the 
trenchant  critique  of  professional  philosophy,  the  school 
of  industrial  history,  Darwinism  in  its  strict  and  wide 
meaning,  the  growing  tendency  in  history  to  recognise 
natural  phenomena,  the  discovery  of  the  institutions  of 

*Of  course,  we  except  from  this  statement  the  first  chapters 
of  "Anti-Duhiing,"  which  are,  moreover,  of  a  controversial 
character,  and  Engels'  "Feuerbach,"  which  is  substantially  but 
an  extensive  review  of  a  certain  book,  interspersed  with  some 
retrospective  and  personal  observations  of  the  author. 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  81 

prehistoric  times,  and  the  ever  increasing  inclination  to 
combine  philosophy  and  science.  But  it  would  be  ridi- 
culous to  apply  the  yardstick  of  an  editor  of  some  Criti- 
cal Review,  by  which  he  measures  new  books,  or  of  a 
professor  who  lays  before  his  pupils  the  successive  im- 
pressions of  his  own  reading,  to  Marx  and  Engels.  That 
is  not  the  way  to  estimate  the  work,  which  these  two 
thinkers  may  have  done,  or  actually  did,  in  assimilating 
the  fruits  of  contemporaneous  science,  these  thinkers, 
who  looked  at  things  from  their  own  specific  and  speci- 
fied point  of  view  and  used  their  historical  materialism 
as  an  individualised  instrument  of  research  and  analysis. 
This  is  substantially  the  mark  of  originality.  To  use  this 
term  without  such  restrictions  would  be  absurd.  But 
while  they  gave  up  philosophical  writing  in  the  strict 
professional  meaning  of  the  term,  they  became  the  most 
perfect  types  of  philosophical  scientists.  This  scientific 
philosophy  is  for  many  but  an  unattainable  desire,  while 
otherk  make  of  it  a  means  of  telling  the  plain  truth  about 
obvious  facts  of  scientific  experience  in  a  new  style  of 
phraseological  affectation.  Sometimes  it  is  a  general 
form  of  rationalism,  and  after  all  it  is  not  possible  to 
grasp  it,  unless  one  makes  himself  familiar  with  the  par- 
ticulars of  real  life  in  the  penetrating  way,  which  is 
appropriate  for  a  genetic  method  arising  out  of  the 
nature  of  things.  Engels  wrote  recently  in  his  Anti- 
Diihring:  "As  soon  as  every  individual  science  is  con- 
fronted with  the  necessity  of  coming  to  a  clear  under- 
standing of  its  position  in  the  general  interrelation  of 
things  and  the  knowledge  of  things,  any  special  science 
of  the  general  interrelation  becomes  superfluous.  No 
portion  of  the  entire  philosophy  of  previous  times  will 
then  remain  independent,  except  the  theory  of  cognition 


82  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

and  its  laws,  in  other  words,  formal  logic  and  dialectics. 
All  the  rest  of  it  will  be  absorbed  by  the  positive  science 
of  nature  and  history. ' ' 

Anything  is  possible  for  the  erudite,  the  seekers  of 
subjects  for  dissertations,  the  budding  post-graduates. 
They  have  made  a  stew  of  the  ethics  of  Herodotus,  the 
psychology  of  Pindar,  the  geology  of  Dante,  the  entomo- 
logy of  Shakespere,  and  the  pedagogy  of  Schopenhauer. 
For  stronger  and  better  reasons  they  may  speak  of  the 
logic  of  Capital  and  construct  a  system  of  the  philosophy 
of  Marx,  duly  specified  and  classified  according  to  the 
sacramental  canons  of  professional  science.  That  is  a 
matter  of  taste.  For  my  part,  I  prefer  the  artlessness  of 
Herodotus  and  the  ponderous  style  of  Pindar  to  that 
erudition  which  extracts  their  specific  properties  by  the 
help  of  posthumous  analysis.  I  prefer  to  leave  un- 
touched the  individuality  of  Capital,  to  which  have  con- 
tributed, as  to  an  organism,  all  the  ideas  and  knowledge 
which  are  distinguished  by  the  name  of  logic,  psycho- 
logy, sociology,  law,  and  history,  in  their  strict  meaning. 
Also  that  rare  flexibility  and  smoothness  of  thought  have 
contributed  to  it,  which  form  the  esthetics  of  the  dialec- 
tic method. 

Of  course,  this  book  is,  and  will  always  be,  subject  to 
particular  analysis,  in  spite  of  this.  But  it  will  never 
be  refuted  as  a  whole  by  the  mere  experimenters,  the 
scholastics  who  love  nice  definitions  that  are  not  assimi- 
lated by  the  flow  of  thought,  the  Utopian  thinkers  of  all 
shades,  especially  the  liberal  Utopians  and  the  liberta- 
rians, who  are  more  or  less  anarchists  without  knowing 
it.  It  is  an  almost  insuperable  difficulty  for  some  intel- 
lectuals to  merge  themselves  in  the  reality  of  social  and 
historical  interrelations.  Instead  of  taking  society  as  a 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  83 

whole,  in  which  certain  laws  are  generated  by  a  natural 
process  and  become  the  mutual  relations  of  movements, 
many  feel  the  need  of  looking  upon  things  as  fixed,  for 
instance  egoism  here,  altruism  there,  and  so  forth.  A 
typical  case  of  this  sort  is  that  of  the  modern  hedonists. 
They  are  not  satisfied  with  studying  the  social  combina- 
tion as  seen  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  economic  inter- 
pretation, but  resort  to  the  expedient  of  evaluation  as 
the  logical  psychologic  premise  of  economics.  This  ex- 
pedient supplies  them  with  a  scale,  and  they  study  its 
degrees  as  though  these  were  the  theoretical  expressions 
of  definite  types.  One  might  as  well  study  formal  esthe- 
tics by  studying  only  degrees  of  pleasure.  By  means  of 
this  scale,  with  its  degrees  of  estimating  needs,  they 
measure  the  things  which  they  call  good.  They  examine 
the  relations  of  things  to  the  various  degrees  of  this 
scale,  taking  into  account  their  available  and  obtainable 
quantities,  and  in  this  way  they  determine  the  quality  of 
their  values,  the  limits  of  their  values,  and  their  final 
value.  After  they  have  thus  constituted  political  econo- 
mics on  a  basis  of  abstract  generalities,  which  are  in- 
different to  the  things  which  nature  freely  gives  as  well 
as  to  those  which  are  produced  in  the  sweat  of  the 
human  brow  (and  by  the  thankless  labor  of  history), 
they  transform  poor,  obvious,  and  plain  production,  with 
its  familiar  common  life,  which  the  theoretical  writers 
of  classic  economy  and  of  critical  socialism  have  analys- 
ed, into  a  particular  case  of  universal  algebra.  Work, 
which  is  the  very  nerve  of  life  from  our  point  of  view, 
because  it  is  man  in  the  making,  becomes  from  their 
point  of  view  a  means  of  avoiding  pain  or  selecting  the 
least  pain.  Amid  this  abstract  atomistic  of  forces,  esti- 


84  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

mates,  and  degrees  of  pleasure,  a  man  loses  sight  of 
"history,  and  progress  resolves  itself  into  a  mere  shadow. 
If  I  had  to  give  some  sort  of  an  outline,  it  would  not 
be  out  of  place  to  say  that  the  philosophy,  which  histo- 
rical materialism  implies,  is  the  tendency  toward  mon- 
ism. And  I  lay  a  special  stress  upon  the  word  tendency. 
I  say  tendency,  and  let  me  add,  a  formal  and  critical 
tendency.  With  us  it  is  not  a  question  of  relying  on  an 
intuitive  theosophical  or  metaphysical  knowledge  of  the 
universe,  on  the  assumption  that  we  have  arrived  with- 
out further  ceremony  at  a  comprehensive  view  of  the 
basic  substance  of  all  phenomena  and  processes  by  an 
act  of  transcendental  cognition.  The  word  tendency  ex- 
presses precisely  that  our  mind  has  adapted  itself  to  the 
conviction  that  everything  can  be  conceived  as  in  the 
making,  that  even  the  conceivable  is  but  in  the  making, 
and  that  the  process  of  growth  is  similar  in  character  to 
continuity.  The  thing  which  differentiates  this  concep- 
tion of  the  genetic  process  from  the  vague  transcenden- 
tal imaginations  of  men  like  Schelling  is  the  critical 
discernment.  This  implies  a  specialization  of  research 
and  an  adherence  to  empirical  methods  in  following  the 
internal  movements  of  the  process.  It  means  giving  up 
the  pretense  of  holding  in  one's  hand  a  universal  dia- 
gram for  all  things.  This  is  the  way  in  which  the  vulgar 
evolutionists  proceed.  Once  that  they  have  taken  hold 
of  the  abstract  idea  of  growth  (evolution),  they  catch 
everything  with  it,  from  the  concentration  of  a  nebula  to 
their  own  fatuity.  It  was  the  same  with  the  imitators  of 
Hegel,  with  their  everlasting  rhythm  of  a  thesis,  anti- 
thesis, and  synthesis.  The  main  principle  of  critical  cog- 
nition, by  which  historical  materialism  corrects  monism, 
is  this:  It  takes  its  departure  from  the  practice  of 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  85 

things,  from  the  development  of  the  labor-process,  and 
just  as  it  is  the  theory  of  man  at  work,  so  does  it  consider 
science  itself  as  work.  It  impresses  the  empirical  scien- 
ces definitely  with  the  implicit  understanding  that  we 
accomplish  things  by  experiment,  and  brings  us  to  a 
realisation  of  the  fact  that  things  are  themselves  in  the 
making. 

The  passage  from  Engels,  which  I  quoted  a  while  ago, 
might,  perhaps,  give  rise  to  some  curious  results.  Some 
people  take  your  whole  hand,  when  you  offer  them  a 
little  finger.  If  it  is  admitted  that  logic  and  dialectics 
continue  to  exist  as  independent  lines  of  thought,  does 
not  that  open  a  fine  opportunity  to  rebuild  the  entire 
encyclopedia  of  philosophy?  By  doing  over,  piece  by 
piece,  or  in  every  individual  science,  the  work  of  ab- 
stracting the  formal  elements  contained  in  them,  vast 
and  comprehensive  systems  of  logic  may  be  written,  such 
as  those  of  Sigwart  and  Wundt.  These  are,  indeed, 
veritable  encyclopedias  of  the  doctrine  of  the  principles 
of  understanding.  Well,  if  that  is  all  the  professors 
want,  they  may  rest  assured  that  their  chairs  will  not 
be  abolished.  The  division  of  labor  on  the  intellectual 
field  permits  of  many  practical  combinations.  If  a  man 
wants  to  make  a  compilation  and  diagrammatic  outline 
of  principles,  by  which  we  give  ourselves  account  of  a 
definite  group  of  facts,  for  instance  of  a  certain  course 
of  law,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  him  from  calling 
his  work  the  general  science  of  law,  or,  if  he  likes,  the 
philosophy  of  law,  so  long  as  he  keeps  in  mind  that  he  is 
simply  arranging  in  a  tentative  way  a  certain  class  of 
historical  facts,  or  that  he  is  collecting  a  certain  line  of 
historical  facts  which  are  products  of  historical  develop- 
ment. 


86  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

A  formal  and  critical  tendency  toward  monism  on  one 
side,  an  expert  ability  to  keep  a  level  head  in  special 
research,  on  the  other,  that  is  the  outcome.  If  a  man 
swerves  but  a  little  from  this  line,  he  either  falls  back 
into  simple  empiricism  (without  philosophy)  or  he  rises 
to  the  transcendental  field  of  hyper-philosophy  with  its 
pretense  that  a  man  can  grasp  the  whole  world-process 
by  mere  intellectual  intuition. 

If  you  have  not  read  Hackel 's  lecture  on  Monism,  do 
me  the  favor  of  reading  it.    It  has  been  introduced  into 
France  by  an  enthusiastic  Darwinian  in  sociology  under 
the  title  Le  Monisme  lien  entre  la  Religion  et  la  Science 
(traduction  de  G.  Vacher  de  Lapouge,  Paris,  1897.) 
Hackel  combines  in  his  personality  three  different  facul- 
ties :    A  marvelous  capacity  for  specialised  research  and 
exposition,  for  profound  systematization  of  special  facts, 
and  for  a  poetical  intuition  of  the  universe,  which,  while 
it  is  purely  imagination,  sometimes  takes  on  the  aspect 
of  philosophy.    But,  my  illustrious  Hackel,  it  surpasses 
even  the  strength  of  your  excellent  mind  to  explain  the 
whole  universe,  from  the  vibrations  of  the  ether  to  the 
formation  of  your  brain!    But  why  do  I  stop  at  your 
brain?     Further  on,  from  the  origins  of  nations  and 
states  and  ethics  to  our  times,  including  the  protecting 
principles  of  your  university  at  Jena,  to  which  you  ren- 
der homage  on  only  47  pages  of  octavo!    Don't  you  re- 
member all  the  riddles  which  the  universe  presents  even 
to  our  advanced  science  ?    Or  have  you  at  your  home  a 
large  armory  full  of  those  nightcaps,  which  Heine  said 
the  Hegelians  used  for  covering  up  those  riddles?    Or 
don't  you  remember  that  case,  which  ought  to  appeal  to 
you  more  directly,  the  case  of  that  Bathybius  which 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  87 

Huxley  named  after  you,  and  which  turned  out  later  to 
be  a  mistake  ? 

In  short,  this  tendency  towards  monism  must  be 
accompanied  by  a  clear  recognition  of  the  specialization 
of  all  research.  It  is  a  tendency  to  combine  science  and 
philosophy,  but  at  the  same  time  also  a  continual  scruti- 
ny of  the  concrete  thought  used  by  us,  and  of  its  bear- 
ing. This  concrete  thought  can  be  very  well  detached 
from  its  concrete  object,  as  happens  in  logic,  strictly  so 
called,  and  in  the  general  theory  of  cognition,  which  you 
call  metaphysics.  We  can  think  concretely,  and  yet  at 
the  same  time  ponder  in  abstract  reflections  over  the  ma- 
terials and  conditions  of  thinkable  things.  Philosophy 
is  and  it  not.*  For  any  one  who  has  not  arrived  at  this 
understanding,  it  is  something  beyond  science.  And  for 
any  one  who  has  arrived  there,  it  is  science  brought  to 
perfection. 

Nowadays,  as  of  yore,  we  may  write  treatises  on  the 
abstract  aspects  of  some  special  experience,  for  instance 
on  ethics  or  politics,  and  we  may  impress  our  work  with 
all  the  perspicuity  of  a  system.  But  we  must  also  keep 
in  mind  that  the  fundamental  premises  of  our  treatise 
are  products  of  genetic  interrelation.  We  must  not  fall 
into  the  metaphysical  illusion  that  principles  are  eternal 
diagrams,  or  supernatural  things  outside  of  human  ex- 
perience. 

So  far  as  this  is  concerned,  there  is  no  reason  why  we 

•In  saying  this,  I  have  in  mind  a  queer  book,  of  XXIII  and 
539  pages  in  large  octavo,  written  by  Professor  R.  Whale,  of 
the  university  of  Czernowitz.  I  don't  reproduce  its  title,  which 
is  very  diffuse  and  argumentative.  The  book  is  published  by 
Braumuller,  Vienna,  1896.  Its  object  is  to  demonstrate  that 
philosophy  has  reached  its  end.  The  pity  of  it  is  that  the  book 
is  philosophical  from  cover  to  cover.  This  shows  that  philos- 
ophy, in  order  to  accomplish  its  own  negation,  must  affirm 
itself! 


88  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

should  not  enunciate  a  formula  like  the  following :  All 
the  knowable  may  be  known;  and  all  the  knowable  will 
be  known  in  an  infinite  time;  and  for  the  knowable  re- 
flecting about  itself,  for  us,  on  the  field  of  cognition, 
there  is  nothing  of  any  higher  importance.  Such  a  gene- 
ral statement  reduces  itself  practically  to  saying :  Know- 
ledge is  valuable  to  the  extent  that  we  can  actually  know 
things.  It  is  a  mere  play  of  fantasy  to  suppose  that 
our  mind  recognises  as  a  fact  an  absolute  difference  be- 
tween the  limits  of  the  knowable  and  the  absolutely  un- 
knowable. That  is  what  you,  von  Hartmann,  have  been 
doing  these  many  years  by  haunting  the  regions  of  the 
Unconscious,  which  you  see  so  consciously  in  operation, 
and  you,  Mr.  Spencer,  who  operate  continually  with  the 
knowledge  of  the 'Unknowable,  of  which  you  at  bottom 
know  something,  while  you  define  the  limits  of  cognition. 
Behind  these  phrases  of  Spencer  hides  the  God  of  the 
catechism.  It  is,  after  all,  nothing  but  the  relic  of  a 
hyper-philosophy  which  devotes  itself,  like  religion,  to 
the  cult  of  an  unknown,  which  is  yet  at  the  same  time 
declared  to  be  known  and  transformed  into  an  object  of 
worship.  In  this  state  of  mind,  philosophy  is  reduced  to 
a  study  of  phenomena  (the  semblance  of  things),  and 
the  concept  of  evolution  does  not  imply  at  all  that  real 
things  are  in  process  of  growth. 

In  opposition  to  this  mode  of  thought,  historical  mate- 
rialism, the  process  of  formation,  or  evolution,  is  real 
and  deals  with  reality  itself.  So  is  labor  real,  which  is 
the  self-development  of  man,  who  rises  from  mere  life 
(animaldom)  to  perfected  liberty  (in  communism).  By 
this  practical  inversion  of  the  problem  of  cognition  we 
confide  ourselves  wholly  to  the  hands  of  science,  which  is 
our  work,  Another  victory  over  fetishism !  Knowledge 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  89 

is  a  necessity  for  us.  It  is  produced  naturally,  refined, 
perfected,  strengthened  by  materials  and  technique,  like 
any  other  human  need.  We  learn  by  slow  degrees  the 
things  that  we  must  know.  Experimental  experience  is 
a  process  of  growth.  What  we  call  progress  of  the  mind 
is  an  accumulation  of  energies  of  labor.  It  is  this  pro- 
saic process,  into  which  the  alleged  absoluteness  of  con- 
sciousness resolves  itself,  this  consciousness,  which  was 
for  the  idealist  a  postulate  of  reason,  or  an  ontological 
entity.* 

A  queer  thing  (thafsocalled  thing  in  itself},  which 
we  do  not  know,  neither  today,  nor  tomorrow,  which  we 
shall  never  know,  and  of  which  we  nevertheless  know 
that  we  cannot  know  it.  This  thing  cannot  belong  to  the 
field  of  knowledge,  for  it  gives  us  no  information  of  the 
unknowable.  That  such  ideas  enter  into  the  scope  of 
philosophy  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  consciousness  of 
the  philosopher  is  not  quite  scientific,  but  rather  harbors 

*The  postulate  of  absoluteness  was  implied  In  the  proofs  of 
God's  existence,  especially  in  the  ontological  argument.  In 
myself,  a  finite  and  imperfect  being,  with  a  limited  knowledge, 
there  exists  the  capacity  to  think  of  the  infinite  and  absolutely 

perfect  being,  who  knows  everything.     Therefore  I  am also 

perfect!  And  so  It  happened  that  Cartesius  committed  the 
following  singular  misstep  in  dialectics,  which  for  him,  how- 
ever, remained  simply  a  doubt  (and  which  the  critics  have 
evidently  overlooked) :  "But  perhaps  I  may  be  something  more 
than  I  imagine,  and  all  the  perfections,  which  I  attribute  to  the 
nature  of  a  God,  may  in  some  manner  be  stored  up  in  myself, 
although  they  do  not  come  forth  as  yet  and  do  not  show  them- 
selves by  any  actions.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  I  experience  already 
that  my  knowledge  grows  and  perfects  itself  by  degrees,  and  I 
see  no  reason  why  it  should  not  continue  to  grow  in  this  way 
infinitely,  nor  why,  having  thus  grown  and  become  perfected,  I 
should  not  acquire  by  this  means  all  the  other  perfections  of 
the  divine  nature,  nor  finally  why  the  power  which  I  have  to 
acquire  these  perfections,  if  it  is  true  that  such  a  power  is  now 
in  me,  should  not  be  sufficient  to  produce  the  corresponding: 
ideas."  ("Oeuvres  de  Descartes,"  edition  of  V.  Cousin,  I,  pages 
282-83.) 


90  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

still  so  many  other  elements,  such  as  feelings  and  emo- 
tions, which  generate  psychic  combinations  under  the 
influence  of  fear,  or  through  fantasy  and  myths.  These 
combinations  hindered  the  development  of  rational  un- 
derstanding in  the  past,  and  still  cast  their  shadows  upon 
the  field  of  studied  and  prosaic  thought.  We  think  of 
death.  Theoretically  it  is  immanent  in  life.  Death, 
which  appears  so  tragical  in  complex  individuals,  who 
seem  to  be  the  true  and  rightful  organisms  to  common 
intuition,  is  immanent  in  the  primitive  elements  of  orga- 
nic substance,  owing  to  the  instability  and  slight  plast- 
icity of  protoplasm.  But  the  fear  of  death  is  quite  dif- 
ferent. It  is  the  egoism  of  life.  And  so  it  is  with  all 
other  feelings  and  emotions.  Their  mythical,  poetical, 
and  religious  antecedents  have  thrown,  are  throwing,  and 
will  throw  their  shadows  more  or  less  upon  the  field  of 
consciousness.  The  philosophy  of  a  purely  theoretical 
thinker,  who  contemplates  all  things  from  the  point  of 
view  of  things  in  themselves,  belongs  in  the  same  class  as 
the  attempt  to  apply  abstract  thought  to  the  entire  field 
of  consciousness  without  meeting  any  byways  or  stops. 
Look  at  Baruch  Spinoza,  that  true  hero  of  thought,  who 
studied  in  his  own  person  the  way  in  which  the  emotions 
and  passions,  as  expressions  of  his  internal  mechanism, 
transform  themselves  for  him  into  objects  of  geometrical 
analysis ! 

In  the  meantime,  until  the  heroism  of  Baruch  Spinoza 
shall  become  the  matter-of-fact  virtue  of  everyday  life 
in  the  higher  developed  humanity  of  the  future,  and  un- 
til myths,  poetry,  metaphysics  and  religion  shall  no 
longer  overshadow  the  field  of  consciousness,  let  us  be 
content  that  up  to  now,  and  for  the  present,  philosophy 
in  its  differentiated  and  its  improved  sense  has  served, 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  91 

and  serves,  as  a  critical  instrument  and  helps  science  to 
keep  its  formal  methods  and  logical  processes  clear :  that 
it  helps  us  in  our  lives  to  reduce  the  obstacles,  which  the 
fantastic  projections  of  the  emotions,  passions,  fears  and 
hopes  pile  in  the  way  of  free  thought ;  that  it  helps  and 
serves,  as  Spinoza  himself  would  say,  to  vanquish  imacii- 
nationem  et  ignorantiam. 


VII. 

Rome,  June  16,  1897. 

i  have  had  a  nice  experience.  Before  I  got  to  the  end 
of  these  letters,  I  had  to  discuss  the  very  same  subject, 
which  is  the  topic  of  my  conversation  with  you,  in  an- 
other place,  in  a  different  form,  and  not  quite  so  plea- 
santly. 

In  one  of  the  recent  issues  of  the  Critica  Sociale,  there 
appeared  a  sort  of  a  message,  sent  forth  by  Mr.  Antonino 
De  Bella,  a  sociologist  of  Calabria,  against  those  exclu- 
sive socialists,  who,  according  to  him,  take  the  word  of 
Marx  for  everything  in  every  question.  De  Bella  forgot 
to  tell  us,  whether  the  Marx,  to  whom  those  whom  he  is 
raking  over  the  coals  appeal,  is  the  genuine  specimen,  or 
another  made  to  order,  as  it  were,  invented  on  purpose, 
a  blond  Marx,  or  some  other.  He  considered  me  worthy 
of  a  place  among  those  obstinate  ones,  to  whom  he 
addresses  his  admonition  and  advice,  in  order  that  they 
may  perfect  themselves  by  means  of  a  wider  culture  in 
sociology  and  natural  history.  But  he  mentions  only  my 
name,  without  telling  us  to  what  particular  book,  saying, 
or  action  of  mine  he  is  referring.  Then  he  adds  a  little 
of  the  usual  rigmarole  of  sociology  with  a  smattering  of 
Darwinism  and  the  inevitable  long  list  of  names  of 
authors. 

I  thought  it  opportune  to  reply.  In  the  first  place,  I 
wanted  to  tell  him  curtly  that  scientific  socialism  was  not 
in  such  bad  condition  as  to  need  his  advice.  Then  I 
wanted  to  show  that  his  suggestions  referred  either  to 

92 


93 

things  that  were  understood,  or  to  things  that  were  con- 
trary to  Marxism.  And  above  all,  since  I  was  just  en- 
gaged in  a  conversation  with  you  on  the  subject  of  social- 
ism and  philosophy,  I  thought  it  opportune  to  use  a  liv- 
ing illustration  in  bringing  home  some  of  the  critical 
observations,  which  I  am  exchanging  with  you  in  this 
somewhat  bizarre  manner. 

I  inclose  my  reply,  just  as  it  appeared  in  yesterday's 
Critica  Sociale.  It  is  also  a  letter.  And  although  it  is 
not  addressed  to  you,  still  you  may  file  it  along  with  the 
others,  as  though  it  were  their  continuation.  It  com- 
pletes and  sums  up  the  others,  with  a  few  slight  and  ex- 
cusable repetitions. 

This  special  letter,  which  I  sent  to  the  editor  of  the 
Critica  Sociale,  is  not  particularly  sweet.  I  did  not  write 
it  exactly  with  the  intention  of  doing  Mr.  De  Bella  a 
favor.  It  is  illhumored  in  some  places.  Perhaps  this 
bitterness  in  my  critique  is  due  to  the  fact  that,  being 
deeply  intent  on  the  study  of  this  grave  problem  of  the 
relations  of  historical  materialism  to  the  other  scientific 
thought  of  my  time,  I  felt  that  the  advice  of  Mr.  De 
Bella  was  rather  inopportune,  at  least  so  far  as  I  was 
concerned,  if  for  no  other  reason  than  that  I  had  not 
asked  it.  Of  course,  it  was  not  my  intention  that  he 
should  see  what  I  was  writing  to  you. 

Rome,  June  5,  1897. 
Dear  Turati ! 

I  am  not  quite  certain  whether  De  Bella  really  means 
me,  when  he  mentions  my  name.  I  am  rather  inclined 
to  think  that  he  is  addressing  his  tirade  to  a  strawman 
of  his  own  making,  on  whose  back  he  has  pasted  my 
name  because  it  was  handy.  However  that  may  be,  as 


94  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

soon  as  he  mixes  my  name  up  in  his  meditations,  I  can- 
not refrain  from  adding  a  postscript  to  your  reply. 

It  is  well  known  that  I  explicitly  and  publicly  allied 
myself  with  socialist  thought  ten  years  ago.*  Ten  years 
are  not  a  very  long  time  of  my  physical  existence,  since 
I  count  four  more  than  half  a  hundred.  But  they  are 
certainly  a  short  span  of  my  intellectual  life.  Before  I 
became  a  socialist,  I  had  had  the  inclination,  leisure, 
time,  opportunity,  and  obligation  to  square  my  accounts 
with  Darwinism,  Positivism,  Neokantianism,  and  so 
many  other  scientific  questions  that  developed  around 
me  and  gave  me  occasion  to  develop  among  my  contem- 
poraries. For  I  hold  the  chair  of  philosophy  at  my  uni-. 
versity  since  1871,  and  before  that  I  had  studied  the 
things  which  are  needed  for  a  philosopher.  When  I 
turned  to  Socialism,  I  did  not  look  to  Marx  for  an  ABC 
of  knowledge.  I  did  not  look  in  Marxism  for  anything 
but  what  it  actually  contains,  namely  its  determined  cri- 
tique of  political  economy,  its  outlines  of  historical  ma- 
terialism, and  its  proletarian  politics,  which  it  proclaims 
or  implies.  Neither  did  I  look  in  Marxism  for  a  know- 
ledge of  that  philosophy,  which  is  its  premise  and  which 
it,  in  a  way,  continues  after  having  inverted  the  dialec- 
tics of  that  philosophy.  I  mean  Hegelianism,  which 
flourished  in  Italy  in  my  youth  and  in  which  I  had  been 
brought  up,  as  it  were.  I  don't  say  it  with  any  intent  to 
be  spiteful,  but  my  first  composition  in  philosophy, 
dated  May,  1862,  is  a  Defense  of  Hegel's  dialectics 

*"Since  1873  I  wrote  against  the  fundamental  principles  of 
the  system  of  liberalism,  and  In  1879  I  began  to  walk  on  the 
road  of  my  new  intellectual  faith,  which  I  still  hold  and  which 
has  been  confirmed  by  further  study  and  observation  during 
the  last  three  years."  Thus  I  wrote  on  page  23  of  my  lecture 
"On  Socialism,"  Rome,  1889.  This  lecture,  which  was  in  a  way 
a  confession  of  faith  in  a  popular  style,  was  supplemented  by 
ne  with  the  pamphlet  "Proletarians  and  Radicals,"  Rome,  1890. 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  95 

against  the  return  to  Kant  initiated  by  Ed.  Zeller! 
Therefore  I  did  not  have  to  familiarise  myself  first  with 
the  dialectic  mode  of  thought,  or  the  evolutionary  or  ge- 
netic method,  whatever  you  wish  to  call  it,  before  I  could 
understand  scientific  socialism,  for  I  had  lived  in  this 
circle  of  ideas  ever  since  I  had  begun  to  think  conscious- 
ly. I  add,  however,  that  while  Marxism  did  not  offer 
any  difficulties  to  me  so  far  as  the  intrinsic  and  formal 
outlines  of  its  conception  and  method  were  concerned, 
I  acquired  its  economic  content  only  by  dint  of  hard 
work.  And  while  I  acquired  this  knowledge  in  the  best 
way  that  I  could,  I  was  neither  compelled  nor  permitted 
to  confound  the  line  of  development  germane  to  histori- 
cal materialism,  in  other  words,  to  confound  the  meaning 
of  evolution  in  this  concrete  case  with  that  almost  diseas- 
ed condition  of  some  people's  brains,  especially  in  Italy, 
which  leads  them  to  speak  of  a  Madonna  Evolution  and 
to  worship  her. 

What  is  it  that  De  Bella  wants  of  me  1  That  I  should 
go  back  to  school  like  a  plucked  freshman  and  start  my 
course  over  again  ?  Or  does  he  want  me  to  be  rebaptised 
by  Darwin,  reconfirmed  by  Spencer,  thereupon  to  recite 
my  general  confession  before  my  comrades,  and  prepare 
to  receive  the  extreme  unction  from  him?  For  the  sake 
of  peace  I  should  be  willing  to  dismiss  all  the  other 
things.  But  I  strongly  protest  against  an  appeal  to  the 
consciences  of  my  comrades.  I  admit  that  there  is  some 
reason  for  strictness  and  often  tyranny  on  the  part  of 
my  comrades  in  matters  of  party  politics,  to  a  certain 
extent  and  under  certain  conditions.  But  that  my  com- 
rades should  have  authority  to  speak  with  arbitrary  de- 
cision in  matters  of  science,  simply  because  they  are 


96  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

comrades. ...  Go  away,  science  will  never  be  put  to  a 
test  vote,  even  in  the  socalled  society  of  the  future ! 

Or  does  he  want  something  less  presumptuous  than 
that?  Am  I  to  affirm  and  swear  that  Marxism  is  not  the 
universal  science,  and  that  the  things  which  it  studies  are 
not  the  universe  f  All  right,  I  grant  that  at  once.  And  I 
defy  the  idea  that  I  cannot  grant  that.  I  have  but  to 
remember  the  plan  of  study  at  the  university  and  the 
numerous  courses  it  includes.  I  grant  even  more  than 
that.  Here  it  is:  "This  doctrine  itself  is  only  in  its 
beginning  and  still  has  need  of  many  developments." 
(Historical  Materialism,  I,  page  97.)*" 

In  fact,  the  thing  that  torments  De  Bella  and  others 
like  him  is  precisely  the  chase  after  that  universal  philo- 
sophy, into  which  socialism  might  be  fitted  as  the  central 
point  of  everything.  Go  ahead !  The  paper  is  patient, 
say  the  German  editors  to  budding  writers.  But  I  can- 
not refrain  from  making  two  remarks.  The  first  is,  that 
no  wise  man  will  ever  succeed  in  giving  us  an  idea  of 
this  universal  philosophy  in  two  columns  of  Critica  So- 
ciale.  The  second  is  a  personal  one.  For  twenty  years 
I  have  detested  systematic  philosophy.  This  attitude  of 
my  mind  made  me  not  only  more  apt  to  accept  Marxism, 
which  is  one  of  the  ways  in  which  the  scientific  mind  has 
freed  itself  from  philosophy  as  such,  but  has  also  made 
of  me  an  inveterate  opponent  of  the  philosopher  Spencer, 
who  gave  us  still  another  diagram  of  the  universe  in  his 
First  Principles.  And  now  I  must  quote  from  my  own 
writings : 

*"I  make  no  vow  to  shut  myself  up  in  any  system  as  though 
in  a  prison."  Thus  I  wrote  twenty-four  years  ago  in  my  work 
ON  MORAL  LIBERTY,  Naples,  1873,  preface.  And  I  can  repeat 
that  now.  That  book  contains  a  detailed  exposition  of 
determinism,  and  was  then  supplemented  by  another  work 
of  mine,  entitled,  "Morality  and  Religion,"  Naples,  1873. 


SOCIALISM    AND   PHILOSOPHY  97 

' '  I  did  not  come  to  this  university,  twenty-three  years 
ago,  as  the  representative  of  any  orthodox  philosophy, 
nor  for  the  purpose  of  hatching  out  any  new  system.  By 
a  fortunate  accident  of  my  life  I  gained  my  education 
under  the  direct  and  straight  influence  of  two  great 
systems,  which  marked  the  close  of  that  philosophy, 
which  we  now  may  call  classic.  I  mean  the  systems  of 
Herbart  and  Hegel,  which  brought  to  its  extreme  culmi- 
nation the  antithesis  between  realism  and  idealism,  be- 
tween pluralism  and  monism,  between  scientific  psycholo- 
gy and  phrenology  of  the  mind,  between  a  specialisation 
of  methods  and  an  anticipation  of  every  method  by  om- 
niscient dialectics.  The  philosophy  of  Hegel  had  already 
blossomed  out  into  the  historical  materialism  of  Karl 
Marx,  and  that  of  Herbart  into  empirical  psychology, 
which,  under  certain  conditions  and  within  certain 
limits,  is  also  experimental,  comparative,  historical,  and 
social.  Those  were  the  years,  in  which  the  intensive  and 
extensive  application  of  the  principle  of  energy,  of  the 
atomic  theory,  of  Darwinism,  and  the  rediscovery  of  the 
precise  forms  and  conditions  of  general  philosophy,  revo- 
tutionized  before  our  eyes  our  entire  conception  of  nat- 
ure. And  in  those  times,  the  comparative  study  of  insti- 
tutions, aided  by  the  comparative  study  of  languages 
and  mythology,  then  of  prehistory,  and  finally  of  indust- 
rial history,  overthrew  most  of  the  actual  positions  and 
hypotheses,  upon  which  and  by  which  people  had  hither- 
to philosophized  concerning  law,  morality,  and  society. 
The  ferments  of  thought,  those  ferments  which  are  im- 
plied by  new  or  renewed  sciences, did  not  approach  as  yet, 
nor  do  they  approach  now,  a  new  development  of  system- 
atic philosophy,  which  should  contain  and  dominate  the 
entire  field  of  experience.  I  pass  by  such  philosophies 


98  SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

for  private  use,  and  of  private  invention,  as  those  of 
Nietzsche  and  von  Hartmann,  and  save  myself  all  cri- 
ticism of  those  pretended  returns  to  the  philosophers  of 
other  times,*  which  produce  a  philology  instead  of  a 
philosophy,  as  happened  to  the  Neokantians. " 

"I  pause  here  in  order  to  call  attention  to  the  almost 
incredible  mistake,  by  means  of  which  many,  especially 
in  Italy,  confound  without  further  ceremony  Positivism, 
as  a  certain  philosophy,  with  the  positive  acquisitions 
made  by  incessant  experience  in  nature  and  society.  To 
such  people  it  happens,  for  instance,  that  they  cannot 
distinguish  the  indisputable  merit  of  Spencer,  namely 
that  of  having  contributed  to  the  formulation  of  a  gene- 
ral philosophy,  from  his  incapacity  to  explain  a  single 

*A  return  to  other  philosophies  is  nowadays  also  suggested 
by  some  socialists.  The  one  wants  to  return  to  Spinoza,  that 
is,  to  a  philosophy,  in  which  the  historical  development  cuts 
no  figure.  Another  would  be  content  with  the  mechanical 
materialism  of  the  18th  century,  that  is,  with  a  repudiation  of 
any  and  all  history.  Still  others  think  of  reviving  Kant.  Does 
that  imply  also  the  revival  of  his  insoluble  antinomy  between 
practical  reason  and  theoretical  reason?  Does  it  mean  a  return 
to  his  fixed  categories  and  fixed  faculties  of  the  soul,  of  which 
Herbart  seemed  to  have  made  short  work?  Does  it  include  his 
categorical  imperative,  in  which  Schopenhauer  had  discovered 
the  Christian  commandments  in  the  disguise  of  a  metaphysical 
principle?  Does  it  mean  the  theory  of  natural  rights,  which 
even  the  Pope  does  not  care  to  uphold  any  more?  Why  don't 
they  let  the  dead  bury  the  dead? 

You  have  only  the  choice  of  two  logical  alternatives.  Either 
you  accept  those  other  philosophies  in  their  entirety,  just  as 
they  were  in  their  own  time,  and  in  that  case  you  must  say 
goodbye  to  historical  materialism.  Or  you  pick  out  from  them 
what  suits  you,  and  cut  your  arguments  to  fit  your  choice,  and 
in  that  case  you  burden  yourselves  with  useless  labor,  because 
the  history  of  thought  is  so  constituted  that  nothing  is  lost  of 
the  things  which  were  in  the  past  the  conditions  and  prepara- 
tions for  our  present  conceptions. 

There  is,  eventually  a  third  possibility,  namely  that  of  falling 
into  syncretism  and  confusion.  A  good  illustration  of  this  type 
Is  K  Woltmann  ("System  des  moralischen  Bewusstseins,"  Dus- 
seldorf,  1898),  who  reconciles  the  eternal  laws  of  morality  with 
Darwinism,  and  Marx  with  Christianity. 


SOCIALISM    AND    PHILOSOPHY  99 

historical  fact  by  means  of  his  wholly  diagrammatic  so- 
ciology. They  are  unable  to  separate  that  which  belongs 
to  the  scientist  Spencer  from  that  which  belongs  to  the 
philosopher  Spencer.  The  latter  is  also  a  back  number, 
for  he  is  sparring  with  such  categories  as  the  Homoge- 
neous, the  Heterogenous,  the  Indistinct,  the  Differentiat- 
ed, the  Known,  and  the  Unknown.  In  other  words,  he  is 
alternately  a  Kantian  without  knowing  it  and  a  cari- 
cature of  Hegel." 

"The  lecture  plan  of  the  university  should  distinctly 
reflect  the  actual  state  of  philosophy,  which  demands  at 
present  the  insistence  of  thought  on  really  known  things. 
In  other  words,  it  demands  just  the  reverse  of  any  pre- 
conceived theories  cencerning  cognition  by  means  of 
theological  or  metaphysical  cogitation."  (L'Universita 
e  la  Liberia  delta  scienza,  Rome  1897,  pages  15,  16, 
and  17.)* 

Ultimately,  then,  this  socalled  philosophy  championed 
by  De  Bella  is  at  bottom  nothing  but  another  edition  of 
that  trinity  Darwin-Spencer-Marx,  which  Enrico  Ferri 
set  in  circulation  about  three  years  ago  with  such  sug- 
gestive eloquence,  but  with  so  little  good  luck.*)  Well 

''I  would  recommend  to  the  reader  my  lecture  on  "La  Laurea 
in  Filosofia"  (The  Doctorate  in  Philosophy),  which  is  appended 
to  the  above  work.  My  friend  Lombroso  called  it  jokingly  "the 
beheading-  of  metaphysics." 

*The  lack  of  good  luck  was  demonstrated  by  many  articles 
which  were  written  against  this  conception,  beginning  with 
Kautsky's  strongly  peppered  and  salted  one  in  "Die  Neue  Zeit," 
XIII,  Vol.  I,  pages  709-716,  to  that  of  David  in  "Le  Devenir 
Social,"  December,  1896,  pages  1059-65,  not  to  mention  the 
others.  Incidentally,  Ferri  says  in  a  footnote  of  his  appendix  to 
the  French  edition  of  his  work  "Darwin,  Spencer,  Marx,"  Paris, 
1897:  "Professor  Labriola  quite  recently  repeated,  without  proof, 
the  assertion  that  socialism  is  not  reconcilable  with  Darwinism 
(in  his  article  on  '  Le  Manifeste  de  Marx  et  Engels,"  in  "Le 
Devenir  Social,'  June  1895)." — Now  it  is  true,  that  I  take 
issue,  in  my  essay  "In  Memory  of  the  Communist  Manifesto," 
with  those  who  "seek  in  this  doctrine  a  derivative  of  Darwin- 
ism, which  is  an  analogous  theory  only  in  a  certain  point  of 
view  and  in  a  very  broad  sense."  (Page  19) — But  it  seems  to 


100  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

now,  dear  Turati,  I  honestly  wish  to  assume  the  role  of 
devil's  advocate  and  admit  that  there  is  a  germ  of  truth, 
a  demand  for  the  satisfaction  of  a  real  need,  in  these 
vague  aspirations  to  a  philosophy  of  socialism,  and  in 
the  many  silly  things  said  in  this  respect  (and  some  have 
almost  gotten  to  the  point  of  believing  that  it  should  'be 
a  sort  of  philosophy  for  the  private  use  of  the  socialists 
alone).  Many  of  these  who  embrace  socialism,  and  not 
merely  as  simple  agitators,  lecturers,  and  candidates, 
feel  that  it  is  impossible  to  accept  it  as  a  scientific  con- 
viction, unless  it  can  be  combined  in  some  way  with  the 
rest  of  that  genetic  conception  of  things,  which  lies  more 
or  less  at  the  bottom  of  all  other  sciences.  This  accounts 
for  the  mania  of  many  to  bring  within  the  scope  of 
socialism  all  the  rest  of  science,  which  is  at  their  disposal. 
This  leads  to  many  mistakes  and  ingenuities,  all  of  which 
are  explicable.  But  it  also  carries  with-it  a  danger.  For 
many  of  these  intellectuals  may  forget  that  socialism  has 
its  real  basis  in  the  present  conditions  of  capitalist 
society  and  in  the  possible  aims  and  actions  of  the  prole- 
tariat and  other  poor  people.  Marx  may  become  a  myth- 
ical personage  through  the  work  of  the  intellectuals. 
And  while  they  discuss  the  whole  scale  of  evolution  up 
and  down,  and  down  and  up,  the  comrades  may  put  the 
following  philosophical  thesis  to  a  vote  in  one  of  their 
next  conventions:  The  first  fundament  of  socialism  is 
found  in  the  vibrations  of  the  ether.* 

me  that  to  deny  its  derivation  and  to  admit  its  analogy  does 
not  mean  to  deny  that  it  can  be  reconciled  with  Darwinism. 
Kindly  see  my  essay  on  "Historical  Materialism,"  chapter  iv. 

*This  philosophical  thesis  is,  in  a  way,  foreshadowed  in  the 
following-  words  of  Ferri,  which  conclude  the  aforementioned 
note:  "Biological  transformism  is  evidently  founded  on  uni- 
versal transformism,  and  at  the  same  time  it  is  the  tyasis  of 
economic  and  social  transformism."  Under  these  circumstances, 
Spencer  is  simultaneously  a  genius  and  an  idiot,  for  he  is  the 
prince  of  evolution  and  yet  he  never  could  understand  socialism! 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  101 

In  this  way  I  explain  to  myself  the  ingenuity  of  De 
Bella.  If  Marx  were  still  alive!  Don't  you  see?  He 
was  born  on  May  5,  1818,  and  died  on  March  14,  1883, 
and  therefore  he  might  still  be  alive,  as  human  life  is 
measured.  And  if  alive,  I  should  continue,  he  could 
have  completed  volume  III  of  Capital,  which  is  so  dis- 
connected and  so  obscure.  No  sirree!  says  De  Bella,  he 
would  have  become  a  materialist!  But  gracious  me! 
That  is  what  he  was  since  1845,  and  he  fell  out  with  the 
radical  ideologists  of  his  acquaintance  on  account  of  it. 
And  he  would  not  only  have  become  a  materialist,  ac- 
cording to  De  Bella,  but  also  a  positivist!  Positivism! 
In  vulgar  chronology,  this  term  signifies  the  philosophy 
of  Comte  and  his  followers.  Now,  it  had  given  up  its 
ghost  ideally  even  before  Marx  died  physically.  What  a 
fine  sight!  Materialism— Positivism— Dialectics,  a  holy 
trinity!  And  still  another  fine  sight!  The  scientific 
papacy  of  Comte  reconciled  with  the  infinite  process  of 
historical  materialism,  which  solves  the  problem  of 
cognition  differently  from  all  other  philosophies  and 
declares:  There  are  no  fixed  limits,  whether  a  priori  or  \ 
a  posteriori,  to  cognition,  because  human  beings  learn 
all  that  they  must  know  by  an  infinite  process  of  labor, 
which  is  experience,  and  of  experience,  which  is  labor.* 

Comte,  on  the  contrary,  proclaimed  that  the  cycle  of 
physics  and  astronomy  was  for  ever  closed,  just  at  the 
moment  when  the  mechanical  equivalent  of  heat  was 
found,  and  a  few  years  before  the  brilliant  discovery  of 
spectral  analysis.  And  in  1845  he  declared  the  research 
after  the  origin  of  species  to  be  absurd! 

*Next  I  expect  a  twin-star  Socrates-Marx.     For  Socrates  was    \ 
the  first  to  discover  that  understanding  is  a  process  of  labor,    I 
and  that  man  knows  only  those  things  well  which  he  can  do.-' 
A  book  of  mine  on  "La  Dottrina  di  Socrate"  bears  the  date  of 
1871,  Naples. 


102  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

But,  continues  De  Bella,  historical  materialism  must 
study  prehistoric  society.  And  this  is  precisely  where 
the  devil  plays  his  joke.  Ancient  Society,  by  Lewis  H. 
Morgan,  which  was  published  in  America  and  reached 
Europe  in  a  few  copies  through  the  firm  of  Macmillan, 
London,  (1877),  was  almost  killed  by  the  pitiless  silence 
of  the  English  ethnographers,  who  were  either  envious 
or  afraid.  But  the  results  of  Morgan's  investigations 
went  around  the  world  precisely  because  Engels  rescued 
them  by  his  book,  The  Origin  of  the  Family,  Private 
Property,  and  the  State,  (first  edition  1884,  fourth  edi- 
tion 1891).  This  book  is  at  the  same  time  a  review, 
an  exposition,  and  a  supplement  of  Morgan's  work.  It 
is  a  combination  of  Morgan  and  Marx.  And  what  does 
Engels  say  of  Morgan?  That  he  had,  "in  a  manner, 
discovered  anew  the  materialistic  conception  of  history, 
originated  by  Marx. . .  "  and,  "in  comparing  barbarism 
and  civilisation,  he  had  arrived,  in  the  main,  at  the  same 
results  as  Marx. ' '  And  why  did  Engels  write  his  book  ? 
Because  he  desired  to  utilize  the  notes  and  comments 
left  by  Marx. 

There!  Ordinary  chronology  is  of  great  importance, 
even  for  socialists. 

And  now  let  us  turn  to  the  inevitable  Spencer.  Is 
there  any  one  outside  of  Italy  who  ever  considered  him 
a  socialist?  Is  Spencer,  perhaps,  a  philosopher  of  the 
other  world?  You  can  read  him,  and  about  him,  in 
every  language,  not  excluding  that  of  modernized  Japan. 
He  does  not  sin  through  lack  of  clearness.  From  my 
point  of  view,  who  love  succinct  brevity,  he  rather  suffers 
from  prolixity  and  overdone  popularization.  The  first 
of  his  known  writings  bears  the  date  of  1843.  That  was 
the  time  when  Chartism  was  at  its  height.  This  work 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  103 

is  entitled,  The  Proper  Sphere  of  Government.  Spencer 
was  in  the  eyes  of  the  whole  world  as  an  admired  con- 
tributor to  the  Westminster  Review,  the  Economist,  and 
the  Edinburgh  Review.  And  take  note  once  more  of  the 
dates  of  his  contributions,  especially  from  1848  to  1859. 
Has  any  one  ever  deceived  himself  in  England  as  to  the 
meaning  and  value  of  his  social  and  political  work  ?  His 
Social  Statics  appeared  in  1851,  his  Psychology  (first 
edition  )  in  1855,  his  Education  in  1861,  the  first  edition 
of  First  Principles  in  1862,  his  Classification  of  Sciences 
in  1864,  his  Biology  from  1864  to  1867,  not  to  mention 
his  smaller  essays,  among  the  most  notable  of  them  his 
Hypothesis  of  Development  (1852),  his  Genesis  of 
Science  (1854),  and  his  Progress  and  Its  Law  (1857). 
Here  I  will  close  this  enumeration,  stopping  at  the  works 
which  appeared  before  the  first  volume  of  Capital  was 
out  (July  25,  1867).  Surely  it  did  not  require  the 
genius  of  a  Marx  in  order  to  discover  what  I. realized  as 
a  simple  student  of  philosophy,  namely,  that  those  writ- 
ings of  Spencer,  and  the  doctrine  of  evolution  enunciated 
in  them,  are  diagrammatical,  not  empirical,  that  Spen- 
cer's evolution  is  one  of  phenomena,  not  one  of  real 
things,  that  behind  it  stands  the  spectre  of  Kant's  thing 
in  itself,  which  he  worshipped  from  the  beginning  in  all 
his  essays  as  God  or  Divinity  (Statics,  edition  of  1851), 
and  which  he  later  circumscribed  with  the  revered  name 
of  the  Unknowable. 

If  Marx  had  ever  reviewed  the  works  of  Spencer  be- 
tween 1860  and  1870,  I  will  bet  that  he  would  have 
done  it  in  the  following  style:  "Here  we  have  the  last 
advance  of  the  shadow  cast  by  the  English  Deism  of  th  ^ 
17th  century;  here  we  have  the  latest  attempt  of  EnglH^ 
hypocrisy  to  combat  the  philosophy  of  Hobbes  and 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

Spinoza;  here  we  have  the  last  projection  of  Transcen- 
dentalism into  the  field  of  positive  science ;  here  we  have 
the  latest  mixture  of  the  egoistic  cretinism  of  Bentham 
with  the  altruistic  cretinism  of  the  Rabbi  of  Nazareth; 
here  we  have  the  last  attempt  of  the  bourgeois  intellect 
to  save,  by  means  of  free  research  and  free  competition 
in  this  world,  an  enigmatical  shred  of  faith  in  the  next 
world.  Only  the  triumph  of  the  proletariat  can  secure 
for  the  scientific  mind  the  full  and  perfect  conditions  of 
its  existence,  because  the  intellect  cannot  be  clear  until 
the  conditions  in  which  it  works  are  made  transparent. ' ' 
Thus  Marx  would  have  written,  or  could  have  written. 
But  he  was  busy  attending  to  the  International,  and 
Spencer  had  no  time  to  take  notice  of  this  association. 

On  March  17,  1883,  Engels  spoke  in  Highgate  Ceme- 
tery in  memory  of  his  friend  Marx,  who  had  died  three 
days  before,  and  he  began  his  address  with  these  words : 
"Just  as  Darwin  discovered  the  laws  of  development  in 
organic  nature,  so  Marx  discovered  the  laws  of  develop- 
ment of  human  history. '  '*  Should  not  De  Bella  feel 
mortified  on  reading  this? 

Nor  is  this  all.  In  his  Anti-Duhring  (first  edition 
1878,  third  edition  1894),  the  same  Engels  had  already 
acquired  all  the  fundamental  ideas  of  Darwinism,  which 
are  required  for  the  general  orientation  of  a  scientific 
socialist.  It  had  taken  him  about  ten  years  to  acquire 
this  new  education  in  natural  science,  and  he  declared 
frankly  that  he  was  more  at  home  in  it  than  Marx,  while 
Marx  was  better  versed  in  mathematics.  Nor  is  even 

*See  "Zurlcher  Socialdemokrat,"  March  22,  1883,  page  1. 
I  remark  by  the  way  that  Darwin,  who  had  died  the  year  be- 
fore, was  born  in  1809.  Engels  was  born  in  1820,  like  Spencer. 
They  were  all  real  contemporaries,  of  about  the  same  age,  and 
living  in  the  same  environment. 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  105 

this  all.  The  first  edition  of  Capital  contains  a  charac- 
teristic and  very  original  note  concerning  the  new  world 
discovered  by  Darwin.  Understand  well  that  these  two 
modest  mortals,  who  never  made  any  supernatural  por- 
tions of  the  universe,  were  always  referring  to  no  other 
Darwinism  but  that  prosaic  one  of  the  Origin  of  Species 
(1859),  which  consists  of  a  series  of  observations  and 
experiences  on  the  limited  field  of  reality,  a  reality 
which  extends  beyond  the  origins  of  life  and  precedes 
human  history  by  a  considerable  length.  They  could 
not  help  perceiving  that  the  Darwinian  theories  pre- 
sented an  analogous  case  to  their  epigenetic  conception 
of  history,  which  they  had  partly  defined,  partly  just 
begun  studying.*  They  never  heard  anything  of  that 
Darwinism,  which  De  Bella  calls  the  discoverer  of  the 
laivs  of  entire  humanity,  of  that  Darwinism,  which  is 
supposed  to  be  good  for  everything,  which  is  a  gratuitous 
invention  of  scientific  publicists  and  philosophical 
decadents.  Did  not  their  friend  Heine  tell  them  that 
the  universe  is  full  of  holes,  and  that  the  German  pro- 
fessor of  Hegel's  school  covers  these  holes  with  his 
nightcap  ? 

But  let  us  leave  aside  the  universe  and  its  holes,  dear 
Turati,  and  let  us  all  do  our  duty.  I  always  remember 
that  strong  invective,  which  the  Hegelian  B,  Spavanta 
hurled  about  30  years  ago :  ' '  In  our  country  they  study 
the  history  of  philosophy  in  the  geography  of  Ariosto, 
and  they  quote  as  equals  Plato  and  the  abbe  Fornari, 
Torquato  Tasso  and  Totonno  Tasso."** 

*I  have  explained  what  I  mean  by  "epigenetic  conception"  in 
a  work  entitled  "The  Problems  of  the  Philosophy  of  History," 
Rome,  1887.  This  work  is  partly  based  on  an  older  work  of 
mine  entitled  "The  Teaching  of  History,"  Rome,  1876. 

**The  last  named  was  a  music  hall  singer,  and  was,  in  his 
own  cracked  estimation,  a  precursor  of  Oscar  Wilde. 


VIII. 

Rome,  June  20,  1897. 

I  must  write  a  sort  of  postscript,  which  shall  supple- 
ment my  letter  preceding  the  last  one,  so  full  of  difficult 
questions. 

Very  naturally,  I  class  among  the  products  of  our 
emotions,  by  which  the  scientific  mind  is  obscured,  also 
those  complex  sensations,  which  we  ordinarily  call  optim- 
ism and  pessimism  respectively,  and  which  represent 
certain  inclinations,  tendencies,  evaluations  and  pre- 
judices. 

No  one  can  find  in  those  modes  of  expression,  which 
oscillate  between  poetry  and  passion  and  always  strike 
that  uncertain  note  which  cannot  be  reduced  to  precise 
terms,  either  a  tendency  to,  or  a  promise  of,  a  rational 
interpretation  of  things.  Taken  in  their  entirety,  these 
emotions  are  combinations  and  expressions  of  infinite 
individual  feelings,  which  may  have  their  seat,  as  is 
plainly  the  case  with  pessimism,  either  in  the  specific 
temperament  of  some  individual  personality  (such  as 
Leopardi),  or  in  the  common  conditions  of  large  multi- 
tudes (for  instance,  the  origin  of  Buddhism).  In  short, 
optimism  and  pessimism  are  essentially  generalisations 
of  emotions  resulting  from  some  particular  experience  or 
social  condition,  which  are  projected  so  far  outside  of 
our  immediate  environment  as  to  make  of  them,  as  it 
were,  the  axis,  the  fulcrum,  or  the  finality  of  the  uni- 
verse. By  this  means  the  categories  of  good  and  bad, 
which  have  really  but  a  modest  relation  to  our  practical 

106 


SOCIALISM  AND   PHILOSOPHY  107 

needs,  finally  become  standards  by  which  the  whole  world 
is  judged,  reducing  it  to  such  small  dimensions  as  to 
make  of  it  a  simple  basis  and  condition  of  our  happiness 
or  unhappiness.  From  either  point  of  view,  the  world 
seems  to  have  no  other  meaning  than  that  of  good  or 
bad,  and  the  final  outcome  seems  to  depend  on  the  pre- 
valence or  triumph  of  one  over  the  other. 

At  the  bottom  if  this  mode  of  looking  at  things  is 
always  the  primitive  poetry  which  is  never  separated 
from  myth.    And  such  modes  of  conception  form  always 
the   practical  pith  and  suggestive   power  of  religious 
systems,  from  the  crude  optimism  of  Mohammedanism  to 
the  refined  pessimism  of  Buddhism.     And  that  is  very 
natural.    Religion  is  a  need  precisely  for  the  reason,  and 
only  for  the  reason,  that  it  represents  the  transfigura- 
tion of  so  many  fears,  hopes,  pains,  bitter  experiences  of 
daily  life  into  pre-ordained  faiths  and  judgments.     In 
this  way  the  struggles  of  this  world,  so-called,  are  trans- 
formed into  transcendental  antagonisms  of  the  universe, 
such  as  God  and  Devil,  sin  and  redemption,  creation  and 
re-birth,  the  scale  of  atonements  and  Nirvana.     This 
optimism,  and  this  pessimism,  which  assume  the  shape  of 
thought  and  surround  themselves  with  a  certain  philo- 
sophy, are  nothing  but  more  or  less  conscious  survivals 
of  religion  in  another  form,  or  of  that  anti-religion, 
which  in  a  transport  of  passionate  unbelief  resembles 
faith.     The  optimism  of  Leibniz,  for  instance,  is  cer- 
tainly not  a  philosophical  function  of  his  study  of  the 
differential  calculus,  nor  of  his  critique  of  action  at  a 
distance,  nor  of  his  metaphysical  theory  of  monads,  nor 
of  his  discovery  of  internal  determinism.    His  optimism 
is  his  religion.    It  is  that  religion  which  appears  to  him 
as  the  perpetual  and  lasting  one.     It  is  for  him  that 


108  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

Christianity  which  reconciles  all  Christian  creeds,  a  pro- 
vidence justified  by  the  view  that  this  world  is  the  best 
which  can  ever  be  and  continue.  This  theological  poetry 
has  its  humoristic,  and  therefore  dialectic,  counterpart 
in  Voltaire 's  Candide.  Similarly  the  pessimism  of  Scho- 
penhauer is  not  a  necessary  result  of  his  critique  of  the 
Kantian  critique,  nor  a  direct  function  of  his  exquisite 
researches  in  logic.  It  is  rather  the  expression  of  his 
petty  bourgeois  soul,  unhappy,  disgruntled,  peevish,  seek- 
ing satisfaction  in  the  metaphysical  contemplation  of 
the  blind  forces  of  the  unknowable  (or  the  blind  effort 
to  exist) .  In  other  words,  he  seeks  satisfaction  in  a  form 
of  religion  to  which  little  attention  is  paid,  the  religion 
of  atheism* 

If  we  rise  from  the  secondary  and  derived  configura- 
tions and  complications  of  religion  or  theological  philo- 
sophy, to  which  optimism  and  pessimism  belong,  to  the 
origin  of  these  mental  creations  themselves,  we  find  our- 
selves in  the  presence  of  a  fact  which  is  as  obvious  as  it 
is  simple.  It  is  that  every  human  being,  on  account  of 
his  or  her  physical  condition  and  social  environment,  is 
led  to  make  a  sort  of  hedonistic  calculation,  in  other 
words,  to  measure  his  or  her  needs  and  the  means  of 
satisfying  them.  The  result  is  a  more  or  less  colored 
appreciation  of  the  conditions  of  existence,  and  of  life 
itself  in  its  interrelations.  Now,  when  intelligence  has 
progressed  so  far  as  to  overcome  the  incantations  pf 

•I  except  the  philosopher  Teichmuller,  who  studied  and 
described  only  that  form  of  active  atheism,  which  is  a  religion 
and  faith.  On  the  other  hand,  the  absence  of  all  religion,  which 
is  characteristic  of  purely  experimental  sciences,  corresponds  to 
the  indifference  of  the  mind  to  all  faiths  or  creeds.  Atheism  as 
an  active  creed  was  the  source  of  that  Parisian  circle  of  writers, 
whose  principal  founders  were  the  ingenuous  Chaumette  and 
the  ambiguous  Hebert. 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  109 

imagination  and  ignorance,  which  link  the  prosaic  pover- 
ty of  ordinary  life  with  fantastic  transcendental  forces, 
then  the  creative  suggestions  of  optimism  and  pessimism 
can  no  longer  exert  themselves.  The  mind  turns  to  the 
prosaic  study  of  the  means  by  which  to  attain,  not  to 
that  fabulous  entity  called  happiness,  but  to  the  normal 
development  of  human  faculties.  Under  favorable, 
natural  and  social  conditions,  these  faculties  find  in  life 
itself  the  reasons  for  its  existence  and  an  explanation- 
tion  for  its  causes.  This  is  the  beginning  of  that  wisdom, 
which  alone  entitles  man  to  the  name  of  homo  sapiens. 
Historical  materialism,  being  a  philosophy  of  life,  in- 
stead of  its  mere  intellectual  phenomena,  overcomes  the 
antithesis  between  optimism  and  pessimism,  because 
it  passes  beyond  their  limits  and  understands  them. 

History  is  indeed  an  interminable  succession  of  pain- 
ful struggles.  Labor,  which  is  the  distinguishing  mark 
of  human  life,  has  been  the  means  of  oppressing  the  vast 
majority.  Labor,  which  is  the  prerequisite  of  all  pro- 
gress, has  pressed  the  sufferings,  the  privations,  the  tra- 
vail, and  the  ills  of  the  multitude  into  the  service  of  the 
comfort  of  the  few.  History  is  like  an  inferno.  It  might 
be  presented  as  a  somber  drama,  entitled  The  Tragedy  of 
Labor. 

But  this  same  sombre  history  has  produced  out  of 
this  very  condition  of  things,  almost  without  the  con- 
scious knowledge  of  men,  and  certainly  not  through  the 
providence  of  any  one,  the  means  required  for  the  rela- 
tive perfection,  first  of  very  few,  then  of  a  few,  and 
then  of  more  than  a  few.  And  now  it  seems  to  be  at 
work  for  all.  The  great  tragedy  was  unavoidable.  It 
was  not  due  to  any  one's  fault  or  sin,  not  to  any  one's 
aberration  or  degeneration,  not  to  any  one's  capricious 


110  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

and  sinful  straying  from  the  straight  path.  It  was  due 
to  an  immanent  necessity  of  the  mechanism  of  social  life, 
and, to  its  rhythmic  process.  This  mechanism  operates 
on  the  means  of  subsistence,  which  are  the  product  of 
human  labor  and  co-operation  under  more  or  less  favor- 
able natural  conditions.  Nowadays,  when  the  prospect 
opens  up  before  our  eyes  of  organizing  society  in  such  a 
way  as  to  give  to  every  one  the  means  of  self  perfection, 
we  see  clearly  the  reasonableness  of  this  view,  because 
the  growing  productivity  of  labor  supplies  all  the  re- 
quirements for  a  higher  culture  of  all.  It  is  this  fact 
on  which  scientific  socialism  bases  its  right  to  existence, 
instead  of  trusting  in  the  triumph  of  a  universal  good- 
ness, which  the  Utopian  and  sentimental  socialists  have 
discovered  in  the  hearts  of  all  and  proclaimed  as  eternal 
justice.  Scientific  socialism  trusts  in  the  development 
of  the  material  means  which  shall  promote  conditions, 
under  which  all  human  beings  shall  have  leisure  to 
develop  in  freedom.  In  other  words,  the  causes  of 
injustice  (to  use  this  term  of  ideologists)  will  be  re- 
moved, such  as  class  rule,  bossism,  the  oppression  of  man 
by  man.  The  injustices  resulting  from  these  causes  are 
precisely  the  indispensable  conditions  for  that  miserable 
material  fact,  the  economic  exploitation  of  the  working 
class. 

Only  in  a  communistic  society  will  labor  be  no  longer 
exploited,  but  rather  rationally  measured.  Only  in  a 
communistic  society  will  a  hedonistic  calculation  become 
practicable,  unimpaired  by  the  private  exploitation  of 
social  forces.  Once  that  the  obstacles  to  the  free  devel- 
opment of  all  are  removed,  those  obstacles  which  now 
divide  classes  and  individuals  until  they  are  separated 
past  all  recognition,  every  one  will  find  at  hand  the 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  HI 

means  by  which  the  faculties  and  needs  of  each  can  be 
measured  by  the  requirements  of  society.    To  adapt  our- 
selves to  the  practicable,  and  do  it  without  any  external 
compulsion,  this  is  the  standard  of  liberty,  which  is  the 
same  as  wisdom.    For  there  can  be  no  true  morality,  un- 
less there  is  a  consciousness  of  determinism.    In  a  com- 
munistic society  the  apparent  antagonism  between  optim- 
ism and  pessimism  falls  to  the  ground.     For  in  that 
society  there  is  no  longer  any  contradiction  between  the 
necessity  to  work  in  the  service  of  the  collectivity  and 
the  self  development  of  the  personality.     That  necessity 
and  this  personal  freedom  will  be  understood  as  one. 
The  ethics  of  that  society  will  abolish  the  contradiction 
between  rights  and  duties,  for  this  contradiction  is  essen- 
tially the  theoretical  elaboration  of  the  present  anta- 
gonistic social  conditions,  in  which  some  have  the  right 
to  command  and  others  have  the  duty  to  obey.     In  a 
society,  in  which  goodness  does  not  mean  charity,  it  will 
not  seem  Utopian  to  demand  that  each  give  according  to 
his  faculties  and  each  take  according  to  his  needs.     In 
such  a  society,  preventive  education  will  largely  elimin- 
ate the  sources  of  crime,  and  the  practical  education  of 
co-operative  life  and  labor  will  reduce  the  necessity  of 
repression  to  a  minimum.     In  short,  punishment  will 
appear  as  a  simple  safeguard  of  a  certain  order  and  will 
lose  all  character  of  a  supernatural  justice,  which  must 
be  vindicated  or  established.     In  such  a  society,  there 
will  no  longer  be  any  need  to  look  for  any  transcendental 
explanation  of  the  practical  fate  of  man. 

This  critique  of  the  motive  causes  of  history,  of  the 
reasons  for  the  existence  of  present  society,  and  of  a 
rationally  measurable  and  measured  outlook  upon  the 
society  of  the  future,  shows  why  optimism,  pessimism, 


112  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

and  so  many  other  fabrics  of  imagination  had  to  serve, 
and  must  continue  to  serve,  as  expressions  of  emotions 
that  stir  minds  under  the  influence  of  the  struggles  of 
social  life.  If  this  is  what  the  transcendental  thinkers, 
to  whom  you  allude,  mean,  and  if  they  intend  to  be  the 
posthumous  collectors  of  the  sighs  and  tears  of  humanity 
in  the  course  of  the  centuries,  so  be  it.  Poetical  license 
is  not  forbidden,  even  to  socialists.  However,  they  will 
not  succeed  in  putting  the  myth  of  eternal  justice  on  its 
legs  and  sending  it  to  fight  against  the  reign  of  darkness. 
That  grand  and  beneficent  lady  will  never  move  a  single 
stone  of  the  capitalist  structure.  That  which  the  meta- 
physical thinkers  among  the  socialists  call  the  evil, 
against  which  the  good  is  struggling,  is  not  an  abstract 
negation,  but  a  hard  and  strong  system  of  practical  facts. 
It  is  poverty  organized  to  produce  wealth.  Now,  the 
historical  materialists  have  so  little  tenderness  of  heart 
as  to  claim  that  this  evil  is  actually  the  cradle  of  the 
future  good.  Freedom  will  come  through  the  revolution 
of  the  oppressed,  not  through  the  goodness  of  the 
oppressors. 

An  easy  relapse  into  metaphysics  of  the  offensive  kind 
is  often  the  fate  of  even  those  studies  which,  according 
to  their  writers,  represent  the  quintessence  of  positive 
and  scientific  procedure.  This  is  the  ease,  for  instance, 
with  many  of  the  expounders  of  the  much  discussed  and 
disputable  criminal  anthropology. 

In  its  aims  and  tendencies,  this  science  represents  a 
notable  factor  in  that  salutary  critique  of  criminal  law, 
which  gradually  succeeded  in  overturning  the  founda- 
tions of  the  philosophical,  and  especially  ethical,  ideas 
concerning  so  simple  a  fact  as  the  experience  that  there 
must  be  punishment  so  long  as  there  is  a  society.  In  its 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  113 

method,  however,  it  passes  rarely  beyond  the  field  of 
statistical  compilation,  or  beyond  that  mass  of  proba- 
bilities which  constitute  the  various  shades  of  study  em- 
braced by  the  general  term  anthropology.  Hardly  ever 
does  it  reach  the  degree  of  precision,  which  has  enabled 
such  analogous  studies  as  psychic  research,  thanks  to  the 
marvelous  progress  in  the  anatomy  of  the  central  nerve 
system  and  in  all  departments  of  medicine,  to  contribute 
in  a  few  years  more  to  the  development  of  psychology 
than  was  contributed  by  twenty  centuries  of  controversy 
over  the  text  of  Aristotle,  or  the  hypothesis  of  spiritual- 
ism, or  that  of  purely  rational  materialism. 

But  this  is  not  what  I  want  to  emphasize. 

This  doctrine  carries  with  it  a  tendency  to  consider 
the  recurrence  of  crime  as  a  result  of  an  innate  predispo- 
sition of  individuals  who  show  certain  characteristic 
marks.  However,  these  marks  are  not  in  all  cases  object- 
ively studied  or  well  fixed.  Still,  there  is  nothing  wrong 
about  this. 

The  theory  which  lies  at  the  bottom  of  the  criminal 
law  of  those  countries  to  which  the  effects  of  the  bour- 
geois revolution  have  extended  shares  the  merits  and 
defects  of  that  equalitarian  principle  of  all  so-called 
liberalism  which  can  be  only  formal  and  abstract,  con- 
sidering the  natural  and  social  inequalities  of  men.  Of 
course,  this  theory  was  an  advance  over  the  corporeal 
justice,  and  over  the  privileges  of  the  clergy  and  arist- 
ocracy. And  for  this  reason,  a  historical  victory  is  pro- 
claimed in  the  words :  The  law  is  equal  for  all.  How- 
ever, this  theory  reduces  the  function  of  punishment  to 
a  mere  defense  of  the  present  system  by  means  of  estab- 
lished laws.  It  is  content  to  punish  only  violations  of 
this  order,  without  penetrating  to  the  problem  of  con- 


114  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

sciousness.  It  has  been  shorn  of  all  religious  character 
and  no  longer  deals  with  the  mind  or  soul.  It  is  no 
longer  the  instrument  of  a  church,  of  a  creed,  of  a  super- 
stition. This  criminal  law  is  prosaic,  just  as  prosaic  as 
all  of  capitalist  society.  And  this  is  another  triumph  of 
free  thought,  leaving  out  of  consideration  a  few  slight 
inconsistencies.  In  short,  it  is  the  act  which  is  punish- 
ed, not  the  man.  It  is  the  disturber  of  this  order  who  is 
punished  by  the  law  that  defends  it.  The  punishment  is 
not  aimed  at  a  man's  conscience,  be  it  irreligious,  here- 
tical, atheistic,  or  what  not.  In  order  to  accomplish  this 
result,  this  theory  had  to  construct  a  typical  equality  of 
responsibility  for  all  human  beings,  on  the  basis  of  a 
free  will,  excluding  only  extreme  cases  of  lack  of  mental 
control  and  liberty  of  action.*  It  is  by  this  very  means 
that  vaunted  and  celebrated  justice,  through  the  irony  of 
fate,  transforms  the  principle  of  equality  befor  the  law 
into  the  grossest  injustice.  For  human  beings  are  in 
reality  socially  and  naturally  unequal  before  the  law. 

This  dialectic  has  of  late  been  discussed  by  sociologists, 
socialists,  and  critics  of  all  sorts.  They  have  built  up  a 
long  line  of  argument  against  the  existing  law,  ranging 
from  the  mystically  colored  paradox  that  society  pun- 

*"...The  jurists  generally  do  not  pay  any  attention  to  this. 
Responsibility  in  the  psychological  meaning  of  the  term  signi- 
fies that  an  action  is  attributed  to  some  person  (to  a  person's 
will),  to  the  extent  that  that  person  is  conscious  of  his  or  her 
action  and  wills  it.  But  since  a  responsibility  in  a  psycho- 
logical sense  implies  a  responsibility  in  a  moral  sense,  we  must 
compare  the  will,  which  is  the  principle  of  action,  with  that 
sum  of  ideas  which  form  the  moral  conscience  of  the  person 
who  acts.  And  such  a  comparison  must  clearly  reveal  the  fact 
that  the  moral  responslblity  of  each  is  reduced  to  an  Infinites- 
imal differentiation  from  individual  to  individual."  See  page 
124  of  my  work  on  "Moral  Liberty,"  Naples,  1873.  This  may  be 
verified  as  we  go  along. 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 


115 


ishes  the  crimes  which  it  breeds  to  the  humanitarian 
demand  that  equal  education  should  vindicate  the  prin- 
ciple of  equality  before  the  law  by  creating  the  actual 
conditions  for  its  practicability.  The  salient  point  of 
all  this  criticism  is  brought  out  by  the  consistent  social- 
ists, who  realize  that  class-struggles  are  an  essential  part 
of  present  society,  and  who  do  not  expect  to  get  equal 
justice  for  all  either  by  the  right  to  punish  or  by  any 
other  existing  law.  For  to  act  otherwise  would  be  like 
looking  for  an  improbable  society,  in  which  divisions 
would  be  the  causes  of  concord  and  union.  This  law  of 
a  mediocre  justice,  which  is  in  constant  conflict  with  it- 
self, is  the  product  of  a  society,  in  which  the  demand  for 
equality  is  ever  at  war  with  itself.  The  lie  becomes  very- 
plain  in  that  fine  discovery  of  the  apologists  of  capita- 
lism that  after  all  the  wage  workers  are  free  citizens, 
who  accept  servitude  voluntarily  by  making  contracts  on 
equal  terms  with  their  equals,  the  capitalists.  Still,  we 
socialists  don't  wish  to  abandon  this  self-contradictory 
principle  merely  to  throw  ourselves  into  the  arms  of 
reactionaries,  who  are  combatting  it  for  other  reasons 
and  would  abolish  it  in  some  other  way.  We  rather  look 
upon  it  as  one  of  the  negative  factors  inherent  in  bour- 
geois society,  as  one  of  the  historical  means  by  which  it 
is  undermining  itself. 

Criminal  anthropology  came  in  good  time  to  support 
with  its  special  studies  the  critical  claim  that  the  law  is 
not  equal  for  all.  To  this  extent  it  is  a  progressive 
science.  To  the  social  differences,  which  render  the  de- 
mand for  an  equal  responsibility  of  all  absurd,  in  pro- 
portion as  the  typical  form  of  free  will  in  sane  minds 
varies,  this  science  has  added  the  study  of  presocial  dif- 
ferences, which  are  the  limits  drawn  around  our  will  bv 


116  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

our  animal  nature  and  which  oppose  an  invincible  re- 
sistance to  all  attempts  to  adapt  ourselves  to  the  de- 
mands of  education.  This  is  not  the  place  to  investigate, 
whether  this  science  has  exaggerated  the  extent  of  this 
animal  nature,  whether  it  has  imperfectly  interpreted 
the  cases  it  wanted  to  study,  and  whether  it  has  fan- 
tastically generalized  the  results  of  partial  and  not  very 
accurate  observations.  The  main  point  is  that  some  of 
its  methods  throw  it  unconsciously  back  into  the  meta- 
physics it  detests.  In  its  legitimate  efforts  to  combat 
the  conception  of  justice  and  responsibility  as  entities, 
it  makes  the  mistake  of  attributing  too  much  to  such 
natural  facts  as  the  disposition  to  commit  crime,  and 
denotes  and  defiaes  them  in  such  a  way  as  to  detract 
from  those  categories  of  social  protection,  which  arise 
out  of  conditions  of  existence  to  which  men  have  become 
accustomed  after  their  birth.  To  be  more  explicit,  ex- 
cessive and  unbridled  license  should  be  attributed  to 
animal  nature,  but  certainly  not  adultery,  which  is  very 
clearly  a  social  product.  Rapacity  should  be  classed  as 
animal  nature,  but  not  theft  in  its  economic  aspects,  in- 
cluding the  forging  of  checks.  A  bloodthirsty  tempera- 
ment belongs  in  the  animal  category,  but  not  the  murder 
of  kings,  etc.  It  must  not  be  said  that  these  are  merely 
verbal  distinctions.  They  touch  the  bottom  of  things. 
They  concern  the  clear  grasps  of  methodical  limits.  They 
show  how  important  it  is  to  remember  that  metaphysics 
is  an  atavistic  evil,  from  which  even  those  do  not  escape 
who  are  continually  shouting:  Down  with  metaphysics! 
The  same  has  for  a  long  time  taken  place  in  other  scien- 
ces, for  instance  in  general  psychology,  or  in  the  special 
study  of  diseased  minds.  Many  have  attempted  to  local- 
ize psychic  phenomena  in  the  brain,  instead  of  adhering 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  117 

to  the  most  elementary  facts,  which,  it  is  true,  were  but 
recently  ascertained.  They  tried  to  locate  the  faculty  of 
the  soul,  for  instance  the  renowned  physiologist  Ludwig. 
In  other  words,  they  tried  to  determine  the  local  seat  of 
rationalist  concepts,  of  things  which  did  not  exist  in 
reality.  Criminal  anthropology  still  has  to  separate  its 
categories  and  determine  them  critically.  It  must  over- 
come the  mistake  of  regarding  as  innate  and  natural 
facts  the  simple  categories,  which  criminal  law  fixed  and 
defined  for  practical  reasons  in  order  to  apply  them  to 
the  experience  of  mere  social  conditions. 


IX. 


Rome,  July  2.,  1897. 

You  refer  to  those  critics  of  different  character  and 
nature,  who  maintain,  for  many  different  reasons,  that 
Christianity  recoils  from  a  materialistic  interpretation  of 
history,  and  who  think  that  they  have  thereby  raised  an 
insurmountable  objection. 

Must  I  enter  into  these  woods,  which,  though  perhaps 
not  impenetrable  and  wild,  are  certainly  very  dark  for 
me?  You  know  how  repugnant  all  hard  and  fast  sys- 
tems are  to  me.  I  am  not  of  the  opinion— and  it  would 
be  fatuous  to  think  otherwise— that  any  theory  of  his- 
tory will  ever  be  so  good  and  excellent  in  itself  that  it 
will  be  a  key  to  the  understanding  of  every  particular 
phase  of  history,  without  first  devoting  ourselves  to 
special  research  in  such  cases.  Now,  I  have  not  made  a 
special  study  of  the  history  of  the  Christian  church  so 
far,  and  therefore  I  am  not  able  to  handle  the  subject 
with  ease.  The  ordinary  sort  of  objectors  mouth  about 
this  subject  on  the  strength  of  general  impressions.  In 
my  young  days,  I  read  Strauss  and  the  principal  writ- 
ings of  the  Tubingen  school,  just  as  all  those  did  who 
studied  German  classic  philosophy.  And  I  might  ex- 
claim with  many  others,  by  slightly  varying  Faust 's  cry : 
"I,  too,  have  unfortunately  studied  theology." 

But  later  on  I  did  not  occupy  myself  any  more  with 
these  matters.  Still,  I  have  adhered  to  the  conviction 
that  the  Tubingen  school  was  the  first  to  begin  definitely 
and  earnestly  that  study  of  Christianity  which  alone  has 

118 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  119 

a  claim  to  the  term  historical,  and  that  latter-day  prog- 
ress in  this  line,  so  far  as  any  has  been  accomplished  or 
is  in  process  of  accomplishment,  consists  mainly  in  cor- 
rections and  supplements  of  the  results  of  that  school. 
The  principal  correction  should  be  in  my  opinion  the 
following:  The  scientists  of  Tubingen  devoted  them- 
selves primarily,  although  not  exclusively,  to  a  study  of 
the  origin  and  development  of  creeds  and  dogmas,  while 
later  it  became  necessary,  and  is  still  necessary,  to  study 
the  formation  and  development  of  Christian  associations. 
To  the  extent  that  we  approach  this  method  of  consider- 
ing the  question,  which  I  shall  call  the  sociological  meth- 
od for  brevity's  sake,  we  shall  get  nearer  to  an  objective 
research.  For  an  understanding  of  the  how  and  why  of 
the  origin  and  development  of  the  associations  will  give 
us  the  means  to  understand,  for  what  reasons,  and  in 
what  way,  the  souls,  the  imaginations,  the  intellects,  the 
desires,  the  fears,  the  hopes,  the  aspirations  of  the  mem- 
bers of  these  associations  had 'to  seek  expression  through 
certain  creeds,  adopt  certain  symbols,  and  arrive  at  the 
formulation  of  certain  dogmas;  in  other  words,  how  it 
happened  that  these  associates  had  to  piece  together  a 
whole  world  of  doctrines  and  imaginary  concepts.  Once 
that  this  step  has  been  made,  we  are  on  the  road  which 
leads  directly  to  historical  materialism.  For  we  have  then 
arrived  at  the  general  statement  that  ideas  should  be  re- 
garded as  products,  not  as  the  causes,  of  certain  social 
structures. 

If  I  am  mistaken — for,  as  I  said,  I  understand  compar- 
atively little  of  these  arguments— the  recent  studies  of 
ancient  Christianity  have  followed  mainly  this  realistic 
line.  And  it  seems  to  me  that  writers  like  Harnack  are 
in  the  front  ranks  of  this  study.  Incidentally  I  refer  to 


120  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

the  very  remarkable  work  of  the  Englishman  Hatch, 
which  I  have  read.  He  demonstrates  with  the  greatest 
lucidity  and  by  means  of  documentary  evidence  that  the 
Christian  association,  beginning  at  a  certain  point  after 
its  first  origins,  developed  and  consolidated  by  means  of 
adaptation  to  the  various  forms  of  corporative  law  which 
flourished  in  the  different  regions  of  the  Roman  empire. 
In  other  words,  the  movement  adapted  itself  to  the  con- 
ditions peculiar  to  Roman  law,  or  to  local  and  national 
customs,  especially  to  Grecian  and  Hellenist  institutions. 
I  hope  our  bishops  may  not  take  it  amiss.  The  Holy 
Ghost  will  have  come  in  by  elevating  the  bishops  above 
the  remaining  mass  of  the  faithful,  to  the  extent  that  the 
original  democratic  organization  was  transformed  into  a 
hierarchy  by  the  differentiation  into  clergy  and  lay- 
members  (or  common  people).  The  name  certainly  in- 
dicates that  the  Christian  organization  was  modeled  after 
those  bodies  of  boatmen,  fish  dealers,  bakers,  and  others, 
who  had  their  episcopi  et  reliqua  (overseers  and  other 
folk). 

At  this  point  we  must  make  another  step  forward.  We 
must  abandon  the  abstract  concept  of  a  uniform  history 
of  all  Christianity  and  take  up  the  particular  history,  in 
time  and  place,  of  Christian  associations.  These  asso- 
ciations were  first  a  part  of  that  greater  civilized,  semi- 
civilized,  or  directly  barbarian  society,  in  which  they 
developed  during  the  first  three  centuries.  Then  it  seems 
that  they  absorbed  and  molded  all  the  complex  relations 
of  that  semi-civilized  or  semi-barbarian  society,  as  was 
the  case,  for  instance,  in  the  Latin  West  during  the  so- 
called  Middle  Ages.  And  finally,  when  the  unity  of 
Catholicism  was  broken  by  Protestantism,  the  liberty  of 
conscience  was  recognized,  especially  after  the  Great 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  121 

Revolution.  The  Christian  associations  then  became  a 
settled  part  of  the  political  and  social  life,  playing  a  pre- 
dominant role  here,  a  minor  role  there,  or  remaining  in- 
significant in  another  place,  as  the  case  might  be.  It  is 
along  this  line  that  the  problem  of  the  relations  between 
state  and  church  must  be  handled,  for  this  is  a  question 
of  historical  relations,  not  of  theoretical  formulae. 

This  method  is  being  more  and  more  applied  to  the 
study  and  explanation  of  those  material  conditions,  by 
which  the  Christian  associations  were  created,  perpetu- 
ated, and  carried  to  partial  or  local  dissolution,  just  as 
other  forms  of  common  life  were.  All  the  causes  and 
reasons  of  these  different  changes  become  easily  evident 
by  this  means.  And  then  it  is  understood  that  creeds, 
dogmas,  symbols,  legends,  lithurgies,  and  other  things  of 
a  similar  nature,  are  matters  of  secondary  consideration, 
the  same  as  every  other  superstructure  of  ideas. 

To  continue  writing  history  on  Christianity  as  an  en- 
tity means  to  multiply  the  errors  of  those  men  of  letters 
and  sages  who  commit  the  methodical  mistake  of  writing 
histories  of  literature  or  philosophy  as  though  these  were 
independent  entities.  In  these  handiworks  of  manu- 
factured wisdom  it  seems  as  though  the  poets,  orators, 
and  philosophers  of  different  epochs,  isolated  from  the 
other  life  of  their  respective  times,  were  grasping  hands 
across  the  centuries  to  form  a  chain  of  celebrities ;  or  as 
though  they  had  not  succeeded  in  getting  the  material 
and  opportunity  for  poems  and  philosophical  essays  out 
of  the  conditions  and  the  stage  of  evolution  of  their  peri- 
od and  had  therefore  tried  to  go  off  to  some  corner  by 
themselves.  This  is  the  studied  mark  of  learned  com- 
pilations. Of  course,  it  is  very  convenient  to  have  on 
hand  some  manual  containing  all  the  information  on  that 


122  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

which  we  call  French  literature,  say  from  La  Chanson 
de  Roland  to  the  novels  of  Zola.  But  the  chronology  of 
thousands  of  years  does  not  run  simply  from  one  thing 
to  another,  nor  does  the  gift  of  poetry  vary  simply  from 
case  to  case.  It  is  rather  a  question  of  transformations 
in  the  entire  relations  of  life  in  all  its  great  outlines.  But 
literary  expressions  are  but  relative  indices,  specific  sedi- 
ments, particular  cases,  among  this  mass  of  social  trans- 
mutations. It  is  very  convenient,  especially  for  the  arti- 
ficial cramming  common  in  our  universities,  to  reduce  all 
that  we  mean  historically  by  the  term  philosophy  to  a 
compendium.  But  who  is  there  that  is  able  to  tell,  after 
such  instruction,  how  it  happens  that  the  individual 
philosophers  came  to  hold  so  many  different,  and  often 
contradictory,  opinions  ?  How  is  it  possible  to  make  one 
single  line  of  independent  progress  out  of  the  antique 
philosophy,  which  up  to  Plato  constituted  about  all  the 
science  there  was,  then  out  of  scholasticism  made  over  by 
theology  with  an  almost  complete  absence  of  science,  then 
out  of  that  philosophy  of  the  17th  century  which  was  a 
sort  of  mental  exploration  running  parallel  with  the  new 
contemporaneous  science  based  on  experiment  and  obser- 
vation, and  finally  out  of  that  new  criticism  which  tends 
to  make  of  philosophy  a  mere  summary  of  the  special 
knowledge  of  the  individual  sciences,  which  have  become 
so  widely  differentiated  ? 

In  short,  it  is  absurd  to  continue  writing  universal 
histories  of  Christianity,  except  it  be  done  for  academic 
convenience.  I  am  not  referring  to  those  who  think  with 
the  minds  of  believers.  These  think  that  the  leading 
thread  of  such  universal  histories  consists  of  the  provi- 
dential mission  of  the  church  through  the  ages.  We  have 
nothing  to  say,  or  to  suggest,  to  people  who  think  like 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  123 

that,  and  who  look  upon  this  ideal  and  eternal  history  as 
a  sort  of  immanent  or  continuous  revelation.  They  are 
standing  outside  of  our  field.  I  am  referring  to  those 
critics,  who  write  universal  histories  of  Christianity  as 
though  it  were  one  homogeneous  whole,  although  they 
know  and  admit  that  this  material  in  their  hands  is  a 
part  of  the  variable  and  more  or  less  necessary  successive 
conditions  of  human  life.  How  is  it  that  they  do  not  see 
that  their  continuous  and  straight  line  of  presentation 
rests  on  a  very  slender  thread  of  tradition  and  reflects  a 
diagrammatic  and  vague  picture  of  things  which  can 
hardly  be  reconciled  ? 

The  origin,  growth,  diffusion,  organization,  or  even 
disappearance  (in  some  parts  of  the  world,  as  m  Asia 
Minor  and  North  Africa)  of  the  Christian  associations, 
the  various  attitudes  assumed  by  them  toward  the  re- 
mainder of  practical  life,  the  many  links  that  connected 
them  with  other  political  and  social  bodies  and  powers: 
all  these  things,  which  make  up  a  true  and  lifelike  his- 
tory, cannot  be  understood,  unless  we  take  our  departure 
from  the  complex  conditions  of  each  individual  country, 
in  which  the  adherents  of  Christianity  were  few,  or 
many,  or  in  which  all  the  inhabitants  and  citizens  were 
Christians,  either  members  of  some  modest  sect,  or  of 
imperious  Catholicism,  persecuted  or  tolerated,  or  them- 
selves intolerant  and  persecuting  others.  Only  in  this  way 
do  we  set  foot  on  solid  ground  and  are  enabled  to  esti- 
mate objectively  the  historical  claims  of  things.  And 
from  this  position  to  that  of  historical  materialism  we 
advance  with  no  more  effort  than  is  required  in  any 
other  branch  of  our  knowledge  of  the  past. 

In  brief,  the  history  of  real  life  is  a  history  of  The 
Church,  or  of  the  various  churches,  that  is  to  say,  a 


124  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

history  of  a  society  which  has  a  certain  economic  basis, 
which  means  a  definite  arrangement  of  its  economy,  and  a 
definite  mode  of  acquiring,  producing,  distributing,  and 
consuming  goods  (which  rests  on  the  control  of  land— Woe 
is  me!)  Others  may  continue  to  mean  by  Christianity 
exclusively  a  mere  complex  of  creeds  and  of  opinions 
concerning  the  destiny  of  mankind.  But,  to  quote  only 
one  illustration,  these  creeds  differ  as  much  as  does  the 
free  will  of  Catholicism  after  the  council  of  Trent  from 
the  absolute  predestination  of  Calvin.  And  it  is  time 
that  those  writers  should  become  reconciled  to  the  under- 
standing that  this  complex  of  outlooks  and  tendencies  a- 
rose  and  developed  within  the  circle  of  definite  associa- 
tions, which  differed  continually  in  various  respects,  and 
which  were  always  more  or  less  surrounded  by  a  vast  and 
complicated  historical  environment,  to  use  a  favorite 
term  of  modern  writers. 

There  is  still  another  thing  to  consider.  In  that  quar- 
ter of  an  hour  of  scientific  prose,  in  which  we  are  living 
at  present,  no  thinking  man  will  believe  any  more  that 
the  great  mass  of  believers  in  those  associations  of  Christ- 
ians had  any  accurate  understanding  of  the  different 
dogmas,  or  of  the  subtile  discussions  of  the  learned  and 
professors.  "We  do  not  know  anything  very  precise  about 
the  passions,  interests,  conditions  of  daily  life,  the  nat- 
ural and  habitual  state  of  mind,  of  the  people  of  Antioch, 
Alexandria,  Constantinople,  and  others,  who  gathered 
around  the  banners  of  Arius  and  Athanasius.  We  can- 
not describe  these  things  as  accurately  as  we  can  in  the 
case  of  present-day  Naples  or  London.  But  we  shall 
never  be  credulous  enough  to  believe  that  those  crowds 
understood  one  word  of  the  dispute  waged  over  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  substance  of  the  Son  was  identical  with 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 


125 


that  of  the  Father,  or  only  similar  to  it.  Nor  shall  we 
measure  the  real  difference  between  the  artisans  of  Gen- 
eva and  those  of  Italy  in  the  16th  century  by  the  theore- 
tical differences  between  Calvin  and  Bellarmino.  In  this 
respect  the  history  of  Christianity  remains  very  obscure, 
because  it  has  been  handed  down  in  an  envelope  of  ideo- 
logical concepts,  which  were  the  dogmatic  and  literary 
reflex  of  the  underlying  development  of  the  movement. 
Under  these  circumstances  we  know  relatively  little  of 
the  practical  life  of  the  Christian  movement,  and  this 
little  dwindles  to  a  minimum  the  more  we  approach  the 
first  centuries. 

Furthermore,  the  mass  of  the  associates  always  pre- 
served in  their  hearts,  and  carried  into  their  inmost  be- 
liefs and  into  their  legends,  many  of  the  superstitions 
and  most  of  the  myths  which  had  been  theirs  before  they 
were  converted,  and  they  had  to  use  these,  and  create 
others,  in  order  to  make  the  metaphysical  and  abstract 
doctrines  of  Christianity  in  some  way  plausible  for 
themselves.  This  came  to  pass  quite  visibly  in  the  second 
half  of  the  second  century,  when  Christian  society  had 
lost  some  of  the  democratic  character  of  comrades  wait- 
ing for  the  coming  of  a  Kingdom  of  Heaven,  comrades 
who  were  all  filled  with  the  holy  spirit,  and  began  to  as- 
sume the  form  of  organized  Catholicism,  not  only  in  the 
orthodox  meaning  of  the  term,  but  also  in  the  sense  of  a 
semi-political  hierarchy  of  a  multitude  no  longer  com- 
posed of  saints,  but  of  simple  human  beings.  Then  grew 
that  transfer  of  local,  national,  and  ethnological  super- 
stitions, which  accompanied  the  gradual  transformation 
of  Christianity  into  an  official  and  territorial  church,  to 
the  extent  that  the  capable  thinkers  were  zealously  and 
scrupulously  picked  out  and  separated  from  the  great 


126  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

mass  of  those,  who  had  simply  to  believe  and  conform  to 
ready-made  rites  and  formalities.  Gradually  the  Western 
empire  disintegrated,  while  the  barbarians  of  the  Ger- 
man and  Slavic  tribes  were  forcibly  converted,  and  in 
proportion  grew  the  power  of  those  creeds,  which  be- 
came the  daily  food  of  the  masses,  who  were  compelled  to 
adopt  symbols  and  ideas  which  were  as  far  beyond  their 
mental  horizon  as  were  those  compounds  of  many  differ- 
ent semi-philosophies.  All  these  Christian  populations 
lived,  and  continued  to  live,  according  to  their  manifold 
faiths.  For  this  reason  they  effectually  transformed  the 
common  elements  of  Christianity  into  ways  and  means 
for  new  and  specious  mythologies.  In  view  of  this  in- 
dependent barbarian  life,  the  definitions  of  the  learned 
and  the  decisions  of  the  councils  remained  suspended  in 
the  air,  became  intangible  conceptions  for  the  multitude, 
and  assumed  the  garb  of  Utopian  doctrines. 

What,  then,  were  the  reasons  and  causes,  the  aims  and 
means,  which  held  the  Christians  together  in  those  times, 
in  which  religion  is  supposed  to  have  been  the  sole  ful- 
crum and  soul  of  all  life?  I  will  not  discuss  the  insults 
and  violent  assaults,  which  form  one  of  those  thorny 
chapters,  to  which  passionate  adversaries  of  Christianity 
usually  resort.  I  will  leave  aside  this  chapter,  which 
unrolls  before  our  eyes  a  history  of  the  most  odius  tyran- 
ny, the  most  ferocious  and  inhuman  persecutions,  and  the 
most  refined  hypocrisy.  Tantum  religio  potuit  suadere 
malorum!  So  many  evils  could  religion  bring  forth! 
The  point  which  I  wish  to  emphasize  especially  is  that 
the  principal  force  of  cohesion  is  found  precisely  in  those 
despised  material  means,  the  use,  management,  and  con- 
trol of  which  promoted  the  growth  of  the  association  in- 
to a  powerful  economic  organization,  with  its  own  offices, 


SOCIALISM  AND   PHILOSOPHY  127 

its  own  hierarchy,  its  own  law,  its  own  servants,  slaves, 
dependents,  colonists,  ministers,  proteges  and  beneficiaries. 
Ecclesiastic  property  represents  many  stages  of  vari- 
ation, from  the  obolus  of  semi-communism  to  the  legal 
corporation,  and  from  this  to  the  concentration  of  the 
serfs,  to  the  constitution  of  the  territorial  complexes  into 
latifundian  estates,  followed  by  feudalism  with  its  tithes 
and  trade  in  souls,  up  to  the  most  modern  attempts  at 
industrial  colonization  (the  Jesuits),  and  so  forth  and  so 
forth.  The  poor  were  then,  as  they  are  largely  now,  held 
together  by  gifts  of  charity,  assistance  to  the  sick,  desti- 
tute, orphans,  widows,  etc.,  by  systematic  management  of 
the  fields,  the  clearing  of  newly  acquired  lands  and  their 
cultivation.  It  is  these  means  which  made  of  the  Christ- 
ian association  a  vital  thing,  as  they  do  of  any  other  hu- 
man collectivity.  They  permitted  a  handful  of  doctrin- 
aires, especially  in  the  Middle  Ages,  to  press  a  vast  eco- 
nomic association  into  the  service  of  relatively  higher, 
nobler,  more  altruistic  and  more  progressive  ends  than 
fell  within  the  scope  of  strictly  feudal  property  in  the 
hands  of  sovereign  blackmailers,  robbers,  and  pirates. 
The  bourgeoisie,  in  its  different  stages,  later  made  an 
end  to  this  economy  of  the  Christian  people  by  more  or 
less  rapid  and  revolutionary  steps.  It  incorporated  this 
property  in  various  ways  in  its  private  property  and 
made  it  fluid  under  the  capitalist  system.  Wherever 
ecclesiastic  property  partially  resisted,  or  still  resists,  the 
blows  of  this  progressive  age,  it  did,  and  does,  for  the 
reason  that  it  still  performed  some  useful  service,  which 
other  organizations,  and  the  state  that  represents  them, 
did  not  care  to  take  upon  themselves,  or  permitted  to  stay 
in  the  hands  of  the  church  by  way  of  competition. 

The  story  of  this  economy  is  the  essence  of  that  inter- 


128  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

pretation  of  changes  in  Christianity,  which  further  cri- 
tique must  elaborate.  None  other  than  Gregorovius  Mag- 
nus, who  so  early  held  the  conviction  that  the  bishop  of 
Rome  was  destined  to  hold  sway  in  the  disintegrated 
empire  of  the  West,  and  who  is  known  generally  to  cul- 
tured persons  by  his  visions,  by  his  love  of  music,  and  by 
the  apostolate  of  his  delegate  Augustine  in  Anglia,  dic- 
tated the  economic  laws  by  which  the  ecclesiastic  lati- 
fundia  were  administered.  After  the  lapse  of  a  few  cen- 
turies, throughout  all  the  adversities  of  the  imperfect 
states  and  semi-political  communities,  which  developed 
within  the  boundaries  of  the  always  unstable  and  badly 
reconstructed  Western  empire,  it  was  this  vast  ecclesias- 
tic property  which,  by  its  universal  diffusion  and  pene- 
tration, gave  rise  to  that  diplomacy,  which  from  Gregory 
VII.  to  Boniface  VIII.  aimed  to  make  an  heir  of  Augustus 
out  of  the  successor  of  Peter.  This  diplomacy  was  not 
what  it  was,  because  its  theory  had  been  thought  out  by 
monks  in  their  cells,  or  because  Gregory  VII.  and  Inno- 
cent III.  were  excellent  men— of  course,  they  were — , 
but  because  the  possibilities  for  a  great  scheme  of  organi- 
zation were  offered  only  by  that  vast  economic  system. 
But  this  system  was  combatted,  not  only  by  the  other 
more  or  less  powerful  rulers  of  that  time,  but  also  by 
some  portions  of  the  plebeian  population  and  of  the  just 
developing  bourgeoisie,  in  the  more  developed  industrial 
and  commercial  regions  (for  instance  in  Flanders,  the 
Provence,  North-Italy),  for  various  reasons,  such  as 
monkish  asceticism,  or  the  civil  liberty  of  Christians.  In 
fact,  the  humiliation  heaped  upon  Boniface  VIII.  in  An- 
agni  indicates  merely  the  climax  of  the  policy  of  Philip 
the  Fair,  who,  as  a  very  early  harbinger  of  the  revolu- 
tionary princes  of  the  16th  century,  for  the  first  time  had 


SOCIALISM  AND   PHILOSOPHY  129 

the  hardihood  to  lay  hands  upon  the  substance  of  the 
Christian  people. 

And  here  I  would  fain  stop  in  my  digression.  For  this 
economic  history  has  not  yet  been  written,  and  I  am  not 
inclined  to  begin  it  with  these  passing  hints. 

However,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  usual  objectors  will 
say :  But  will  everything  else  be  clear,  after  this  econo- 
mic history  has  been  written  ?  Here  we  have  once  'more 
the  ordinary  case  of  those  who  build  a  house  of  cards  in 
order  to  have  the  pleasure  of  blowing  it  over.  To  explain 
a  process  means  generally  to  resolve  it  into  its  most  ele- 
mentary conditions,  so  far  as  we  can  discern  and  follow 
their  successive  phases  (from  the  lowest  to  the  highest 
limit),  passing  from  cause  to  effect. 

No  one  will  dream  of  claiming,  for  instance,  that  if  we 
are  thoroughly  familiar  with  the  economic  structure  of 
the  city  of  Athens  between  the  close  of  the  5th  and  the 
beginning  of  the  4th  century  before  Christ,  we  can  then 
pass  straight  on  to  an  understanding  of  the  whole  ideo- 
logical content  of  every  dialogue  of  Plato,  without  any 
further  ceremony,  that  is,  without  the  critical  assistance 
of  the  intellectual  elements  gathered  by  tradition.  We 
must  above  all  be  able  to  explain  Plato,  the  man,  his 
esthetic  and  mental  disposition,  his  pessimism,  his  flight 
away  from  the  world,  his  idealism,  and  his  utopianism. 
All  these  things  are  products  of  conditions,  which  de- 
veloped in  the  mind  of  the  individual  Plato  as  they  did 
equally  in  so  many  other  contemporaries  of  his,  who 
otherwise  could  not  have  understood,  admired,  and  fol- 
lowed him  to  the  extent  of  creating  around  him  a  sect, 
which  lived  on  for  centuries  with  so  many  modifications. 
If  any  one  tries  to  separate  this  idealogical  formation 
from  the  environment  in  which  it  arose  as  a  first  precur- 


130  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

sor  of  Christianity,  he  would  render  it  unintelligible,  or 
almost  absurd. 

This  applies  still  more  to  those  dispositions  and  inclin- 
ations to  fantastic  or  reflective  thought,  which  gave  rise 
to  the  need  of  so  many  creeds,  symbols,  dogmas,  legends, 
in  so  vast  an  association  as  the  Christian  was,  with  its 
many  offices  and  its  different  relations.  It  is  assuredly 
easier  to  understand  the  relations,  which  lead  in  a  gen- 
eral way  from  certain  determined  material  conditions  of 
common  life  to  all  those  ideas,  than  to  explain  the  par- 
ticular content  of  each  individual  idea.  This  difficulty  of 
an  adequate  explanation  is  due  to  the  fact  that  we  are 
dealing  with  times  of  terrible  catastrophes,  of  indescrib- 
able confusion,  of  decadence  of  the  aptitudes  for  correct 
science ;  times,  in  brief,  in  which  unprejudiced  testimony, 
critique,  and  public  opinion  are  almost  always  missing, 
and  in  which  the  strongest  minds,  isolated  from  life, 
incline  toward  the  abstruse,  the  subtile,  the  verbalistic. 

It  is  indeed  the  difficulty  of  explaining  precisely  the 
way  in  which  ideas  arise  out  of  material  conditions  of 
life,  which  lends  strength  to  the  argument  of  those,  who 
deny  the  possibility  of  clearly  explaining  the  genesis  of 
Christianity.  In  general  it  is  true  that  the  phenomeno- 
logy, or  psychology,  of  religion,  whatever  you  wish  to 
call  it,  presents  great  difficulties  and  carries  within  itself 
rather  obscure  points.  It  is  not  always  an  easy  matter 
to  understand  fully,  how  the  experienced  facts  of  nature 
and  social  life  are  transformed,  at  certain  determined 
times  and  under  certain  determined  ethnological  con- 
ditions, and  after  passing  through  the  crucible  of  some 
particular  fantasy,  into  persons,  gods,  angels,  demons, 
and  then  into  attributes,  emanations,  and  ornaments  of 
these  same  personifications,  and  finally  into  such  ab- 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  131 

stract  and  metaphysical  entities  as  The  Logos,  infinite 
Goodness,  supreme  Justice,  etc.  On  this  field  of  derived 
and  complicated  psychic  production  we  are  still  far  re- 
moved from  the  most  elementary  conditions  necessary  to 
enable  us  by  observation  and  experiment  to  follow  the 
rise  and  development  of  the  first  sensations  from  one  ex- 
treme to  the  other,  that  is,  from  the  peripheral  apparatus 
to  the  cerebral  centers,  in  which  the  irritations  and  vibra- 
tions are  converted  into  conscious  apperception,  into  con- 
sciousness. 

But  is  this  psychological  difficulty  a  privilege  of  the 
Christian  creeds?  Is  it  not  characteristic  of  the  genesis 
of  all  creeds,  all  mythical  and  religious  imaginations  ?  Are 
the  very  original  creations  of  the  most  primitive  Budd- 
hism, or  the  more  second-hand  collections  of  Mahomme- 
danism,  perhaps  clearer?  Or,  going  beyond  these  great 
systems  of  religion,  are  the  processes  of  fantasy  in  the 
creation  of  the  most  elementary  myths  of  our  Aryan 
forefathers  perhaps  clearer  and  more  transparent  at  first 
sight  ?  Is  it,  perhaps,  easy  to  account  for  every  detail  in 
all  the  transitions  of  fantasy  in  the  course  of  centuries 
and  generations  from  the  pramantha,  that  is,  the  stick 
used  in  making  fire  by  rubbing  and  chafing  it  against 
another  piece  of  wood,  to  the  gradual  rise  of  the  hero 
Prometheus?  And  yet  this  is  the  best  known  myth  of 
the  Indo-European  mythology.  We  have  more  data  by 
which  we  can  follow  its  successive  embryogenetic  phases, 
from  the  most  ancient  Vedic  hymns  in  honor  of  the  god 
Agni  (fire)  to  the  creation  of  the  ethical  and  religious 
tragedy  of  Aeschylus,  than  of  any  other  myth. 

Furthermore,  such  psychic  productions  of  men  of  past 
centuries  present  very  peculiar  difficulties  of  their  own 
to  our  understanding.  We  cannot  easily  reproduce  in 


132  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

ourselves  the  necessary  conditions,  by  which  we  might 
approach  their  state  of  mind  concerning  those  produc- 
tions. Long  training  is  required,  before  we  acquire  that 
aptitude  of  interpretation,  which  is  characteristic  of  the 
connoiseur  of  languages,  of  the  philologist,  the  critic, 
the  student  of  prehistory,  or  the  mental  attitude  of  a 
man,  who  through  long  training  and  repeated  trials  has 
acquired  an  artificial  consciousness,  as  it  were,  which  is 
congruous  and  consonant  with  the  object  of  study. 

Under  these  circumstances,  Christianity  (and  I  mean 
here  the  creed,  the  doctrine,  the  myth,  the  symbol,  the  le- 
gend, not  merely  the  association  in  its  oikonomika)  be- 
comes more  easily  intelligible  to  us  to  the  extent  that  it 
approaches  our  own  time.  We  are  surrounded  by  it,  and 
we  have  to  consider  all  the  time  its  consequences  and  its 
influence  on  the  literature  and  various  philosophies  with 
which  we  are  familiar.  We  can  observe  every  day,  that 
the  multitude  crudely  combines  ancient  and  modern  su- 
perstitions with  a  more  or  less  indistinct  general  accepta- 
tion of  the  underlying  principle,  which  is  common  to  all 
confessions,  namely  the  principle  of  redemption.  We  can 
see  Christianity  at  work  and  watch  its  accomplishments 
and  its  struggles.  And  we  are  enabled  to  draw  conclu- 
sions from  the  present  as  to  the  past  by  analogy,  which 
places  us  in  a  position  to  undertake  the  interpretation  of 
more  remote  creeds.  We  also  watch  the  creation  of  new 
dogmas,  new  saints,  new  miracles,  new  pilgrimages.  And 
comparing  this  with  the  past,  we  may  exclaim  in  most 
cases:  Tout  comme  chez  nous!  Just  what  we  see  today! 
In  other  words,  we  have  at  our  command  a  store  of  ob- 
servation and  experience  in  psychology,  which  permits  us 
to  bring  the  past  once  more  to  life  with  less  effort  than 
is  needed  for  the  purely  documentary  analysis  of  the 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  133 

conditions  of  most  remote  antiquity.  How  long  is  it  that 
we  understand  anything  definite  about  the  origin  of 
language  ?  It  dates  from  the  very  moment  that  we  rea- 
lized that  we  have  no  better  means  of  experience  in  this 
respect  than  to  study  the  way  in  which  children  still 
learn  to  speak. 

The  problem  of  the  origin  of  Christianity  is  further- 
more obscured  for  many  by  still  another  prejudice.  They 
imagine  that  it  is  due  to  first  causes  which  created  it  out 
of  nothing,  as  it  were.  These  people  forget  that  those 
who  became  Christians  did  so  by  renouncing  other  re- 
ligions; and  that  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  Christi- 
anity reduces  itself  above  all  to  the  prosaic  task  of  study- 
ing the  way,  in  which  the  elements  of  former  periods 
took  on  new  shapes  within  the  environment  of  that  asso- 
ciation, which  formed  the  actual  nucleus  of  the  new  or- 
ganization. This  event  took  place  in  historical  times. 
And  among  those  religions  which  preceded  it,  the  most 
noted  is  that  of  advanced  Judaism,  whose  great  masses 
were  waiting  for  the  coming  of  a  new  Messiah,  while  its 
doctrinaires  were  splitting  fine  hairs.  We  are  also  fairly 
familiar  with  the  cults,  superstitions,  and  creeds  of  the 
various  Pagan  religions  in  the  Roman  empire,  and  with 
the  religious  inclinations  of  many  of  the  thinkers  of  that 
time,  just  as  we  know  the  leanings  of  the  multitudes  of 
that  period,  who  were  ever  ready  to  accept  new  faiths, 
new  promises,  and  good  tidings. 

It  is,  therefore,  not  a  question  of  creation,  but  of 
transformation,  and  we  carry  on  our  inquiry  on  the  same 
field  as  that  of  any  other  history.  The  question  is,  for 
instance,  (to  give  a  few  general  hints),  how  Jesus  became 
the  Messiah  of  the  Jews  (a  primitive  form  of  develop- 
ment), how  the  Messiah  of  the  Jews  became  the  Be- 


134  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

deemer  of  all  mankind  from  sin  (Paul),  and  finally,  how 
the  Word  combined  with  the  Neo-Platonism  of  Philo 
(fourth  gospel).  This  is  the  outline  of  the  ideological 
development.  And  on  the  other  hand  we  must  find  out, 
how  the  primitive  communistic  association  (a  commun- 
ism of  consumption)  of  comrades  expecting  the  impend- 
ing end  of  the  world  and  the  final  catastrophe  (the 
Apocalypse)  became  a  congregation  (a  church),  which 
deferred  the  coming  of  the  millennium  indefinitely  (the 
second  epistle  of  Peter)  and  grew  into  an  organization 
that  evolved  its  own  economy  and  progressively  as- 
sumed more  complicated  attributes  and  functions.  In  this 
transition  from  a  sect  to  a  church,  from  naive  expecta- 
tion to  a  complicated  doctrine,  lies  the  whole  problem  of 
the  origin  of  Christianity.  With  the  expansion  of  the 
association  came  in  due  time  an  adaptation  on  its  part  to 
the  prevailing  forms  of  law,  and  the  requirements  of  the 
doctrine  fell  in  with  the  diffusion  of  decadent  Platonism. 
Of  course,  we  shall  never  be  able  to  get  close  to  those 
things  with  our  vision  and  observation  by  an  intuitive 
mode  of  chronicling.  We  shall  never  watch  Philip,  Mat- 
thew, Peter,  James,  and  their  next  successors,  in  conver- 
sation, and  so  forth,  in  the  way  that  we  may  observe 
Camille  Desmoulins  in  a  cafe  of  the  Palais  Royal,  at  3 
P.  M.,  on  Sunday,  July  12.,  1789.  We  shall  not  be  able 
to  follow  the  genesis  and  establishment  of  those  dogmas 
as  we  may  the  compilation  of  the  articles  of  the  Encyclo- 
pedia. For  we  are  dealing  with  times  of  vague  impres- 
sions and  of  fermentations  such  as  have  never  been  seen 
since.  Great  moral  epidemics  invade  the  souls  of  men. 
The  most  elementary  relations  of  life  approach  a  period 
of  acute  crisis.  Under  the  surface  of  that  civilization  of 
the  Mediterranean  countries,  which  combined  the  politi- 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  135 

cal  and  administrative  power  of  the  empire  with  all  that 
was  most  useful  and  refined  in  Hellenism,  vegetated  a 
thousand  forms  of  local  barbarisms  and  festering  and 
rotten  products  of  decadence.  It  is  enough  to  remind  the 
reader  that  Christianity,  as  a  thing  in  itself,  took  its 
start,  both  in  fact  and  in  name,  from  Antioch,  that  cess- 
pool of  all  vices,  and  that  Paul  addressed  his  subtile  med- 
itations, which  show  him  to  us  in  the  light  of  one  of  those 
Jews,  who  later  compiled  the  Talmud,  to  the  Galatians, 
that  is,  to  Jews  scattered  through  a  country  of  real  bar- 
barians. Christianity  was  spread  among  the  lowly,  the 
outcasts,  the  plebeians,  the  slaves,  the  despairing  multi- 
tudes of  those  large  cities,  whose  vicious  life  is  to  a  small 
degree  revealed  by  the  satires  of  Petronius  and  Juvenal, 
the  Voltairian  tales  of  Lucian,  or  the  grewsome  writings 
of  Apuleius.  Is  there  anything  precise  that  we  know 
about  the  conditions  of  those  Jews  in  the  city  of  Rome, 
among  whom  this  new  sad  superstition,  as  Tacitus  called 
it,  first  developed,  that  superstition  which  in  the  course 
of  centuries  grew  into  the  most  powerful  social  organism 
ever  known  in  history  ?  We  cannot  reconstruct  those  first 
origins  by  intuitive  descriptions,  but  must  have  recourse 
to  conjecture  and  combination.  This  is  the  main  reason 
for  the  interminable  literature  on  this  subject.  And  it 
applies  especially  to  the  learned  of  Germany,  who  are  in 
the  habit  of  calling  such  critical  and  erudite  literature 
theological,  even  though  they  are  not  believers  them- 
selves. 

The  relative  obscurity  of  the  first  origins  of  Christian- 
ity gives  rise  in  the  minds  of  many  to  the  queer  belief 
in  a  true  Christianity,  which  is  supposed  to  have  been 
quite  different  from  that  other  which  later  assumed  the 
name  of  Christian.  This  so-called  true  Christianity,  or 


136  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

original  Christianity,  which  is  in  its  turn  so  obscure  that 
every  one  can  interpret  it  in  his  own  way,  serves  often 
as  a  motive  for  the  polemics  of  those  rationalists,  who 
hurl  invectives  against  that  historical  church,  which  we 
know  by  experience,  and  then  extoll  with  a  great  flow  of 
oratory  that  ideal  church,  which  is  supposed  to  have 
been  the  first  communion  of  saints.  This  is  but  a  histo- 
rical myth,  the  same  as  the  Sparta  of  the  Athenian  ora- 
tors, the  antique  Rome  of  the  decadent  Ghibellines  of 
the  14th  century,  and  all  other  fantastic  creations  of  a 
lost  paradise,  or  of  a  future  paradise  which  is  as  yet 
out  of  our  reach.  This  historical  myth  has  assumed 
various  shapes.  The  sectarians,  who  revolted  against 
Catholicism  in  its  inception  or  in  its  prime,  these  secta- 
rians, whose  democratic  equality  under  definite  histori- 
cal conditions,  from  the  Montanists  to  the  Anabaptists, 
rose  in  rebellion  against  the  profanely  worldly  and 
hierarchically  orthodox  church,  felt  the  need  of  recon- 
structing in  their  imagination  the  true  Christianity,  that 
is,  the  simple  primitive  life  of  the  first  evangelists.  At 
the  same  time  they  wailed  about  the  decadence,  aberra- 
tion, works  of  Satan,  and  the  other  things  that  happened 
after  that  time.  It  is  this  truest  of  true  Christianities, 
which  was  often  invoked  by  the  naive  communists,  who 
drew  pictures  of  their  own  aspirations  in  the  absence 
of  any  other  adequate  ideas  concerning  the  way  of  living 
under  these  disgraceful  conditions  of  inequality  in  this 
unjust  world.  And  these  pictures  could  find  inspiration 
and  color  in  the  evangelical  poetry  and  in  so  many 
other  true  or  fantastic  records.  This  happened  also  to 
Weitling,  who  on  his  part  composed  a  Gospel  of  a  Poor 
Sinner.  And  why  should  I  not  mention  those  followers 
of  Saint  Simon,  who  fabulized  about  a  truer  Christianity 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  137 

of  the  future,  into  which  they  projected  all  the  aspira- 
tions of  their  heated  imagination  ? 

For  all  these  and  other  reasons,  there  is  hung  in  the 
air,  in  the  fantastic  imagination  of  many,  the  picture  of 
an  ultra-perfect  Christianity,  which  shall  be  different, 
or  is  absolutely  different,  from  the  one  which  vulgar 
history  knows  and  depicts,  a  Christianity  that  stoned 
Stephen,  that  instituted  the  Holy  Inquisition,  which 
dispatched  so  many  multitudes  of  infidels  to  the  other 
world ;  from  the  barefooted  fisherman  Peter,  who  played 
the  part  of  a  Sancho  Panza  by  his  cowardly  denials,  to 
Pope  Pius,  who  consoled  himself  for  the  loss  of  his 
temporal  power  by  assuming  infallibility;  from  the 
spontaneous  agape  of  the  poor  visited  by  the  comforter 
to  the  Jesuits  who  arm  squadrons  and  contract  commer- 
cial loans,  like  daring  harbingers  of  the  colonial  policy 
of  the  bourgeois  world;  from  the  Rabbi  of  Nazareth, 
who  says  that  his  kingdom  is  not  of  this  world,  to  the 
bishops  and  other  prelates  who  occupy  in  his  name  from 
one  fifth  to  one  third  of  the  land,  according  to  various 
countries,  and  who  rule  as  its  sovereigns  and  proprie- 
tors, enjoying  even  the  jus  primce  noctis.  Whoever  be- 
lieves in  this  so-called  true  Christianity,  for  one  reason 
or  another,  even  were  it  only  for  literary  hypocrisy  pure 
and  simple,  is  naturally  confronted  by  the  obligation  to 
explain  whence  the  other  less  true  Christianity  came 
later  on,  which  differed  so  completely  from  the  one 
which  we  know.  And  it  is  evident  that  this  true  Christ- 
ianity must  become  a  miracle,  if  not  of  revelation,  at 
least  of  human  ideology.  We  are  not  obliged  to  furnish 
an  explanation  for  this  miracle,  either  in  the  name  of 
materialism,  or  in  the  name  of  any  other  theory,  for  the 
same  reason,  that  no  rational  mechanics  is  obliged  to 


138  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

explain  either  the  flight  of  Icarus  or  the  hippogriff  of 
Ariosto. 

Nevertheless,  we  must  not  forget  that  this  true 
Christianity,  this  ideal  antagonist  of  the  positive  and 
realistically  human  Christianity,  which  we  know  and 
which  developed  under  conditions  accessible  to  our  re- 
search, performed  also  a  historical  function,  and  serves 
to-day  in  our  hands  as  a  key,  by  which  we  may  enter 
into  the  state  of  mind  and  conditions  of  life  of  the 
primitive  Christians.  For  this  true  Christianity  is  but 
a  symbol  of  the  various  revolutions  of  the  proletariat, 
the  plebians,  the  lowly,  the  manumitted,  the  serfs,  the 
exploited,  up  to  the  16th  century. 

I  had  occasion,  as  I  said  once  before  in  another  letter, 
to  occupy  myself  at  length  in  my  academic  lectures  with 
Fra  Dolcino,  who  marks  the  culmination  and  impending 
decline  of  the  Apostolic  sect.  After  I  had  described  the 
general  conditions  of  the  economic  and  political  develop- 
ment of  Northern  and  Middle  Italy,  and  those  of  the 
particular  environment  (or  of  the  social  classes)  in 
which  the  Apostolic  sect  arose  and  developed,  I  had  to 
explain,  at  a  certain  point,  the  doctrine  by  which  Dol- 
cino held  together  the  ranks  of  his  followers,  who  were 
intrepid  and  tenacious  fighters  to  the  last  and  worked 
like  heroes,  martyrs,  and  harbingers  of  a  new  order  of 
human  life.  His  doctrine  was  likewise  one  of  those 
apocalyptic  returns  to  a  purely  evangelical  Christianity. 
It  was  a  negation  of  everything  which  the  hierarchy  had 
established  since  Pope  Sylvester  (at  least  the  legendary 
one),  and  this  negation  was  reinforced  by  an  apostolic 
ardor,  which  the  spirit  of  battle  transformed  into  a  duty 
to  fight.  It  is  natural  that  the  first  explanation  for  these 
ideas,  as  the  literary  men  would  say,  should  be  sought 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  139 

in  similar,  immediately  preceding,  movements  of  rebel- 
lion against  the  hierarchy.  By  a  short  step  we  come  to 
the  Albigenses,  and  by  another  short  step  to  those  con-' 
fused  and  manycolored  popular  movements  known 
under  the  common  name  of  Patarenian  movements. 
And  on  the  other  hand  we  must  try  to  understand  the 
mystic  and  ascetic  agitation,  which  often  came  near  dis- 
rupting the  papal  empire,  from  the  theoretical  commun- 
ism of  Joaquin  of  Fiore  to  the  active  resistance  of  the 
Friars.  If  we  penetrate  another  step  into  this  inquiry, 
it  is  not  difficult  to  see  that  behind  this  mystic  veil  of 
asceticism,  and  behind  the  exalted  passion  for  true 
Christianity,  there  lurked  those  material  conditions  and 
material  incentives,  which  rallied  around  certain  sym- 
bols of  revolt  the  lowly  monks,  the  peasants  of  those 
countries,  in  which  feudalism  was  still  alive,  the  peasants 
of  other  countries,  who,  having  been  freed  from  feudal- 
ism, were  forcibly  proletarianized  by  the  rapid  forma- 
tion of  free  communes,  the  poor  people  of  these  pitiless- 
ly corporate  communes  themselves,  and  finally,  as  ever, 
the  idealists  who  espoused  the  cause  of  the  oppressed 
as  their  own:  in  other  words,  all  the  elements  of  social 
revolution.  From  this  close  analysis  we  pass  on  to  a 
more  general,  or,  I  should  say,  typical  one.  The  move- 
ment of  Dolcino  is  a  link  in  that  long  chain  of  uprisings 
on  the  part  of  the  Christian  people,  who  revolted  against 
the  hierarchy  with  more  or  less  good  luck,  and  under 
complicated  conditions,  and  who  in  the  most  acute  crises 
came  to  the  logical  conclusion  of  espousing  communism. 
The  classic  example,  which  was  the  most  vigorous,  as 
concerns  circumstances  of  time,  extension,  and  duration, 
is  certainly  the  uprising  of  the  Anabaptists.  However, 
the  revolt  of  the  Dolcinians  was  by  no  means  a  small 


140  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

matter,  especially  since  the  valley  of  the  Po,  in  the  be- 
ginning of  the  14th  century,  was  precociously  modern 
in  its  economic  conditions. 

Now,  the  instinct  of  affinity  turned  the  minds  of  the 
representatives  and  leaders  of  revolting  peoples  to  the 
image,  or  to  the  confused  memory,  or  to  an  approxima- 
tive reproduction  in  imagination,  of  that  primitive 
Christianity,  which  consisted  only  of  poor  people,  of 
afflicted  and  suffering  humanity  hoping  for  redemption 
from  the  miseries  of  this  sinful  world.  True  Christiana 
ty,  to  which  these  zealous  rebels  turned  with  so  much 
ardor  of  faith  and  fantasy,  out  of  sympathies  arising 
from  similar  conditions,  was  a  reality.  It  was  a  fact, 
not  in  the  sense  of  an  ideal  or  type  from  which  poor 
weak  humanity  had  strayed  on  account  of  mistakes  or 
bad  will,  but  in  the  sense  of  a  sober  historical  reality. 
Primitive  Christianity  was,  with  due  allowance  for 
historical  differences,  much  closer  in  type,  as  a  whole,  in 
its  aspects  and  incentives,  to  that  which  Montano,  Dol- 
cino,  or  Thomas  Miinzer  wanted  to  re-establish  at  in- 
opportune times,  than  to  all  the  dogmas,  lithurgies,  hier- 
archic ranks,  dominions  and  domains,  political  fights, 
supremacies,  inquisitions,  and  other  vanities,  around 
which  the  sober  and  profane  history  of  the  church  turns. 
In  these  attempts  of  the  medieval  rebels  we  see,  as  it 
were,  a  reproduction  of  an  experiment  of  the  past,  we 
recognize  what  must  have  been,  approximately,  the 
original  form  of  Christianity  as  a  sect  of  perfect  saints, 
that  is,  of  perfect  equals,  without  any  differences  of 
clergy  and  laymen,  all  of  them  equally  partaking  of  the 
holy  spirit,  revolutionists  and  worshippers  in  one,  all 
on  the  same  level. 

The  most  difficult  a,nd  thorny  problem  in  all  the  hi- 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  141 

story  of  Christianity  is  precisely  this:  To  understand 
by  what  means  a  sect  of  perfect  equals  was  turned,  in 
the  course  of  but  two  centuries,  into  an  association 
divided  into  hierarchic  ranks,  so  that  we  have  on  one 
side  the  mass  of  believers,  and  on  the  other  the  clergy 
invested  with  sacred  powers.  This  hierarchic  division 
is  completed  by  a  dogma,  that  is  to  say,  by  regulations 
which  suppress  the  spontaneousness  of  belief  as  a  fact  of 
personal  practice  on  the  part  of  the  individual  believers. 
A  hierarchy  means  a  rule  by  priests,  an  administration 
of  things  and  government  of  persons  by  the  clergy. 
This  gives  rise  to  political  policies.  And  the  inquiry  into 
these  policies  is  the  pith  of  the  history  of  the  third 
century.  The  meeting  of  church  and  state  in  the  fourth 
century  is  but  the  result  of  the  intermingling  of  two 
policies,  in  which  religion  and  the  management  of  public 
affairs  are  finally  merged  in  one.  This  transition  from 
a  free  association  to  an  organized  semi-state,  which  is 
responsible  for  the  fact  that  the  church  has  ever  since 
dabbled  in  politics,  either  in  support  of  the  state,  or 
against  the  state,  or  itself  as  a  state,  verifies  but  the 
truth  of  the  statement  that  any  organisation,  which  has 
things  to  administer  and  offices  to  fill,  becomes  of  necessi- 
ty a  government.  The  church  has  reproduced  within  its 
confines  the  same  antagonisms  as  any  other  state,  that 
is,  the  antagonisms  between  rich  and  poor,  protector  and 
protected,  patron  and  client,  owners  and  exploited,  prin- 
ces and  subjects,  sovereigns  and  oppressed.  Therefore 
is  has  had  in  its  ranks  class-struggles  peculiar  to  itself, 
for  instance,  struggles  between  a  patrician  hierarchy 
and  a  plebian  priesthood,  between  high  and  low  clergy, 
between  Catholicism  and  sects.  The  sects  were  largely 
inspired,  up  to  the  16th  century,  by  the  idea  of  return- 


142  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

ing  to  the  primitive  Christianity,  and  for  this  reason 
they  often  colored  their  designs  on  existing  conditions 
by  ideological  inspirations  smacking  of  utopianism.  The 
church,  on  the  other  hand,  such  as  it  grew  to  be, 
followed  the  methods  used  by  the  profane  state  and  be- 
came a  hierarchic  congregation  of  unequals,  instead  of 
equals  with  the  holy  spirit,  and  exercised  the  rights  of 
the  privileged  by  means  of  oppression  and  violence,  like 
a  perfect  empire,  some  parts  of  which  were  ceded  to 
other  rulers,  with  a  superadded  control  of  the  souls, 
which  must  go  hand  in  hand  with  a  government  of 
things,  because  souls  cannot  exist  without  material 
things.  These  human  characteristics,  which,  once  that 
a  condition  of  economic  inequality  exists  among  men, 
make  any  religious  association  similar  to  any  other 
government  of  things  in  this  world,  show  at  a  glance 
that  an  association  of  saints  can  never  have  had  any 
other  but  a  Utopian  form,  and  on  the  other  hand  they 
show  to  us  a  constant  tendency  toward  intolerance  and 
toward  Catholicism  in  its  various  forms,  to  the  extent 
that  this  association,  forgetting  the  simple  martyr  of 
Nazareth,  whose  form  has  been  left  hanging  pathetically 
to  the  cross  on  the  altars,  has  made  its  kingdom  of  this 
world. 

To  stick  to  an  illustration,  which  is  familiar  to  ine 
through  recent  studies,  the  super-imperial  papacy  fell 
in  the  person  of  Boniface  VIII.,  just  as  had  been  pro- 
phesied by  Dolcino,  who  survived  him  for  three  years. 
But  it  did  not  fall  in  order  to  give  way  to  the  apoca- 
lypse. It  is  true,  the  humiliation  of  the  exile  at  Avignon 
was  inflicted  upon  the  papacy,  but  not  to  give  way  to 
a  new  Cesarian  empire,  in  keeping  with  Dante's  Utopia. 
The  indications  of  the  modern  era,  the  forebodings  of 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  143 

the  bourgeois  reign,  were  already  manifest.  Philip  the 
Fair,  who  for  a  long  time  had  been  reaching  out  for  that 
civil  power,  under  which  the  bourgeoisie  two  centuries 
later  went  through  the  first  stage  of  its  political  rule 
over  society,  condemned  the  Templars  to  death,  as 
though  he  wanted  to  say  that  the  heroic  poem  of  the 
crusades  ended  by  the  hands  of  the  Christians  them- 
selves. And  in  order  that  we  might  find  the  moral  of 
the  situation  even  in  the  anecdote,  which  always  exposes 
and  unmasks  the  strident  passages  on  the  irony  of  hi- 
story, the  agent  of  the  Sire  of  France,  who  prepared  the 
humiliation  of  Anagni,  was  not  a  captain  of  the  feudal 
bands,  but  a  civilian,  who  negotiated  the  money  required 
to  cover  a  bill  of  exchange  delivered  to  a  banker  of 
Florence. 

These  legists,  and  princes  usurping  historical  rights, 
and  bankers  accumulating  money  that  later  on  became 
capital,  were  the  people  who  initiated  modern  history, 
which  is  so  transparent  in  the  prosaic  structure  of  its 
aims  and  means.  On  the  ruins  of  corporate  and  feudal 
society  as  well  as  on  the  ruins  of  the  patrimony  of  eccle- 
siasticism  settled  that  cruel  bourgeoisie  which,  suspicious 
of  mysterious  forces,  inaugurated  the  era  of  free  thought 
and  free  research.  And  now  the  bourgeoisie  is  waiting 
to  be  dethroned.  But  assuredly  this  will  not  be  done  by 
true  Christianity,  nor  by  the  truest  of  the  true. 

Whether  the  people  of  the  future,  of  whom  we  social- 
ists often  entertain  such  exalted  ideas,  will  still  produce 
any  religion  or  not,  I  can  neither  affirm  nor  deny.  And 
I  leave  it  them  to  arrange  their  own  lives,  which  will 
not  be  easy,  I  hope,  in  order  that  they  may  not  become 
imbeciles  in  paradisian  beatitude.  But  I  see  this  much 
clearly :  Christianity,  which  in  its  entirety  is  up  to  now 


144  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

the  religion  of  the  most  advanced  nations,  will  not  leave 
any  room  for  any  other  religion  after  it.  Whoever  will 
not  be  a  Christian  henceforth  will  be  without  religion. 
And  in  the  second  place  I  note  that  the  socialists  have 
been  wise  enough  to  write  into  their  platforms :  Religion 
is  a  private  matter.  I  hope  that  no  one  will  interpret 
this  statement  in  the  sense  of  a  theoretical  point  of  view 
which  might  lead  to  the  elaboration  of  a  philosophy  of 
religion.  This  wholly  practical  statement  means  simply 
that  for  the  present  the  socialists  are  too  busy  with  more 
useful  and  serious  work  than  that  kind  which  would 
liken  them  to  those  Hebertists,  Blanquists,  Bakounists, 
and  others,  who  decreed  the  abolition  of  divinity  and  de- 
capitated God  in  effigy.  The  historical  materialists 
think,  however,  on  their  part  and  aside  from  all  sub- 
jective appreciation,  that  the  people  of  the  future  will 
very  probably  dispense  with  all  transcendental  explana- 
tions of  the  practical  problems  of  daily  life.  Primus 
in  orbe  deos  fecit  timor!  Fear  was  the  first  in  this 
world  to  make  gods.  The  statement  is  very  old.  But  it 
is  valuable,  and  therefore  I  perpetuate  it. 


X. 

Eesina  (Naples) ,  September  15,  1897. 
Dear  Sorel ! 

In  re-reading,  revising,  retouching  the  letters  which  I 
addressed  to  you  from  April  to  July  of  this  year  —  I 
intend  to  publish  them  --  I  find  that  they  make  up  a 
sort  of  series  and  on  the  whole  deal  with  the  same  sub- 
ject. Of  course,  if  I  had  the  intention  of  writing  a  book 
worthy  of  some  such  high-sounding  title  as  Socialism 
and  Science,  or  Historical  Materialism  and  World  Con- 
ception, or  the  like,  I  should  have  to  sift  this  matter 
anew  by  elaborate  meditation.  And  then  the  thoughts 
at  which  I  have  here  merely  hinted,  the  statements  which 
I  have  but  roughly  outlined,  the  observations  which  are 
often  made  incidentally,  and  the  bizarre  criticisms 
scattered  here  and  there,  in  short  all  those  things  which 
came  to  me  as  I  wrote  with  a  flowing  pen  would  assume 
quite  a  different  form  and  would  be  differently  arranged. 
But  since,  in  conversing  with  you  at  a  distance,  I  have 
made  use  of  the  liberties  peculiar  to  conversation,  I 
shall  now,  in  making  these  fleeting  letters  into  a  little 
volume,  head  it  with  the  modest  and  appropriate  title: 
A  Discourse  on  Socialism  and  Philosophy.  Letters  to 
G.  Sorel. 

It  is  the  fault  of  the  insistent  advice  of  my  friend 
Benedetto  Croce  that  I  commit  this  new  literary  sin. 
This  blessed  friend  of  mine  became  a  torment  and  a 
cross  to  me.  After  he  had  read  these  letters,  he  did  not 
give  me  any  rest,  until  I  promised  him  that  I  would  pub- 

145 


146  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

lish  them  in  book  form.  If  I  were  to  follow  him,  I 
should  become  in  my  old  days  a  continuous  and  perpet- 
ual producer  of  printed  matter.  I  have  always  preferred 
in  the  past  to  let  the  scattered  manuscripts,  which  I 
accumulated  in  the  course  of  years  in  my  capacity  as 
a  teacher  and  passionate  connoisseur  of  literature,  slum- 
ber quietly  in  my  desk.  But  in  the  present  case,  Croce 
continued  to  plead  that  it  was  my  duty,  now  that  Social- 
ism was  spreading  in  Italy,  to  take  part,  in  such  a  way 
and  by  such  means  as  suited  my  inclinations,  in  the  life 
of  the  party  that  was  growing  and  gaining  strength. 
And  that  may  be  so.  Still  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether 
the  socialists  feel  the  need  of  and  a  desire  for,  my  help 
and  participation. 

To  tell  the  truth,  I  have  never  had  any  great  inclina- 
tion for  public  writing,  and  I  have  never  acquired  the 
art  of  writing  in  prose.  I  have  always  written  the 
things  as  they  came  to  me.  I  have  always  been,  and  still 
am,  passionately  found  of  the  art  of  oral  instruction  in 
every  form.  And  attending  to  this  work  with  great  in-, 
tensity,  I  have  long  lost  the  gift  of  repeating  in  writing 
the  things  which  I  used  to  express  spontaneously,  in 
ready  and  flexible  speech,  as  fitted  the  occasion,  preg- 
nant with  side  issues  and  full  of  references.  And  who 
can  really  repeat  such  things  from  memory?  Later, 
when  I  was  born  again  in  spirit  and  accepted  Socialism, 
I  became  more  desirous  of  communicating  with  the  pub- 
lic by  means  of  booklets,  occasional  letters,  articles  and 
lectures,  and  these  grew  in  time  almost  without  my  be- 
ing aware  of  it.  Are  not  these  the  duties  and  burdens 
of  the  professional?  Just  then,  about  two  years  ago, 
my  blessed  Mr.  Croce  came  along  at  an  opportune  hour 
with  his  advice  that  I  should  publish  essays  on  scientific 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  147 

socialism,  in  order  to  give  to  my  activity  as  a  socialist  a 
more  solid  footing.  And,  as  one  thing  follows  another, 
these  chance  letters  may  likewise  be  regarded  as  a  sub- 
sidiary and  supplementary  essay  on  historical  mater- 
ialism. 

It  is  evident,  dear  Sorel,  that  this  discourse  does  not 
concern  you,  but  only  me.  For  I  am  seeking  an  excuse, 
as  it  were,  to  publish  a  new  book,  written  by  an  Italian 
living  in  Italy.  If  these  letters  should  be  read  by  others 
in  France  besides  you,  those  readers  may  probably  say 
that  I  have  not  won  them  over  to  historical  materialism, 
and  perhaps  they  will  justly  repeat  the  observation  of 
some  critics  of  my  essays  to  the  effect  that  the  intellect- 
ual moods  of  a  nation  are  not  changed  by  translations 
from  a  foreign  language.* 

While  I  am  writing  this  with  a  view  of  bringing  these 
letters  to  a  close,  I  have  some  misgivings  whether  I 
might  not  want  to  continue  them.  Cannot  letters  be 
multiplied  indefinitely,  just  like  fables  and  stories? 
Fortunately  I  had  made  up  my  mind,  when  I  first  began, 
to  take  up  in  a  general  way  the  problems  which  you 

*In  this  little  volume  I  intended  to  solve  exclusively  such  prob- 
lems as  were  raised  in  my  mind  in  various  ways  by  the  ques- 
tions and  objections  of  Sorel.  The  reader  cannot,  therefore, 
find  any  reply,  either  direct  or  indirect,  in  this  book  to  the 
various  criticisms  aimed  against  my  essays.  Passing  over  mere 
carping  reviews  and  leaving  aside  incidental  polemics  and  the 
gratuitous  impertinence  of  some  unmannered  writers,  I  sincere- 
ly thank  Messieurs  Andler,  Durkheim,  Gide,  Seignobos,  Xenopol, 
Bourdeau,  Bernheim,  Pareto,  Petrone,  Croce,  Gentile,  and  the 
editors  of  "Annee  Sociologique"  and  "Novoie  Slovo,"  for  the 
lengthy  reviews  with  which  they  honored  me.  I  cannot  refrain 
from  remarking  that  I  have  been  the  object  of  such  opposite 
observations  as  the  following:  "You  are  too  Marxian,"  and 
"You  are  no  longer  a  Marxian."  Both  assertions  are  equally 
unfounded.  The  truth  is  simply  I  have  first  accepted  the  theory 
of  historical  materialism,  and  then  I  have  treated  it  from  the 
point  of  view  of  modern  science  and — according  to  my  own 
intellectual  temperament. 


148  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

raised  in  your  preface  by  touching  upon  such  very 
difficult  questions.  So  one  reason  for  coming  to  a  close  is 
given  by  the  outlines  of  your  own  article,  to  which  I 
have  referred  from  time  to  time.  If  I  were  to  abandon 
myself  to  the  sweep  of  conversation,  who  knows  where  I 
would  stop !  The  letters  might  grow  into  a  literature. 
You  would  not  thank  me  for  that  a  bit.  But  it  would 
please  Mr.  Croce,  who  would  like  to  fill  everybody  with 
his  instinct  for  literary  prolixity.  In  this  respect  he 
forms  a  queer  contrast  to  the  leisurely  habits  of  leisure- 
ly Naples,  where  men,  like  the  Lotus  Eaters,  who  dis- 
dained any  other  food,  live  in  sweet  enjoyment  of  the 
present  and  seem  to  mock  the  philosophy  of  history  in 
plain  view  of  the  statue  of  G.  B.  Vico. 

But  I  really  wish  to  come  to  a  close,  and  so  I  must 
put  down  a  few  more  brief  remarks. 

It  seems  to  me,  first  of  all,  that  you  ask,  not  on  ac- 
count of  any  curiosity  of  your  own,  but  because  you  art- 
fully place  yourself  into  the  position  of  your  readers: 
Is  there  any  way  to  explain  to  us  in  an  easy  and  clear 
manner  in  what  consists  that  dialectics  which  is  so 
often  invoked  for  the  elucidation  of  the  gist  of  histori- 
cal materialism?  And  I  think  you  might  add  that  the 
conception  of  this  dialectics  remains  obscure  for  purely 
empirical  scientists,  for  the  still  surviving  metaphysi- 
cians, and  for  those  popular  evolutionists,  who  abandon 
themselves  so  willingly  to  a  general  impression  of  what 
is  and  happens,  appears  and  disappears,  is  born  and 
dies,  and  who  mean  by  evolution  in  the  last  resort  the 
unknowable,  not  the  process  of  understanding.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  by  the  dialectics  we  mean  that  rhythmic 
movement  of  understanding,  which  tries  to  reproduce 
the  general  outline  of  reality  in  the  making. 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  149 

For  my  part — if  these  letters  were  not  too  long  to 
render  such  a  thing  improbable — should  I  ever  feel  like 
taking  this  matter  up  once  more,  I  should,  before  an- 
swering such  difficult  questions,  remember  that  Grecian 
poet,  who,  on  being  asked  by  the  tyrant  of  Syracuse: 
"What  are  the  gods?"  asked  first  for  one  day's  respite, 
then  for  a  second,  then  for  a  third,  and  so  on  to  infinity. 
And  yet  the  poets,  who  create,  invent,  praise,  and  cele- 
brate the  gods,  ought  to  be  more  familiar  with  them 
than  I  could  be  with  dialectics,  if  a  man  held  me  in  a 
tight  place  and  demanded  imperiously  that  I  should 
answer  him.  I  should  take  my  time,  a  method  of  pro- 
cedure not  out  of  harmony  with  dialectic  thought,  and 
I  should  say  in  so  many  words  (and  this  reply  is  im- 
plicit) :  We  cannot  give  ourselves  an  adequate  account 
of  thought  unless  it  be  by  an  act  of  thinking.  We  must 
become  accustomed  to  the  various  modes  of  applying 
thought  by  successive  efforts.  And  it  is  always  a  dang- 
erous thing  to  jump  with  both  feet  from  the  concrete 
application  of  a  certain  concept  to  the  formulation  of 
its  general  definition.  And  if  I  were  hard  pressed  for  a 
reply,  I  should,  in  order  to  save  the  questioner  the 
trouble  of  long,  arduous,  and  complicated  study,  recom- 
mend a  perusal  of  ANTI-DUEHRING,  especially  of 
the  chapter  entitled  The  Negation  of  the  Negation. 

There,  and  throughout  the  whole  book,  it  will  be  seen 
that  Engels  did  not  only  make  great  efforts  to  explain 
what  he  taught,  but  also  tried  to  combat  the  wrong  use 
to  which  mental  processes  may  be  applied,  as  they  are 
by  people  who,  instead  of  arriving  at  concrete  thoughts 
in  which  the  mental  faculty  shows  itself  alive  and  fresh, 
have  an  inclination  to  fall  into  a  priori  diagrams,  or 
into  scholasticism.  And  be  it  said,  without  prejudice  to 


150  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

the  ignorant,  that  scholasticism  was  by  no  means  ex 
clusively  confined  to  the  learned  of  the  Middle  Ages, 
and  is  not  worn  merely  as  a  priestly  robe.  Scholasticism 
may  fasten  itself  upon  any  theory.  Aristotle  himself 
was  the  first  scholastic.  He  was,  indeed,  a  good  many 
other  things,  above  all  a  scientific  genius.  Scholasticism 
is  even  presented  in  the  name  of  Marx.  The  fact  is 
that  the  greatest  difficulty  in  the  understanding  and 
further  elaboration  of  historical  materialism  is  not  the 
understanding  of  the  formal  aspects  of  Marxism,  but 
a  possession  of  the  facts  in  which  those  forms  are  im- 
manent. Marx  possessed  some  of  these  facts  and  elabor- 
ated them,  and  there  are  many  others  left  which  we  must 
find  out  and  elaborate  for  ourselves. 

In  the  course  of  many  years  which  I  have  spent  in 
education  I  became  firmly  convinced  of  the  great  injury 
done  to  young  minds  by  steeping  them  without  warning 
in  formulae,  diagrams,  and  definitions  as  though  these 
were  the  forerunners  of  real  things,  instead  of  leading 
them  by  gradual  and  well  weighed  steps  through  a 
chosen  department  of  reality  and  first  observing,  com- 
paring, and  experimenting  with  actual  objects  before 
formulating  theories.  In  short,  a  definition  placed  at 
the  beginning  of  a  study  is  meaningless.  Definitions 
take  on  a  meaning  only  when  genetically  developed.  In 
the  course  of  construction  it  is  often  seen  how  injurious 
mere  definitions  are.  The  common  interpretation  given 
by  untutored  minds  to  certain  passages  of  the  Roman 
law  is  quite  different  from  the  real  meaning.  Teaching 
is  not  an  activity  which  produces  a  bare  effect  by  means 
of  bare  objects.  It  is  rather  an  activity  which  gener- 
ates another  activity.  In  teaching  we  learn  to  under- 
stand that  the  first  germ  of  all  philosophic  thought  is 


SOCIALISM  AND   PHILOSOPHY  151 

always  planted  by  the  Socratie  method,  that  is,  by  the 
accomplished  talent  of  generating  ideas.* 

*I  would  refer  the  reader  to  my  work  on  THE  DOCTRINE 
OF  SOCRATES,  Naples,  1871,  especially  to  pages  56  to  72,  where 
I  discuss  his  method.  I  quote  a  few  passages  from  this  work, 
just  to  show  the  "Socratie  element"  in  any  form  of  thought. 

"The  primitive  state  of  human  consciousness,  while  typical  of 
the  primitive  epoch  of  social  development,  still  continues  and 
perpetuates  itself  in  subsequent  historical  periods,  because  It 
acquires  a  certain  degree  of  lasting  power  through  habit  and 
fixes  its  expression  in  myths  and  primitive  poetry.  The  suc- 
cessive rise  and  slow  development  of  reflection. .  .do  not  wholly 
succeed  in  overcoming  the  diverse  manifestations  of  the  primi- 
tive and  unreasoning  mind.  The  transformation  of  ancient 
elements  into  consciously  understood  and  expressed  concepts 
does  not  take  place  until  after  a  long  process,  an  assiduous 
and  incessant  struggle  through  centuries.  This  process  of 
transformation  does  not  take  place  by  the  mere  instrumentality 
of  those  internal  motives  of  criticism  and  research  which  may 
be  called  theoretical.  It  is  rather  the  necessary  outcome  of  the 
"practical  collisions  between  the  will  of  the  individual  and  the 
traditional  opinions  as  expressed  by  customs."  Still  later  it 
assumes  the  character  of  "a  social  struggle  between  class  and 
class,  individual  and  individual."  In  the  history  of  this  struggle, 
one  of  the  elements  of  primitive  life  which  offers  the  greatest 
material  for  contrasts.  .  .is  the  language. .  .which  assumes  in 
later  periods  the  appearance  of  a  rule  to  which  all  individuals 
must  necessarily  and  inevitably  conform.  But  when  men  no 
longer  agree  instinctively  in  calling  the  same  things  just, 

virtuous,  honest,  etc when  they  have  lost  faith  in  those 

abstract  types  of  legend  and  myth,  in  which  the  primitive  mind 
had  deposited  and  expressed  points  of  common  agreement... 
then  there  arises... in  the  individual  the  need  of  recovering 
that  certainty,  which  came  from  the  agreement  on  a  natural 
and  common  criterion  and  he  asks:  What  is  it?  This  question 
manifests  the  logical  interest  of  Socrates."  (Page  59.)  —  "The 
external  sameness  of  a  word,  which  preserves  a  certain  appear- 
ance of  uniformity  in  its  constant  phonetical  value,  helps  but 
to  increase  the  confusion  and  uncertainty.  For  we  are  first 
overcome  by  the  illusion  that  the  same  words  express  the  same 
meaning,  but  in  the  long  run  we  acquire  the  conviction  of  the 
wide  difference  between  our  concepts  and  those  of  others.  The 
first  illusion  thereby  becomes  so  much  more  evident,  and  finally 
it  is  entirely  dispelled."  (Page  62).  —  "The  question:  What 
is  it?  comprises  the  entire  inquiry  into  the  worth  of  a  concept, 
from  its  evident  and  determinable  limits  to  the  idea  which  we 
have  of  it.  The  content  of  a  concept,  which  seems  at  first  sight 
expressed  by  its  simple  denomination,  must  be  In  reality  &»c«r- 


152  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

In  recommending  ANTI-DUEHRING,  and  the  cited 
chapter,  I  do  not  mean  to  make  a  catechism  of  these 
things,  but  only  to  refer  to  them  as  an  illustration  of 
ability  in  teaching.  Arms  and  instruments  serve  their 
purposes  only  so  long  as  they  are  in  use,  not  when  hung 
on  the  walls  of  museums. 

By  the  way,  if  I  did  not  have  to  come  to  a  close,  I 
should  like  to  dwell  for  a  moment  on  that  passage  where 
you  say  that  Italy  deserves  the  homage  of  all,  because 
it  is  the  common  cradle  of  all  civilization.  These  words 
might  seem  rather  highsounding,  seeing  that  you  are 
speaking  of  socialism,  which  is  really  not  greatly  in- 
debted to  Italy.  However,  if  it  is  true  that  socialism  is 
the  outcome  of  advanced  civilization,  then  the  mature 
and  advanced  of  other  countries  may  do  well  to  turn 
their  eyes  occasionally  upon  this  cradle.  By  thinking 
now  and  then  of  Italy,  which  for  centuries  made  the 
greater  part  of  universal  history,  all  will  always  be  able 
to  learn  something  from  us.  And  then  they  will  per- 
ceive that  they  already  had  this  Italy  at  home  as  the 
forerunner  of  that  which  they  now  are.  Some  French- 
men have  been  of  the  opinion  that  Italy  had  been  trans- 

tained,  In  its  essence  and  identity.  And  this  cannot  be  accom- 
plished by  going  from  the  top  to  the  bottom,  or,  as  we  say, 
deductively,  because  we  still  lack  the  conviction  of  the  exist- 
ence of  an  unconditional  and  absolute  logical  value."  (Page  65.) 
—  "The  point  of  departure,  that  is,  the  name  which  in  its 
simple  phonetic  unity  was  at  first  the  center  of  research, 
becomes  ultimately  the  extreme  limit  of  thought,  which  is 
placed  at  the  end  of  research  by  making  of  it  consciously  the 
expression  of  a  content  due  to  deliberate  thought.  Then  the 
concrete  images,  which  at  first  arranged  themselves  doubtfully 
around  a  vague  denomination,  no  longer  dominate  the  new 
synthesis  and  are  compelled  to  disband  and  seek  a  new  location. 
And  only  the  new  element  which  is  the  outcome  of  research,  or 
the  constant  content  of  the  object  of  inquiry  found  by  way  of 
Induction,  can  determine  the  co-ordination  and  subordination, 
in  which  the  images  shall  exist  side  by  side."  (Page  66-67.) 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  153 

formed  from  a  cradle  into  a  tomb  of  civilization.  And 
like  a  tomb  it  must  appear  to  all  strangers  who  visit  it 
as  though  it  were  a  museum,  but  are  ignorant  of  our 
present  history.  And  in  this  they  are  wrong,  and,  how- 
ever learned  these  visitors  may  be,  to  that  extent  they 
remain  ignorant  of  the  actual  life  of  our  country,  a  life 
which  seems  that  of  one  risen  from  the  dead.  And  this, 
at  least,  is  worthy  of  note. 

In  what  does  this  rebirth  of  Italy  really  consist  and 
what  prospects  does  it  hold  out  to  those  who  watch  the 
general  progress  of  humanity  without  prejudice  and 
preconceived  notions?*  I  will  not  speak  of  the  great 
difficulties,  which  must  be  overcome  in  the  treatment  of 
the  actual  history  of  each  country  from  an  objective 
point  of  view,  that  will  not  permit  personal  opinions  to 
influence  scientific  research.  In  the  particular  case  of 
Italy,  we  should  have  to  go  back  to  the  16th  century, 
when  the  first  beginnings  of  the  capitalist  era  were  in- 
augurated by  the  Mediterranean  countries,  in  which 
Capitalism  then  had  its  principal  seat.  We  should  have 
to  reach  the  positive  and  negative,  internal  and  external, 
premises  of  the  present  conditions  of  Italy  by  way  of  the 
history  of  successive  decadence.  It  is  not  necessary  for 
me  to  say  that  my  powers  would  not  be  equal  to  the 
task.  I  do  not  feel  the  slightest  temptation  to  undertake 
it  as  an  incident  to  an  occasional  and  familiar  discourse 
like  the  present.  The  man  who  can  compress  such  a 
study  into  a  book  might  claim  to  have  made  a  contribu- 

*When  I  first  wrote  these  hasty  outlines  of  the  present  con- 
ditions in  Italy,  I  made  them  rather  lengthy.  Later,  when  I 
prepared  these  letters  for  the  printer,  I  decided  to  make  this 
outline  shorter.  For  in  the  not  very  distant  future  I  intend  to 
publish  another  essay,  in  which  I  shall  have  occasion  to  speak 
at  sufficient  length  of  the  remote  causes  and  immediate  reasons 
for  the  present  conditions  of  our  country. 


154  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

tion  to  the  mental  expression  of  the  actual  situation  and 
of  the  actual  thought  life  of  the  Italians.*  Here  we 
have  often  blind  optimists  or  blind  pessimists  among  us, 
in  the  sense  in  which  unphilosophical  people  use  these 
terms.  For  in  Italy  there  exists  not  only  a  great  deal  of 
ignorance  concerning  the  actual  condition  of  other  coun- 
tries, but  also  a  valuation  of  conditions  at  home  by  a 
standard,  which  is  entirely  ideal,  hypothetical,  and  often 
Utopian,  instead  of  comparative  and  practical.  It  is  in- 
deed a  singular  case  that  here  in  our  country,  where  the 
sciences  devoted  to  the  observation  of  nature,  sciences 
really  cultivated  for  particularistic  and  anti-philosophi- 
cal reasons,  have  had  such  a  rise,  we  should  meet  with 
so  little  positive  understanding  of  present  social  condi- 
tions, while  at  the  same  time  we  have  such  an  extra  large 
number  of  sociologists,  who  supply  the  seekers  for  truth 
with  definitions.  But  it  is  well  known  that  the  sociolo- 
gists of  all  countries  have  a  queer  antipathy  against  the 
study  of  history.  And  yet  this  same  history  is  in  the 


*I  made  this  analysis,  at  least  in  a  summary  fashion,  in  the 
beginning  of  my  academy  course  of  1897-98,  which  was  devoted 
to  the  fall  of  the  "Ancient  Regime."  In  order  to  explain  the 
catastrophic  development  of  capitalist  society  in  France,  it 
occurred  to  me  to  preface  it  with  a  general  description  of  what 
we  call  modern  society.  But  the  hampered  or  backward 
development  of  Italian  life  deprives  many  Italians  of  a  clear 
vision  of  the  capitalist  world,  and  therefore  it  suited  me  to 
give  a  precise  statement  of  the  causes,  reasons,  and  manner  of 
development  of  present  conditions  in  Italy.  Many  Italian 
socialists  did  not  see  until  recently  that  the  obstacles  to 
capitalist  development  are  so  many  obstacles  to  the  formation 
of  a  proletarian  society  capable  of  political  action.  To  that 
extent  they  were  and  remained  Utopians,  whether  they  liked  it 
or  not.  At  that  time,  in  December,  1897,  I  could  not  foresee 
the  hurricane,  which  broke  loose  in  Italy  in  May,  1898.  But 
this  hurricane  found  me  at  least  prepared — to  understand  it. 
And  what  else  can  we  do  under  certain  circumstances  but  to 
understand? 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  155 

opinion  of  the  profane  the  very  thing  by  which  society 
has  developed. 

Finally,  few  clearly  see  the  fact  that  the  Italian  bour- 
geoisie, which  is  already  the  object  of  scorn  and  hatred 
on  the  part  of  the  lowly,  freed  slaves,  and  exploited, 
the  same  as  in  all  other  countries,  and  on  the  other 
hand  is  pushed  and  crowded  by  the  small  tradesmen,  is 
unstable,  restless,  and  diffident  in  its  own  ranks,  because 
it  cannot  compete  with  the  capitalists  of  other  countries 
on  equal  terms.  For  this  reason,  and  for  the  other  that 
they  have  the  Pope,*  with  his  still  marketable  com- 
modities which  only  the  theoretical  thinkers  of  liberalist 
utopianism  proclaim  to  be  for  ever  outgrown,  this 
bourgeoisie,  which  must  still  rise,  is  intrinsically  revo- 
lutionary, as  the  Manifesto  would  put  it.  And  since 
they  have  not  had  a  chance  to  be  Jacobins,  as  they  would 
have  liked  very  much  to  be,  they  have  become  used  to  the 
formula  of  a  king  by  the  grace  of  God  and  the  nation, 
all  in  the  same  breath.  Since  this  bourgeoisie  could  not 
count  on  a  rapid  development  of  industry  on  a  large 
scale,  which  is  in  fact  slow  in  coming,  nor,  consequently, 

*Sevcral  times  I  had  occasion,  from  1887  until  now.  to  combat 
in  speech  and  writing  the  attempts  to  reconcile  Italy  and  the 
Vatican.  But  I  never  appealed  in  my  polemics  either  to  ma- 
terialism or  to  atheism,  and  the  like,  as  the  ideologists  gen- 
erally do.  I  appealed  always  to  the  practical  interests  of  our 
bourgeoisie,  who,  to  say  it  in  two  words,  cannot  get  along  with- 
out two  things  at  the  same  time,  namely  the  Hymn  of  Garibaldi 
and  the  Royal  March.  The  practical  impossibility  of  a  real 
conservative  party  is  one  of  the  characteristic  marks  of  our 
country.  For  in  order  to  conserve,  we  should  have  to  destroy 
here.  Moreover  our  priests,  who  are  as  prosaic  as  the  other 
Italians,  are  always  working  for  a  Kingdom  of  Heaven  on 
earth,  manage  affairs  like  belated  humanitarians,  and  import 
theology,  sacred  Instruction,  Christian  democracy,  and  con- 
fessional treasuries  as  articles  of  luxury  from  Germany  and 
Austria. 


156  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

on  a  rapid  conquest  of  foreign  markets,  on  account  of 
the  slow  and  uncertain  progress  of  national  economy 
which  is  largely  agricultural,  they  practice  the  mediocre 
politics  of  expediency  and  spend  all  their  talents  in 
adroitness.  This  is  the  part  played  recently  for  a 
number  of  months  by  our  navy  in  the  Orient.  It  is 
playing  the  role  of  the  fox  in  the  fable,  who  declared 
that  the  grapes  were  sour,  because  he  could  not  reach 
them.  But  this  fox  finds  itself  among  other  foxes,  who 
guard  the  grapes  or  are  about  to  seize  them.  And  then 
the  fox  becomes  an  idealist  for  want  of  anything  posi- 
tive. This  Italian  bourgeoisie  feels  itself  in  the  role  of 
the  whole  nation,  partly  on  account  of  the  reactionary 
or  demagogical  abstention  of  the  clericals  from  political 
activity,  partly  on  account  of  the  very  slow  development 
of  a  proletarian  opposition.  In  the  absence  of  party 
divisions  in  society,  the  bourgeoisie  gave  the  name  of 
parties  to  the  factions  that  gathered  around  captains  or 
proconsuls,  enterprising  or  adventurous  leaders.  The 
first  appearance  of  Socialism  struck  them  like  lightning. 
On  the  other  hand,  those  deceive  themselves  who  be- 
lieve that  every  commotion  of  the  multitude  in  this 
country,  such  as  we  have  witnessed  several  times  in  vari- 
ous places  of  Italy,  is  an  indication  of  a  proletarian 
movement,  which  has  for  its  concrete  basis  the  economic 
struggle  and  turns  its  aspirations  more  or  less  explicitly 
in  the  direction  of  the  socialism  of  other  countries. 
More  often  these  commotions  are  like  revolts  of  ele- 
mentary forces  against  a  state  of  things,  in  which  these 
forces  do  not  find  that  controlling  discipline  which  is 
typical  of  a  bourgeois  rule  tending  to  train  the  prole- 
tariat in  squads.  Look,  for  instance,  at  the  aggravated 
phenomenon  of  emigration,  which,  with  a  few  excep- 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  157 

tions,  carries  away  men,  who  are  able  to  offer  to  capita- 
list exploitation  in  foreign  countries  strong  arms,  incom- 
parable diligence,  and  stomachs  capable  of  any  amount 
of  privation.  They  are,  in  short,  laborers  from  the 
fields  who  are  superfluous,  or  artisans  from  decaying 
trades,  whom  the  rule  of  capitalist  education  would  join 
in  squads  for  factory  labor,  if  industry  on  a  large  scale 
were  ready  to  develop  that  sort  of  thing,  or  whom  our 
home  capital  would  invite  to  our  home  colonies,  if  we 
had  any,  and  if  we  had  not  been  seized  by  the  craze  of 
founding  colonies  in  places  where  it  is  almost  impossible 
to  do  so.* 

Italy  has  become  during  recent  years,  for  very  natural 
reasons,  the  promised  land  of  decadents,  self-glorifiers, 
shallow  critics,  fastidious  and  posing  sceptics.  The  sane 
and  veracious  part  of  the  socialist  movement  (  which  has 
no  other  duties  to  perform  for  the  present  under  the 
prevailing  circumstances  but  to  prepare  the  small  mid- 
dle class  for  democratic  education)  therefore  contains 
admixtures  of  elements,  who  would  have  to  admit  to 

*  "Italy  has  need  of  material,  moral,  and  intellectual  progress. 
I  hope  that  you  will  see  an  Italy,  in  which  the  backward  man- 
agement of  agriculture  will  be  supplanted  by  machinery  and 
chemistry  on  a  large  scale;  and  that  you  will  see  the  generative 
power  of  electricity,  which  alone  can  make  up  for  our  lack  of 
coal,  hitched  to  the  superior  courses  of  rivers,  or.  perhaps,  to 
the  waves  of  the  sea  and  the  winds.  I  look  forward  to  a  time 
when  you  will  no  longer  see  any  illiterates  in  Italy,  and  there- 
fore no  longer  any  men  who  are  not  citizens  and  mobs  who  are 
not  people.  You  will,  perhaps,  witness  and  take  part  in  politics 
that  will  be  directed  in  conformity  with  an  understanding  of 
growing  culture  and  increased  economic  power,  instead  of  base 
alliances  and  fantastically  adventurous  enterprises  ending  in 
acts  of  prudence  which  seem  vile." — Thus  1  spoke  last  year,  in 
my  inaugural  address  at  the  university  of  Rome,  on  November 
14,  addressing  myself  to  the  students.  It  was  precisely  these 
words  which  made  such  a  stir.  (See  "The  University  and  the 
Freedom  of  Jcience,"  Rome,  1897,  page  50.) 


158  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

themselves,  if  they  wanted  to  be  honest  with  themselves, 
that  they  are  decadents,  that  they  are  not  moved  to  be- 
stir themselves  by  the  strong  will  to  live,  but  by  a  vague 
satiety  with  the  present.  They  are  merely  satiated  and 
bored  bohemians. 

But  I  must  really  come  to  a  close.  It  seems  to  me, 
however,  that  I  hear  a  small  voice  of  protest  coming 
from  those  comrades, who  are  always  so  ready  to  raise 
objections.  And  this  voice  says:  "All  this  is  sophistry 
and  doctrinairism.  What  we  need  is  practice."  Cer- 
tainly, I  agree  with  you,  you  are  right.  Socialism  has 
so  long  been  Utopian,  scheming,  offhand,  and  visionary, 
that  it  is  well  to  repeat  now  all  the  time  that  what  we 
need  is  practice.  For  the  minds  of  those  who  adopt 
socialism  should  never  be  out  of  touch  with  the  things 
of  the  actual  world,  should  continually  study  their 
field,  in  which  they  are  compelled  to  work  hard  for  a 
clear  road.  But  my  supposed  critic  should  take  care  not 
to  become  a  doctrinaire  himself.  For  this  term  desig- 
nates for  those  who  understand  it  a  certain  mental  dis- 
position to  lose  one's  self  in  abstractions  and  to  claim 
that  ideas  which  are  pronounced  excellent  in  themselves. 
and  fruits  which  have  been  collected  by  experience  at 
different  times  and  places,  can  be  applied  straight  to 
concrete  cases  and  are  good  for  all  times  and  places. 
The  practice  of  the  socialist  parties  in  their  relations 
with  other  politics  has  so  far  been  exercised  rather  in 
keeping  with  rational  requirements  than  with  science. 
It  is  the  outcome  of  constant  observation,  of  an  inces- 
sant adaptation  to  new  conditions.  It  is  the  tested 
fruit  of  the  struggle  for  an  alignment  of  often  different 
and  antagonistic  tendencies  of  the  proletariat  in  the 
same  direction.  It  is  the  endeavor  to  bring  practical 


SOCIALISM  AND   PHILOSOPHY  159 

plans  to  a  realization  by  the  help  of  a  clear  under- 
standing of  all  the  complicated  and  intricate  interrela- 
tions which  hold  together  the  world  in  which  we  are 
living.  If  it  were  not  so,  with  what  right  and  by  what 
claim  could  we  speak  of  a  vaunted  Marxism  ?  If  histori- 
cal materialism  does  not  hold  good,  it  means  that  the 
prospects  for  the  coming  of  socialism  are  doubtful,  and 
that  our  thought  of  a  future  society  is  a  Utopian  dream. 

Too  often  it  is  true,  that  all  our  contemporaneous 
socialism  still  contains  within  itself  some  latent  germs  of 
a  new  utopianism.* 

This  is  the  case  with  those  who  continuously  harp  on 
the  dogma  of  the  necessity  of  evolution,  which  they  con- 
found with  a  certain  right  to  a  better  condition.  And 
they  say  that  the  future  society  of  collectivist  economic 
production,  with  all  its  technical  and  pedagogic  conse- 
quences, will  come  because  it  should  come.  They  seem  to 
forget  that  this  future  society  must  be  produced  by  hu- 
man beings  themselves  in  response  to  the  demands  of  the 
conditions  in  which  they  now  live  and  by  the  develop- 
ment of  their  own  aptitudes.  Blessed  are  those  who 
measure  the  future  of  history  and  the  right  to  progress 
with  the  yardstick  of  a  life  insurance  policy! 

Those  dogmatists  of  cheap  ideas  forget  several  things. 
In  the  first  place,  they  forget  that  the  future,  just  be- 
cause it  is  a  future  which  will  be  a  present  when  we  are 

•Bernstein  wrote  recently  with  great  ability  some  ingenious 
articles  In  the  NEUE  ZEIT  on  the  utopianism  latent  in  some 
Marxists.  And  many,  whom  the  shoe  fitted,  may  have  asked 
themselves:  "Does  that  concern  me?"  (When  I  wrote  this  in 
1897,  I  never  dreamed  that  this  Bernstein,  whose  critique  I 
praised  simply  in  so  far  as  it  was  a  critique,  would  be  carried 
around  the  world  as  the  greatest  example  of  a  reformist,  by 
the  salesmen  of  the  "crisis  of  Marxism." — Note  to  the  new 
edition.) 


160  SOCIALISM   AND  PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  past,  cannot  be  used  as  a  practical  criterion  for 
our  present  actions.  It  will  be  the  thing  at  which  we 
wish  to  arrive,  but  not  the  way  by  which  to  reach  it.  In 
the  second  place,  the  experience  of  these  last  fifty  years 
should  convince  those,  who  can  think  critically,  of  the 
following  truth:  To  the  extent  that  the  capacity  for 
organization  in  a  class  party  will  grow  among  prole- 
tarians and  small  trades  people,  the  process  of  this 
complicated  movement  will  itself  furnish  the  proof  that 
the  development  of  the  new  era  will  have  to  be  meas- 
ured by  a  standard  of  time  considerably  slower  than 
that  first  assumed  by  the  early  socialists  who  were  still 
tainted  with  Jacobine  memories.  It  is  evident  that  we 
cannot  look  forward  across  such  long  stretches  of  time 
with  very  great  certitude.  We  must  take  into  account 
the  enormous  complexity  of  modern  life  and  the  vast 
expansion  of  capitalism,  or  of  bourgeois  society.*  Who 
cannot  see  that  the  Pacific  is  now  taking  the  place  of 
the  Atlantic  Ocean,  just  as  the  Atlantic  once  upon  a 
time  took  the  place  of  the  Mediterranean  Sea  ?  Finally, 
in  the  third  place,  the  practical  science  of  socialism  con- 
sists in  the  clear  observation  of  all  the  complicated  pro- 
cesses of  the  economic  world,  and  in  a  simultaneous 
study  of  the  conditions  in  which  the  proletariat  lives, 
becomes  capable  of  concentration  in  a  class  party,  and 

•The  multiplication  of  the  centers  of  production  and  the 
resulting  complexity  of  Interrelations  have  also  led  to  a  change 
In  commercial  crises.  In  the  place  of  the  periodical  spasms, 
which  in  Marx's  time  came  every  ten  years  in  the  typical  exam- 
ple of  England,  we  have  now  a  diffuse  and  chronic  state  of 
depression.  This  has  Been  turned  into  a  weighty  argument  by 
those  who  combat  the  idea  of  catastrophes.  In  short,  they 
attempt  to  make  Marxism  as  a  theory  responsible  for  the 
errors  of  prevision  and  calculation,  which  Marx  was  liable  to 
make,  because  he  lived  in  a  certain  environment  limited  by 
space  and  time  and  circumstances. 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  161 

carries  into  this  successive  concentration  the  spirit  which 
it  needs  in  the  economic  struggle  that  /shapes  its  own 
peculiar  politics.  Upon  these  present  data  we  can  base 
sufficiently  clear  calculations  of  our  forecast  and  make 
connection  with  that  point  where  the  proletariat  be- 
comes dominant  and  shapes  the  political  policies  of  the 
state.  This  point  must  coincide  with  the  one  where 
capitalism  becomes  unfit  to  rule.  And  from  this  point, 
which  no  one  can  very  well  imagine  to  be  a  noisy  affray, 
we  shall  have  the  beginning  of  that  thing  which  many, 
with  tiresome  persistency,  call  the  social  revolution  par 
excellence,  I  don't  know  why,  since  the  entire  history 
is  a  series  of  social  revolutions.  To  go  beyond  that  point 
with  our  reasoning  would  be  to  mistake  it  for  a  fabric 
of  our  imagination. 

The  time  of  the  prophets  is  past.  Happy  thou,  Fra 
Dolcino,  who  in  thy  three  letters*  wast  able  to  trans- 
figure the  fleeting  incidents  of  politics  (such  as  pope 
Celestine  and  pope  Boniface  VIII.,  the  champions  of 
Anjou  and  Aragon,  the  Guelfs  and  the  Ghibellines,  the 
poor  plebs  and  the  patricians  of  the  communes,  and  so 
forth)  into  types  which  had  already  been  symbolized  by 
the  prophets  and  the  Apocalypse,  measuring  the  periods 
of  providence  by  successive  corrections  according  to 
years,  months,  and  days.  But  thou  wast  a  hero.  And 
this  proves  that  these  fantasies  were  not  the  cause  of 
thy  struggles,  but  rather  their  ideological  envelope,  by 
means  of  which  thou  gavest  an  account  to  thyself,  in 
the  way  that  many  others  did,  for  a  whole  century  in 
advance  of  thyself  and  Francis  of  Assisi,  of  the  des- 
perate movement  of  the  plebeians  against  the  papal 

*Of  one  of  these  letters  we  have  only  fragments  by  indirec- 
tion. 


162  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

hierarchy,  against  the  growing  bourgeoisie  in  the  com- 
munes, and  the  rising  monarchy.  But  all  these  envel- 
opes have  been  torn,  including  the  religion  of  ideas, 
as  some  would  say  who  employ  a  hypocritical  jargon  out 
of  superstitious  reverence  for  the  religion  of  others. 
Nowadays  only  the  imbeciles  are  permitted  to  remain 
Utopians.  The  utopia  of  imbeciles  is  either  a  ridiculous 
thing,  or  a  pet  idea  of  literary  men,  who  pay  a  visit  to 
that  children's  phalanstery  which  Bellamy  built.  Our 
humble  Marx,  on  the  other  hand,  wholly  a  prosaic  man 
of  science,  went  about  modestly  collecting  in  present 
society  the  indications  for  its  transition  into  the  coming 
society,  for  instance,  the  rise  of  co-operatives  (real 
ones!)  in  England  and  similar  things,  and  to  him  fell 
the  task  (especially  by  the  work  spent  on  the  Interna- 
tional) to  be  the  midwife  of  the  future,  which  is  not 
quite  the  same  as  being  its  fanciful  builder.  He  and 
Engels  spoke  of  the  society  of  the  future,  assuming  the 
dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  as  a  fact,  not  from  the 
intuitive  point  of  view  of  one  who  thinks  he  can  see  it 
before  him,  but  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  principle 
of  formation  of  the  economic  structure  which  should  de- 
velop in  opposition  to  the  present  society.* 

For  the  rest,  if  any  one  feels  the  need  of  living  in 
the  future  as  though  he  could  feel  it  and  try  it  on  his 
own  skin,  and  if  he  stammers  in  the  name  of  such  ideas 
and  wants  to  invest  members  of  the  future  society  with 
their  rights  and  duties,  let  him  go  ahead.  I  hope  he 
will  permit  me,  who  has  also  a  sort  of  right  to  send  his 
visiting  card  to  posterity,  to  express  the  sentiment  that 
the  people  of  the  future  will  not  lay  aside  their  human 

•For  information  on  this  point  see  the  quotations  at  the  end 
of  my  essay  on  "Historical  Materialism." 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  163 

nature  to  such  an  extent  as  to  be  no  longer  comparable 
to  us  of  the  present,  and  that  they  will  have  enough  of 
the  dialectic  joy  of  laughter  left  to  crack  jokes  over  the 
prophets  of  today. 

Now  I  close  for  good.     And  it  is  for  you  to  recom- 
mence, if  you  should  ever  desire  to  do  so. 


APPENDIX 


AUTHOR'S  POSTSCRIPT   TO   THE 
FRENCH  EDITION. 

Frascati  (Rome),  September  10,  1898. 

While  Sorel  has  not  given  any  sign  of  recommencing 
up  to  the  present  time,  it  may  be  that  he  will  still  do  so. 
However,  I  have  good  reasons  to  fear  that  he  will  take 
quite  a  different  road  than  I  expected,  if  he  should 
recommence,  since  now  he  is  talking  of  his  Crisis  of 
Scientific  Socialism  (See  his  article  in  Critica  Sociale, 
May  1,  1898,  pages  134-138),  which  he  wrote  with  refer- 
ence to  the  same  publications  of  Merlino,  which  he  had 
so  severely  criticised  the  year  before,  in  Le  Devenir 
Social  (October,  1897,  pages  854-858). 

But  whether  he  does  or  does  not  recommence  the  dis- 
cussion of  the  general  problems  which  I  treated  in  the 
foregoing  letters  addressed  to  him,  I  feel  compelled  to 
state  at  this  place,  in  order  to  avoid  misunderstanding 
and  save  the  reader  from  mistakes,  that  I  shall  not  follow 
him  in  his  immature  and  premature  lucubrations  on  the 
theory  of  value  (in  the  Journal  des  Economistes,  Paris, 
May  15,  1897 ;  Sozialistische  Monatshefte,  Berlin,  August, 
1897;  Giornale  degli  Economisti,  Rome,  July,  1898). 
Without  entering  into  the  merits  of  these  lucubrations, 
a  thing  which  cannot  be  done  in  passing,  or  as  a  pastime, 
I  want  to  say  that  I  don't  care  to  share  the  indefinite 
company  of  Sorel  merely  for  the  pleasure  of  being 

164 


SOCIALISM  AND   PHILOSOPHY  165 

quoted  among  the  examples  for  a  crisis  of  Marxism  ( See 
Th.  Masaryk,  Die  Krise  des  Marxismus,  Vienna,  1898, 
French  translation  in  the  Revue  de  Sociologie,  July, 
1898,  where  Sorel  is  quoted  in  support  of  this  precious 
literary  discovery).  In  my  opinion  there  are  many 
dramatis  personce  in  this  alleged  crisis,  who  either  have 
not  learned  their  lines  very  well,  or  are  afraid  to  learn 
them,  or  recite  them  wretchedly. 

The  same  reservation  I  must  also  make  in  regard  to 
Croce,  and  I  make  it  with  some  insistence,  so  far  as  his 
memorial  on  The  Intepretation  and  Critique  of  some 
Concepts  of  Marxism  is  concerned,  which  was  published 
in  Naples,  in  1897,  and  reproduced  in  Le  Devenir  Social, 
volume  IV,  February  and  March,  1898. 

Although  this  work  is  supposed  to  be  a  free  review 
of  my  Socialism  and  Philosophy  (as  the  author  himself 
says  on  page  3),  the  fact  it  that  aside  from  some  useful 
observation  on  historical  methods  and  a  few  sagacious 
remarks  on  political  tactics  it  contains  theoretical  enun- 
ciations, which  have  nothing  to  do  with  my  publications 
and  opinions,  but  are  rather  diametrically  opposed  to 
them.  Should  I  now  engage  officially  in  an  explicit 
polemic  against  the  whole  dissertation,  which  is  worthy 
bf  perusal  for  so  many  other  reasons?  But  why  should 
I?  What  good  would  it  do?  I  gladly  let  the  free 
reviewer  enjoy  his  liberty  of  opinion,  so  long  as  it  does 
not  pass  in  the  eyes  of  the  reader  for  a  complement  of 
my  own,  and  at  that  as  a  complement  endorsed  by 
myself. 

However,  I  cannot  confine  myself  to  the  general  reser- 
vation, which  is  sufficient  in  the  case  of  Sorel.  I  must 
rather  take  up  a  few  general  points  of  criticism. 


166  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

I  pass  without  further  notice  over  the  subtile  and 
scholastic  distinctions,  upon  which  Croce  insists,  such  as 
that  between  pure  and  applied  science,  economic  and 
moral  man,  egoism  and  utility,  what  we  are  and  what 
we  should  be,  and  so  forth,  because  a  tolerance  of  tradi- 
tional scholasticism  is  largely  a  part  of  my  profession. 
This  scholasticism  may  serve  to  give  to  youthful  ingenu- 
ousness its  first  training,  but  it  is  never  a  full  and  con- 
crete science.     How  is  the  astronomer  ever  going  to 
prevent  people  from  saying  that  the  sun  rises  and  sets? 
I  might  refer  to  another  case  similar  in  logic  and  about 
in  line  with  this  one,  treated  in  chapters  VI  and  VIII 
of  my  essay  on  Historical  Materialism.     There  I  have 
shown,  step  by  step,  that  the  elements  which  are  indis- 
pensable as  a  material  for  experimental  and  direct  cogni- 
tion, turn  at  a  certain  point  into  aspects,  or  into  parts 
of  a  complex  mental  combination,  as  the  case  may  be. 
But,  I  ask  for  the  sake  of  greater  clearness,  how  can  a 
man,  whose  mind  is  still  engrossed  in  such  a  narrow 
logic  of  first  experimental  cognition,  undertake  to  grap- 
ple with  the  problem  of  Marxism,  which  stands  above 
such  vulgar  distinctions,  or,  to  be  polite  toward  our 
adversaries,  professes  to  stand  above  them?    Is  not  this 
a  fight  with  too  unequal  weapons?     I  should  like  to 
invite  Croce  to  try  his  art  of  critique  on  some  other 
field,  to  read  critically  some  treatise  on  Energetica,  for 
instance  the  recent  one  of  Helm,  to  let  Helmholtz,  R. 
Mayer,  and  such  men,  go  to  the  devil,  and  restore  to 
honor  and  worship  the  common  sense  for  which  light 
always  shines  and  heat  is  always  warm. 

But  where  does  Croce  get  the  idea— and  that  when 
dealing  with  Marx— that  aside  from  the  various  econ- 


SOCIALISM  AND   PHILOSOPHY  167 

omies  succeeding  one  another  in  history,  of  which  the 
economy  of  capitalist  industry  is  a  particular  case  (but, 
mark  well,  the  only  case  which  has  so  far  produced  its 
theory,  represented  by  many  schools  and  schools  of 
schools),  there  exists  a  pure  economy,  which  sheds  light 
all  of  its  own  accord  and  explains  all  those  cases,  or  let 
us  say,  all  those  forms  of  prosaic  experience  ?  An  animal 
in  itself,  aside  from  the  visible  and  palpable  animals? 
And  what  is  the  content  of  this  economy  of  super- 
historical  and  supersocial  man,  who  becomes  more  bother- 
some than  all  the  supermen  of  literature  and  philosophy  ? 
Is  it,  perhaps,  a  naked  doctrine  of  wants  and  appetites, 
based  solely  on  the  natural  environment,  but  without 
any  experience  through  labor,  without  tools,  and  without 
precise  interrelations  of  common  life  and  society?  This 
conjecture  might  probably  pass  as  an  explanation  of 
the  psychology  of  prehistorical  life.  But  no,  this  economy 
of  man  in  himself  is  supposed  to  be  perpetual  and  still 
existing.  And  here  is  where  I  get  lost.  For  instance, 
he  tells  us  on  page  19 :  "I  hold  firmly  to  the  economic 
construction  of  the  hedonist  principle,  to  marginal  util- 
ity, to  final  utility,  and  finally  to  the  economic  explana- 
tion of  profit  on  capital  as  arising  from  different  degrees 
of  utility  of  the  present  and  future  goods.  But  this  does 
not  do  away  with  the  necessity  of  a  sociological  explana- 
tion of  profits  on  capital.  And  this  explanation,  with 
others  of  the  same  nature,  cannot  be  found  in  any  other 
way  than  the  one  in  which  Marx  sought  it. ' '  My  friend 
Croce  is  quite  an  insatiable  fellow,  and  for  this  reason 
he  might  seem  rather  capricious  to  those  who  don 't  know 
him.  He  swallows  at  one  mouth  full  a  whole  system  of 
economics,  a  system  which  pretends  to  embrace  all 


168  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

economic  knowledge.  This  system,  by  the  way,  is  well 
enough  known  in  Italy,  where  it  has  prominent  represen- 
tatives, and  even  some  who  have  continued  and  perfected 
it,  such  as  iBarone,  who,  it  is  claimed,  elaborated  the 
theory  of  distribution.  In  affirming  his  confession  of 
faith,  which  cannot  help  being  full  of  gladness,  seeing 
that  it  is  hedonistic,  he  makes  a  special  bid  for  admira- 
tion by  his  statement  that  he  accepts  the  economic  expla- 
nation (it  could  not  well  be  other  than  economic)  of 
"profit  on  capital  as  arising  from  different  degrees  of 
utility  of  the  present  and  future  goods."  And  now  he 
might  as  well  say  that  Marx  was  ignorant  and  wasted 
his  time,  when  he  devoted  so  much  effort  in  his  researches 
into  the  origin,  production,  and  distribution  of  surplus- 
value,  for  which  he  looked  in  an  entirely  different  direc- 
tion from  Croce.  For  this,  in  the  last  analysis,  was 
Marx's  essential  and  specific  contribution  to  economics 
as  a  critic  and  innovator.  The  blessed  formula  of  MM', 
that  is,  of  money  returned  with  more  money,  was  so  to 
say  the  fixed  idea  in  the  mind  of  the  explorer  Marx,  the 
pivot  of  his  entire  research.  Now  Croce,  having  made 
his  confession  of  faith  as  a  convinced  hedonist,  acts  like 
a  man  who  has  eaten  and  drunk  his  fill  and  wants  to  eat 
and  drink  some  more  by  turning  to  Marx  in  the  quest 
after  a  sociological  theory,  which  should  supplement  the 
other  one,  which  Croce  so  firmly  and  decisively  accepts. 
Of  course,  Marx  cannot  tell  him  anything  else  but  this : 
"Chase  your  hedonistic  mincemeat  to  the  devil.  Don't 
ask  me  any  questions  about  such  nonsense.  I  can  offer 
you  only  the  direct  opposite."  In  fact,  Croce  is  com- 
pelled to  make  up  a  Marx  more  or  less  different  from 
the  real  one,  so  that  he  may  have  a  Marx  whose  principles 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  169 

may  seem  reconcilable  with  those  undebatable  ones  of 
hedonism.  In  speaking  of  the  way,  in  which  Marx 
"could  succeed  in  discovering  and  defining  the  social 
origin  of  profit,  or  surplus-value,"  he  writes  the  follow- 
ing sentence:  "Surplus- value,  in  pure  economy,  is  a 
meaningless  term,  as  the  term  itself  shows,  since  surplus- 
value  is  extra-value  and  passes  out  of  the  field  of  econom- 
ies. But  it  has  a  meaning,  and  is  not  absurd,  as  a  con- 
cept of  a  distinction  made  in  comparing  one  society  with 
another,  one  fact  with  another,  or  two  hypotheses  with 
one  another."  And  then  he  adds  in  a  note:  "I  make 
amends  for  an  error  which  I  committed  in  one  of  my 
former  essays,  in  which,  while  saying  correctly  that 
surplus-value  is  not  a  purely  economic  concept,  I  defined 
it  further  inexactly  as  a  moral  concept.  And  I  should 
rather  have  said,  as  I  say  now,  that  surplus-value  is  a 
concept  of  a  difference  between  economic  sociology  and 
applied  economics,  and  not  of  pure  economics.  Morals 
has  nothing  to  do  with  this,  and  it  has  no  part  in  the 
entire  analysis  of  Marx."  I  would  advise  Croce,  when 
he  writes  his  third  memorial,  to  confess  that  he  could 
make  amends  for  his  first  error,  for  it  was  at  least  a 
generalization  of  an  opinion  commonly  held  by  vulgar 
socialism,  namely,  that  surplus-value  is  the  thing,  on 
account  of  which  the  exploited  are  protesting;  but  that 
he  has  no  excuse  for  his  second  error,  because  he  is  no 
longer  capable  of  deciphering  his  own  thoughts.  And 
this  is  true  not  merely  because  he  continually  confounds 
profit,  interest,  and  surplus-value,  but  because  he  assumes 
in  more  than  one  place  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a 
laboring  society  as  a  form  in  itself  (perhaps  in  distinc- 
tion from  a  society  of  saints  in  paradise  ?) .  And  he  says : 


170  SOCIALISM  AND   PHILOSOPHY 

"Marx  compared  capitalist  society  with  one  of  its  own 
parts,  isolated  and  elevated  to  an  independent  existence ; 
in  other  words,  he  compared  capitalist  society  with  an 
economic  society  by  itself  (but  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  a 
laboring  society)."  And  he  continues:  "The  Marxian 
economy  is  one  which  studies  the  abstract  laboring 
society. ' ' 

If  any  one  should  feel  the  need  of  freeing  himself 
from  the  accursed  metaphysical  bacillus,  which  is  to 
blame  for  such  arguments  as  these,  I  would  recommend 
to  him  as  a  remedy  the  perusal,  not  of  the  polemics  of 
economists,  not  even  those  of  Germany,  who  wrote  their 
criticisms  of  the  works  of  Dietzel,  since  these  may  seem 
doubtful,  but  of  the  Logic  of  Wundt  (Vol.  II,  Part  II, 
pages  499-533).  In  this  Logic,  by  the  way,  you  will 
find,  on  other  pages  than  those  just  cited,  that  surplus- 
value  is  precisely  used  as  an  illustration  of  a  typical 
case  of  a  social  law.  Would  you  believe  it !  And  Wundt 
is  not  particularly  kind,  either  to  the  sociologists,  or  to 
the  so-called  social  laws.* 

Finally,  then,  this  so-called  pure  economics,  as  it  is 
called  in  Italy,  which  is  always  the  land  of  emphasis  or 
exaggeration,  or  this  method  of  research  and  systematiza- 
tion,  which  developed  on  the  weak,  unfamiliar,  or  for- 
gotten foundations  laid  by  Gossen,  Walrass,  and  Jevons, 
and  is  now  vulgarly  known  by  the  name  of  the  Austrian 
school,  is  merely  a  variety  of  theoretical  interpretation 
for  the  same  empirical  facts  of  modern  economic  life, 
which  have  always  been  the  object  of  study  of  so  many 

*Wundt  was  never  quite  free  from  metaphysical  Ideologies, 
and  in  his  later  work  he  frankly  relapsed  into  metaphysics. — 
Translator. 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  171 

other  schools.  It  is  distinguished  from  the  classic  school 
(which  was  not  so  anti-historical  as  some  would  have  us 
believe,  and  as  R.  Schiiller  showed  in  his  work,  Die 
klassische  Nationalokonomie,  Berlin,  1895)  by  a  greater 
tendency  to  abstraction  and  generalization.  It  strives 
to  make  more  evident  the  psychological  stages  which 
accompany  the  economic  processes  and  relations.  It  uses 
and  misuses  mathematical  expedients.  It  is  not  entirely 
superhistorical,  although  it  often  stages  characters  like 
Robinson  Crusoe,  whom  it  tries  to  hide  afterwards  under 
the  cloak  of  subtile  individualistic  psychology.  Indeed, 
it  is  so  little  superhistorical  that  it  assumes  from  actual 
history  two  concepts  and  molds  them  into  theoretical 
extremes,  namely  the  liberty  to  work  and  the  liberty  of 
competition,  which  have  been  carried  to  their  maximum 
as  hypotheses.  For  this  reason  it  is  palpable,  compre- 
hensible, and  debatable  on  the  points  which  it  seeks  to 
make,  because  it  can  be  confronted  with  the  experiences, 
of  which  it  is  often  a  forced  and  onesided  interpretation. 
The  general  public  in  France  has  now  an  opportunity 
to  read  a  clear  and  full  explanation  of  the  theory  of 
value  of  this  school  in  E.  Petit 's  book  Etude  critique 
des  differentes  Theories  de  la  Valeur,  Paris,  1897. 

Returning  to  Croce,  I  do  not  know  how  to  conceal  my 
astonishment  over  his  ridicule  of  Engels,  who  speaks  of 
the  science  of  economics  as  historical  in  one  place,  and 
as  theoretical  in  another.  For  those  who  cling  to  words 
it  will  be  enough  to  say,  that  historical,  as  applied  in  this 
case,  is  the  opposite  of  the  fixed  and  immutable  idea  of 
nature  (such  as  the  famous  natural  laws  of  vulgar 
economy) ,  and  theoretical  is  used  as  the  opposite  of  the 
grossly  descriptive  and  empirical  method  of  knowledge. 


172  SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY 

But  that  is  not  all.  Every  theory  is  but  a  more  or  less 
perfect  presentation  of  the  relative  conditions  of  certain 
facts,  which  appear  homogeneous,  reconcilable,  and  con- 
nected in  any  field  of  knowledge.  But  all  these  various 
groups  are  elements  of  a  process  of  development.  Now, 
if  some  physiologist,  after  having  explained  the  physical 
and  mechanical  theory  of  lung  breathing,  should  close 
by  saying  that  breathing  is  not  dependent  exclusively 
on  lungs,  and  that  lungs  themselves  are  but  one  par- 
ticular product  in  the  general  history  of  the  growth  of 
organisms,  would  you  want  to  drag  this  physiologist  as 
a  defendant  before  the  court  of  some  other  pure  science, 
for  instance,  before  the  court  of  purest  physiology,  which 
studies  the  metaphysical  entity  Life  instead  of  living 
beings? 

In  fact,  Croce  upbraids  Marx  in  more  than  one  place 
for  not  having  established  points  of  relationship  between 
his  method  and  the  concepts  of  pure  economy,  in  order 
to  show  ''by  a  methodical  exposition  that  the  apparently 
most  widely  differing  facts  of  the  economic  world  are 
ultimately  governed  by  the  same  law,  or,  what  amounts 
to  the  same,  that  this  law  shows  itself  in  different  ways 
in  passing  through  different  organizations  without  any 
change  on  its  own  part,  for  otherwise  the  mode  and 
criterion  of  the  explanation  itself  would  be  missing." 
If  Marx  were  in  a  position  to  reply  to  this,  he  would 
not  know  what  to  say.  This  is  beyond  Marx.  Nor  is  it 
even  a  question  any  longer  of  such  abstract  generaliza- 
tions of  the  hedonistic  school  as  are  commonly  used  in 
legitimate  processes  of  abstraction  and  isolation  by  all 
sciences  that  seek  to  derive  principles  by  starting  out 
from  an  empirical  basis.  Here  we  find  ourselves  in  the 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  173 

presence  of  an  economic  law  which  assumes  the  guise  of 
an  entity,  as  it  were,  and  passes  mysteriously  through 
the  various  phases  of  history,  in  order  that  they  may 
not  have  to  part.  That  is  the  pure  possible,  which  in 
reality  turns  out  to  be  the  real  impossible.  Diihring  is  a 
back  number,  even  if  he  is  defended  occasionally  by 
Croce.  Here  it  is  a  question  of  re-encountering  difficulties 
in  the  preliminary  conception  of  every  scientific  problem 
which  exclude  from  comprehension  not  only  Marx,  but 
three  quarters  of  the  contemporaneous  thought.  The 
formal  logic  of  blessed  memory  becomes  the  arbiter  of 
knowledge.  Let  us  remember,  however,  that  Port-Royal 
"Logic"  used  to  have  an  extended  sale  throughout 
France.  You  start  out  with  a  concept  of  the  greatest 
extension  and  the  smallest  content,  and  by  means  of 
mechanically  increased  notations  you  arrive  at  a  concept 
of  the  smallest  extension  and  the  greatest  content.  Then, 
if  we  come  across  a  real  process,  such  as  the  transition 
from  invertebrates  to  vertebrates,  or  from  primitive  com- 
munism to  private  property  of  the  land,  or  from  un- 
differentiated  root  words  to  differentiated  verbs  and 
nouns  in  the  Aryan  and  Semitic  groups,  we  do  not  regard 
these  facts  as  the  outcome  of  a  slow  and  real  process  of 
actual  development,  but  we  take  recourse  to  a  nice  and 
preconceived  concept  and  write  by  a  facile  method  of 
notation  first  an  A,  then  an  a,  then  an  a',  and  an  a", 
then  an  a'",  and  so  forth,  and  everything  will  be  lovely. 
I  think  this  will  do  on  this  point. 

As  a  result,  we  come  across  the  following  somewhat 
queer  statements:  The  society  studied  by  Marx  in 
Capital  "is  an  ideal  and  diagrammatic  society,  de- 
duced from  a  few  hypotheses,  which  might  eventually 


174  SOCIALISM   AND  PHILOSOPHY 

not  have  been  realized  in  the  course  of  history"  (page  2) . 
Here  Marx  becomes  a  theoretical  illustrator  of  a  sort  of 
Utopia.  Then  we  read  on  page  4  that  "Marx  assumed 
outside  of  the  camp  of  pure  economic  theory  a  proposi- 
tion which  amounts  to  the  famous  equality  of  value  and 
labor."  Indeed,  where  did  he  get  it?  Did  he  find  it, 
perhaps,  as  some  say,  by  ' '  pushing  to  its  ultimate  conse- 
quences a  rather  unfortunate  concept  of  Ricardo ' '  ?  This 
Ricardo  ought  to  be  expelled  in  short  order  from  the 
history  of  science,  because  he  did  not  hit  upon  a  more 
fortunate  term.  At  another  place  (page  20,  footnote) 
Croce  takes  issue  with  Pantaleoni,  because  this  writer 
"combats  Bohm-Bawerk  and  asks  him,  where  the  bor- 
rower of  capital  gets  the  money  to  pay  interest  with." 
Pantaleoni  says  indeed  on  page  301  of  his  Principii 
di  Economia  Politico,:  "The  generative  cause  of 
interest  is  found  in  the  productivity  of  capital  in  its 
capacity  as  a  supplementary  factor  in  a  lucrative  tech- 
nical process  requiring  a  certain  time,  not  in  the  virtue 
of  time,  which  would  leave  things  as  it  found  them." 
Here,  and  throughout  one  whole  chapter,  Pantaleoni 
repeats  in  the  manner  peculiar  to  his  school,  and  in  his 
own  style,  that  explanation  of  interest  through  the 
productivity  of  (money-)  capital,  which  came  out 
victor  as  early  as  the  17th  century  in  the  controversies 
with  the  moralists  and  canonists  and  assumed  its  elemen- 
tary economic  form  for  the  first  time  in  Barbon  and 
Massey.  This  is  the  only  explanation  which  the  economist 
can  give,  until  the  productivity  of  capital,  which  appears 
evident  on  the  face  of  things,  is  itself  made  an  object  of 
analysis.  It  is  this  which  Marx  has  later  carried  out 
into  the  more  general  formula  and  genetic  principle  of 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  175 

surplus-value.  In  this  same  chapter,  Pantaleoni  engages 
in  an  able  controversy  against  Bohm-Bawerk,  who,  to 
speak  with  Croce,  "gives  an  (economic)  explanation  of 
profit  on  capital  as  arising  from  the  different  degrees  of 
utility  of  the  present  and  future  goods. '  '* 

Would  you  enact  for  your  pastime  the  following  ideo- 
logical farce:  Assume  on  one  side  the  legitimate  expecta- 
tion of  the  creditor,  and  on  the  other  the  honest  promise 
of  the  debtor  ?  Place  these  two  psychological  attributes, 
which  speak  so  well  for  the  excellence  of  their  minds,  in 
due  evidence.  Then  suppose  that  both  creditor  and 
debtor  are  as  perfact  economic  men  as  they  must  be 
presumed  to  be  after  they  have  been  born  with  the  trade- 
mark of  Gossen  stamped  upon  their  brains.**  Then  add 
the  notion  of  abstract  time. 

After  thus  constituting  the  Holy  Trinity  of  expecta- 
tion, promise,  and  time,  attribute  to  it  the  power  of  con- 

*In  revising  the  proof  sheets  it  occurs  to  me  that  the  reader 
might  be  in  doubt  about  the  character  of  this  writer.  Panta- 
leoni, whom  I  defend  at  this  place,  is  himself  a  representative 
of  that  hedonism  which  Croce,  employing  the  well-known 
illustration  of  the  two  foci  of  an  ellipse,  would  like  to  reconcile 
with  Marxism.  He  is  even  an  extreme  representative  of  that 
school.  Pantaleoni  is  so  extreme  in  his  partisanship,  that  in 
his  introduction  to  his  course  at  Geneva,  in  this  semester,  (see 
his  "Prolusione,"  reproduced  in  the  November  issue  of  the 
"Giornale  Degli  Economisti,"  page  407-431)  he  expels  the  name 
of  Marx  from  the  history  of  science — which  cannot  register  any 
errors! — (See  page  427.)  He  has  a  very  poor  opinion  of  the 
socialists,  especially  those  of  Italy,  and  regards  them  as  fools, 
apostles  of  violence,  and  worse  (see  his  letter  of  August  12,  this 
year,  on  pages  101-110  of  the  work  of  professor  Pareto  on  "La 
Liberte  Economique  et  les  Evenements  d'ltalie,"  Lausanne, 
1898,  especially  pages  103  and  following). 

**I  take  pleasure  in  referring  for  this  trademark  to  the 
strong  criticism  of  the  very  sagacious  Lexis  in  his  article  on 
marginal  utility  in  the  supplementary  volume  of  the  "Hand- 
wOrterbuch"  of  Conrad. 


176  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

verting  itself  into  that  surplus  of  value  which  must  be 
contained,  say,  in  the  boots  produced  with  the  borrowed 
money.  For  the  borrower,  if  he  would  pay  off  his  debt 
with  interest,  must  die  of  starvation,  unless  he  can  him- 
self gain  something  by  the  transaction.  But  this  is  put- 
ting an  iron  collar  upon  science.  In  reality,  time  in 
economics  as  well  as  iu  nature  is  simply  a  measure  of  a 
process.  Particularly  in  economics  it  is  a  measure  of  the 
processes  of  production  and  circulation  (in  other  words, 
and  in  the  last  analysis,  a  measure  of  labor) .  And  time 
is  also  a  measure  of  interest  only  to  the  extent  that  it 
enters  into  economics  in  this  way.  A  time  which  oper- 
ates as  a  real  cause  as  time  in  itself  is  a  creature  of 
mythology.  (On  the  mythical  survivals  in  the  represen- 
tation of  time  read  Zeit  und  Weile  in  the  Ideate  Fragen 
of  Lazarus,  Berlin,  1878,  pages  161—232).  If  we  are  to 
return  to  mythology,  then  let  us  place  that  most  ancient 
Kronos,  whom  the  common  Grecian  people  confounded 
with  chronos  (time),  on  his  throne  in  heaven  high  above 
Mount  Olympus.  And  if  expectations,  promises,  and 
hopes  are  by  themselves  real  causes  of  economic  facts, 
then  let  us  give  ourselves  without  reserve  to  magic. 

Either  through  inadvertence,  or  by  means  of  a  bizarre 
literary  form,  it  appears  as  though  Croce  were  butting 
his  head  against  magic  when  he  writes  on  page  16 :  "  And 
if  in  Marx's  hypothesis  the  commodities  appear  as  labor 
jelly,  or  crystallized  labor,  why  might  not  they  appear 
in  another  hypothesis  as  a  jelly  of  wants,  as  quantities 
of  crystallized  wants?"  Holy  gods!  Marx  was  not 
exactly  a  model  of  what  one  might  call  classic  diction, 
especially  so  far  as  the  plasticity,  transparency,  and  con- 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  177 

timiity  of  his  illustrations  are  concerned.  Marx  was  a 
scientist.  But  his  illustrations,  while  often  bizarre,  are 
never  whimsical  or  facetious,  and  they  always  say  some- 
thing profoundedly  realistic.  If  you  repeat  this  illustra- 
tion of  jelly,  or  paste,  which,  by  the  way,  has  nothing 
sacramental  or  obligatory  about  it,  to  the  first  shoemaker 
that  you  happen  to  n;eet,  he  will  at  once  tell  you  that  he 
understands  it,  and  he  may  refer  to  his  calloused  hands, 
bent  back,  and  perspiring  brow  and  affirm  that  the  boots 
which  he  produces  contain  a  part  of  himself,  his  mechani- 
cal energy  directed  by  his  will  according  to  a  precon- 
ceived plan,  which  his  brain  activity  carries  out  while 
he  is  engaged  on  his  work.  But  so  far  none  but  wizards 
have  believed,  or  pretended  to  believe,  that  we  can  trans- 
fer a  part  of  ourselves  to  some  commodity  by  mere 
wishes,  regardless  of  whether  this  commodity  is  produced 
or  not. 

Psychology  will  not  stand  any  trifling.  I  would  not 
undertake  to  say  in  so  many  words,  how  much  of  it 
should  enter  into  the  assumptions  of  political  economy. 
But  I  am  at  least  certain  that  most  of  the  psychological 
concepts  which  hedonists  and  others  are  chasing  in 
economics  have  an  air  of  being  there  on  purpose  to  blind 
the  unwary,  a  certain  air  of  being  thought  out,  not 
actually  discovered,  a  certain  air  of  having  been  im- 
ported from  vulgar  terminology,  not  critically  evolved. 
It  is  another  case  of  repeating  that  the  craftsman  should 
look  to  his  tools.  And  I  know  furthermore  that  the 
whole  gamut  of  human  psychology  runs  from  wants  to 
labor,  as  it  does  in  the  case  of  the  particular  feeling  of 
thirst,  which  is  a  desire  to  drink,  which  a  baby  does  not 


178  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

yet  associate  with  the  idea  of  water,  let  alone  with  the 
movements  necessary  to  procure  it,  while  a  provident 
laborer  with  mature  will  and  intellect,  a  will  in  which 
experience  and  imagination,  imitation  and  invention 
combine,  digs  a  well  or  opens  up  a  spring.  It  was  the 
shortcoming  of  vulgar  psychology  that  it  attempted  to 
reduce  this  living  formation  to  a  dry  skeleton,  and  yet 
the  economists  of  our  day  still  show  a  great  preference 
for  the  same  thing  in  their  particular  lucubrations.  The 
psychology  of  labor,  which  would  be  the  crowning  of 
determinism,  remains  yet  to  be  written. 

What  good  will  this  postcript  do?,  some  readers  may 
ask.  Just  this  much:  I  am  not  the  shield  bearer  of 
Marx,  I  am  open  to  every  critique,  I  am  myself  critical 
in  everything  I  say,  and  therefore  I  do  not  forget  the 
sentence  that  to  understand  means  to  overcome.  But  I 
am  disposed  to  add  that  to  overcome  one  must  have 
understood. 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE  TO  THE  FRENCH 
EDITION 


Rome,  December  31,  1898. 

This  little  booklet  of  mine,  as  the  postcript  also  shows, 
was  scheduled  to  appear  in  Paris  in  September  of  this 
year.  Accidental  causes  retarded  its  publication. 

In  the  meantime  Sorel  has  delivered  himself  body  and 
soul  to  the  crisis  of  Marxism,  treats  of  it,  expounds  it, 
comments  on  it  with  gusto  wherever  he  gets  an  oppor- 
tunity, for  instance  in  the  Revue  Parlementaire  of 
December  10,  pages  597—612  (where  he  converts  this 
crisis  into  one  of  socialism)  and  in  the  Rivista  Critica 
del  Socialismo,  Home,  Number  I,  pages  9-21.  And  he 
establishes  and  canonizes  it  still  more  in  his  preface  to 
Merlino's  Formes  et  Essence  du  Socialisme.  We  are 
ultimately  threatened  with  a  congress  of  thinking  se- 
cessionists. 

There  we  have  evidently  a  war  of  the  Frond  before  us ! 

What  was  I  to  do  ?  Begin  all  over  again  ?  Write  an 
anti-Sorel  after  I  had  written  an  avec-Sorel?  I  did  not 
yield  to  the  temptation.  It  is  true  that  I  had  named 
my  composition  of  a  somewhat  unusual  make-up  a  Dis- 
course. But  a  man  discourses  when  he  feels  like  it,  not 
when  he  is  commanded. 

I  merely  ask  the  reader  to  look  at  the  dates  of  these 
letters,  or  these  little  monographs  in  loose  style,  which  I 
addressed  to  Sorel.  These  dates  run  from  April  20,  to 

179 


180  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

September  15,  1897.  I  was  writing  to  that  Sorel,  not  to 
this  new  one.  I  was  addressing  the  old  Sorel,  whom  I 
had  known  in  the  pages  of  Devenir  Social,  who  had  in- 
troduced me  to  the  French  readers  in  the  quality  of  a 
Marxist,  who  had  sent  me  letters  full  of  fine  observations 
and  interesting  critical  reflections.  It  is  true,  he  was 
full  of  doubts,  and  seemed  at  times  impregnated  with  the 
spirit  of  a  frondeur,  but  when  I  wrote  with  a  mind 
intent  on  him,  I  did  not  think,  in  1897,  that  he  would  so 
shortly  become  the  herald  of  a  war  of  secession.  0  how 
glad  it  will  make  the  small  lights  of  intellectualism,  or 
those  who  need  a  testimonial  to  prove  that  they  are  not 
cowards!  Sorel  leaves  at  least  a  little  ray  of  hope  for 
us,  when  he  writes :  "I  and  some  friends  of  mine  shall 
try  hard  to  utilize  the  treasures  of  reflexion  and  hypothe- 
ses collected  by  Marx  in  his  books.  This  is  the  best  way 
to  derive  advantage  from  a  work  of  genius  which  has 
remained  unfinished."  (Revue  Parlementaire,  same 
issue,  page  612).  Well,  there  are  thus  many  auguries 
for  the  new  year,  which  commences  tomorrow,  in  this 
benign  and  pitiful  work  of  salvage,  which,  by  the  way, 
neither  I  nor  a  good  many  others  like  myself  feel  in 
need  of. 

I  feel  no  rancor,  but  I  certainly  cannot  help  feeling 
some  mortification.  In  offering  these  pages  of  somewhat 
unconventional  composition  to  the  French  reading 
public,  I  fear  that  intelligent  readers— and  France  has  a 
greater  abundance  of  them  than  any  other  country— will 
say  to  me:  You  are  a  pretty  tolerable  conversationalist, 
but  a  very  poor  teacher.  You  open  your  didactic  dia- 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  181 

logue  with  a  friend  like  an  erudite  man,  and  now  this 
friend  runs  over  to  the  other  side ! 

Is  it  not  so,  Mr.  Sorel?  Well,  then,  let  us  accomodate 
all  parties.  This  dialogue  has  been  only  a  monologue.  I 
wish  it  were  otherwise. 


PREFACE  OF  G.  SOREL 

TO  THE 

ESSAYS  ON  THE  MATERIALISTIC  CONCEPTION 
OF  HISTORY, 

By  Antonio  Labriola,  French  Translation,  Paris, 
Giard  et  Briere,  1897. 


Contemporaneous  socialism  presents  a  character  of 
originality  which  has  struck  all  the  economists.  It  owes 
this  character  to  the  fact  that  it  is  inspired  by  the  ideas 
enunciated  by  Karl  Marx  on  Historical  Materialism. 
Wherever  these  ideas  have  deeply  penetrated  into  the 
consciousness  of  people,  the  Socialist  Party  is  strong  and 
alive :  otherwise  it  is  weak  and  divided  into  sects. 

The  Marxian  theses  have  generally  not  been  well 
understood  in  France  by  the  writers,  who  occupy  them- 
selves with  social  questions.  Mr.  Bourguin,  professor  at 
the  university  of  Lille,  wrote  in  1892* :  ' '  The  thinkers 
among  our  socialists  do  not  accept  the  blighting  doctrine 
of  their  master,  from  which  the  idea  of  Right  and  Justice 
is  so  rigorously  banished,  without  reservation.  It  is  a 
strange  garment,  which  they  wear  with  little  ease  and 
which  they  will  no  doubt  touch  up  some  day  in  order  to 
fit  it  better  to  their  own  figure. ' '  The  writer  was  referr- 
ing to  an  essay  published  in  1887  by  Mr.  Eouanet,  in  the 
Revue  Socialiste,  under  the  title:  Le  materialisme  econ- 
nomique  de  Marx  et  le  socialisme  francais. 

*Des  rapports  entre  Proudhon  et  K.  Marx,  page  29. 

182 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  183 

Nearly  all  those  who  speak  of  historical  materialism 
know  this  doctrine  solely  through  this  essay  of  Mr. 
Rouanet.  This  writer  has  occupied  for  a  long  time  an  im- 
portant place  in  the  advanced  parties  of  France.  He 
informed  his  readers  that  he  had  made  a  profound  study 
of  Marx  and  that  he  had  devoted  himself  to  exhaustive 
researches,  in  order  to  understand  Hegel.  One  would 
naturally  think  him  to  be  well  informed.* 

Before  beginning  the  perusal  of  the  exposition,  which 
Mr.  Labriola  gives  in  excellent,  but  very  concise,  terms 
of  historical  materialism,  the  French  reader  should 
guard  himself  against  widely  disseminated  prejudices. 
For  this  reason  I  think  it  necessary  to  show  here,  how 
false  and  futile  the  great  objections  against  the  Marxian 
doctrine  are.  We  must,  therefore,  pause  to  consider  the 
ideas  enunciated  by  Mr.  Rouanet  in  1887. 

The  prejudices  existing  among  us  have  to  a  large 
extent  a  sentimental  origin.  Mr.  Rouanet  has  gone  to  a 
lot  of  trouble  to  show  that  the  Marxian  doctrines  run 
counter  to  the  French  genius.  We  hear  this  reproach 
repeated  every  day.  In  what  consists  this  antagonism? 

The  problem  of  modern  development,  considered  from 
the  materialist  point  of  view,  rests  upon  three  questions : 
1)  Has  the  proletariat  acquired  a  clear  consciousness  of 
its  existence  as  an  indivisible  class?  2)  Has  it  enough 
strength  to  begin  the  struggle  against  the  other  classes  ? 
3)  Is  it  in  a  position  to  overthrow,  together  with  the 


*I  note  by  the  way  that  Mr.  Rouanet  had  read  nothing  by 
Marx  but  the  "Communist  Manifesto"  and  "Capital."  Moreover, 
he  had  but  a  rather  imperfect  idea  of  the  economic  theories 
contained  in  this  lastnamed  work, 


184  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

capitalist  organisation,  the  entire  system  of  traditional 
ideologies  ?  It  is  for  sociology  to  reply. 

If  a  man  adopts  the  principles  of  Marx,  he  can  say 
that  there  is  no  longer  any  social  question.  He  can  even 
say  that  socialism  (in  the  ordinary  and  historical  mean- 
ing of  the  term),  is  outgrown.  In  fact,  research  then 
applies  no  longer  to  what  society  should  ~be,  but  to  what 
the  proletariat  can  accomplish  in  the  present  class- 
struggle. 

This  manner  of  looking  at  things  does  not  suit  the 
French  genius,  at  least  not  those  who  have  the  preten- 
sion to  claim  that  they  represent  it.  In  our  country,  the 
progressive  parties  contain  an  appalling  number  of  men 
of  genius,  whose  talent  present  society  is  misunderstand- 
ing, who  have  in  their  hearts  an  infallible  oracle  of 
Justice,  who  have  devoted  their  lives  to  the  elaboration 
of  marvelous  plans  for  insuring  the  happiness  of  human- 
ity. These  gentlemen  do  not  wish  to  step  down  from 
their  fastidious  tripods  and  mingle  with  the  crowd. 
They  are  made  to  lead,  not  to  become  the  co-operators 
in  a  proletarian  task.  They  intend  to  defend  the  rights 
of  intelligence  against  those  audacious  ones  who  lack 
respect  for  the  liberal  Olympus,  and  who  do  not  take 
sufficient  account  of  mentality. 

Add  to  this  that  these  rare  spirits  have  a  naive  faith 
in  French  supremacy,  in  the  leading  role  of  France*, 
that  they  have  the  superstition  of  revolutionary  phrase- 
ology, and  that  they  practice  with  devotion  the  cult  of 

*Only  one  country  seems  to  me  to  have  the  right  to  claim  an 
exceptional  place  in  our  modern  civilization:  Italy,  the  common 
fatherland  of  free  and  cultured  spirits. 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  185 

great  men.  They  cannot  forgive  Marx,  Engels,  and 
especially  Lafargue  for  lacking  in  respect  for  their  own 
revered  idols. 

I  do  not  belong  to  those  who  have  a  great  admiration 
for  French  genius,  so  understood.  Besides,  I  have  reason 
to  believe  that  this  sort  of  French  genius  is  not  the  kind 
possessed  by  those  of  my  countrymen  who  devote  them- 
selves to  scientific  research  and  do  not  feel  the  need  of 
posing  as  the  spiritual  leaders  of  the  people. 

The  great  reproach  advanced  against  the  doctrine  of 
Marx  from  a  scientific  point  of  view  is  that  of  leading 
to  fatalism.  According  to  Rouanet,  it  is  very  close  to 
Hegelian  idealism,  divested  of  its  "nebulous  transcen- 
dentalism."* It  has  "the  same  fatal  succession  of 
events,  which  are  necessary  phases  of  a  process  not  en- 
lightened by  .human  will,  and  even  a  cult  of  force,  that 
sombre  god  of  iron,  who  is  the  blind  instrument  of  the 
laws  of  the  great  Fate  destined  to  fulfilment  in  spite  of 
everything."  One  might  make  many  objections  to  the 
idea  which  this  French  author  makes  for  himself  of  the 
philosophy  of  Hegel.  But  a  superficial  perusal  of 
Capital  suffices  to  show  that  Marx  never  thought  of  the 
evolutionary  apocalypse  so  generously  attributed  to  him. 

Determinism  assumes  that  changes  are  automatically 
connected  with  one  another,  that  simultaneous  phenom- 
ena form  a  compact  mass  having  a  determined  structure, 
that  there  are  iron  laws  insuring  a  necessary  order 
between  all  things.  Nothing  of  the  kind  is  found  in 
Marx's  doctrine.  Events  are  considered  from  an  em- 
pirical point  of  view.  It  is  their  interconnection  which 

*Revue  sociajiste,  May,   1887,  page   400, 


186  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

results  in  the  historical  law  that  determines  the  tempo- 
rary mode  of  their  generation.  The  demand  is  no  longer 
that  we  should  recognize  in  the  social  world  a  system 
analogous  to  the  astronomical.  We  are  only  asked  to 
recognise  that  the  intermingling  of  causes  produces  suffi- 
ciently regular  and  characteristic  periods  to  permit  of 
their  becoming  objects  for  an  intelligent  understanding 
of  facts. 

Marx  gives  a  very  good  view  of  the  multiplicity  of 
causes  which  have  produced  modern  capitalism.  Nothing 
proves  that  these  causes  must  appear  together  at  a  de- 
termined date.  Their  fortuitous  co-existence  engenders 
the  transformation  of  industry  and  changes  all  social 
relations. 

But  some  insist  and  say  that,  according  to  Marx,  all 
political,  moral,  esthetic  phenomena  are  determined  (in 
the  strict  meaning  of  the  word)  by  economic  phenomena. 
What  can  such  a  formula  signify  ?  To  say  that  one  thing 
is  determined  by  another  without  at  the  same  time  giving 
a  precise  description  of  the  way  in  which  they  join  is  to 
utter  one  of  those  absurdities,  which  have  made  the  vul- 
garisers  of  vulgar  materialism  so  ridiculous. 

Marx  is  not  responsible  for  this  caricature  of  his 
historical  materialism.  The  fact  that  all  sociological 
manifestations,  in  order  to  be  made  clear,  must  be  placed 
upon  their  economic  basis  does  not  imply  that  an  under- 
standing of  the  basis  obviates  an  understanding  of  the 
superstructure.  The  connections  between  the  economic 
underpinning  and  the  products  resting  upon  it  are  very 
variable  and  cannot  be  translated  into  any  general  form- 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  187 

U|la.  This  cannot  be  called  determinism,  since  there  is 
nothing  to  be  determined. 

Mr.  Rouanet  forms  a  very  singular  conception  of  the 
Marxian  doctrine.  He  assumes  that  the  means  of  pro- 
duction, the  economic  organisation,  and  the  social  rela- 
tions, are  beings,  which  succeed  one  another  like  palae- 
ontological  species  by  the  mysterious  road  of  evolution, 
and  that  the  entire  history  of  humanity  is  deduced  from 
them  by  laws,  which  he  does  not  know  any  more  than  I 
do,  and  which  Marx  has  never  divulged.  Historical 
materialism  would  thus  have  an  idealist  basis,  namely 
the  fatal  succession  of  the  forms  of  production!  That 
would  certainly  be  a  very  singular  conception. 

A  distinguished  professor,  Mr.  Petrone*,  agrees  with 
Mr.  Rouanet  in  maintaining  that  historical  materialism 
fails  when  applied  to  the  Christian  revolution.  I  believe, 
on  the  contrary,  that  the  theories  of  Marx  throw  a 
certain  light  upon  this  question,  by  showing  the  reasons 
which  prevent  the  historian  from  fully  understanding 
what  took  place.  We  cannot  discuss  the  problem  scien- 
tifically, because  we  lack  the  elements  necessary  for  clear- 
ing it  up.  The  Italian  author  places  himself  upon  the 
Catholic  standpoint.  Mr.  Rouanet  invents  a  fantastic 
history.  The  scientists  should  keep  still  and  wait  until 
the  monuments  shall  have  revealed  to  us  the  economic 
conditions  of  the  primitive  church. 

Mr.  Bourguin  wants  to  know**  whether  we  must  not 

*Mr,  Petrone  is  a  free  lecturer  at  the  university  of  Rome.  He 
has  written  a  very  interesting  critical  report  on  the  book  of 
Mr.  Labriola  in  the  "Rivista  internazionale  di  science  social! 
e  discipline  ausiliarie,"  fourth  year,  volume  XI,  pages  551-560. 

**Des  rapports  entre  Proudhon  et  K.  Marx,  page  25. 


188  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

count  among  the  active  forces  "the  more  or  less  de- 
veloped consciousness  among  the  laborers  of  being  objects 
of  alleged  exploitation. ' '  But  is  not  the  development  of 
class-consciousness  the  pivot  of  the  social  question,  in 
the  eyes  of  Marx?  One  needs  but  to  have  a  mediocre 
knowledge  of  the  works  of  the  great  socialist  philosopher 
to  know  that. 

Can  Marx  be  accused  of  having  given  too  little  atten- 
tion to  human  mentality,  he,  who  has  shown  the  import- 
ance of  the  least  creations  of  inventive  genius  ?  Nowhere 
does  intelligence  appear  in  such  strong  relief  as  in 
technology,  whose  historical  role  is  placed  in  the  front 
rank  in  a  striking  manner,  in  Capital.  I  know  very  well 
that  the  representatives  of  French  genius  have  but  little 
esteem  for  machine  builders,  who  are  incapable  of  de- 
claiming formidable  cantatas  on  the  Rights  of  Man  from 
the  speaker's  platform.  But  simple  mortals  believe  with 
Mr.  Bourdeau*  that  the  steam  engine  ' '  has  exerted  more 
influence  on  social  organisation  than  all  the  systems  of 
philosophy." 

Does  this  mean  that  intellectual  and  moral  products 
are  without  historical  efficacy,  as  some  pretend  to  be 
the  result  of  historical  materialism?  Not  at  all.  Such 
products  possess  the  faculty  of  detaching  themselves 
from  their  natural  cradle  and  assuming  a  mystical  form, 
"as  though  they  were  independent  beings  able  to  com- 
municate with  mankind  and  one  another. '  '**  After  they 
have  thus  freed  themselves,  they  are  liable  to  enter  into 

•Journal  des  Dfibats,  May   1,   1896. 

••Capital,  French  translation,  page  28.  Marx  says  this  of 
commodities. 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  189 

the  most  diverse  imaginary  combinations.  No  great 
revolution  has  ever  taken  place  without  producing  many 
insistent  illusions.  It  is  again  Marx  who  tells  us  so. 
But  this  statement  goes  against  the  grain  of  our 
men  of  progress.  They  don't  like  the  idea  of  having 
ascribed  to  fantasy  what  they  ascribe  to  reason.  For  to 
do  so,  means  to  lack  respect  for  all  the  Titans  of  the 
present  and  past. 

In  his  introduction  to  his  translation  of  the  selected 
works  of  Vico,  Michelet  wrote :  ' '  The  word  of  the  new 
science  is  that  humanity  is  of  its  own  making . . .  Social 
science  dates  from  the  day  on  which  this  great  idea  was 
expressed  for  the  first  time.  Hitherto  humanity  thought 
that  it  owed  its  progress  to  the  hazards  of  individual 
genius . . .  History  was  a  sterile  spectacle,  at  most  a 
f  antasmagoria. " 

How  is  history  made?  Engels  tells  us  in  the  follow- 
ing passage:  "The  innumerable  conflicts  of  individual 
wills  and  individual  agents  in  the  realm  of  history  reach 
a  conclusion  which  is  on  the  whole  analagous  to  that  in 
the  realm  of  nature,  which  is  without  definite  purpose. 
The  ends  of  the  actions  are  intended,  but  the  results 
which  follow  from  the  actions  are  not  intended,  or  in  so 
far  as  they  appear  to  correspond  with  the  end  desired, 
in  their  final  results  are  quite  different  irom  the  conclu- 
sion wished."*  This  thesis  is  admitted  by  scientists 
without  any  difficulty.  But  it  is  full  of  despair  for  the 
great  men  whose  genius  is  flowing  over.  Their  plans 
cannot  be  realised  as  they  have  conceived  them!  And 

*Feuerbach,  The  Roots  of  the  Socialist  Philosophy,  pages 
104-105. 


190  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

yet  these  plans  are  so  well  laid,  that  one  cannot  touch 
them  without  interfering  with  their  efficacy  and  assailing 
Justice,  whose  authorised  delegates  these  gentlemen  are. 

But  let  us  leave  aside  all  these  vulgar  objections  and 
take  up  what  constitutes  in  my  eyes  the  vulnerable  part 
of  the  doctrine,  that  part  which  the  French  critics  have 
not  yet  examined. 

Many  scientists  are  disposed  to  admit  the  value  of 
historical  materialism  as  a  training  of  the  mind,  and  to 
recognise  that  the  Marxian  theses  furnish  useful  hints 
for  the  historian  of  institutions.*  But  it  remains  to  find 
out  what  is  the  metaphysical  basis  of  this  theory.  It 
serves  no  end  to  say  that  this  search  is  superfluous,  that 
we  may  follow  the  same  method  which  was  so  successful 
in  psychology  after  the  discussion  of  the  soul  had  been 
abandoned.  But  where  is  the  metaphysician  who  re- 
mains entirely  indifferent  to  the  metaphysical  problem? 
Every  one  has  his  own  hypothesis.  And  these  hypothe- 
ses, often  adroitly  dissimulated,  distinguish  the  various 
schools.  Many  mistakes  have  been  made  by  a  hasty 
application  of  historical  materialism.  Nearly  all  these 
mistakes  may  be  traced  to  agnosticism,  which  the  authors 
professed  and  which  really  concealed  imperfectly  elabor- 
ated working  hypotheses. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  we  examine  the  applications 
made  by  Marx,  we  find  that  he  employed  a  great  many 
psychological  principles,  which  have  not  been  generally 
enunciated  in  a  scientific  form.  To  the  extent  that  we 

*Mr.  Petrone  admits  this  without  any  difficulty.  While  Mr. 
Bourdeau  says  that  the  theses  of  Marx  throw  a  new  light  on 
history.  (Debats,  October  13,.  1896.) 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILObGi'I- Y  191 

advance  we  will  see  the  necessity  of  stepping  forward 
from  this  provisional  position  and  cutting  solid  timber 
for  the  support  of  historical  relations. 

Here,  then,  are  two  great  blanks.  The  disciples  of 
Marx  should  make  efforts  to  complete  the  work  of  their 
master.  This  master  seems  to  have  feared  nothing  so 
much  as  the  idea  of  leaving  behind  a  system  of  too  great 
rigidness  and  firmness.  He  understood  that  a  theory  is 
at  the  end  of  its  career,  when  it  is  completed,  and  that 
the  condition  of  all  metaphysical  science  is  to  leave  a 
wide  door  for  further  development.  The  prudence  of 
Marx  was  extreme.  He  did  not  try  to  terminate  a  single 
theory.  Recent  discussions  show  that  he  had  not  said 
his  last  word  on  value  and  surplus-value.  How  blind 
are,  therefore,  the  critics  who  accuse  the  disciples  of 
Marx  of  wishing  to  lock  up  the  human  thought  in  a  ring 
fence  built  by  their  master ! 

In  this  work  of  perfection  we  must  follow  the  example 
set  by  Marx  and  be  prudent.  The  time  has  not  come  for 
the  enunciation  of  the  metaphysics  and  the  definition  of 
the  psychology  of  historical  materialism,  so  long  as  its 
basis  has  been  studied  only  in  a  limited  way. 

Men  of  great  hearts  say  that  the  spirit  cannot  rest 
content  in  this  state  of  expectation,  when  it  is  a  question 
of  Morality  and  Right.  Superficial  critics  are  not  slow 
in  denouncing  the  absence  of  ideals,  without  asking  them- 
selves whether  a  reasonable  theory  of  ethics  can  be  in- 
dependent of  metaphysics,  and  whether  the  latter  is  worth 
anything  without  a  scientific  basis.  One  may  admit  the 


192  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

historical  and  social  value  of  moral  teaching*  without 
having  the  pretension  of  imposing  upon  it  rules,  laws, 
and  postulates  evolved  out  of  the  imagination.  It  seems 
rather  that  by  giving  to  ethics  a  basis  of  metaphors,  in- 
sufficient psychological  theories,  or  declamations  on 
Nature,  the  effect  of  this  teaching  is  considerably  cur- 
tailed. To  bring  morality  down  to  earth,  to  divest  it  of 
all  fantasy,  does  not  mean  to  deny  it.  On  the  contrary 
it  means  to  treat  it  with  the  respect  due  to  the  work  of 
reason.  Is  it  a  denial  of  science  to  leave  aside  the  specu- 
lations on  the  essence  of  things  and  to  stick  to  realities  ? 
Capital  is  full  of  appreciation  for  morality.  It  is, 
therefore,  rather  paradoxical  to  reproach  Marx  with 
having  carefully  avoided  all  consideration  of  Justice. 
Every  one  has  his  own  interpretation  for  this  word.  Mr. 
Bourguin,  in  the  above  cited  passage,  stands  on  the 
ancient  theory  of  a  moral  sense.  But  this  theory  is  out 
of  date.  Mr.  Rouanet  speaks*  of  ' '  a  natural  justice,  con- 
forming to  the  law  of  social  development,  which  is  the 
free  solidarity  of  the  diverse  parties  constituting  human- 
ity as  a  whole  and  coming  closer  and  closer  together." 
This  is  evidently  what  Marx  called  "Humbug  of  juri- 
dical ideology  dear  to  the  French  democrats  and  social- 
ists."* The  fact  that  the  two  above-mentioned  authors 

*On  the  great  Importance  of  morals  on  socialist  philosophies 
read  the  fine  observations  of  Mr.  B.  Croce  in  his  Sulla  con- 
cezione  materialistica  della  storia,  published  in  the  Atti  della 
Accademia  Pontaniana,  Vol.  XXVI,  1896. 

*Revue  socialiste,  June,   1887,  page   591 

•Letter  on  the  Gotha  Program,  published  in  Revue  d'£con- 
omie  politique,  1894,  page  758.  The  German  text  appeared  in 
the  Neue  Zeit,  ninth  year,  Vol.  I,  number  18,  pages  560-575. 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  193 

are  in  agreement  in  imputing  a  certain  moral  character 
to  the  doctrine  of  Marx  proves  only  that  they  do  not  find 
in  Capital  an  expression  of  their  personal  theories  on 
morality,  which,  moreover,  have  no  value. 

It  is  in  the  name  of  the  metaphysics  of  morals  that 
Jaures  took  part  in  this  debate  and  proposed  to  reconcile 
the  materialist  and  idealist  points  of  view.  Nothing 
seemed  easier  to  him.  He  affirms,  first  of  all,  that  the 
disciples  of  Marx  recognise  the  existence  of  a  ' '  direction 
in  the  economic  and  human  movement."  He  asks  that 
he  be  granted  as  an  indisputable  axiom  that  there  is  in 
history  not  only  "a  necessary  evolution,  but  an  appreci- 
able direction  and  an  ideal  sense."  To  admit  these  pre- 
mises would  be  to  explain  history  by  means  of  idealism, 
and  only  idealism.  It  would  be  a  rejection  of  the 
doctrine  of  Marx.  But  if  that  is  so,  how  can  he  reconcile 
them?  Very  simple.  If  we  condemn  all  the  ideas  of 
Marx,  we  proclaim  the  author  as  a  great  man,  as  great  a 
man  as  his  disciples  can  desire.* 

If  we  admit  everything  the  famous  orator  demands, 
we  shall  be  convinced  that  the  ' '  word  Justice  has  a  mean- 
ing even  in  the  materialist  conception  of  history ! ' '  This 
conclusion  is  true,  only  it  has  a  different  meaning  from 
that  of  Mr.  Jaures.  "Humanity  seeks  itself,"  he  says, 
' '  and  affirms  itself,  no  matter  how  different  may  be  its 
environment ...  It  is  the  same  sigh  of  suffering  and 
hope  which  comes  from  the  mouth  of  the  slave,  the  serf, 
and  the  proletarian.  It  is  the  immortal  breath  of  hu- 

*This  paradox  was  published  in  the  Jeunesse  socialiste,  Janu- 
ary, 1895,  under  the  title  of,  Idealism  of  History.  Read  the 
spirited  reply  of  Mr.  Lafargue  in  the  February  number. 


194  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

inanity,  which  is  the  soul  of  the  thing  we  call  Right." 
Marx  certainly  never  thought  of  that! 

I  have  said  enough  to  make  it  plain  that  historical 
materialism  has  been  almost  unknown  in  France.  The 
book  of  Mr.  Labriola  brings  the  French  readers  in  touch 
with  new  regions,  through  which  the  learned  Italian  pro- 
fessor conducts  us  with  great  ability. 

The  publication  of  this  work  marks  a  date  in  the 
history  of  Socialism.  It  is,  indeed,  the  first  time  that  an 
author  of  the  Latin  tongue  studies  in  an  original  and 
profound  manner  one  of  the  philosophical  foundations 
on  which  contemporaneous  socialism  rests.  The  work  of 
Mr.  Labriola  occupies  a  marked  place  in  the  libraries,  by 
the  side  of  the  classic  books  of  Marx  and  Engels.  It 
constitutes  a  methodical  elucidation  and  development  of 
a  theory,  which  the  masters  of  new  socialist  thought  have 
never  treated  in  a  didactic  manner.  His  book  is,  there- 
fore, indispensable  for  those  who  wish  to  understand 
proletarian  ideas. 

More  than  the  works  of  Marx  and  Engels,  the  present 
work  adresses  itself  to  the  foreign  public  with  a  taste  for 
social  problems.  The  historian  will  find  in  these  pages 
substantial  and  precious  hints  for  the  study  of  the  gene- 
sis and  transformation  of  institutions. 

G.  SOBEL. 

Paris,  December  1896, 


CONCERNING  THE  CRISIS  OF  MARXISM 


AN    ARTICLE    PUBLISHED    BY    ANTONIO    LABRIOLA    IN    THE 
RIVISTA  ITALIANA  DI  SOCIOLOGIA,  VOLUME  III,  1899. 

I  refer  here  to  a  book,  which  is  neither  brief,  nor  easy 
to  read,  written  by  Th.  G.  Masaryk,  professor  at  the 
Bohemian  university  of  Prague,  and  published  quite  re- 
cently. How  voluminous  it  is  may  be  seen  at  the  foot  of 
this  page*,  where  I  give  its  title  in  full.  I  do  not  intend 
however,  to  write  a  mere  review  of  this  book.  And  if  it 
should  be  said  that  the  expression  of  a  personal  opinion 
on  a  book  requires  its  review,  I  would  reply  that  this  one 
would  have  to  assume  the  proportions  and  make-up  of 
an  article. 

My  name,  and  the  title  of  my  article,  might  lead  one 
to  infer  that  I  was  about  to  engage  in  party  polemics. 
The  reader  may  rest  in  peace.  I  shall  not  confound  the 
pages  of  the  Rivista  italiana  di  sociologia  with  the 
columns  of  a  political  daily. 

I  will  merely  say  in  passing  that  the  great  uproar 
made  curiously  enough  by  the  political  press  of  Italy, 
whether  daily  or  otherwise  periodical,  over  the  alleged 
death  of  Socialism  on  account  of  a  socalled  Crisis  of 
Marxism  appears  to  me  as  one  more  proof  of  that  organic 

*Die  philosophischen  und  sociologischen  Grundlagen  des 
Marxismus — Studien  zur  sozialen  Frage,  von  Th.  G.  Masaryk,, 
Professor  an  der  bohmischen  Unlversitat  Prag,  Wien,  C.  Kone- 
gen,  pages  XV  and  600,  in  large  octavo. 

195 


196  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

national  vice  which  one  might  call  the  right  to  ignorance. 
Not  one  of  those  grave  diggers  of  Socialism,  who  jumbled 
the  most  incompatible  writers  indiscriminately  together 
in  order  to  get  a  crowd  around  their  crisis,  thought  of 
asking  himself  these  simple  and  honest  questions :  May 
the  critique  raised  in  other  countries  in  matters  of  Marx- 
ism have  any  direct  bearing  upon  Italy?  Had,  or  has, 
this  theory  any  solid  footing  and  established  spread  in 
our  country  ?  And  finally,  has  the  Italian  Socialist  Party 
sufficient  strength,  and  enough  adherents  among  the 
masses,  and  does  it  carry  within  itself  such  development, 
complex  conditions  and  political  aims  as  reveal  the  pre- 
cise and  clear  marks  of  a  stable  and  durable  proletarian 
organisation,  so  that  a  thorough  discussion  of  the  theory 
will  amount  to  a  discussion  of  things  rather  than  of 
words?  And,  to  go  more  to  the  bottom  of  the  matter, 
can  any  one  tell  whether  the  whole  thorny  path  of 
economic  development  has  already  been  traveled,  which 
led  to  the  establishment  of  the  socalled  capitalist  system 
in  other  countries,  and  of  which  Marxism  is  the  critical 
reflex  ? 

Whoever  would  have  asked  these  and  similar  questions, 
would  have  come  to  the  honest  conclusion  that  there  can- 
not be  any  crisis  of  a  thing. . . .  which  does  not  yet  exist. 

It  may  be,  or  rather  it  is  certain,  that  none  of  these 
necrologists  of  Socialism  knew  that  the  phrase  of  a  Crisis 
of  Marxism  was  coined  and  set  in  circulation  by  pro- 
fessor MaSaryk,  whose  lot  it  was  (quite  unknown  to  him, 
as  happens  frequently  to  strangers  in  matters  concern- 
ing Italy)  to  bring  to  our  country  a  new  and  unexpected 
contribution  to  the  fortune  of  words.  But  this  is  a  fact 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  197 

The  expression— Crisis  of  Marxism— was  invented  by 
Masaryk  in  numbers  177  to  179  of  the  Zeit  of  Vienna,  in 
February  1898,  and  these  articles  of  his  were  later  on 
gathered  in  one  pamphlet*  and  published  under  the  date 
of  March  10.  And  mark  well,  the  author  of  this  dis- 
covery in  literature  did  not  have  in  mind  to  declare  that 
Socialism  was  dying,  but  merely  that  it  seemed  to  him 
he  was  observing  a  crisis  within  Marxism.  In  fact,  he 
concluded  as  follows:  "I  would  admonish  the  enemies 
of  Socialism  not  to  nurse  any  vain  hopes  for  their  own 
parties  on  account  of  this  crisis  of  Marxism,  which  may 
rather  strengthen  Socialism  considerably,  if  its  leaders 
will  frankly  criticise  its  fundamentals  and  overcome 
their  defects.  Like  every  other  social  reform  party, 
Socialism  has  its  fountain  of  life  in  the  manifest  imper- 
fections of  the  present  social  order,  in  its  injustice,  im- 
morality, and  above  all  in  the  material,  moral,  and  in- 
tellectual misery  of  the  great  masses  of  all  nations. '  '* 

On  those  24  pages,  which  were  too  few  for  the  import- 
ance of  the  subject,  the  data  concerning  the  crisis— so 
far  as  it  related  to  the  German  social-democracy,  and 
with  a  few  references  to  French  and  English  literature- 
were  collected,  enumerated,  defined,  in  a  rather  hasty 
manner...  But  what  avails  it  to  speak  of  the  little 

*Dle  wissenschaftliche  und  philosophische  Krise  innerhalb 
des  gegenwartigen  Marxismus.  Vienna,  1898,  24  pages. 

•Ibidem,  page  24.  The  same  statement  is  now  amply  re- 
peated in  the  present  book  near  its  close,  especially  on  pages 
59-92.  To  mention  another  little  illustration  of  the  fortune  of 
a  word,  I  observe  that  the  crisis  within  Marxism  has  become 
the  crisis  o  f  Marxism  in  the  French  translation  of  this  work 
by  Bugiel,  Paris,  1898,  (extract  from  the  Revue  Internationale 
de  sociologie,  July  number). 


198  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

work  of  March  10,  1898,  since  these  24  pages  have  be- 
come 600  in  the  book  of  March  27,  1899,  600  mind  you, 
which  in  turn  is  "too  much  enough,"  as  a  Neapolitan 
would  say,  both  as  concerns  the  substance  of  the  subject 
treated  and  the  patience  of  the  average  reader? 

Professor  Masaryk  is  a  positivist.     This  term  has  in 
Italy  an  exceedingly  wide  and  elastic  meaning,  but  for 
him,  as  a  professed  philosopher,  it  means  in  so  many 
words  that  he  is  standing  on  the  line  which  leads  from 
Comte  to  Spencer.  .  .or  to  Masaryk  himself.     I  am  not 
in  a  position  to  accord  to  him  all  the  admiration  which 
is,  perhaps,  due  to  him.    For  he  has  the  habit  of  writing 
in    Bohemian,    which    is   rather    inconvenient    for   me. 
Hitherto  I  had  not  read  anything  by  him  except  his 
Concrete  Logic  in  its  German  translation.    Nor  would  I 
split  hairs  about  the  subtile  meaning  of  his  expressions, 
because  this  book  has  been  translated  by  Mr.  Kalandra 
into   a  rather  bureaucratic  German.     The  work  as  a 
whole,  as  the  author  himself  states  in  his  preface,  must 
not  be  considered  under  the  aspect  of  composition  and 
style.     It   is   an   ultra-academic   production,   with  the 
customary  division  into  introduction  and  sections.  There 
are  five  of  the  latter,  followed  by  a  recapitulation,  and 
they  are  subdivided  into  chapters,  with  subheadings  of 
A,  B,  C,  and  so  on,  down  to  a  division  of  the  subdivisions 
into  162  paragraphs,  with  various  bibliographies  in  a 
loose  and  in  a  concentrated  order,  and  with  a  truly  won- 
derful index,  which  makes  you  think  of  a  lot  of  things 
which  you  don't  find  in  the  book  on  turning  to  it,  and 
with  the  inevitable  table  of  contents.     In  short,  it  is  a 
book  of  comprehensive  and  instructive  lessons,  poised  in 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  199 

tone,  with  occasional  touches  of  lightness,  and  it  is  edited 
after  the  model  of  an  encyclopedia.  However,  not  all 
lessons  can  be  referred  to  the  same  date.  While  this 
book,  originally  written  in  the  Bohemian  language  and 
announced  in  the  small  booklet  of  the  preceding  year 
which  may  take  its  place  for  those  who  don't  care  to 
read  600  pages,  was  being  printed  in  the  German  lang- 
uage, the  now  famous  book  of  Bernstein  (quoted  in  a 
footnote  on  page  590  of  Masaryk's  book)  appeared,  and 
the  author  felt  the  need  of  accomodating  his  friends  with 
it  in  another  place.* 

The  achievement  of  Masaryk  is  truly  in  a  class  by 
itself.  He  is  not  a  socialist,  he  has  an  extensive  know- 
ledge of  socialist  literature,  he  is  not  a  professional  ad- 
versary of  Socialism,  he  judges  it  from  on  high,  in  the 
name  of  Science.  He  was  a  member  of  the  Reichsrath  of 
Cisleithania,  but  is  at  the  same  time  a  nationalist  and 
progressist,  which,  so  far  as  I  know,  is  never  found  as 
a  combination  in  Young  Czechs.  At  present,  it  seems  to 
me,  he  is  keeping  himself  aloof  from  politics.  He  pub- 
lishes a  review  which  is  somewhat  similar  to  our  Nuova 
Antologia.  He  is  a  scientist  by  profession,  that  is,  a 
great  reader  and  accurate  reporter  of  what  he  reads,  to 
the  point  of  the  minute  detail  of  the  smallest  particle. 
And  this  is  the  first  and  principal  defect  of  his  book. 
The  book  discusses  an  infinite  number  of  things,  but  it 
never  gets  to  the  real  point.  It  is  as  though  the  author's 
view  were  obstructed  by  printed  matter  and  obscured  by 

*This  was  done  in  numbers  239  and  240,  of  April  20,  and  May 
6,  of  the  Vienna  Zeit.  He  had  done  the  same  in  October  of  last 
year  with  the  message  of  Bernstein  to  the  national  con- 
vention at  Stuttgart. 


200  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

the  shadows  of  the  writers,  through  whom  he  wends  his 
way  with  so  much  obsequiousness  for  all,  like  a  man 
whose  eyes  have  lost  all  sense  of  perspective. 

Isn't  it  the  principal  duty  of  one,  who  undertakes  to 
study  the  fundamentals  of  Marxism,  to  be  in  a  position 
to  answer  the  following  question  on  the  strength  of  a 
study  of  actual  conditions :  "Do  you,  or  don 't  you,  be- 
lieve in  the  possibility  of  a  transformation  of  the  so- 
cieties of  the  most  advanced  countries,  which  would  do 
away  with  the  causes  and  effects  of  class-struggles  ? "  In 
view  of  this  general  problem  the  question  of  the  mode  of 
transition  into  that  desired  or  foreseen  future  society 
is  a  matter  of  secondary  importance.  For  that  mode  of 
transition  is  not  subject  to  our  judgment  and  assuredly 
does  not  depend  on  our  definitions.  So  far  as  this 
general  proposition  is  concerned,  it  is,  I  will  not  say  a 
matter  of  indifference,  but  certainly  of  subordinate 
value,  to  know  what  part  of  the  thought  and  opinions 
(many  confound  these  two,  unfortunately)  of  Marx  and 
of  his  direct  followers,  and  interpreters  agree,  or  does 
not  agree,  with  the  present  and  future  conditions  of  the 
proletarian  movement.  It  is  not  necessary  that  a  man 
should  be  a  passionate  partisan  of  historical  materialism 
in  order  to  understand  that  theories  have  a  value  as 
theories,  that  is,  in  so  far  as  they  throw  light  upon  a  cer- 
tain order  of  facts,  but  that  as  mere  theories  they  are 
not  the  cause  of  anything. 

But  Mr.  Masaryk  is  also  a  doctrinaire,  that  is,  a  be- 
liever in  the  power  of  ideas,  in  other  words,  an  academic 
thinker,  for  whom  everything  consists  in  a  struggle  for 
the  general  world  conception.  We  need  not  be  surprised, 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  201 

then,  that  he  rejects  with  sovereign  contempt  the  expres- 
sion mass  instinct.  This  critique,  which  derives  from 
Science  all  its  assumption  of  an  impartial  judgment  of 
the  practical  struggles  of  life,  and  which  ignores  the 
guidance  of  thought  by  the  natural  course  of  history,  is 
and  remains  essentially  fallacious,  because  it  keeps  turn- 
ing around  Marxism,  without  ever  touching  its  nerve, 
which  is  the  general  conception  of  the  historical  develop- 
ment from  the  point  of  view  of  the  proletarian  revolu- 
tion. 

In  stopping  to  define  Masaryk's  particular  achieve- 
ment, I  think  I  will  pay  him  with  Italian  courtesy  for 
his  ignorance  of  my  writings  bearing  upon  his  argument. 
If  he  had  ever  read  them,  he  would,  perhaps,  see  that 
one  can  even  nowadays  be  an  advocate  of  historical 
materialism,  making  allowance,  of  course,  for  the  new 
historical  and  social  experiences  made  in  the  meantime 
and  with  such  a  revision  of  concepts  as  follows  natur- 
ally in  the  development  of  thought.  And  that  one  can 
be  so  without  descending  to  a  controversy  dealing  with 
minute  points  and  coming  to  blows  with  the  party  press, 
and  without  proclaiming  one's  self  as  a  discoverer  or 
author  of  a  crisis  of  Marxism.  Theories  which  are  in  a 
process  of  development  and  progress  do  not  lend  them- 
selves to  erudite  and  philological  treatment,  such  as  may 
be  accorded  to  past  forms  of  thought,  and  to  the  things 
transmitted  to  us  by  tradition  and  called  antique.  But 
the  intellectual  temperaments  of  men  differ  so  much 
from  one  another!  Some— and  these  are  few— present 
the  public  with  the  results  of  their  own  work  and  do  not 
feel  obliged  to  append  to  it  an  intimate  history  of  their 


202  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

readings  down  to  a  portrait  of  the  pen  used  by  them. 
Others— and  these  are  the  majority — feel  the  pressing 
need  of  putting  the  whole  fruit  of  their  reading  into 
print.  They  are  fastidious  guardians  of  their  notes  and 
will  not  let  the  least  part  of  their  labors  get  lost,  be  it 
for  the  present  or  the  future.  Professor  Masaryk,  who 
stretches  the  discussion  of  some  momentary  proposition 
over  600  pages,  is  one  of  these.  The  proposition  is 
simply  this :  What  can  an  outsider  make  of  Marxism  at 
present,  seeing  that  it  is  being  discussed  within  the 
party  ?  Professor  Masaryk,  who  has  read  so  much,  can- 
not help  considering  also  Marxism  according  to  the  sacra- 
mental formulas  of  philosophy,  religion,  ethics,  politics, 
and  so  on  to  infinity.  And  the  curious  part  of  it  is  that 
he,  who  has  so  much  deference  for  the  bureaucracy  of 
the  universities  and  for  the  pigeon  holes  of  scientific 
fetishism,  declares  finally  that  Marxism  is  a  syncretic 
system  (incidentally  all  through  his  book,  and  explicitly 
on  page  587)  !  It  had  seemed  to  me  that  this  theory  was 
just  exactly  the  reverse  of  syncretic,  and  rather  so  pro- 
nouncedly Unitarian  that  it  tends  not  only  to  overcome 
the  doctrinaire  antagonism  between  science  and  philos- 
ophy, but  also  the  more  obvious  one  between  theory  and 
practice.  But  Mr.  Masaryk  is  what  he  is.  So  let  us 
follow  him  through  his  pigeon  holes. 

He  gladly  leaves  to  others  the  pastime  of  occupying 
themselves  with  Socialism  as  a  tendency  to  legal  reforms, 
after  the  manner  of  A.  Menger.  He  declares  that  he 
does  not  interfere  directly  in  questions  of  economics  (in 
which,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  he  seems  to  be  lame  on  both 
feet.)  He  confines  himself  to  discussing  above  all  the 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  203 

philosophy  of  Marx,  which  exists  even  though  it  has  not 
been  expounded  in  a  special  work  written  for  that  pur- 
pose. And  he  studies  on  600  pages  the  crisis  so  far  as  it 
is  strictly  "scientific  and  philosophical."  (Page  5.)  Do 
not  expect,  therefore,  that  our  author  should  give  you  a 
concrete  examination  of  actual  conditions  in  the  econ- 
omic world  from  first  hand  study,  nor  a  practical  and 
comprehensive  manual  of  social  legislation.  Whether  the 
proletarianization  of  the  masses  continues  or  not, 
whether  Marx's  theory  of  value  is  exact  or  not,  these  and 
other  related  questions,  while  of  the  greatest  importance, 
do  not  interest  him  as  a  philosopher.  (Page  4.)  The 
practical  result  of  his  studies  is  merely  to  advise  the 
socialists  to  stick  to  the  program  of  Engels  in  1895,  that 
is,  to  parliamentarian  tactics.  This  is  what  they  are 
actually  doing  all  over  the  world,  and,  in  my  humble 
opinion,  for  the  simple  reason  that  they  cannot  do  any- 
thing else  without  proving  themselves  either  insane  or 
senseless.  However,  Masaryk  re-enforces  his  advice  with 
the  admonition  that  the  socialists  should  also  drop  the 
Marxian  ideologies!  Once  more,  then,  it  is  not  the 
natural  course  of  the  political  changes  of  civilized 
Europe  which  has  induced  the  socialists  to  change  their 
tactics  (the  author  could  not  tell  us  how  long  the  present 
tactics  will,  or  may,  last),  but  it  is  the  ideas  which 
change  and  must  change.  Everything  is  merged  in  the 
struggle  for  the  Weltanschauung  (world  conception)  — 
see  especially  pages  586  to  592— as  is  natural  in  a  writer 
who  holds  so  closely  to  the  sacramental  concepts  of  scien- 
tific classification  (Page  4)  and  to  the  super-eminent 
position  of  philosophy. 


204  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

The  philistine,  in  his  professorial  subspecies,  reveals 
himself  here  fully  in  his  true  nature.  To  be  intimately 
familiar  with  socialist  literature,  and  yet  ignore  the  in- 
nermost soul  and  meaning  of  Socialism !  If  this  meaning 
is  once  grasped,  it  is  a  matter  of  course  that  it  changes 
scientific  orientation  completely,  and  changes  also  the 
position  of  science  in  the  economy  of  our  interests.  But 
Masaryk  never  gets  so  far,  because  he  would  have  to 
leave  the  confines  of  definitions  in  order  to  do  that.  For 
this  reason  his  book,  while  full  of  conscientious  informa- 
tion and  free  from  professional  contempt  of  Socialism, 
amounts  in  intent  and  effect  to  an  enormous  plea  of  Posi- 
tivism against  Marxism ! 

Two  observations  occur  to  me  at  this  point.  The  fore- 
going statement  will  sound  strange  to  many  in  Italy, 
where  it  is  customary  to  designate  anything  and  every- 
thing by  the  term  Positivism.  On  the  other  hand,  I  have 
said  frequently  that  that  mode  of  conceiving  of  life  and 
the  world  which  is  understood  by  the  name  of  historical 
materialism,  has  not  come  to  perfection  in  the  writings 
of  Marx  and  Engels  and  their  immediate  followers.  And 
I  declare  now  more  pointedly  that  the  development  of 
this  theory  proceeds  still  slowly,  and  will  perhaps  pro- 
ceed at  the  same  gait  for  a  good  while. 

But  such  books  as  Masaryk 's  serve  no  good  purpose. 
It  is  indeed  an  accumulation  of  objections  in  the  name 
of  Positivism,  but  not  in  the  name  of  an  authentic  and 
direct  revision  of  the  problems  of  historical  science,  not 
in  the  name  of  actual  political  questions.  The  socalled 
crisis  is  not  made  the  object  of  publicist  examination,  nor 
of  sociological  study,  but  is  rather  a  blank  space,  or  a 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  205 

pause,  in  which  the  author  proceeds  to  deposit,  or  recite, 
his  philosophical  protests. 

One  essay,  which  is  neither  useless  nor  devoid  of  inter- 
est, is  devoted  to  the  first  formation  of  the  thought  of 
Marx  (pages  17—89).  But  the  result  is  rather  scant. 
"Marx  ultimately  found  in  the  continuous  mutation  of 
the  social  structure  the  historical  reason  of  Communism, 
a  something  which  imposes  its  sway  of  its  own  necessity. 
— According  ito  Marx,  philosophy  is  the  natural  copy  of 
the  world  process. — Communism  follows  from  history 
itself. — The  materialism  of  Marx  is  a  historical  material- 
ism.—  "  Such  propositions  as  these,  which  reproduce  at 
one  stroke  of  the  pen  the  fundamental  thought  of  the 
author  in  question,  should  induce  our  critic,  it  seems  to 
me,  to  examine  the  fundamentals  of  these  conceptions, 
in  order  to  overthrow  them,  if  he  can.  And  what  does 
Mr.  Masaryk  do  instead?  A  few  lines  further  along  he 
writes:  "His  philosophy,  and  that  of  Engels,  bear  the 
imprint  of  eclecticism."  And  thereupon  he  treats  us 
under  letter  D  of  heading  II  to  a  Russian  salad  of  con- 
troversial opinions  of  Bax,  K.  Schmidt,  Stern,  Bernstein, 
Plechanoff,  Mehring,  so  far  as  they  have  discussed  the 
question  whether  this  philosophy,  from  a  Marxist  point 
of  view,  is,  or  is  not,  reconcilable  with  a  return  to  Kant, 
Spinoza,  or  others.  And  he  never  remembers  the  poet 
who  was  present  at  the  foundation  of  the  university  of 
Prague,  in  order  to  exclaim  with  him : 

Poor  and  nude  goest  thou,  philosophy ! 

Somewhat  disconnected  is  the  treatment  accorded  by 
the  author  to  historical  materialism  (pages  92— 168).  He 
speaks  first  of  the  different  definitions  and  their  clash, 


206  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

and  comes  finally  to  a  critique  founded  on  that  old  bore, 
the  doctrine  of  factors,  which  he  hides  more  or  less  under 
a  rather  doubtful  and  uncertain  sociological  and  psycho- 
logical phraseology.  Lastly,  the  idea  of  an  objectively 
Unitarian  conception  of  history  is  repugnant  to  our 
author,  and  it  frequently  happens  that  he  confounds  the 
explanation  of  historical  mass  effects  primarily  by  way 
of  changes  in  the  economic  foundation  with  the  curt  and 
crude  explanation  of  some  particular  historical  fact  out 
of  particular  and  concrete  economic  conditions.  We  need 
not  wonder  then  when  we  see  that  he  considers  Marx  as 
a  sort  of  deteriorated  Comte,  who  becomes  an  uncon- 
scious follower  of  Schopenhauer  and  accepts  the  primacy 
of  the  will,  which  doctrine,  however,  contradicts  the 
sacred  trinity  of  intellect,  feeling,  and  will.  Likely 
enough  poor  Marx  did  not  know  that  man  had  not  only 
an  intellect,  but  also  a  liver,  which  is  so  much  more 
surprising  as  he  was  himself  suffering  from  liver  trouble ! 
Perhaps  this  is  a  good  reason  why  he  did  not  see  that 
surplus-value  is  an  eminently  ethical  concept ! 

A  university  professor  who  treats  his  subject  matter  as 
he  does  his  profession,  may  easily  be  tempted  to  subject 
a  certain  author  to  the  test  of  all  the  various  doctrines 
which  he,  as  a  critic,  is  in  the  habit  of  studying  and 
handling.  And  then  it  happens  through  a  strange  illu- 
sion of  the  erudite,  that  the  terms  of  comparison,  which 
are  in  the  subjective  mind  of  the  critic,  become  surrepti- 
tiously terms  of  actual  derivation.  This  happened  also 
to  Masaryk.  Here  we  find  him,  just  when  he  is  right  in 
the  midst  of  his  attempted  comparisons,  contradicting 
himself  by  the  sententious  statement  (page  166)  :  "In 


SOCIALISM   AND  PHILOSOPHY  207 

fact,  Marx  molded  into  a  formula  something  which  was 
in  the  air,  as  the  saying  is,  and  for  this  reason  I  have 
not  attributed  much  weight  to  particular  influences  on 
his  mental  development."  Therefore,  I  would  say,  start 
all  over  again  and  try  the  opposite  way.  In  the  author 
whom  you  criticise  this  opposite  process  took  place,  for 
he  rose  from  a  critique  of  economy  and  from  the  fact  of 
the  class  struggle  to  a  new  conception  of  history  and  by 
the  same  way  further  to  a  new  orientation  on  the  general 
problems  of  cognition  (and,  mind  you,  not  by  a  modi- 
fication of  the  thing  which  is  technically  called  historical 
research) .  But  you  do  violence  to  the  facts.  You  turn 
them  upside  down  and  you  follow  a  course  which  is  not 
the  one  chosen  by  the  object  of  your  critique.  But  of 
course,  you,  a  professional  philosopher,  descend  from  the 
altitude  of  definitions  to  the  particular  thing  called 
historical  materialism.  And  with  all  due  obsequiousness 
to  red  tape,  you  thus  come  to  the  theory  of  the  class- 
struggle  as  one  comes  to  a  corollary  in  logic. 

In  this  case,  likewise,  a  faithfulness  to  material  exposi- 
tion renders  all  the  more  conspicuous  the  incapacity  for 
an  intimate  and  vivid  understanding.  We  meet  here  and 
there  with  a  few  useful  remarks  concerning  the  insuffi- 
cient precision  of  such  terms  as  bourgeoisie,  proletariat, 
etc.,  and  more  valuable  ones  concerning  the  impossibili- 
ty of  reducing  all  of  present  society  to  those  famous  two 
classes,  seeing  that  it  is  of  a  more  complex  and  different- 
iated composition.  In  spite  of  all  this  he  shows  a  singu- 
lar inaptitude  for  grasping  so  simple  an  idea  as  the 
following:  Seeing  that  social  life  is  so  intricate,  the 
intentions  of  some  individual  may  all  be  erroneous.  This 


208  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

fact  induces  our  author  to  say  that  Marxism  reduces 
individual  consciousness  down  to  a  pure  illusion.  It 
goes  against  his  grain  to  believe  that  economic  laws 
should  be  subject  to  a  natural  process  of  development. 
Well,  then,  let  him  prove  that  the  succession  of  histori- 
cal events  can  be  changed  by  arbitrary  acts.  After 
claiming  a  spontaneousness  (what  is  that?)  of  the  forces 
which  give  an  impulse  to  history,  and  proclaiming  the 
aristocracy  of  the  philosophical  spirit,  the  author  tells 
us  that  Marxian  determinism  is  identical  with  fatalism, 
and  then  he  confesses  (page  234)  :  ''I  explain  the  world 
and  history  theistically. "  Thank  God! 

Now  we  come  at  last  to  the  main  question,  that  is,  the 
explanation  of  the  capitalistic  world  (pages  235-313) 
and  the  critique  of  Communism  and  the  development  of 
civilization  (pages  313 — 386).  This  is  the  essential 
point  for  socialists,  and  they  cannot  be  combatted  on 
any  other  ground.  But  the  author  descended  from  the 
heights,  and  so  let  it  be.  I  cannot  deny— to  begin  with 
his  conclusions — that  there  is  some  justification  in  his 
remarks  about  our  excessive  primitiveness  and  simplici- 
ty, especially  as  concerns  the  attempt  of  Engels  to  out- 
line in  brief  the  main  phases  of  the  history  of  civiliza- 
tion. The  origin  of  the  state,  or  of  class  society,  by 
means  of  dominion  and  authority,  assuming  the  presence 
of  private  property  and  the  monogamic  family,  has  var- 
ious modes  of  development  in  particular  and  concrete 
historical  cases,  and  no  facile  explanation  will  hold  good 
in  the  attempt  to  make  too  simple  diagrams  plausible. 
It  may  happen  that  socialists  will  ordinarily,  in  every- 
day argument,  see  the  intricacies  of  history  in  too  simple 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  209 

a  light  and  reduce  them  too  much  in  size.  This  leads 
them  to  smooth  the  intricacies,  of  present  society  too 
much  into  the  same  likeness,  in  an  arbitrary  manner.  It 
is  also  certain  that  it  will  not  do  to  refer  continually  to 
the  negation  of  the  negation,  for  this  is  not  an  instru- 
ment of  research,  but  only  a  comprehensive  formula, 
valid,  indeed,  but  post  factum.  It  is  furthermore  cer- 
tain that  Communism,  that  is,  a  more  or  less  remote 
approach  of  present  society  to  a  new  form  of  production, 
will  not  be  the  mental  fruit  of  subjective  dialectics.  For 
this  reason  I  believe— to  be  courteous  in  the  use  of  arms 
against  my  adversaries — that  there  is  but  one  sole  mode 
of  seriously  combatting  Socialism,  and  that  is  to  prove 
that  the  capitalist  system,  for  the  present  at  least,  has 
enough  adaptability  to  reduce,  for  an  indefinite  time, 
all  proletarian  movements  at  bottom  to  meteoric  agita- 
tion, without  ever  resulting  in  an  ascending  process, 
which  will  finally  eliminate  class  rule  with  wage  slavery. 
This  is  the  gist  of  the  critical  efforts  of  such  schools  as 
that  of  Brentano  and  his  followers.  But  this  does  not 
seem  to  be  the  kind  of  bread  that  is  suitable  for  the  teeth 
of  Mr.  Masaryk,  who  reveals  all  his  inaptitude  for  grasp- 
ing the  economic  connection  of  his  subject  matter,  es- 
pecially in  the  chapter  which  he  devotes  to  a  criticism 
of  surplus-value.  (Pages  250—313.) 

After  wending  his  way  through  a  mass  of  references 
concerning  the  vexatious  question  of  the  alleged  funda- 
mental difference  between  the  first  and  third  volumes  of 
Capital,  Masaryk  repudiates  the  theory  of  surplus- 
value  as  inexact,  and  then  he  affirms  that  Marx  could  not 
take  his  departure  from  the  concept  of  utility,  because 


210  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

his  extreme  objectivity  prevented  him  from  taking  psy- 
chological considerations  into  account !  Then  he  proceeds 
to  give  his  own  opinion  as  to  the  position  which  political 
economy  should  occupy  among  the  sciences,  assuming  it 
to  be  dependent  on  the  premises  of  general  sociology. 
He  rejects  the  idea  that  political  economy  is  a  historical 
science  and  re-affirms  his  belief  in  a  pretended  science  of 
economics  which,  without  being  confounded  with  ethics, 
shall  embrace  the  whole  man,  and  not  only  man  as  a 
worker.  He  advances  some  sophistry  on  the  impossibili- 
ty of  finding  a  measure  of  labor,  so  far  as  it,  in  its 
turn,  is  to  serve  as  a  measure  of  value,  and  considers 
surplus-value  as  a  mental  concept  derived  from  the 
hypothesis  of  two  classes  engaged  in  a  mutual  struggle. 
By  means  of  many  subterfuges  he  writes  an  apology  of 
the  capitalist  so  far  as  he  is  enterprising,  that  is,  a 
worker  and  manager.  And  while  he  fulminates  against 
the  parasitic  class  and  against  dishonest  commerce,  he 
demands  ethics  which  shall  teach  to  each  his  duty  and 
place.  He  is  kind  enough  to  admit  that  Marx  discovered 
the  importance  of  small  laborers,  even  though  he  is  said 
to  have  fallen  into  such  little  errors  as  Masaryk  notes, 
for  instance,  the  reduction  of  complex  labor  to  simple 
labor,  and  above  all  the  belief  in  a  class-struggle,  when 
there  is  really  nothing  but  a  struggle  between  individ- 
uals. 

But  if  it  is  so  easy  to  reduce  historical  materialism  to 
powder,  if  class-struggles  as  a  dynamic  principle  of  his- 
tory are  but  an  erroneous  generalisation  of  ill-understood 
facts,  if  the  expectations  of  Communism  are  practically 
Utopian,  if  the  theories  of  Capital  are  so  obviously  false, 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  211 

and  if  all  the  fundaments  of  Marxism  have  now  been 
destroyed,  why  does  Masaryk  take  the  pains  to  write 
another  two  hundred  pages  on  rights,  ethics,  religion, 
and  so  forth,  that  is,  on  the  systems  which  are  called 
ideological?  For  my  part,  I  should  have  been  satisfied 
with  the  statements  made,  for  instance,  on  pages  509— 
519,  which  fill  a  sort  of  blank  intervening  between  the 
net  work  of  paragraphs.  There  he  tries  to  come  to  some 
final  summing  up,  but  through  defects  in  his  style  there 
is  too  little  concentration  of  thought  and  the  summary 
lacks  conciseness.  This  attempted  summary  gives  a  sort 
of  a  survey  of  the  characteristics  of  Marxism  and  there- 
by brings  the  thesis  of  the  author  into  a  stronger  relief. 
Marx — this  is  the  gist  of  this  summary — marks  the 
extreme  limit  of  the  reaction  against  subjectivism,  so 
far  as  he  regards  nature  as  the  primary  and  conscious- 
ness as  the  resulting  thing.  His  is  therefore  an  absolute 
positive  objectivism.  For  him  history  is  the  antecedent 
and  the  individual  the  consequent.  Hence  his  concep- 
tion amounts  to  an  absolute  negation  of  individualism. 
The  question  of  understanding  is  purely  a  practical  one. 
Between  the  nature  of  man  and  human  history  there  is 
a  perfect  accord.  There  is  no  other  source  of  human 
consciousness  outside  of  the  one  offered  by  history.  Man 
consists  entirely  of  what  man  makes.  Hence  the  econ- 
omic foundation  of  all  the  rest.  Hence  labor  as  a  lead- 
ing thread  of  history.  Hence  the  conviction  that  the 
various  social  forms  are  but  different  forms  of  organiza- 
tion of  labor.  Hence  the  point  of  view  of  Socialism,  no 
longer  as  a  mere  aspiration  or  expectation.  Hence  the 
conception  of  Communism,  not  as  a  simple  diagram  of 


212  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

economic  relations,  but  as  a  new  consciousness  exceeding 
the  limits  of  all  present  illusions  and  as  an  application 
of  positive  humanitarianism.  But  this  extreme  object- 
ivism is  now  breaking  up  by  a  return  to  Kant,  that  is, 
to  criticism.  Marx's  work  was  incomplete.  He  could 
not  overcome  Hegel,  he  found  no  adequate  expression 
for  his  tendencies,  he  relapsed  into  the  romanticism  of 
Rousseau,  he  tried  in  vain  to  extricate  himself  from 
Ricardo  and  Smith,  whom  he  attempted  to  criticise,  and 
he  remained  the  author  of  an  incomplete  system.  He 
personifies,  as  it  were,  a  philosophical  tragedy.  He 
pressed  old  ideas  into  the  service  of  new  ideals,  he  could 
not  find  any  other  incentive  for  revolutionary  work  but 
an  impulse  toward  hedonism,  and  therefore  he  remained 
aristocratic  and  absolutistic  in  his  revolutionary  passion. 

So  far  Masaryk's  characteristic.  I  leave  it  to  some 
one  with  a  faculty  of  adequate  expression  to  give  color 
to  this  outline.  It  certainly  is  calculated  to  call  our 
attention  to  the  great  tragedy  of  labor,  which  runs 
through  all  history.*  But  all  this  leaves  our  author  un- 
moved in  his  academic  pedantry.  He  does  not  oppose 
one  conception  to  another  in  his  rapid  survey  of  a  new 
interpretation  of  human  destinies,  but  merely  objects 
to  it  in  the  name  "of  the  mission  of  our  time  to  find  a 
new  synthesis  of  the  sciences"  (page  513).  Then  he 
calls  in  once  more  Hume  and  Kant,  and  asks  the  ques- 
tion: What  is  truth?  And  then  follows  a  discussion 
of  the  new  neo-ethics,  which  must  descend  to  give  us  a 
scientific  critique  of  society.  The  new  philosophy  must 
solve  the  problem  of  religion,  which  Marx  believed  to 

*See  letter  IX  of  Socialism  and  Philosophy. 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  213 

have  overcome,  calling  it  a  form  of  illusion.  Pessimism 
is  the  dominant  note  of  our  time.  Schopenhauer  ap- 
proached the  truth  somewhat  by  making  of  the  will  the 
root  of  the  worlct.  Marx  was  a  pendant  to  him  with  his 
unilateral  theory  of  labor.  Marxism  has  the  shortcom- 
ing of  having  remained  negative.  "Capital  is  but  the 
economic  transcript  of  Mephistopheles  by  Faust,"  (so 
he  says  on  page  516,  and  if  you  don't  believe  me,  go  and 
see  for  yourselves!).  And  finally  we  learn — if  I  have 
understood  him  right— that  the  crisis  consists  essential- 
ly in  a  return  to  Kant  and  a  leaning  of  the  revolution- 
ary spirit  toward  parliamentarianism.  This,  then,  marks 
the  beginning  of  the  Masaryk  epoch  in  the  world's 
history. 

Kant  and  the  parliament,  so  let  it  be!  But  which 
Kant?  Does  he  mean  the  Kant  of  the  most  private  of 
private  philistine  lives  in  Konigsberg?  Or  does  he  mean 
the  revolutionary  author  of  subversive  writings,  who 
seemed  to  Heine  like  one  of  the  heroes  of  the  Great 
Revolution  ?  And  which  parliament  of  the  ordinary  and 
customary  make-up  is  destined  to  transform  history? 
Well,  then,  let  us  say  Kant  and  the  Convention.  But 
the  Convention  followed  after  the  revolution,  that  is, 
after  the  downfall  of  an  entire  social  system,  the  ruin 
of  a  whole  political  order,  the  unchaining  of  all  class  pas- 
sions . . .  and  that  will  do.  Mr.  Masaryk,  as  a  professional 
academic  sociologist,  has  the  right  to  ignore  that  living, 
agitated,  impulsive,  passionate  history,  which  pleases 
those  other  human  beings  who  have  a  sympathetic  feel- 
ing for  human  realities.  He  can,  therefore,  rest  com- 
fortably in  the  persuasion  that  the  period  of  revolutions 


214  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

is  gone  by  for  ever,  and  that  we  have  definitely  entered 
the  period  of  slow  evolution,  the  idyl  of  quiet  and 
resigned  reason. 

Still,  let  us  turn  to  his  pigeon  holes. 

The  course  on  the  theory  of  the  state  and  of  law 
(pages  387—426)  combats  principally  the  point  of  view, 
according  to  which  this  or  that  is  a  secondary  or  derived 
form  as  compared  to  society  in  general.  The  state  exists 
from  the  very  beginning  of  evolution,  and  it  will  always 
exist  because  reason  and  morality  approve  of  it  (page 
405)  ;  and  man,  "by  his  natural  disposition,  does  not 
only  like  to  command,  but  also  to  be  commanded  and  to 
obey  willingly."  Natural  inequalities  justify  hierarchy 
(page  406).  And  that  settles  it!  But  if  that  is  true, 
why  take  such  pains  to  demonstrate  that  law  is  not  to 
be  derived  from  economic  conditions?  Why  waste  time 
in  combating  the  equalitarian  theories  of  Engels?  To 
what  end  does  he  appeal  to  the  awesome  authority  of 
Bernstein  (page  409),  who  is  said  to  have  restored  the 
state  to  honor  (imagine,  in  an  article  in  the  Neue 
Zeitl),  declaring  that  it  is  a  thing  which  the  socialists 
no  longer  wish  to  abolish,  but  only  to  reform?  It  is 
easy  enough  for  him  to  find  himself  in  accord  with  the 
everyday  mind,  which  does  not  hesitate  to  admit,  just 
like  Mr.  Masaryk,  that  there  are  just  inequalities,  and 
among  them  some  unjust  ones.  I  wish  he  would  tell  us 
his  measure  of  what  is  just ! 

I  pass  over  the  chapter  entitled  Nationality  and  Inter- 
nationality  (pages  426-565),  in  which  the  author,  aside 
from  exhibiting  his  indignation  over  the  Slavophobia  of 
Marx,  makes  some  useful  observations  concerning  those 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  215 

obstacles  to  internationalism  which  arise  naturally  from 
peculiarities  of  the  national  mind,  and  I  stop  a  minute 
to  consider  the  remarkable  paradoxes  which  he  pro- 
nounces in  regard  to  religion  (pages  455—481).  Here 
he  reveals  himself  as  a  true  decadent.  Catholicism  and 
Protestantism  are  for  him  still  the  fundamental  facts 
of  life  and  have  a  preponderating  influence  on  the  des- 
tinies of  the  world!  We  are  all  either  the  one  or  the 
other.  Indeed,  all  modern  philosophy  is  protestant,  and 
there  is  no  catholic  philosophy  unless  it  be  by  default 
(and  what  about  your  Comte?).  Marx  contains  an  ele- 
ment of  Catholicism,  not  only  because  he  adopted 
French  Socialism,  which  is  Catholic  and  repugnant  to 
the  Protestant  mind,  but  because  he  was  authoritative, 
an  enemy  of  individuality,  an  internationalist,  and  a 
champion  of  absolute  objectivism  (page  476).  Just  as 
the  French  revolution  was  largely  a  religious  movement, 
so  all  contemporaneous  Socialism  carries  within  itself  a 
religious  element.  Here  and  there  he  approaches  the 
idea  that  Catholicism  and  Protestantism  supplement  one 
another.  And  likely  enough  the  author  thinks  that  the 
religion  of  the  future  is  being  prepared  by  Socialism, 
seeing  that  "faith  is  the  highest  objectivism  of  normal 
man,  and  for  this  very  fact  social . . .  But  the  objectiv- 
ism of  Marx  is  too  bilious."  (Page  480.) 

If  religion  is  perennial,  if  the  state  is  immortal,  if  law 
is  natural,  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  ethics  (pages 
482—500)  must  not  be  super-eternal.  The  author  claims 
for  moral  consciousness  the  privilege  of  an  indisputable 
and  first-hand  fact.  I  need  not  stop  to  declare  that  one 
need  not  be  a  historical  materialist,  nor  even  a  simple 


216  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

materialist,  in  order  to  assign  to  such  an  infantile 
opinion  a  place  among  the  fairy  tales.  And  for  this 
reason  I  thank  the  author  for  his  quotation  of  magazine 
articles,  in  which  a  Bernstein,  a  Schmidt,  and  socialists 
like  them,  are  said  to  have  advanced  ethical  reasons 
against  Marx's  indifference  to  morality  (page  497). 

On  pages  500—508  we  find  the  shortcomings  of  Social- 
ism in  the  matter  of  art. 

All  these  reasons  as  well  the  statements  of  the  author 
in  section  V  concerning  the  practical  politics  of  Social- 
ism, which  are  treated  under  two  heads,  one  of  them 
entitled  Revolution  and  Reform,  the  other  Marxism  and 
Parliamentarianism,  make  us  acquainted  with  a  doctrin- 
aire handiwork  of  the  finest  verbalistic  kind.  That  So-, 
cialism  has  developed  during1  these  last  fifty  years  from 
a  sect  into  a  party  is  well  enough  known.  That  im- 
perative and  categorical  Communism  as  conceived  at  one 
time  has  become  Social-Democracy,  is  likewise  known. 
That  Socialist  parties  are  at  present  engaged  in  a 
varied  and  differentiated  practical  work,  is  not  only 
a  historical  fact,  but  also  a  making  of  history  on  their 
part.  That  in  all  these  things  mistakes  are  made  and 
practical  uncertainties  encountered,  is  inevitable  for 
human  beings.  But  it  is  also  true  that,  in  order  to 
understand  these  things,  one  must  live  among  them  and 
study  them  with  the  eye  and  intellect  of  the  historical 
observer. 

And  what  does  Mr.  Masaryk  do  ?  He  sees  nothing  but 
divisions  into  categories.  And  so  he  comes  to  the  idea 
of  a  transition  from  a  systematical  revolutionism  tn  a 
negation  of  the  possibility  of  any  revolution,  from 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  217 

romanticism  to  experience,  from  revolutionary  aristocra- 
cy to  democratic  ethics,  from  a  categorical  imperative 
to  empirical  methods,  from  absolute  objectivism  to  self- 
critique,  from  Titanic  conceptions  to  I  don't  know  what, 
but  we  know  only  that  "Faust-Marx  becomes  a  voter" 
(page  562).  You  fortunate  socialist  voters,  who  com- 
plete the  work  of  Goethe! 

And  then  look  at  the  specious  method  of  the  author. 
He  assumes  that  the  personality  of  Marx  (whose  biogra- 
phy he  claims  not  to  know  for  some  reason,  on  page  517) 
is  indefinitely  prolonged,  as  it  were,  throughout  all  the 
actions  and  the  expressions  of  the  socialist  parties  and 
socialist  press,  and  he  places  the  words  and  deeds  of 
all  others  to  the  account  of  the  Marxism  of  Marx,  as 
though  they  were  his  own  alterations  and  revisions.  But 
it  seems  that  the  Nemesis  overtook  him,  because  he 
wanted  to  be  too  much  at  one  time,  this  Marx,  namely 
a  German  philosopher  and  a  Latin  revolutionist,  a  Pro- 
testant and  a  Catholic, — and  the  revenge  of  Protestant- 
ism overtook  him  (page  566),  so  that  we  have  here  the 
real  device  of  the  crisis,  the  plain  meaning  of  the  new 
Ninth  Thermidor  of  Maximilian  Carl  Robespierre  Marx. 

It  is  not  worth  my  while  to  follow  the  author  in  his 
ramblings  through  the  whole  socialist  press  and  party 
documents  in  his  attempt  to  rake  together  the  proofs  for 
the  dissolution  of  Marxism  by  the  work  of  the  Marxists 
themselves,  who  are  a  sort  of  prolongued  Marx.  His 
thesis  is  that  Socialism  becomes  constitutional.  Every- 
thing is  good  enough  to  prove  this  thesis,  even  a  call 
upon  the  testimony  of  Enrico  Ferri,  who  is  supposed  to 
have  said,  I  really  don't  know  where,  that  a  republic  is 


218  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

in  the  private  interest  of  the  bourgeois  parties.  There- 
fore away  with  the  republic!  And  this  is  the  hope  of 
the  author :  ' '  That  Socialism  will  lose  the  acute  marks  of 
atheism,  materialism,  and  revolutionism,  and  develop 
ultimately  into  a  true  democracy,  which  shall  acquire 
the  proportions  of  a  universal  conception  of  life  and  the 
world,  a  politics  sub  specie  ceternitatis,"  with  an  outlook 
upon  eternity  (page  858).  So  far  as  I  am  concerned,  I 
must  confess  that  I  don't  understand  that. 

I  have  read  the  600  pages  of  Mr.  Masaryk  with  un- 
usual care  and  patience,  considering  that  the  nature  of 
my  occupations  prevents  me  from  perusing  one  and  the 
same  book  all  in  one  sitting.  I  had  a  great  curiosity  to 
see  it  as  soon  as  it  was  announced.  So  much  had  been 
said  and  gossiped  about  a  crisis  of  Marxism  by  such  a 
large  number  of  persons  of  mediocre  and  little  culture, 
which,  besides,  was  almost  always  incongruous,  that  I 
thought  I  might  learn  a  good  deal  from  the  masterpiece 
of  the  author  of  the  new  phrase  in  social  science.  I 
have  been  thoroughly  disillusioned  by  the  things  which  1 
have  mentioned  above. 

Mr.  Masaryk  assuredly  has  nothing  in  common  with 
the  various  kinds  of  professional  ignorance  and  auda- 
cious assertiveness,  which  have  produced  so  many  de- 
finitive criticisms  of  Socialism  in  so  short  a  time  in  our 
happy  country,  where  all  sorts  of  moral  and  intellectual 
anarchism  are  in  flower.  The  author  with  whom  I  have 
been  occupied  shares  nothing  with  the  socalled  crisis  of 
Marxism  in  Italy  but  the  outward  label,  and  this  label 
has  reached  us  without  a  doubt  by  way  of  the  French 
press. 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  219 

The  honest  and  modest  intention  of  Masaryk  was 
simply  to  preach  the  funeral  service  over  Marxism  in  the 
name  of  another  philosophy.  He  collected  the  material 
for  his  critique  in  patiently  and  minutely  elaborated 
notes.  It  is  clear  from  his  whole  context,  and  from  the 
equanimity  of  his  tone  throughout  the  work,  in  what 
name  and  for  what  purpose  he  wrote  this  critique.  The 
social  question  is  one  fact,  Socialism  is  another  fact,  So- 
cialism and  Marxism  are  one  (the  author  repeats  this 
several  times,  and  it  seems  to  me  he  makes  a  great  mis- 
take) ,  but  the  social  problem  must  be  solved  in  a  differ- 
ent way  than  the  one  expected  by  Marxian  Socialism. 
Therefore  let  us  retouch,  revise,  and  overturn  the  Welt- 
anschauung, on  which  Marxism  is  based,  and  since  the 
Marxists  themselves  are  just  discussing  this  question,  let 
us  step  between  them  in  this  crisis  as  an  arbiter. 

What  Masaryk  personally  wants  in  practice,  we  shall 
probably  find  out  better  some  other  time.  And  I  confess 
that  I  am  not  consumed  by  a  desire  to  know  it.  But  the 
perusal  of  his  book  has  made  me  think  of  a  whole 
century  of  the  history  of  thought. 

Positivism  has  from  its  beginning  walked  at  the  heels 
of  Socialism.  So  far  as  the  ideas  are  concerned,  the  two 
things  were  born  about  the  same  time  in  the  vague  mind 
of  the  genius  Saint-Simon.  They  were  in  a  way  the 
reverse  supplements  of  the  principles  of  the  Revolution. 
The  antagonism  between  these  two  things  developed  in 
the  varicolored  following  of  Saint-Simon.  And  at  a 
certain  point  Comte  became  the  representative  of  the 
reaction  (the  aristocratic  one,  as  Masaryk  would  say), 
which  assigns  to  men  their  position  and  destination 


220  SOCIALISM  AND   PHILOSOPHY 

according  to  the  fixed  diagram  of  the  system,  in  the 
name  of  classifying  and  omniscient  science.  To  the 
extent  that  Socialism  became  the  consciousness  of  the 
class-struggle  within  the  orbit  of  capitalist  production; 
and  to  the  extent  that  sociology,  often  badly  tried, 
rallied  around  historical  materialism,  Positivism,  the 
infidel  heir  of  the  spirit  of  the  revolution,  retired  into 
the  supereminent  pride  of  scientific  classification,  which 
deprecates  the  materialist  conception  of  science  itself, 
according  to  which  it  would  be  a  changeable  thing 
subject  to  the  transformation  of  natural  conditions,  in 
other  words,  subject  to  labor.  Masaryk  is  too  modest 
a  man  to  imitate  the  scientific  infallibility  of  Comte,  but 
he  is  enough  professor  to  cling  to  the  idea  that  the  Welt- 
anschauung is  something  above  the  social  question  of  the 
humble  laborers.  Turn  it  whichever  way  you  want  to, 
there  is  always  something  of  a  priest  in  a  professor.  He 
creates  the  God  whom  he  adores,  whether  it  is  a  fetish 
or  a  sacred  host. 

And  now  we  may  say  that  we  understand. 

I  might  feel  tempted  to  quote  a  few  passages  from  my 
writings,  which  would  show  clearly  the  distinction  be- 
tween criticism  and  a  crisis.  But  it  seems  to  me  that 
I  have  gone  far  enough. 

Since  politics  cannot  be  anything  else  but  a  practical 
and  working  interpretation  of  a  certain  historical  mo- 
ment, Socialism  is  today  confronted— generally  speak- 
ing, and  without  taking  into  account  local  differences  of 
the  various  countries— by  the  following  difficult  and  in- 
tricate problem :  It  must  beware  of  losing  itself  in  vain 
attempts  at  a  romantic  reproduction  of  traditional  revo- 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  221 

lutionism  (or,  as  Masaryk  would  say,  it  must  flee  from 
ideology),  and  yet  it  must  take  care  at  the  same  time 
not  to  fall  into  an  acquiescent  and  willing  attitude  which 
would  cause  its  disappearance  in  the  elastic  mechanism 
of  the  bourgeois  w^orld  by  means  of  compromise.  Some 
people  nurse  the  desire,  the  expectation,  the  hope,  of 
such  an  acquiescence  of  Socialism,  and  these  apologists 
of  the  present  order  of  society  have  attributed  great 
weight  to  the  open  literary  controversies  within  the 
party,  and  to  the  modest  book  of  Bernstein,  which  was 
raised  at  one  stroke  to  the  honor  of  a  historical  work.* 
This  fact  characterizes  and  condemns  this  book  as  well 
as  so  many  similar  expressions.  But  all  this  has  nothing 
to  do  with  Masaryk.  Masaryk,  as  a  professor  in  the 
exercise  of  his  profession,  has  expounded  philology  by 
means  of  type. 

ANTONIO  LABRIOLA. 
Rome,  June  18,  1899. 

*With  reference  to  the  book  of  Bernstein  see  my  article  In 
Le  Mouvement  Socialiste,  May   1899. 


ANTONIO  LABRIOLA  AND  JOSEPH  DIETZGEN 


A  Comparison  of  Historical  Materialism  and  Monist 
Materialism. 

"Study  historical  materialism?"  exclaimed  a  newly 
converted  friend  of  mine  in  surprise.  ''Why,  I  think  I 
know  all  about  it.  I  have  read  Marx's  introduction  to 
his  Critique  of  Political  Economy  and  Engels'  introduc- 
tion to  his  Socialism,  Utopian  and  Scientific.  What  else 
is  there  to  study  about  it?  It's  as  simple  as  can  be. 
Material  conditions  shape  human  thought  and  action. 
There  you  have  it  in  a  nutshell.  Isn't  that  enough?" 

My  friend  is  not  the  only  socialist  who  believes  he  can 
meet  all  eventualities  with  his  historical  materialism  in  a 
nutshell.  The  overwhelming  majority  of  socialists  man- 
age to  get  along  on  such  homoeopathic  doses  of  historical 
materialism.  Indeed,  if  we  want  to  be  honest  about  it, 
we  must  admit  that  there  is  scarcely  one  among  us  who 
has  so  fully  assimilated  historical  materialism  and  its 
most  obvious  conclusions  that  they  have  become  natural 
parts  of  his  conscious  being,  things  to  be  lived  in  daily 
thought  and  practice. 

Every  debate  shows  that.  Slight  differences  of  opinion 
on  tactical  questions,  due  to  different  individual  develop- 
ment and  changes  in  present  environment,  are  magnified 
into  great  scientific  controversies,  or  even  pushed  to  the 
extreme  of  personal  enmities.  Psychological  changes, 

222 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  223 

such  as  frequently  occur  in  our  quicklived  time,  which 
gives  us  little  leisure  to  digest  new  ideas,  are  condemned 
offhand  as  recantations  of  sacred  pledges,  without  ana- 
lysing to  what  extent  alterations  in  the  physical  struct- 
ure or  social  environment  of  such  comrades  may  have 
caused  the  change  of  mind.  The  same  men  pronounce 
in  the  same  breath  moral  sentence  upon  others  without  a 
careful  investigation  of  facts,  deliver  themselves  of  the 
academic  pronunciamento  that  historical  materialism 
implies  no  moral  condemnation  of  individuals  or  classes 
for  acting  in  accord  with  their  historical  necessities,  and 
censure  others  flatly  for  applying  the  scientific  standards 
of  proletarian  ethics  to  historical  research.  Tactical 
groupings  produced  by  the  natural  development  of  men 
and  things  in  different  localities  and  times,  instead  of 
being  analysed  and  understood,  become  so  many  warring 
camps  and  end  in  factional  splits,  without  the  slightest 
attempt  to  ascertain  whether  a  dialectic  reconcilation 
and  co-operation  is  possible  for  them.  Distinctions  of  a 
merely  formal  nature,  such  as  that  between  scientific 
argument  and  appeal  to  sentiment,  instead  of  being  re- 
cognised as  justified,  each  in  its  own  place,  are  forcibly 
separated  by  yawning  and  impassable  chasms. 

In  short,  many  facts  give  abundant  evidence  that 
historical  materialism  and  its  direct  conclusions  have 
barely  penetrated  the  surface  of  our  consciousness. 

I  advised  my  friend  to  spend  a  little  time  studying 
Labriola  and  Dietzgen.  And  now  I  repeat  this  advice 
for  the  benefit  of  a  large  circle  of  comrades.  And,  let 
me  add,  don't  study  these  two  writers  merely  for  the 
sake  of  intellectual  sport.  Try  to  let  their  words  ' '  soak 


224  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

in. ' '  Make  a  persistent  effort  to  transform  the  blossom- 
ing understanding,  which  comes  after  reading,  into  prac- 
tical fruit.  Turn  your  book  wisdom  into  wise  deeds. 

Antonio  Labriola  and  Joseph  Dietzgen,  each  in  his 
own  way,  have  made  a  valuable  contribution  to  the  in- 
dependent thought  life  of  the  revolutionary  proletariat. 
If  you  want  to  know  how  much  that  simple  formulation 
of  historical  materialism  by  Marx  in  his  introduction  to 
the  Critique  of  Political  Economy  implies,  and  how 
much  it  can  accomplish  by  itself,  read  Labriola.  If  you 
want  to  know  where  it  falls  short,  and  why  it  does  so, 
read  Dietzgen. 

Labriola,  a  methodical  academic  thinker,  grown  up  in 
a  philosophical  and  literary  atmosphere,  has  the  one  in- 
dispensable gift  of  the  university  lecturer,  namely  that 
of  pointing  out  all  the  various  aspects  of  his  subject  in 
a  tentative  manner  and  stimulating  his  pupils  to  analyse 
each  point  for  themselves,  in  order  to  develop  their  own 
conclusions  about  it  independently.  He  addresses  him- 
self to  trained  thinkers.  Therefore  he  never  gives  them 
more  than  just  the  suggestions  required  to  point  the  way 
for  them,  never  exhausts  his  subject  fully,  and  does  so 
intentionally  in  order  to  impress  his  pupils  with  the 
fact  that  he  is  himself  still  in  process  of  constant  devel- 
opment, and  that  he  cannot  say  all  he  knows,  because 
he  is  still  discovering  new  points  of  view  from  which  his 
subject  must  be  analysed.  This  is  no  doubt  the  correct 
method  of  teaching  for  university  lecturers.  But  in 
order  to  reach  the  great  mass  of  proletarians,  for  whom 
his  studies  are  so  valuable,  Labriola  must  be  popularized. 
At  present  he  reaches  the  masses  only  indirectly  through 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  225 

a  little  band  of  students,  who  go  to  his  works  for  in- 
formation. These  students  are  lavishly  rewarded  for 
their  confidence  in  him,  and  their  influence  on  the  devel- 
opment of  their  less  trained  comrades  is  of  incalculable 
benefit  for  the  Socialist  movement. 

Joseph  Dietzgen,  the  selftaught  man  of  the  people, 
speaks  their  simple  language.  He  addresses  himself 
directly  to  his  proletarian  comrades  of  all  shades.  He 
understands  their  mental  capacities.  He  knows  that  he 
cannot  teach  them  more  than  one  simple  proposition  at 
one  time.  But  he  also  knows  that  proletarian  brains, 
however  untaught,  are  capable  of  grasping  the  most 
difficult  problem,  provided  it  is  presented  in  a  way  that 
is  adapted  to  the  proletarian  experience.  Therefore 
Dietzgen  avoids  all  academic  by-work.  He  handles  his 
subject  without  gloves  and  says  all  he  knows  about  it. 
When  he  gets  through,  he  has  made  his  point  perfectly 
plain.  This  is  precisely  what  his  pupils  want,  for  they 
are  not  used  to  developing  any  conclusions  themselves. 
But  Dietzgen  knows  how  to  develop  this  faculty  in  them. 
For  his  subject  is  the  self-investigation  of  the  faculty  of 
thought.  A  proletarian  who  has  grasped  this  is  equipped 
to  undertake  the  analysis  of  any  problem,  which  histori- 
cal materialism  may  present,  is  aware  that  there  is  in- 
finite room  for  self-development,  within  the  natural  limits 
of  historical  necessities. 

Both  Dietzgen  and  Labriola  thus  produce  the  same 
effect  by  different  methods  applied  to  different  classes  af 
students.  Each  impresses  his  pupils  with  the  fact  that 
things  are  in  constant  flow,  and  that  we  must  move  with 
them  to  the  end  of  our  days.  We  must  keep  on  learning. 


226  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

Joseph  Dietzgen  was  not  so  much  a  follower,  as  a 
collaborator  of  Marx  and  Engels.  He  cut  his  own  way 
through  the  jungle  of  philosophical  thought.  And  step- 
ping out  into  the  clearing  which  he  had  made  for  him- 
self, he  met  the  two  founders  of  scientific  Socialism,  and 
all  three  shook  hands  and  divided  the  work  between 
them.  Marx  and  Engels  devoted  themselves  to  the  econ- 
omic and  historical  side  of  the  work,  Dietzgen  continued 
his  own  specialty,  the  critique  of  the  faculty  of  under- 
standing. 

He  had  never  been  a  Hegelian.  He  had  from  the  out- 
set maintained  a  critical  attitude  towards  all  philoso- 
phers. He  had  given  them  all  a  fair  chance  to  present 
their  claims  and  had  found  them  all  wanting  in  one 
respect.  Of  course,  he  realised  that  each  philosopher 
was  the  product  of  his  own  time,  and  that  each  deserved 
credit  for  his  contribution  to  the  uplift  and  explanation 
of  the  human  mind.  And  so  he  sifted  the  disorderly 
mass  of  evidence  offered  by  past  and  present  philoso- 
phers and  came  independently  of  Marx  and  Engels,  not 
only  to  a  discovery  of  their  historical  materialism,  but  to 
an  advance  beyond  them  and  a  perfection  of  their 
theory  of  historical  evolution  by  his  theory  of  under- 
standing and  conception  of  the  world. 

Antonio  Labriola  had  been  a  Hegelian,  like  Marx  and 
Engels.  In  his  researches  into  the  problems  of  free  will 
and  moral  consciousness  he  had  realised  the  inadequacy 
of  the  idealist  schools,  and  become  equally  convinced  of 
the  inadequacy  of  the  various  forms  of  bourgeois  materi- 
alism, whether  presented  in  the  form  of  Comte  's  positiv- 
ism, Spencer's  metaphysical  eclecticism,  or  Biichner's 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  227 

mechanical  realism.  The  work  of  Marx  and  Engels  came 
to  him,  more  as  a  fulfillment  of  a  long  felt  want,  than 
as  a  revelation.  True  to  his  scientific  convictions,  he 
boldly  avowed  his  Marxism,  once  that  he  had  reached 
this  point.  And,  strange  to  say,  the  freedom  of  science 
was  more  highly  respected  in  Italy  than  in  the  socalled 
land  of  thinkers,  Germany,  or  the  socalled  land  of  the 
free,  the  North-American  republic.  Labriola  retained 
his  chair  of  philosophy  at  the  university  of  Rome. 

Although  an  avowed  follower  of  Marx  and  Engels, 
Labriola  was  by  no  means  their  follower  through  thick 
and  thin.  He  was  a  thinking  and  critical  follower,  the 
kind  of  followers  that  Marx  and  Engels  desired.  La- 
briola did  not  look  in  Marxism  for  anything  but  what  it 
actually  claimed  to  offer,  that  is,  in  his  own  words,  "its 
determined  critique  of  political  economy,  its  outlines  of 
historical  materialism,  and  its  proletarian  politics. ' '  As 
a  former  Hegelian,  he  was  familiar  with  dialectics  be- 
fore he  came  in  contact  with  Marxism.  So  far  as  the 
special  problems  of  formal  philosophy  were  concerned, 
he  distinguished  them  from  Marxism,  although  well 
aware  of  their  bearing  upon  historical  materialism.  But, 
like  Marx  and  Engels,  he  seems  to  have  shelved  the 
problems  of  cognition  and  moral  consciousness,  as  con- 
crete studies,  after  adopting  historical  materialism  for 
his  general  guide.  At  least  in  all  his  writings  on  Marx- 
ism, he  never  entered  into  an  analysis  of  the  limits  of 
cognition  or  the  nature  of  the  human  faculty  of  thought. 

This  is  characteristic  of  the  entire  generation  of  strict 
Marxians  from  1848  to  1900.  All  of  them  take  the  fact 
of  consciousness  for  granted,  content  with  the  general 


228  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

declaration  of  Marx  and  Engels  that  thinking  and  being 
are  inseparable  and  that  the  general  trend  of  human 
thought  is  predominantly  modified  by  economic  condi- 
tions. Even  Franz  Mehring,  the  official  historian  of  the 
German  Social  Democracy,  who  more  than  any  other 
Marxian  had  occasion  to  deal  with  problems  of  personal 
psychology,*  never  went  beyond  the  social  horizon  of 
the  psychological  problem.  He  made  brilliant  researches 
into  the  economic  and  political  conditions  shaping  the 
psychologies  of  men,  with  occasional  hints  at  biological 
characters,  but  he  never  went  to  the  cosmic  root  of  the 
problem  of  cognition,  even  when  he  discussed  the  meta- 
physical relapses  of  philosophers  like  Kant,  Hegel,  or 
Schopenhauer. 

This  is  not  said  in  a  spirit  of  disparagement.  On  the 
contrary,  it  is  a  simple  statement  of  historical  fact.  And 
it  explains  itself  quite  naturally  out  of  the  circumstances 
surrounding  the  origin  and  development  of  historical 
materialism. 

The  founders  of  scientific  Socialism  inverted  Hegelian 
dialectics  and  transformed  it  into  a  practical  method  of 
historical  research.  They  had,  indeed,  squared  their 
own  accounts  with  German  classic  philosophy  and  eigh- 
teenth and  nineteenth  century  materialism.  But  they 
limited  themselves  from  the  outset  to  the  practical  social 
implications  of  their  new  theory.  They  had  to  specialize 
in  order  to  accomplish  something  great,  and  they  selected 
with  keen  insight  those  specialties  which  bore  most 

*See,  for  instance,  Die  Lesslng  Legende. — Furthermore,  Zur 
Psychologic  Lassalle's,  Neue  Zeit,  XXI,  2,  No.  41,  p.  456. — Also 
Die  Philosophic  des  Selbstwusstseins  and  Demokrit  und 
Epikur  in  Aus  dem  literarischen  Nachlass  von  Karl  Marx, 
Friedrich  Engels  und  Ferdinand  Lassalle,  Vol.  I,  pages  41-57. 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  229 

directly  upon  the  practical  problems  of  their  time.  To 
what  extent  they  had  penetrated  independently  into  the 
problem  of  cognition  before  they  made  this  choice,  no 
one  can  know  but  those  comrades  who  have  charge  of 
the  unpublished  joint  manuscript  of  Marx  and  Engels 
written  in  1845-46.  But  it  is  safe  to  say  that  this  manu- 
script would  have  been  published  by  this  time,  if  it  con- 
tained such  a  contribution  to  historical  materialism  as 
that  supplied  by  Joseph  Dietzgen.  This  assumption  is 
further  strengthened  by  the  fact  that  Marx  and  Engels 
acknowledged  Dietzgen 's  merit  and  called  him  "the 
philosopher  of  the  proletariat. ' '  And  it  is  further  borne 
out  by  the  fact  that  even  the  latest  writings  of  Engels, 
such  as  Anti-Dilkring  and  Feuerbacli,  in  the  passages 
dealing  directly  with  the  problems  of  cognition,  free  will, 
moral  consciousness,  do  not  contain  anything  which 
materially  modifies  the  original  conception  of  human 
consciousness  formulated  by  Marx. 

The  obvious  conclusion  from  these  facts  is  that  Marx 
and  Engels  were  acquainted  with  Dietzgen 's  theory  of 
cognition,  but  had  not  familiarized  themselves  with  it 
except  in  so  far  as  it  touched  upon  society.  They  had  not 
assimilated  its  meaning  as  a  concrete  theory  of  cognition, 
but  only  its  general  aspects  as  a  contribution  to  historical 
materialism.  They  had  not  realized  its  importance  as  a 
key  to  the  dialectic  connection  of  class  psychology  with 
individual  psychology. 

This  is  not  a  reflection  on  the  acumen  of  Marx  and 
Engels.  The  simple  chronological  succession  of  Dietz- 
gen's  principal  works  accounts  for  it.  His  Nature 
of  Human  Brain  Work  was  published  in  1869. 
It  is  a  critique  of  reason  in  which  he  gives  an  epistemo- 


230  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

logical  substantiation  of  Marxian  historical  materialism. 
But  the  monist  dialectics  of  this  work  are  not  so  clearly 
developed  that  its  advance  over  Hegel,  Marx  arid  Engels 
becomes  apparent  without  close  study.  The  next  larger 
work  of  Dietzgen  dealing  with  philosophical  questions 
appeared  in  1886.  It  was  entitled  Excursions 
of  a  Socialist  Into  the  Domain  of  Epistemology 
and  contained  a  critical  discussion  of  the  contem- 
poraneous idealist  and  materialist  philosophies.  It 
was  more  an  application  of  Dietzgen 's  own  conclusions 
to  the  philosophical  position  of  prominent  bourgeois 
philosophers  than  a  systematic  presentation  and  demon- 
stration of  his  own  position.  Marx  had  been  dead  three 
years  when  this  work  appeared,  and  Engels  was  over- 
whelmed with  his  editorial  work  on  Capital,  his 
studies  of  natural  science,  and  party  polemics.  The 
philosophical  work  of  Engels  published  soon  after  the 
above  work  of  Dietzgen  was  Feuerbach  (1888),  and 
in  it  Engels  gave  prominent  recognition  to  Dietzgen  only 
for  his  independent  discovery  of  the  dialectics  of  histor- 
ical materialism.  He  says  nothing  there  about  Dietzgen 's 
contribution  to  the  theory  of  cognition,  and  his  own  posi- 
tion on  that  theory  is  substantially  the  same  as  that  taken 
by  him  in  Anti-Diihring  *  that  is  a  more  elaborate 
application  of  limited  historical  materialism.  The  next 
work  of  Dietzgen  on  this  subject  did  not  appear  until 
1895,  the  year  of  Engels'  demise.  This  was  the  culminat- 
ing work  of  Dietzgen,  The  Positive  Outcome  of  Phil- 
osophy, and  it  also  contained  his  Letters  on  Logic.  Here 
he  fully  elaborated  his  cosmic  dialectics  and  drove 
metaphysics  from  its  last  hiding  place. 

*First  German  edition  1878,  second  1885,  third  1894. 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  231 

We  see,  then,  that  neither  Marx  nor  Engels  had  an 
opportunity  to  familiarize  themselves  with  Dietzgen's 
perfected  dialectics. 

Mehring's  neglect  of  the  special  problem  of  cognition 
explains  itself  in  the  same  simple  manner.  He  performed 
most  of  his  classic  work  before  the  crowning  book  of 
Dietzgen  was  published.  Mehring's  first  History  of 
the  German  Social  Democracy,  written  in  1877,  when 
he  was  still  an  opponent  of  Socialism  and  had  not 
fully  digested  the  significance  of  his  previous  experi- 
ence with  Marxism,  could  not  well  be  expected  to 
contain  an  objective  appreciation  of  Dietzgen,  even  if 
Dietzgen 's  work  up  to  that  time  had  clearly  revealed  the 
real  import  of  his  researches.  Mehring's  Lessing 
Legende  and  his  new  and  completely  rewritten  edition 
of  the  History  of  the  German  Social  Democracy 
were  completed  before  he  had  had  sufficient  oppor- 
tunity to  familiarize  himself  with  Dietzgen's  monism. 
Mehring's  psychological  studies,  even  those  in  his 
commentaries  to  the  Nachlass,  etc.,  did  not  lead  him 
particularly  to  an  epistemological  analysis  of  individual 
consciousness,  but  rather  to  a  study  of  the  social 
elements  affecting  the  personality.  For  this  purpose 
the  limited  historical  materialism  of  Marx  was  suf- 
ficient. By  this  means,  Mehring  added  incidentally 
another  proof  of  the  characteristic  difference  between 
historical  materialism  and  proletarian  monism.  Histor- 
ical materialism,  in  explaining  the  psychology  of  classes, 
does  not  establish  a  firm  dialectic  connection  between  the 
class  and  the  individual.  It  takes  insufficient  notice  of 
the  simultaneous  concatenation  of  events  and  lays  stress 
too  one-sidedly  upon  the  revolutionary  tendencies  of  in- 


232  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

dustrial  evolution.  Vice  versa,  when  inquiring  into  the 
problems  of  personal  psychology,  Mehring  considers  per- 
sonal consciousness  pre-eminently  as  a  part  of  the  exist- 
ing environment,  without  a  dialectic  appreciation  of 
hereditary  influences  transmitted  by  the  natural  selection 
of  ancestral  and  social  characters.  But  often  physio- 
logical psychology  or  the  theory  of.  cognition  furnish  a 
better  clue  to  certain  movements  of  the  personal  will 
than  historical  materialism  does.  At  any  rate,  it  is 
necessary  to  keep  all  the  sources  of  the  personal  mind  in 
view.  This  insufficient  amalgamation  of  simultaneous 
and  successive  movements  is  the  chief  weakness  of  lim- 
ited historical  materialism.  And  the  dialectic  compre- 
hension and  reconciliation  of  these  two  movements  is 
precisely  one  of  Dietzgen  's  chief  merits. 

We  need  not  wonder,  then,  that  Labriola,  as  a  strict 
Marxian,  staid  within  the  circle  of  limited  Marxism,  also 
in  referring  to  these  special  problems.  Whether  he  ever 
read  Dietzgen 's  writings,  I  do  not  know.  He  certainly 
made  no  allusion  to  them  in  any  of  his  works  on  histor- 
ical materialism.  And  his  own  interpretation  and  appli- 
cation of  historical  materialism  remained  strictly  within 
the  limits  of  the  first  generation  of  Marxian  theorists. 
This  seems  to  me  an  added  proof  that  neither  Marx's 
nor  Engels'  writings  give  a  sufficient  clue  to  the  complete 
solution  of  the  problems  of  cognition  and  moral  conscious- 
ness. For  so  painstaking  a  thinker  and  investigator  as 
Labriola,  who  spent  years  in  securing  every  scrap  of 
evidence  for  Marxism  which  he  could  locate,  would 
surely  have  mentioned  such  an  important  contribution 
to  historical  materialism,  if  he  could  have  noticed  it.  It 
was  not  until  after  his  death,  in  1904,  that  the  claims  of 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  233 

Joseph  Dietzgen  were  more  and  more  recognized  by  the 
leading  Marxians  of  Germany,  and  even  then  this  recog- 
nition was  by  no  means  identical  with  a  full  assimilation 
of  Dietzgen 's  conclusions. 

Under  these  circumstances,  Labriola  offers  a  rare 
opportunity  to  compare  Marx's  limited  historical  mater- 
ialism with  the  more  comprehensive  dialectic  materialism 
of  Joseph  Dietzgen.  This  opportunity  is  so  much  more 
valuable,  as  attempts  have  been  made  of  late  to  belittle 
Dietzgen 's  contribution  to  historical  materialism.  It  is 
an  eloquent  fact  that  these  aspersions  have  come  almost 
exclusively  from  quarters,  which  have  shown  a  very 
indifferent  understanding  even  for  Marx's  historical 
materialism — Neokantian  agnostics,  metaphysical  mater- 
ialists, and  other  eclectic  philosophers.  This  fact  assumes 
a  crushing  significance,  when  we  remember  that  Marx  and 
Engels,  and  their  most  gifted  followers,  have  not  hesi- 
tated to  acknowledge  Dietzgen 's  merit,  even  if  they  have 
not  fully  appreciated  it.  These  undeniable  facts  refute 
all  claims  of  those  would-be  critics  of  Dietzgen  to  a 
serious  consideration.  A  man  who  has  not  grasped  the 
significance  of  Marx's  historical  materialism  is  poorly 
equipped  to  criticise  Dietzgen 's  contribution  to  it. 

History  is  always  the  most  convincing  proof  of  any 
theory.  And  history  has  shown  that  historical  mater- 
ialism by  itself,  without  Dietzgen 's  theory  of  under- 
standing, cannot  free  itself  from  metaphysical  survivals. 

I  shall  not  attempt  to  give  a  detailed  proof  of  this 
statement  in  this  place.  I  shall  merely  avail  myself  of 
Labriola 's  own  work  as  an  illustration  to  what  extent 
historical  materialism  can  be  consistently  dialectic  with- 
out the  help  of  Dietzgen 's  dialectic  materialism. 


234  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

If  we  try  to  sum  up  the  most  characteristic  statements 
of  Labriola,  which  express  his  interpretation  of  historical 
materialism  in  so  far  as  it  bears  upon  problems  of  cogni- 
tion, we  arrive  at  the  following  result : 

"Passing  from  the  underlying  economic* structure  to 
the  picturesque  whole  of  a  given  history,  we  need  the 
aid  of  that  complexus  of  notions  and  knowledge  which 
may  be  called,  for  the  lack  of  a  better  term,  social  psy- 
chology." (Historical  Materialism,  p.  Ill):  ..."We 
hold  this  principle  to  be  indisputable  that  it  is  not  the 
forms  of  consciousness  which  determine  the  human  being, 
but  it  is  the  manner  of  being  which  determines  the  con- 
sciousness. But  these  forms  of  consciousness,  even  as 
they  are  determined  by  the  conditions  of  life,  constitute 
in  themselves  also  a  part  of  history."  (P.  113.)  . .  ."The 
discovery  of  the  instruments  of  labor  is  at  once  the  cause 
and  effect  of  those  conditions  and  of  those  forms  of  the 
inner  life  to  which,  isolating  them  by  abstraction,  we 
give  the  name  of  imagination,  intellect,  reason,  thought, 
etc."  (P.  121.)  ...Historical  materialism  implies  "a 
practical  mental  revolution  of  the  theory  of  understand- 
ing." (Socialism  and  Philosophy,  p.  58.) ..  ."Every 
act  of  thinking  is  an  effort,  that  is  to  say,  new  labor.  In 
order  to  perform  it,  we  need  above  all  the  material  of 
mature  experience  and  the  methodical  instruments,  made 
familiar  and  effective  by  long  handling. . .  Every  time 
we  set  about  producing  a  new  thought  we  need  not  only 
the  external  materials  and  impulses  of  actual  experience, 
but  also  an  adequate  effort  in  order  to  pass  from  the 
most  primitive  stages  of  mental  life  to  that  superior, 
derived  and  complex,  stage  called  thought,  in  which  we 
cannot  maintain  ourselves,  unless  we  exert  our  will- 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  235 

power,  which  has  a  certain  determined  duration  beyond 
which  it  cannot  be  exerted."  (P.  58-59.) . .  .By  inverting 
the  dialectics  of  Hegel,  Marx  set  aside  "the  rythmic 
movement  of  the  Idea  Itself,  the  spontaneous  generation 
of  thought"  and  adopted  "the  rythmic  movement  of  real 
things,  a  movement  which  ultimately  produces  thought. ' ' 
(P.  60.)  ..."The  means  of  social  activity,  made  up  on 
one  side  of  the  conditions  and  instruments,  on  the  other 
of  the  products  of  co-operative  labor  and  specialisation, 
constitute  together  with  the  free  gifts  of  nature  the 
materials  and  incentives  for  our  internal  activity."  (P. 
59.) ..  .Historical  materialism  implies  "a  tendency 
toward  monism ...  a  critical  tendency  of  formation. ' ' 
(P.  84.)... "A  formal  and  critical  tendency  toward 
monism  on  one  side,  an  expert  ability  to  keep  a  level  head 
in  special  research  on  the  other,  that  is  the  outcome." 
(P.  86.) ..  ."All  the  knowable  may  be  known;  and  all 
the  knowable  will  be  known  in  an  infinite  time ;  and  for 
the  knowable  reflecting  about  itself,  for  us,  on  the  field 
of  cognition,  there  is  nothing  of  higher  importance.  Such 
a  general  statement  reduces  itself  practically  to  saying: 
Knowledge  is  valuable  to  the  extent  that  we  can  actually 
know  things.  It  is  a  mere  play  of  fantasy  to  suppose 
that  our  mind  recognises  as  a  fact  an  absolute  difference 
between  the  limits  of  the  knowable  and  the  absolutely 
unknowable."  (P.  88.) . .  ."A  queer  thing  this  so- 
called  thing  in  itself,  which  we  do  not  know,  neither  to- 
day, nor  tomorrow,  which  we  shall  never  know,  and  of 
which  we  nevertheless  know  that  we  cannot  know  it.  This 
thing  cannot  belong  to  the  field  of  knowledge,  for  this 
gives  us  no  information  of  the  unknowable."  (P.  89.) 
..."  On  this  field  of  derived  and  complicated  psychic 


236  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

production  we  are  still  far  removed  from  the  most  ele- 
mentary conditions  necessary  to  enable  us  by  observation 
and  experiment  to  follow  the  rise  and  development  of 
the  first  sensations  from  one  extreme  to  the  other,  that 
is,  from  the  peripheral  apparatus  to  the  cerebral  centers, 
in  which  irritations  and  vibrations  are  converted  into 
conscious  apperception,  into  consciousness."  (P.  131.) 
. .  ."Whether  the  people  of  the  future,  of  whom  we  so- 
cialists often  entertain  such  exalted  ideas,  will  still  pro- 
duce any  religion  or  not,  I  can  neither  affirm  nor  deny. ' ' 
(P.  143.)... "We  cannot  give  ourselves  an  adequate 
account  of  thought,  unless  it  be  by  an  act  of  thinking. ' ' 
(P.  149.) . .  ."The  psychology  of  labor,  which  would  be 
the  crowning  of  determinism,  remains  yet  to  be  written. ' ' 
(P.  178.) 

In  these  statements,  the  whole  gist  of  Labriola's  inter- 
pretation of  historical  materialism,  in  its  philosophical 
aspects,  is  contained.  That  it  is  a  faithful  and  correct 
interpretation  of  the  position  of  Marx  and  Engels,  no 
well  informed  Marxian  will  deny.  Some  of  these  state- 
ments sound  almost  as  though  they  were  duplicates  of 
statements  of  Dietzgen.  But  the  "dot  over  the  i"  is 
wanting.  And  Labriola  finally  says  clearly  that  we  can- 
not solve  this  problem  by  physiological  analyses,  but  only 
"by  an  act  of  thinking,"  and  that  the  crowning  work  of 
proletarian  psychology  remains  to  be  written. 

No  matter  how  much  we  may  analyse  these  statements 
from  all  sides,  we  shall  find  that  they  say  in  substance 
no  more  than  this :  The  historical  materialism  of  Marx 
and  Engels  has  not  solved  the  problem  of  cognition,  but 
it  implies,  by  its  tendency  toward  monism,  a  gradual 
amalgamation  of  science  and  philosophy,  the  growth  of 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  237 

a  "critically  self-conscious  thought  identified  with  the 
material  of  knowledge,  the  complete  elimination  of  the 
traditional  distinction  between  philosophy  and  science." 
(Socialism  and  Philosophy,  p.  76).  The  characteristic 
outcome  of  historical  materialism,  according  to  him,  is 
the  elimination  of  speculative  and  the  adoption  of  in- 
ductive dialectics.  By  this  means  materialist  meta- 
physics as  defined  by  Engels,  that  is,  the  purely  mechani- 
cal conception  of  the  universe  and  society,  is  displaced 
by  the  evolutionary  conception.  On  the  other  hand,  says 
Labriola,  metaphysics  has  still  another  meaning  than 
that  given  to  it  by  Engels.  It  also  refers  to  supernatural 
dualism  as  distinguished  from  natural  monism.  And  in 
this  respect,  he  declares,  metaphysics  has  not  been  over- 
come by  historical  materialism,  nor  will  it  ever  be  fully 
overcome.  "Human  beings  have  never  been  exclusively 
theological  or  metaphysical,  nor  will  they  ever  be  exclus- 
ively scientific."  (Socialism  and  Philosophy,  p.  72.) 
For  this  reason,  Labriola  cautiously  refrains  from  mak- 
ing any  definite  assertion  as  to  whether  the  people  of  the 
future  will  still  produce  any  religion. 

Clearly,  then,  the  strict  Marxian  Labriola  agrees  with 
proletarian  monists  that  historical  materialism  did  not 
fully  overcome  metaphysics  in  every  form.  More  dis- 
criminating than  other  champions  of  limited  historical 
materialism,  he  sees  correctly  that  it  is  only  a  new  orien- 
tation on  the  general  problems  of  cognition,  but  that  it 
has  not  solved  the  special  problem  of  cognition,  the 
nature  of  the  human  faculty  of  thought.  He  further 
agrees  with  us  that  historical  materialism  does  not  result 
in  a  complete  amalgamation  of  philosophy  and  science. 
He  is  even  inclined  to  ridicule  the  idea  that  this  will  ever 


238  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

be  fully  accomplished.  On  the  other  hand,  he  claims 
that  this  was  accomplished  more  perfectly  by  Marx  than 
by  any  other  thinker.  And  from  his  point  of  view  he  is 
right. 

But  we  have  advanced  since  then.  And  from  our  ad- 
vanced position  we  see  that  Labriola's  estimate  requires 
a  modification.  Marx  and  Engels  were  indeed  the  first 
to  apply  dialectic  materialism  most  perfectly  to  economics 
and  history,  but  only  so  far  as  the  horizon  of  their  his- 
torical materialism  permitted.  Joseph  Dietzgen,  on  the 
other  hand,  did  not  only  discover  the  dialectics  of  histori- 
cal materialism  as  a  social  science  independently  of  Marx 
and  Engels,  a  fact  which  Engels  frankly  acknowledged, 
but  he  also  solved  the  problem  of  cognition,  he  revealed 
the  essence  of  the  human  faculty  of  thought  and  was 
thereby  enabled  to  arrive  at  a  perfect  dialectic  concilia- 
tion of  the  simultaneous  and  successive  movements  of  the 
world  process  and  historical  process. 

Let  us  sum  up  the  salient  points  of  Dietzgen 's  position 
as  we  did  those  of  Labriola : 

' '  If  we  could  place  the  general  work  of  thinking  on  a 
scientific  basis,  if  we  could  find  a  theory  of  general 
thought,  if  we  were  able  to  discover  the  means  by  which 
reason  arrives  at  understanding,  if  we  could  develop  a 
method  by  which  truth  is  produced  scientifically,  then 
we  should  acquire  for  science  in  general,  and  for  our  in- 
dividual faculty  of  judgment,  the  same  certainty  of 
success  which  we  already  possess  in  special  fields  of 
science."  (The  Nature  of  Human  Brain  Work,  p.  48) . . . 
The  general  sciences  are  at  variance  with  one  another 
because  they  lack  the  touchstone  of  "a  conscious  theory 
of  understanding."  (P.  50.) . .  ."Whoever  knows  the  gen- 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  239 

eral  rule  by  which  error  may  be  distinguished  from 
truth,  and  knows  it  as  well  as  the  rule  in  grammar  by 
which  a  noun  is  distinguished  from  a  verb,  will  be  able 
to  distinguish  in  both  cases  with  equal  certainty."  (P.  50) 
. . .  Reason,  or  the  faculty  of  thought  is,  in  the  first  place, 
"not  a  mystical  object  which  produces  the  individual 
thought.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  a  fact  that  certain  indi- 
vidual thoughts  are  the  products  of  perceptions  gained 
in  contact  with  certain  objects,  and  that  these  in  connec- 
tion with  certain  brain  processes  produce  the  concept  of 
reason."  (P.  69) ..  ."Thinking  is  a  physical  process  and 
it  cannot  exist  or  produce  anything  without  materials 
any  more  than  any  other  process  of  labor."  (P.  74) . . . 
The  object  and  the  concept  of  the  object  are  two  separate 
things,  but  both  are  natural  things.  The  one  exists  as  a 
tangible  fact,  the  other  as  a  reflex  of  that  fact.  So  are 
the  faculty  of  thought  and  our  thought  about  it  two 
separate  things.  The  one  is  the  instrument,  the  other 
its  product.  In  order  to  understand  its  own  nature,  the 
faculty  of  thought  proceeds  in  the  same  way  that  it  does 
in  seeking  to  understand  other  things.  It  thinks  about 
itself  as  it  does  about  other  natural  objects.  "The 
development  of  the  general  out  of  the  concrete  constitutes 
the  general  method  by  which  reason  arrives  at  under- 
standing." "P.  74)... It  pursues  the  same  method  in 
arriving  at  an  understanding  about  itself.  "The 
'world  itself  is  nothing  but  the  sum  total  of  its  pheno- 
mena. The  same  holds  good  of  that  part  of  the  world 
phenomena  which  we  call  reason,  spirit,  faculty  of 
thought.  Although  we  distinguish  between  the  faculty 
of  thought  and  its  phenomena  or  manifestations,  yet  the 
faculty  of  thought  'itself,'  or  'pure'  reason,  exists  in 


240  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

reality  only  in  the  sum  total  of  its  manifestations."  (P. 
76)... "The  faculty  of  thought  practically  exists  only 
in  the  sum  total  of  our  thoughts. . .  These  thoughts,  this 
practical  reason,  serve  as  the  material  out  of  which  our 
brain  manufactures  the  concept  of  'pure'  reason."  (P. 
76) ..  ."Consciousness,  the  word  indicates,  is  the  knowl- 
edge of  being  in  existence.  It  is  a  form,  or  a  quality, 
of  existence,  which  differs  from  other  forms  of  be- 
ing in  that  it  is  aware  of  its  existence."  (P.  78)... 
"The  idealist  conception  that  there  is  an  abstract  nature 
behind  phenomena  which  materializes  itself  in  them  is 
refuted  by  the  understanding  that  this  hidden  nature 
does  not  dwell  in  the  world  outside  of  the  human  mind, 
but  in  the  brain  of  man.  But  since  this  brain  difleren- 
tiates  between  phenomena  and  their  nature,  between  the 
concrete  and  the  general,  only  by  means  of  sense  percep- 
tions, it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  distinction  between 
phenomena  and  their  nature  is  well  founded;  only,  the 
essential  nature  of  things  is  materially  existent,  and  our 
faculty  of  thought  is  a  real  and  natural  one."  (P.  86) ... 
"It  is  true  of  spiritual  things  as  well  as  of  physical 
things. .  .that  they  are  what  they  are,  not  'in  them- 
selves,' not  in  their  abstract  nature,  but  in  contact  with 
other  things,  in  reality."  (P.  86) . .  .Hence  things  must 
he  conceived  dialectically,  first,  as  being  in  touch  with 
one  another  and  existing  only  through  their  universal 
interrelation  side  by  side,  and  secondly,  as  following  in 
succession  one  out  of  another.  They  are  mutually  causes 
and  effects,  simultaneously  in  space  and  successively  in 
time.  They  are  inseparable,  whether  seen  in  the  past, 
the  present,  or  the  future.  Matter  and  mind,  matter  and 
force,  are  only  different  names  for  interrelated  things 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  241 

and  their  phenomena.  The  essential  point  is  not  that 
one  thing  is  first,  another  last,  although  such  a  distinction 
is  valid  enough.  The  main  point  is  that  the  one  cannot 
be  without  the  other  nor  without  the  universal  inter- 
relation .  .  . "  In  short,  the  world  consists  only  in  its  inter- 
relations. Anything  that  is  torn  out  of  its  relations  with 
the  world  ceases  to  exist.  A  thing  is  anything  'in  itself' 
only  because  it  is  something  for  other  thingr,,  by  acting 
or  appearing  in  connection  with  something  else. "... 
"Truth  itself  is  the  universe,  the  infinite  and  inexhausti- 
ble." (Letters  on  Logic,  p.  202) . .  ."Thought,  intellect, 
are  really  existing,  and  their  existence  is  a  uniform  part 
of  the  universal  existence.  That  is  the  cardinal  point 
of  sober  logic."  (P.  195) . .  ."Special  truths  enlighten  the 
intellect.  But  the  understanding  that  all  specialties  are 
connected  with  one  another  by  one  monad,  or  unit,  which 
is  truth  itself,  gives  us  a  certain  general  enlightenment 
which  certainly  does  not  render  any  special  research 
unnecessary,  or  take  the  place  of  it,  but  which  may  well 
serve  as  the  foundation  of  all  research,  which  may  there- 
fore be  called  'a  fundamental  assistance.'  "  (P.  207) . . . 
"Kant  has  demonstrated  that  the  truth  in  general  is  as 
much  a  matter  of  experience  as  the  brain  with  which  we 
search  for  it.  He  has  shown  beyond  a  doubt  that  our 
eyes  and  ears  are  inseparably  connected  with  our  mind 
and  with  the  whole  cosmic  truth.  But  the  persistent 
spirit  of  transcendentalism,  or  what  is  the  same  thing, 
the  traditional  belief  in  a  transcendental  spirit,  has  led 
him  to  grant  a  mysterious  existence  alongside  of,  or 
above,  the  human  mind,  alongside  of,  or  above,  the 
cosmic  truth,  to  an  incomprehensible  monster  spirit  and 
to  a  phantastical  hyper-truth."  (P.  223) . .  ."The  truth 


242  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

which  is  the  universe,  the  cosmic  or  universal  truth,  will 
reveal  to  you  the  absurdity  of  abnormal  humility  which 
is  contained  in  the  dualistic  doctrine  of  two  minds .  . .  All 
intellects  partake  of  the  nature  of  the  general  intellect, 
and  no  intellect  can  step  above  or  below  this  general 
nature  without  losing  sense  or  reason."  (P.  224) . .  ."All 
things  are  one  thing,  are  interdependent,  stand  in  rela- 
tion of  cause  and  effect  to  one  another ...  To  say  that  all 
things  have  a  cause  means  that  they  have  a  mother.  The 
fact  that  every  mother  has  a  mother  finds  its  final  ending 
in  the  world  mother,  or  mother  world,  which  is  absolute 
and  motherless,  and  contains  all  mothers  in  its  womb .  . . 
All  things  have  a  mother,  but  to  expect  that  the  world 
mother  should  logically  have  a  mother  is  to  carry  logic 
to  extremities  and  to  misunderstand  the  intellect  and  its 
art  of  reasoning."  (P.  268) . .  ."In  order  to  differentiate 
logically,  we  must  know  that  everything  is  everything, 
that  the  universe  or  absolute  is  its  own  cause  and  the 
final  cause  of  everything,  which  embraces  all  distinctions, 
even  that  of  causality  and  that  between  mind  and  mat- 
ter." (P.  283) . .  /'Understand  that  everything  is  dialect- 
ically  interrelated,  that  the  infinite,  eternal,  divine,  can 
live  only  in  the  finite  special  things,  and  that  on  the 
other  hand,  the  parts  of  the  world  can  exist  only  in  the 
absolute"  (P.  323),  which  is  the  natural  universe  and 
has  no  other  universe  above  or  below  it ..."  It  is  this 
two-fold  nature  of  the  universe,  this  being  at  the  same 
time  limited  and  unlimited,  the  reflection  of  its  eternal 
essence  and  eternal  truth  in  changing  phenomena,  which 
has  rendered  its  understanding  very  difficult  for  the 
human  mind .  . .  The  positive  outcome  of  philosophy  is 
the  knowledge  of  the  monistic  way  in  which  the  duality 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  243 

of  the  universe  is  active  in  the  human  understanding." 
(The  Positive  Outcome  of  Philosophy,  p.  342.) 

A  simple  comparison  of  these  two  summaries  reveals 
at  a  glance  their  characteristic  theoretical  difference. 
Historical  materialism  takes  its  departure  from  human 
society,  dialectic  monism  from  the  natural  universe. 
This  leads  to  important  practical  differences. 

We  have  seen  that  Labriola  admits  that  historical 
materialism  as  a  mere  interpretation  of  social  evolution 
does  not  fully  overcome  metaphysics  as  a  theory  of  cog- 
nition. At  the  same  time  he  claims  that  historical  mater- 
ialism gives  the  last  blow  to  all  forms  of  that  idealism 
which  regards  things  as  mere  reflexes,  etc.,  of  so-called 
a  priori  thought,  and  of  bourgeois  materialism  (Socialism 
and  Philosophy,  p.  60). 

Here  we  take  issue  with  Labriola.  If  historical  mater- 
ialism does  not  eliminate  metaphysics  from  the  theory  of 
cognition,  neither  can  it  give  the  last  blow  to  all  systems 
of  metaphysical  idealism  and  materialism.  Without  a 
monistic  theory  of  cognition,  historical  materialism,  is 
imperfect  and  itself  retains  some  elements  of  meta- 
physics. Neither  can  historical  materialism  be  perfectly 
dialectic  without  a  dialectic  theory  of  cognition.  This 
is  shown  by  the  works  of  Marx  and  Engels  and  of 
their  most  prominent  interpreters.  It  is  shown  every 
day  in  the  activity  of  the  various  Socialist  Parties.  Un- 
consciously, the  great  majority  of  the  socialists  still  prove 
that  class-consciousness  without  dialectic  world-conscious- 
ness remains  metaphysical  and  unscientific.  Labriola  is 
no  exception  to  this  rule. 

Under  these  circumstances  we  wish  to  modify  Labrio- 
la 's  statement  that  Marx  accomplished  most  perfectly 


244  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

the  amalgamation  of  philosophy  and  science.  Marx  was 
the  first  to  make  a  conscious  step  in  this  direction.  But 
he  could  not  come  to  perfection  in  this  until  the  theory 
of  cognition  had  found  its  dialectic  solution.  We  must 
not  attribute  to  Marx  what  was  historically  impossible 
for  him.  Otherwise  we  should  commit  a  violation  of 
dialectics  and  of  historical  materialism  itself. 

A  glance  at  the  works  of  Marx  and  Engels  with  a  view 
of  testing  them  on  this  point  will  easily  reveal  the  cor- 
rectness of  our  claims.  Space  forbids  its  detailed  sub- 
stantiation by  quotations  from  these  works  at  this  junc- 
ture. But  our  claim  can  be  easily  verified.  In  place  of 
particular  quotations,  I  shall  here  content  myself  with 
pointing  to  the  following  undeniable  facts : 

1)  According  to  the  confession  of  Engels,  he  and  Marx 
frequently  laid  excessive  stress  upon  the  importance  of 
the  economic  basis  of  society  as  a  clue  to  changes  in  the 
ideological  superstructure.     This  led  especially  some  of 
their  followers  to  a  neglect  of  the  other  elements  entering 
into  the  problems  of  historical  materialism.    One  of  the 
most  common  mistakes  resulting  from  this  misunder- 
standing was  an  underestimation  of  the  influence  of  ideas 
on  social  evolution. 

2)  The  imperfect  theoretical  foundation  of  dialectic 
thought  and  the  insufficient  assimilation  of  dialectics 
showed  itself,  furthermore,  in  the  fact  that  Marx  himself 
did  not  always  find  the  historically  correct  solution  for 
the  theoretical  evaluation  of  practical  facts.     See,  for 
instance,  his  critique  of  the  Gotha  program  of  1875.  This 
critique  was  justified  enough  from  the  abstract  theoret- 
ical point  of  view,  but  entirely  overlooked  the  fact  that 
the  Gotha  program  had  to  be  drafted  under  conditions 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  245 

to  which  this  abstract  yardstick  could  not  be  applied 
offhand. 

3)  Mehring  shows  in  his  commentaries  to  Aus  Dem 
Literarischen    Nachlass,    etc.,    that    Marx    and    Engels 
not    unf requently    overshot    the    mark    in    their    con- 
troversies with  their   antagonists,  when  they  tried  to 
apply  their  theoretical   conclusions  to  practical   facts, 
such  as  the  Ten  Hours  Bill  in  England.    History  subse- 
quently corrected  their  views  upon  this  and  similar  ques- 
tions.   This  is  not  due  merely  to  the  natural  inefficiency 
that  goes  with  the  first  handling  of  a  new  instrument, 
but  also  to  the  inadequacy  of  limited  historical  mater- 
ialism itself. 

4)  By  underrating  the  dialectic  interrelations  between 
simultaneously  existing  things  and  overrating  the  revolu- 
tionary trend   of   successive    interrelations,   Marx   and 
Engels  were  led  to  a  wrong  estimate  of  the  speed  of  social 
evolution.*      In    the    Communist    Manifesto    they    ex- 
pected  that   the   proletarian   revolution    would    follow 
immediately  after  the  bourgeois  revolution.    In  his  pre- 
face to  the  first  German  edition  of  Capital  in  1897, 
Marx  still  referred  approvingly  to  remarks  of  bourgeois 
thinkers  concerning  an  imminent  radical  change  in  the 
relations  between  Capital  and  Labor.    And  even  as  late 
as  1886,  Engels  awaited  a  speedy  collapse  of  the  capitalist 
system.    Similar  sanguine  expectations  were  nursed  by 
other  prominent  German  socialists,  and  to  this  day  we 
meet   occasionally  with   well   informed'  comrades   who 
harbor  such  expectations. 

The  numerous  controversies  still   carried   on   in   ail 

*See  Eugene  Dietzgen,  Der  wissenschaftHche  Soziallsmus  und 
J.  Dletzgen's  Erkenntnisstheorie.  Neue  Zeit,  XXII;  1,  No.  8, 
page  231. 


246  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

Socialist  parties  over  formal  problems  of  historical  ma- 
terialism or  practical  problems  of  tactics  all  bear  the 
imprint  of  those  early  imperfections  of  historical  mater- 
ialism. The  period  of  the  after-effects  of  those  imper- 
fections is  not  yet  over. 

The  use  of  the  historical  method  of  Marx  must  be 
learned,  like  the  use  of  any  other  instrument.  And  only 
by  frequent  sharpening  can  this  instrument  be  kept 
effective.  One  generation,  or  one  human  life,  is  not 
sufficient  to  convert  the  Marxian  theories  into  flesh  and 
blood.  Neither  will  Dietzgen's  dialectic  materialism  be 
fully  assimilated  by  the  present  generation  of  Marxian 
thinkers.  Socialists  will  become  skilled  in  the  use  of 
these  instruments  only  as  one  generation  after  another 
becomes  more  and  more  imbued  with  them.  And  even 
the  best  assimilation  of  Dietzgen's  dialectics  will  not 
prevent  socialists  from  occasionally  forming  wrong  esti- 
mates of  things  in  the  making.  But  Dietzgen's  theory 
of  cognition  will  certainly  insure  a  more  dialectic  appli- 
cation of  historical  materialism. 

Labriola  quite  naturally  shows  the  historical  short- 
comings of  strict  Marxism.  I  repeat,  this  is  not  said  in 
the  spirit  of  disparagement.  It  is  merely  explained  as  a 
natural  fact.  It  is  not  only  a  proof  of  his  insufficient 
assimilation  of  historical  materialism,  but  also  a  further 
evidence  of  the  inadequacy  of  limited  historical  material- 
ism to  produce  a  consistently  dialectic  thought.* 

*Of  course,  It  will  be  difficult  to  decide  in  every  individual 
case,  to  what  extent  the  blame  for  certain  mistakes  rests  with 
the  method,  and  to  what  extent  it  rests  with  an  imperfect 
understanding  or  wrong  application  of  that  method  by  some 
Individual.  I  cannot  enter  into  such  an  analysis  here.  The 
thing  which  decides  here  is  the  recurrence  of  the  same  pheno- 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  247 

Take  for  instance  one  of  the  most  flagrant  illustrations 
of  anti-dialectic  language  in  Labriola 's  essays.  In  his 
essay  In  Memory  of  the  Communist  Manifesto,  he 
says:  "There  are  really  no  historic  experiences  but 
those  that  history  makes  itself.  It  is  as  impossible 
to  foresee  them  as  it  is  to  plan  them  beforehand 
or  to  make  them  to  order"  (P.  11).  In  unreconciled 
contradiction  to  this  statement,  we  read  on  page  10  that 
we  can  show  by  the  present  necessity  of  Socialism  ''the 
inevitability  of  its  triumph."  On  page  13  we  read  that 
Marx  and  Engels  had  "anticipated  the  events  which  had 
occurred"  and  that  they  had  "an  eye  only  to  the 
future."  On  page  16  we  read  that  the  Manifesto  gives 
the  genesis  of  the  class-struggle, ' '  details  its  evolutionary 
rhythm,  and  predicts  its  final  result."  And  so  forth 
throughout  the  book.  It  is  evident  that  Labriola  had 
in  mind  to  say  that  we  cannot  fully  foresee  historical 
events  in  all  their  details,  but  that  historical  materialism 
at  least  enables  us  to  foresee  the  general  trend  of  events 
and  to  organize  ourselves  accordingly,  and  that  our 
ability  so  to  organize  ourselves  is  an  experience  produced 
by  history  itself.  But  he  states  this  in  such  a  form  that 
it  becomes  a  contradiction,  which  lacks  a  dialectic  connec- 
tion.* The  sole  purpose  of  science  is  to  supply  us  with 
the  means  to  act  with  a  predetermination  of  success,  and 

mena,  which  appear  on  an  average  among  the  majority  of  strict 
Marxians.  And  only  from  this  point  of  view  must  the  following 
remarks  about  Labriola  be  judged. 

*This  manner  of  thinking,  which  first  lays  stress  onesidedly 
upon  one  side  of  a  question  and  then  after  a  while  sketches  its 
other  side  equally  onesidedly,  forgetting  their  mutual  connec- 
tions, is  typical  of  bourgeois  metaphysics.  But  it  has  left  its 
traces  also  in  historical  materialism  and  thereby  has  done 
much  harm. 


248  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

historical  materialism  fulfills  this  purpose  only  to  the 
extent  that  it  permits  us  to  forecast  the  trend  of  history 
in  general  and  apply  this  general  forecast  to  a  specific 
circle  of  particular  cases. 

Labriola  is  forcibly  reminded  of  the  inadequacy  of 
historical  materialism  to  overcome  metaphysical  thought 
on  the  field  of  economics  and  history,  by  the  fate  of  his 
friends  Sorel  and  Croce.  Both  of  these  men  first  became 
enthusiastic  supporters  of  historical  materialism,  and 
great  admirers  of  Labriola.  But  they  quickly  relapsed 
into  metaphysical  economics  and  history  and  compelled 
Labriola  to  disavow  them.  (Socialism  and  Philosophy.) 
They  lacked  the  backing  of  a  dialectic  theory  of  cogni- 
tion, which  would  have  made  such  a  relapse  into  meta- 
physics impossible. 

Labriola  himself  illustrates  how  easily  an  excessive 
emphasis  on  particular  points  and  a  consequent  under- 
rating of  other  points  leads  to  anti-dialectic  results,  in 
his  critique  of  Enrico  Ferri's  Socialism  and  Modern 
Science.  Ferri  showed  in  this  work  that  Darwin's 
theory  of  natural  selection  and  Spencer's  theory  of 
organic  evolution  supplement  the  Marxian  theory  of 
social  evolution,  and  that  the  organic  development  of  the 
universe  together  with  the  biological  development  of  man 
form  the  natural  basis  of  the  historical  evolution  of 
human  tools  and  modes  of  production.  He  had  thus 
given  a  monistically  comprehensive  presentation  of  the 
organic  and  social  process  of  development.  Labriola 's 
critique,  however,  leaves  the  impression  that  Ferri  tried 
to  make  Darwinism  and  Spencerianism  the  basis  of 
Marxism,  in  other  words,  that  Ferri  tried  to  make  of 
Marxism  a  derivative  of  Darwinism  and  Spencerianism. 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  249 

But  this  is  not  a  fact.  Such  an  idea  could  arise  in 
Labriola's  mind  only  through  a  misapprehension  of  the 
position  of  Marxism  toward  the  other  sciences,  or 
through  a  misinterpretation  of  Ferri's  views.  Ferri 
merely  shows  the  natural  analogy  between  these  three 
theories  and  points  out  that  they  supplement  one 
another  monistically.  He  makes  quite  a  clear  distinction 
between  Spencer  as  a  scientist  and  Spencer  as  a 
bourgeois  philosopher  and  individualist.  And  on  the" 
last  score,  Ferri  criticises  Spencer  quite  as  severely  as 
Labriola  himself  does. 

It  is  true,  Ferri  made  the  mistake  of  taking  a  some- 
what uncertain  position  on  the  question  of  the  social 
equality  of  the  sexes.  His  studies  in  criminal  anthropo- 
logy had  led  him  to  the  conclusion  that  women  are  natur- 
ally the  mental  inferiors  of  men.  And  instead  .of 
demanding  equal  social  and  political  rights  for  women 
with  men,  he  took  the  anti-Marxian  and  anti-dialectic 
position  of  demanding  only  better  conditions  of  life  for 
them.  He  did  not  give  sufficient  thought  to  the  proba- 
bility that  the  biological  inferiority  of  women  may  not  be 
an  absolute  consequence  of  natural  selection,  but  mainly 
due  to  the  economic  oppression  from  which  women  have 
suffered  under  class  rule.  Whether  they  will  be  physic- 
ally and  mentally  inferior  to  men  when  both  sexes  shall 
have  had  as  many  centuries  of  economic  and  political 
equality  as  they  have  had  of  inequality,  remains  to  be 
seen.  Under  a  socialist  equality  it  is  certain  that  labor- 
power  in  general  and  motherhood  in  particular  will  be 
appreciated  more  dialectically  at  their  social  value  than 
is  practical  under  class-rule.  Therefore  we  declare  that 


250  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

the  alleged  physical  inferiority  of  women  is  no  more  a 
reason  to  deny  them  equal  rights  with  men  than  the 
increasing  physical  deterioration  of  both  sexes  among 
proletarians  is  a  justification  for  the  class  rule  of  the 
better  fed  bourgeoisie. 

The  real  difference  between  the  points  of  view  of 
Labriola  and  Ferri  is  due  to  their  different  individual 
development.  Labriola  developed  from  Hegelianism 
straight  into  historical  materialism,  the  same  as  Marx 
and  Engels.  Ferri,  on  the  other  hand,  came  into  Socialism 
by  way  of  Darwinism  and  Spencerianism,  in  other  words, 
he  drew  from  Darwinism  and  Spencerianism  the  obvious 
social  conclusions  which  their  founders  had  refused  to 
draw.  In  this  Ferri  made  quite  as  revolutionary  a  step 
as  Marx  and  Engels  did  by  drawing  the  obvious  natural 
conclusions  from  Hegel's  dialectics.  Labriola,  instead  of 
appreciating  this,  and  realizing  that  we  cannot  all  come 
into  Socialism  by  the  Hegelian  route,  objects  to  Ferri 's 
appreciation  of  the  merits  of  Darwin  and  Spencer  as 
teachers  of  dialectic  thought.  But  Ferri  has  quite  as 
much  right  to  pay  his  historical  debts  to  Darwin  and 
Spencer  as  Labriola  has  to  pay  his  to  Hegel.  It  is  true, 
that  scientific  Socialism  is  intimately  connected  with 
Hegel,  but  only  because  its  founders  were  Germans.  This 
does  not  in  the  least  prove,  that  Darwinism  and  Spencer- 
ianism do  not  lead  to  Socialism.  The  fact  remains  that 
they  do,  and  Ferri 's  great  merit  is  to  have  proclaimed 
this  freely  and  proved  it.  In  this  respect,  Ferri 's  work 
is  quite  as  significant  for  Italy  as  Bebel's  position  on 
Darwinism  is  for  Germany. 

So  far  as  Ferri  falls  short  of  a  perfect  dialectic  presen- 
tation of  facts,  he  shares  this  shortcoming  with  Labriola 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  251 

and  most  of  the  other  Marxians,  forvthe  simple  reason 
that  they  are  not  familiar  with  Dietzgen'.s  theory  of 
cognition.* 

From  his  point  of  view  as  a  strict  Marxian,  Labriola 
is  quite  within  the  limits  of  historical  materialism,  when 
he  modestly  dismisses  the  question  whether  the  "people 
of  the  future . . .  will  still  produce  any  religion  or  not. ' ' 
It  is  also  quite  consistent  with  this  position  that  he  doubts 
whether  "the  whole  theory  in  its  intimate  bearings,  or 
the  whole  theory  in  its  entirety,  that  is,  as  a  philosophy, ' ' 
will  ever  become  ' '  one  of  the  articles  of  universal  popular 
culture."  (Socialism  and  Philosophy,  p.  14.)  But  from 
the  point  of  view  of  proletarian  monism,  we  are  out- 
spoken in  claiming  definitely  that  metaphysical  theology 
and  philosophy  will  give  way  to  dialectic  monism  as  a 
conception  of  the  world  and  life.  Of  course,  we  agree 
with  Labriola,  that  there  will  hardly  ever  be  a  time  when 
all  human  beings  will  be  consistent  materialist  monists. 
And  we  do  not  at  all  claim  that  even  those  who  fully 
assimilate  proletarian  monism  will  never  make  any  mis- 
takes. No  single  man  will  ever  become  omniscient.  But 

*It  goes  without  saying  that  my  critique  of  strict  Marxism 
applies  with  still  greater  force  to  revisionism,  neo-Marxism, 
and  other  eclectic  forms  of  old  and  new  socialism,  which  are 
more  or  less  indifferent  to  historical  materialism.  But  this 
does  not  mean  that  I  am  trying  to  pose  as  an  impartial  judge. 
I  could  not  be  impartial  if  I  tried  to  be.  Every  science  takes 
sides  for  some  definite  knowledge,  and  every  man  is  consciously 
or  unconsciously  a  partisan  of  a  definite  cause.  I  am  a  partisan 
of  strict  Marxism,  and  I  work  in  the  United  States  along  the 
lines  which  Bebel,  Kautsky,  Mehring,  and  others,  follow  in 
Germany.  In  other  words,  theoretically  I  stand  on  the  ground 
of  the  class-struggle,  tactically  I  am  in  favor  of  the  tried  "good 
old  tactics,"  which  uses  parliamentarism  more  for  the  political 
education  of  the  working  class,  than  for  offering  principles  in 
exchange  for  minister's  chairs,  vice-presidential  honors,  etc., 
under  a  capitalist  government. 


252  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

we  claim  positively  that  the  evolution  from  metaphysical 
into  clearly  monistic  thought  is  inseparably  connected 
with  the  evolution  of  the  class-conscious  proletariat,  and 
that  with  the  victory  of  this  proletariat,  proletarian 
monism  will  become  as  much  the  predominant  mode  of 
thought  as  metaphysical  dualism  is  and  has  been  under 
class  rule. 

True  to  his  conception  of  historical  materialism,  La- 
briola  does  not  enter  into  a  discussion  of  the  special 
problems  of  cognition  even  where  his  subject  deals  direct- 
ly with  formal  philosophy,  as  it  does  in  his  Socialism 
and  Philosophy  and  in  his  review  of  Masaryk's 
Grundlagen  des  Marxismus.  Hence  he  cannot  do 
justice  to  the  subject.  From  the  point  of  view  of 
Dietzgen's  theory  of  cognition,  Masarj^k's  work  remains 
to  be  criticised.  Labriola  waves  Masaryk's  philosophical 
arguments  aside  with  a  jest.  Yet  Masaryk's  philosophy 
is  the  very  citadel  of  his  work,  and  a  few  well  aimed 
shots  from  Dietzgen's  arsenal  would  reduce  this  citadel 
to  crumbling  ruins. 

Equally  unsatisfactory  is  Labriola 's  treatment  of  Mas- 
aryk's  idea  of  moral  consciousness.  Masaryk  holds  that 
moral  consciousness  is  an  a  priori  fact.  Labriola  does 
not  think  that  this  deserves  a  serious  reply.  Perhaps  he 
is  right,  so  far  as  Masaryk  is  personally  ccfncerned.  But 
Masaryk  is  for  us  but  a  phenomenon  by  which  we  can 
demonstrate  the  hollowness  of  metaphysical  idealism. 
And  he  is  so  much  more  serviceable  for  this  purpose,  as 
philosophy  is  his  specialty.  It  is  a  pity  that  Labriola's 
unfamiliarity  with  proletarian  monism  prevented  him 
from  giving  Masaryk  a  more  exhaustive  reply.  Even 
historical  materialism  would  have  enabled  Labriola  to 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  253 

do  better  than  to  dismiss  Masaryk  with  the  curt  state- 
ment: "The  author  claims  for  moral  consciousness  the 
privilege  of  an  indisputable  and  first  hand  fact.  I  need 
not  stop  to  declare  that  one  need  not  be  a  historical 
materialist,  nor  even  a  simple  materialist,  in  order  to 
assign  to  such  an  infantile  opinion  a  place  among  the 
fairy  tales."  (P.  215.)  For  in  his  essay  on  Histor- 
ical Materialism  Labriola  says  himself:  "The  moral 
consciousness  which  really  exists  is  an  empirical  fact; 
it  is  an  index  or  a  summary  of  the  relative  ethical 
formation  of  each  individual.  If  there  can  be  in  it 
material  for  science,  this  cannot  explain  the  ethical  rela- 
tions by  means  of  the  conscience,  but  the  very  thing  it 
needs  to  understand  is  how  that  conscience  is  formed." 
(P.  207). 

Yes,  that  is  the  point.  Explain  how  the  moral  con- 
science is  formed  and  what  it  means.  Labriola  does  not 
attempt  to  explain  this,  because  it  exceeds  the  limits  of 
historical  materialism.  So  far  as  historical  materialism 
can  express  itself  on  this  question,  Engels  has  done 
so  in  his  Anti-Dukring :  "One  cannot  discuss  the  ques- 
tion of  morality  and  right,  without  touching  upon  the 
problem  of  the  so-called  free  will,  of  the  accountability 
of  man,  of  the  relation  between  necessity  and  freedom . . . 
Freedom  does  not  consist  in  a  fancied  independence  from 
laws  of  nature,  but  in  the  understanding  of  these  laws, 
and  the  resulting  possiblity  to  make  them  produce 
definite  effects  according  to  our  plans.  Freedom  of  the 
will,  therefore,  signifies  nothing  else  but  the  faculty  of 
making  decisions  in  harmony  with  expert  understanding. 
Freedom .  . .  consists  in  a  control  of  ourselves  and  of 
nature  based  on  an  understanding  of  natural  necessities ; 


254  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

consequently  it  is  necessarily  a  product  of  historical 
development."  (P.  111.) 

These  general  statements,  however,  do  not  constitute 
a  sufficient  solution  of  the  problem  of  the  relatively  free 
will,  any  more  than  the  general  formulation  of  historical 
materialism  is  a  satisfactory  solution  of  the  problem  of 
cognition.  The  will  problem  can  be  completely  solved 
only  by  Dietzgen's  theory  of  cognition.  Dietzgen  him- 
self, however,  did  not  attempt  to  apply  his  dialectic 
monism  to  the  will  problem  in  moral  consciousness.  He 
contented  himself  with  a  monistic  explanation  of  moral- 
ity, without  entering  into  the  will  problem  beyond  the 
general  position  of  historical  materialism.  This  expla- 
nation amounts  in  so  many  words  to  this:  An  under- 
standing of  the  human  faculty  of  thought  reveals  the 
fact  that  absolute  moral  concepts  deduced  from  so-called 
"pure"  reason  are  meaningless  abstractions.  If  we 
understand  that  reason  cannot  arrive  at  understanding 
without  material  objects,  and  that  morality  is  based  on 
common  needs,  then  we  also  realize  that  moral  standards 
are  not  eternal  or  absolute,  but  relative  and  temporary- 
rules  of  conduct  adapted  to  definite  social  stages.* 

The  freedom  of  the  will  is  a  relative  freedom.  So 
much  we  know,  thanks  to  Engels'  general  statement  and 
Dietzgen's  epistemological  confirmation  of  it.  To  what 
extent  the  freedom  of  the  will  is  relative,  and  to  what 
extent  it  must  always  remain  subject  to  absolute  necessi- 
ties, remains  to  be  analyzed.  Karl  Kautsky  has  recently 

*See  chapter  on  "Morality  and  Right"  in  Joseph  Dietzgen's 
Nature  of  Human  Brain  Work. — Also,  Marx  Stirner  and  Joseph 
Dietzgen,  by  Eugene  Dietzgen,  in  Philosophical  Essays  of  J. 
DJetzgen,  where  the  position  of  Engels  on  freedom  and 
necessity  is  explicitly  endorsed  and  supplemented  by  a  dialectic 
theory  of  cognition. 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  255 

made  a  contribution  to  this  subject  in  his  Ethics  and  the 
Materialist  Conception  of  History.  A  dialectic  critique 
of  this  work  has  not  yet  been  published.  And  this  is  not 
the  place  to  undertake  it. 

At  any  rate,  if  we  were  asked  to  reply  to  Masaryk's 
assertion  that  moral  consciousness  is  a  metaphysical 
entity,  we  should  tell  him:  "Moral  consciousness  is  in- 
deed an  indisputable  fact,  as  you  say.  But  it  is  not  an 
a  priori  fact.  It  is  is  not  an  eternal,  unchangeable,  super- 
natural entity  which  expresses  itself  in  moral  conscious- 
ness. Your  metaphysical  ethics  and  moral  codes  are 
flotsam  and  jetsam  on  the  high  seas  of  age-long  class- 
struggles.  They  are  but  mental  images  of  practical  needs 
moulded  into  meaningless  abstractions.  They  have  no 
practical  power,  because  they  have  always  been  inapplica- 
ble under  the  prevailing  conditions.  They  have  floated 
in  the  air  just  as  your  metaphysical  ideas  have.  What 
men  hear  when  they  listen  to  the  voice  of  what  they  call 
their  moral  conscience  is  but  the  primeval  voice  of 
natural  needs  modified  by  social  conditions.  And  the 
fantastic  veil  which  the  metaphysical  theologians  and 
philosophers  have  thrown  over  these  needs  has  rendered 
their  voice  well-nigh  unintelligible  to  mankind.  The 
hand  of  the  class-conscious  proletariat  tears  this  fan- 
tastic veil  aside.  Then  it  becomes  evident  that  human 
consciousness,  and  also  that  part  of  it  which  is  called 
moral  conscience,  is  a  product  of  cosmic,  telluric,  physio- 
logical and  social  evolution.  Experiences  of  millions  of 
years  of  development  have  become  firmly  impressed  in 
the  physiological  and  psychic  make-up  of  men.  Some  of 
these  impressions  have  become  solidified  in  physiological 
structures.  Others  are  still  in  the  plastic  stage.  Others 


256 

are  as  yet  mere  vague  ideas.  Proletarian  class-conscious- 
ness gives  to  the  working  class  a  new  social  standard  by 
which  to  measure  the  moral  value  of  their  actions  and 
ideals.  The  first  demand  of  this  revolutionary  ethics  is : 
Working  men  of  all  countries,  unite  for  the  overthrow 
of  class  rule  and  the  organization  of  an  environment  in 
which  all  human  beings  shall  be  able  to  secure  the  natural 
requirements  for  their  normal  physiological  and  psycho- 
logical development.  Only  then  will  they  be  able  to 
adapt  themselves  consciously  to  the  understood  require- 
ments of  a  scientific  morality.  This  will  not  be  an  eternal 
morality,  any  more  than  others  before  it  were.  For  the 
present,  the  immediate  demands  of  the  new  proletarian 
ethics  are  the  following:  The  abolition  of  all  economic, 
political,  and  intellectual  oppression ;  a  reduction  of  the 
struggle  for  the  material  requirements  of  life  to  a  min- 
imum by  a  collective  control  of  productive  processes ;  an 
understanding  of  cosmic,  social,  and  individual  evolu- 
tion; sexual  selection  of  evolutionary  natures;  and  a 
control  of  self  in  accord  with  the  requirements  of  uni- 
versal evolution  through  the  fulfillment  of  the  preceding 
conditions.*  Every  one  of  these  demands  is  opposed  to 
bourgeois  ethics  and  to  the  fundamental  laws  of  bour- 
geois society.  Therefore  our  ethics  are  revolutionary  and 
nothing  but  the  proletarian  class-struggle  can  and  will 
realize  this  proletarian  ideal.  This  class-struggle  is 
under  way  and  nearing  its  climax.  Your  metaphysical 
and  eternal  a  priori  moral  conscience  will  find  a  very 
sober  and  prosaic  end.  What  are  you  going  to  do  about 
it,  Mr.  Masaryk?" 


•See  my  Science  and  Revolution,  page  191. 


SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY  257 

A  perfect  assimilation  and  application  of  our  insight 
into  the  nature  of  the  human  faculty  of  thought,  its 
dialectic  interrelation  with  the  historical  process,  and  the 
practical  significance  of  the  understood  relative  freedom 
of  our  wills,  carries  with  it  a  scientific  broadening  of 
historical  materialism  and  an  elimination  of  much  fric- 
tion from  our  daily  party  life.  For  the  present,  this 
assimilation  and  practical  application  of  the  theoretical 
achievements  of  proletarian  thinkers  remain  a  consum- 
mation to  be  devoutly  wished  for.  This  is  due,  aside 
from  the  above-mentioned  shortcomings  of  historical 
materialism,  to  the  fact  that  the  growth  and  assimilation 
of  ideas  is  itself  a  historical  process,  and  that  the  spread 
of  proletarian  ideas  is  strongly  checked  by  capitalist 
environment,  which  casts  its  shadows  far  into  our  prole- 
tarian thought  life.  But  if  our  proletarian  consciousness 
cannot  fully  expand  and  express  itself  under  a  capitalist 
environment,  we  find  at  least  a  wide  field  for  the  prac- 
tical application  of  our  historical  materialism  and  prole- 
tarian monism  in  our  various  organizations  and  our  inter- 
course with  comrades.  It  is  here  that  we  should  more 
than  heretofore  practice  what  we  preach  and  eliminate 
as  much  as  possible  the  survivals  of  anti-dialectic 
thought. 

We  want  to  give  full  recognition  to  the  overwhelming 
importance  of  the  economic  basis  as  a  clue  to  the  mental 
life  and  social  superstructures  of  the  various  historical 
epochs.  But  at  the  same  time,  we  also  want  to  give  due 
recognition  to  the  telluric,  biological,  and  cosmic  factors 
which  shape  our  physiology  and  psychology,  and  without 
which  the  historical  process  remains  unintelligible.  We 
don't  want  to  deduce  the  principles  of  social  evolution 


258  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

from  the  principles  of  Darwinism  or  Spencerianism,  bir 
we  do  want  to  apply  the  inductive  method  of  materialist 
dialectics  to  all  sciences,  and  utilize  the  results  of  special 
research  for  a  general  understanding  of  the  universe, 
society,  and  the  individual.  We  want  to  distinguish 
clearly  between  economic  and  other  historical  facts, 
between  a  scientific  presentation  of  economic  and  polit- 
ical facts  and  an  appeal  to  ethic  or  aesthetic  sentiments. 
But  at  the  same  time  we  want  to  realize  that  moral 
standards,  ethic  and  aesthetic  feelings  are  likewise 
historical  facts,  even  when  they  are  under  the  influence 
of  vague  and  meaningless  concepts.  What  we  have 
to  do  is  to  place  ethic  and  esthetic  sentiments  on  a 
solid  scientific  basis,  and  for  the  proletariat  this  basis  is 
the  class-struggle,  the  materialist  conception  of  history, 
and  Dietzgen's  theory  of  cognition.  But  an  implacable 
separation  of  scientific  argument  from  appeal  to  senti- 
ment is  a  violation  of  the  dialectic  method.  Both  things 
belong  together. 

We  want  to  insist  on  a  full  understanding  of  scientific 
Socialism  and  keep  the  proletarian  movement  on  the  safe 
path  of  revolutionary  tactics  and  aims.  But  we  also 
want  to  realize  that  all  sorts  of  eclectic  Socialism,  such 
as  sentimental,  Christian,  revisionist,  impossibilist  Social- 
ism, are  natural  products  of  proletarian  evolution,  which 
we  should  educate  and  assimilate,  if  possible,  instead  of 
straightway  combating  or  isolating  them.  We  want  a 
clean  line  of  cleavage  between  proletarian  thought  and 
bourgeois  thought.  But  we  also  want  to  realize  that  this 
is  merely  a  formal  cleavage,  that  these  two  flow  into  one 
another  imperceptibly  in  real  life,  and  cannot  be  cut 


SOCIALISM   AND   PHILOSOPHY  259 

asunder  as  by  a  knife.     Their  separation  must  not  be 
carried  to  the  point  of  excess  and  meaninglessness.* 

The  Socialist  Party  must  remain  a  revolutionary 
party,  aye,  it  must  become  more  revolutionary  to  the 
extent  that  Capitalism  approaches  the  critical  period  of 
transition  into  Socialism.  But  the  Socialist  Party  must 
also  be  a  conservative  party  in  the  sense  that  it  must 
preserve  the  historical  progress  of  the  bourgeoisie  against 
the  reactionary  aims  of  the  bourgeoisie  itself.  In  order 
to  accomplish  this,  the  Socialist  Party  must  know  how 
to  reconcile  its  revolutionary  class-struggle  tactics  with 
the  opportunist  requirements  of  its  every  day  activity 
under  Capitalism.  We  must  not  carry  opportunism  to 
the  point  of  abandoning  our  class-struggle  position  for 
the  sake  of  insignificant  palliatives  or  a  handful  of 
doubtful  votes.  But  neither  must  we  distort  the  class- 
struggle  into  a  meaningless  catchword  or  a  sterile  isola- 
tion from  all  present  day  activity.  We  want  to  insist  on 
the  intelligent  use  of  the  ballot.  We  want  to  extend  the 
electoral  franchise  to  both  sexes  and  free  it  from  all 
reactionary  interference.  But  we  don 't  want  to  make  a 

*Mark  well  that  I  am  speaking  of  a  dialectic  correlation, 
not  of  a  sentimental  conciliation.  This  correlation  may  signify 
a  peaceful  development  side  by  side,  or  a  struggle  for  suprem- 
acy without  co-operation.  So  far  as  the  modern  socialist  move- 
ment is  concerned,  the  class-struggle  is  the  decisive  test  in 
this  correlation.  Impossibilism  and  revisionism  may,  as  a  rule, 
exist  within  the  Socialist  Party,  and  co-operate  with  Marxism 
on  the  same  basis  for  their  common  aims.  Whether  these 
tendencies  shall  be  tolerated  in  the  party  or  excluded  from  it, 
depends  on  considerations,  which  must  be  analyzed  in  each 
particular  case.  On  the  other  hand,  deep  antagonisms,  such  as 
class-struggles  in  society,  cannot  be  overcome  in  any  other 
way  than  by  natural  selection  through  a  struggle  for  adapta- 
tion. The  antagonism  between  proletarians  and  capitalists  can 
be  overcome  only  by  a  transformation  of  capitalist  society  into 
a  socialist  society.  The  above  passage  must  not  be  interpreted 
in  any  other  way. 


260  SOCIALISM  AND  PHILOSOPHY 

fetish  of  the  ballot,  nor  exaggerate  our  veneration  for  it 
into  the  belief  that  it  is  our  only  effective  weapon.  All 
weapons  are  good  which  accomplish  our  aim,  and  if  the 
ballot  should  prove  a  failure  we  shall  not  hesitate  to 
resort  to  other  weapons,  even  to  powder,  lead,  and 
dynamite. 

Antonio  Labriola  and  Joseph  Dietzgen  have  made 
lasting  contributions  to  socialist  thought  by  bringing 
these  facts  home  to  our  understanding.  Labriola 's  special 
merit  is  to  have  clearly  shown  that  we  must  study  the 
social  conditions  which  were  the  cradle  of  historical 
materialism,  if  we  would  understand  its  full  meaning. 
He  has  demonstrated  to  us  that  we  must  familiarize 
ourselves  also  with  the  individual  growth  of  the  founders 
of  scientific  Socialism,  of  its  prominent  interpreters,  its 
present  day  elaborators.  Unless  we  do  this,  we  cannot 
test  the  extent  to  which  these  men  realized  the  implica- 
tions of  their  own  theories,  their  historical  position  in 
the  general  development  of  human  consciousness,  nor 
the  extent  to  which  they  themselves  were  consistent  in 
the  application  of  their  theories.  Only  by  doing  this 
can  we  ascertain  how  much  still  remains  for  us  to  do  in 
the  workshop  of  historical  materialism. 

Dietzgen 's  crowning  merit  is  to  have  cured  historical 
materialism  of  its  dialectic  weakness,  to  have  freed  it 
from  the  last  vestiges  of  metaphysics,  and  to  have  placed 
Marx's  revolutionary  theory  on  the  solid  foundation  of 
an  impregnable  theory  of  cognition,  which  no  reactionary 
assault  of  metaphysical  dualism  can  ever  shatter. 

It  remains  for  us  to  use  diligently  and  faithfully  the 
instruments  which  these  two  workers  have  added  to  the 
arsenal  of  Marx  and  Engels.  ERNEST  UNTERMANN. 

Orlando,  Florida,  August  9,  1906. 


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